This blog post is already quite long, so it will omit changes merged for Plasma 6.5 (releasing in October, to be announced in a future post).

With the Plasma 6.2 release, we moved Plasma Dialer and Spacebar to the Plasma release cycle, allowing us to have consistent releases of the two apps. This completes our year long move to having all Plasma Mobile related projects released as part of wider KDE releases, streamlining the work for distributions and taking a load off us on having to maintain a separate release cycle!

In other news, a Fedora spin for Plasma Mobile was released! It will only be targeting devices that can currently boot Fedora (i.e. not ARM phones), but is very exciting nonetheless!

The Dev Log: April 2024 - June 2025

The Plasma Mobile team is happy to announce the developments in the project over the past few months! Housekeeping This blog post was completed much later than originally planned. In the meantime, several releases have taken place:

^{The Dev Log: April 2024 - June 2025}

cross-posted from: feddit.org/post/14434622

cross-posted from: feddit.org/post/14434560

[Letter sent on the 06th of June and made public today]

Dear Minister,

My mandate is to foster the effective observance of human rights in all member states of the Council of Europe. An important part of my work is to engage in dialogue with the governments and parliaments
of member states, and to assist them in addressing possible shortcomings in their laws and practices.

I write in relation to measures taken by the German authorities that restrict freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly of persons protesting in the context of the conflict in Gaza.

Freedom of peaceful assembly

It is my understanding that since February 2025, the Berlin authorities have imposed restrictions on the
use of the Arabic language and cultural symbols in the context of the protests. In some cases, such as an assembly in Berlin on 15 May 2025, marches have been restricted to stationary gatherings.
Furthermore, protestors were allegedly subject to intrusive surveillance, online or in person, and arbitrary police checks.

I am also concerned by reports of excessive use of force by police against protesters, including minors, sometimes leading to injuries. The use of force by law enforcement officials including during protests must comply with the principles of non-discrimination, legality, necessity and proportionality, and precaution. Incidents of excessive use of force need to be effectively investigated, those responsible should be sanctioned in an appropriate manner and victims should be informed about possible remedies. To facilitate accountability, law enforcement officials should always display a visible and easily recognisable form of identification during assemblies, which reportedly has not always been the
case during some of the latest demonstrations.

I further have to observe that over a number of years protests on Nakba commemoration day, particularly in Berlin, have been suppressed. For instance, in 2024, protests were reportedly met with
excessive use of force by the police, resulting in arrests and injuries among participants. Peaceful protesters were reportedly arrested, and criminal law provisions were applied to expressions of support
for Palestine.

I draw your attention to the Guidelines on Peaceful Assembly prepared by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR). They outline that content-based restrictions on assembly must be subject to the most serious scrutiny: freedom of peaceful assembly also protects demonstrations that may annoy or cause offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that it is seeking to promote. Any measures interfering with freedom of peaceful assembly and expression other than in cases of
incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles do a disservice to democracy and may even endanger it.

Freedom of expression

Restrictions on freedom of expression have also reportedly been identified in such contexts as universities, arts and culture institutions, and schools. Furthermore, allegedly there have been attempts to deport foreign nationals in relation to their participation in protests and other forms of expression regarding the conflict in Gaza.

I understand that restrictions have been justified on the basis that events, symbols, or other forms of expression “disrupt public order” or “disturb public peace”. The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (the Court) establishes that freedom of expression “applies not only to ‘information’ and ‘ideas’ that are favourably received, regarded as inoffensive, or which leave one indifferent […] - it implies pluralism, tolerance and openness, without which there is no ‘democratic society’”. In assessing the necessity of the interference, member states have little scope to impose restrictions on political speech or on debate on matters of public interest, unless the views expressed comprise incitements to violence, and must always carry out such an assessment case by case.

I observe that other justifications invoked for the restrictions on rights include the prevention of antisemitism. I note with concern reports indicating that the working definition of antisemitism of the
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) has been interpreted by some German authorities in ways which lead to the blanket classification of criticism of Israel as antisemitic. In that
regard, I urge you to be vigilant that the IHRA working definition is not distorted, instrumentalised or misapplied to stifle freedom of expression and legitimate criticism, including of the state of Israel.

More generally, the Court’s case law and the Council of Europe standards and guidance on freedom of expression, hate speech and hate crime (among others, Recommendation CM/Rec(2022)16 of the
Committee of Ministers to member States on combating hate speech and, ECRI General Policy Recommendation N°15 on Combatting Hate Speech), provide the necessary framework for calibrating restrictions which must respect the principles of legality, necessity, roportionality and non-discrimination.

In conclusion, I recall that member states have both an obligation to refrain from undue interference with human rights and also positive obligations to safeguard these rights by securing their effective enjoyment for everyone, at all levels of government. I therefore respectfully ask you to ensure the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly for all and to refrain from measures that discriminate against persons based on their political or other opinion, religion or belief, ethnic origin, nationality or
migration status.

I stand ready to continue our constructive dialogue on this and other human rights issues in Germany.___

https://www.coe.int/de/web/commissioner/-/the-commissioner-asks-the-german-authorities-to-uphold-freedom-of-expression-and-peaceful-assembly-in-the-context-of-the-conflict-in-gaza

The two parties that make up the Third Way (Trzecia Droga), which is part of Poland’s ruling coalition, have confirmed that they are splitting and will stand separately at the next elections.

The decision was confirmed in statements issued last night and this morning by the leaders of the two parties that make up the alliance: Szymon Hołownia of the centrist Poland 2050 (Polska 2050) and Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz of the centre-right Polish People’s Party (PSL).

The Third Way was formed two years ago, when PSL and Poland 2050 were in opposition. They retained their separate identities as parties but stood candidates on joint electoral lists at the October 2023 parliamentary elections, where they together won 14.4% of the vote.

That placed them third, behind the national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS, 35.4%) and centrist Civic Coalition (KO, 30.7%) and ahead of The Left (Lewica, 8.6%).

After those elections, KO, the Third Way and The Left formed a new coalition government, led by KO leader Donald Tusk, that removed PiS from power after eight years in office. It has ruled the country ever since.

Kosiniak-Kamysz serves as deputy prime minister and defence minister in the government, while Hołownia is the speaker of Sejm, the more powerful lower house of parliament.

PSL and Poland 2050 formed separate caucuses in parliament, with each currently having 32 MPs in the 460-seat Sejm.

But they continued to stand jointly as the Third Way in subsequent elections. At the April 2024 local elections, the Third Way won 14.3% of the vote. However, at the European elections that took place two months later, its share fell to just 6.9%.

In this year’s presidential election, PSL agreed to support the candidacy of Hołownia, but he won a disappointing 5% of the vote in the first round, finishing fifth. That was significantly worse than his presidential run as an independent in 2020, when he finished third with 13.9%.

Since the most recent presidential elections, rumours have circulated that PSL and Poland 2050 might decide to separate.

The two parties have not always been natural allies, with PSL taking more conservative positions on issues such as abortion and same-sex partnerships and Poland 2050 placing stronger emphasis on climate policies than its partner.

On Tuesday evening, PSL’s leadership met to discuss the best path forward. Afterwards, before any official announcement had been made, Hołownia issued a statement saying that his party “accepts the decision of our coalition partner PSL to effectively end the Third Way project”.

He said that Poland 2050 was “determined to work constructively with our partners” going forward, but was also felt “sincere political joy at the prospect of running independently in the next elections”.

Subsequently, leading PSL figures, including party spokesman Miłosz Motyka, noted that no resolution had been formally adopted on ending the Third Way alliance. That prompted questions over whether what Hołownia had written was accurate.

However, on Wednesday, Kosiniak-Kamysz confirmed the split, telling broadcaster Radio Zet that the Third Way “is behind us, it has reached the end”.

The announcement was “supposed to be a bit different”, he added. “We had a discussion yesterday; Poland 2050 will have a discussion on 28 June. Then we were supposed to come out together and say that this stage is closed. [But] when there are 150 people in the room, it is difficult to keep everything absolutely sterile.”

After this month’s presidential election run-off was won by PiS-backed candidate Karol Nawrocki – who defeated KO deputy leader Rafał Trzaskowski – there were questions over whether and how the government would be able to rule with a hostile president and his power of veto.

PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński called for Tusk’s administration to step down and be replaced by an “apolitical technical government”. Figures from his party appealed to PSL, the most conservative element of the ruling coalition, to join them in bringing down the government.

However, at a vote of confidence in the government called by Tusk last week, he emerged triumphant, with all his coalition partners – PSL, Poland 2050 and The Left – joining KO in voting in favour.

The next elections scheduled in Poland are parliamentary ones that are due to take place in autumn 2027. If PSL and Poland 2050 stand as individual parties, they would have to win at least 5% of vote to enter parliament. If they stand as part of a coalition, the threshold is 8%.

https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/06/18/polands-third-way-alliance-confirms-split-but-remains-within-tusks-ruling-coalition/

The European Union has unveiled plans to legally bypass Hungary and Slovakia to ban Russian gas imports by 2027, using trade and energy laws that avoid national vetoes.

Slovakia and Hungary, which have sought to maintain close political ties with Russia, say switching to alternatives would increase energy prices. They have vowed to block sanctions on Russian energy, which require unanimous approval from all EU countries, and have opposed the ban.

The Commission based its proposed ban on EU trade and energy law to get around this, relying on support from most countries and a majority of the European Parliament.

First, imports would be banned from January 1, 2026, under any Russian pipeline gas and LNG contracts signed during the remainder of this year.

Imports under short-term Russian gas deals—those lasting less than one year—signed before June 17, 2025, would be banned from June 17 next year.

Finally, imports under existing long-term Russian contracts would be banned from January 1, 2028, effectively ending the EU's use of Russian gas by this date, the Commission said.

Hungary and Slovakia, which still import Russian gas via pipeline and have opposed the EU plans, would have until January 1, 2028, to end their imports, including those on short-term contracts.

“When the legislation is passed, all countries, of course, has to apply to it, and if they don't, then there will be legal consequences, like with any other legislation in the European Union,” Dan Jørgensen, European Commissioner for Energy and Housing said.

Russia loses market

The EU would also gradually ban liquid natural gas (LNG) terminals from providing services to Russian customers, and companies importing Russian gas would have to disclose information on their contracts to EU and national authorities.

On Monday, EU energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen said that the measures were designed to be legally strong enough for companies to invoke the contractual clause of “force majeure”–an unforeseeable event–to break their Russian gas contracts.

About 19% of Europe’s gas still comes from Russia via the TurkStream pipeline and LNG shipments, down from roughly 45% before 2022.

Companies, including TotalEnergies and Spain’s Naturgy, have Russian LNG contracts extending into the 2030s.

To replace Russian supplies, the EU has signaled it will expand clean energy and could import more LNG from the U.S.

Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands and France import Russian LNG but have all said they fully support the ban, emphasizing that it must be sufficiently robust legally to avoid exposing companies to penalties or arbitration, EU diplomats told Reuters.

EU unveils plans to bypass Hungary and Slovakia vetoes on Russian gas imports ban

Sanctions on Russian energy would require unanimous approval.

^{Reuters/fb (Telewizja Polska S.A)}

Creating NFTs requires minting and burning the token, which means there’s an upfront cost. Apparently, the OutfinityGift project is changing this concept — the value of their token comes from the fact that, when an NFT is created, the token is locked instead of burned. If the NFT doesn’t sell, the funds can be withdrawn. They use a concept called Points as their token.

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