Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37262246
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities - Atlantic Council
This report explores applying strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities to spyware abuses in California and the UK.bgronemeyer (Atlantic Council)
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37262246
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities - Atlantic Council
This report explores applying strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities to spyware abuses in California and the UK.bgronemeyer (Atlantic Council)
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37262246
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities - Atlantic Council
This report explores applying strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities to spyware abuses in California and the UK.bgronemeyer (Atlantic Council)
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37262246
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities - Atlantic Council
This report explores applying strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities to spyware abuses in California and the UK.bgronemeyer (Atlantic Council)
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37262246
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities - Atlantic Council
This report explores applying strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities to spyware abuses in California and the UK.bgronemeyer (Atlantic Council)
Checkpoint Britain: the dangers of digital ID and why privacy must be protected.
cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37261683
- At their worst, digital ID systems can enable population-wide surveillance; infringe on civil liberties; monitor, predict or influence individuals’ decisions; identify individuals or groups for targeted interventions; and facilitate the tracking, persecution, or differential treatment of marginalised groups.
- There is little evidence to support the government’s claim that digital ID would deter illegal immigration or employment fraud, and many good reasons to believe that mandatory digital ID would burden law-abiding citizens and businesses.
- No matter what is promised at the outset, once in place, a digital ID system is highly likely to be used beyond its initial stated purposes. The government is already considering proposals that would require digital ID for right-to-work and right-to-rent checks. Other reporting suggests that an option under consideration would expand further into everyday interactions such as voting online, signing contracts, paying bills and shopping.
- There are serious doubts about the government’s ability to run an effective and efficient digital ID scheme and prevent against the system failures and inaccuracies that have plagued the eVisa system. There is also significant doubt about the government’s ability to protect the vast amounts of personal data collected in a digital ID scheme – a point which 63% of respondents polled said they were concerned about.
- Far from being a backwards outlier, the UK is in good company with countries that have inherited its legal systems such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in consistently rejecting mandatory ID systems.
Checkpoint Britain: the dangers of digital ID and why privacy must be protected.
- At their worst, digital ID systems can enable population-wide surveillance; infringe on civil liberties; monitor, predict or influence individuals’ decisions; identify individuals or groups for targeted interventions; and facilitate the tracking, persecution, or differential treatment of marginalised groups.
- There is little evidence to support the government’s claim that digital ID would deter illegal immigration or employment fraud, and many good reasons to believe that mandatory digital ID would burden law-abiding citizens and businesses.
- No matter what is promised at the outset, once in place, a digital ID system is highly likely to be used beyond its initial stated purposes. The government is already considering proposals that would require digital ID for right-to-work and right-to-rent checks. Other reporting suggests that an option under consideration would expand further into everyday interactions such as voting online, signing contracts, paying bills and shopping.
- There are serious doubts about the government’s ability to run an effective and efficient digital ID scheme and prevent against the system failures and inaccuracies that have plagued the eVisa system. There is also significant doubt about the government’s ability to protect the vast amounts of personal data collected in a digital ID scheme – a point which 63% of respondents polled said they were concerned about.
- Far from being a backwards outlier, the UK is in good company with countries that have inherited its legal systems such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in consistently rejecting mandatory ID systems.
How Tim Cook sold out Steve Jobs
cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37252441
How Tim Cook sold out Steve Jobs
The Multiverse of Artificial Intelligence
The ongoing development of artificial intelligence means that humans will simultaneously confront multiple interfaces of AI that exhibit a range of its propensity to contribute to good and bad, progress and destruction, and as act as a perpetrator of violence or a tool for peace. As a dual-use technology, AI can be adopted for military and civilian purposes alike.Whether on the civilian or military side of adoption, AI contains inherent conflicts. Some of the main sources of conflict that policymakers must attempt to address are about how to ensure human rights values such as individual autonomy are preserved and not destroyed, navigate the organizational culture change necessary to respond to AI political end-uses, construct and upgrade the appropriate institutional arrangements needed for accountability, and ensure safeguards exist to enable trust-building.
The Multiverse of Artificial Intelligence - New Lines Institute
Read the Report Here Introduction In 2021 Amazon and Google won a tender to provide the Israeli government with cloud computing services ranging from “mundane Google Meet video chats to a variety of sophisticated machine-learning tools.rkremzner@newlinesinstitute.org (New Lines Institute)
Defeating Nondeterminism in LLM Inference
Defeating Nondeterminism in LLM Inference
Reproducibility is a bedrock of scientific progress. However, it’s remarkably difficult to get reproducible results out of large language models.Thinking Machines Lab
Housing affordability in Canada is getting worse, federal records say
Housing affordability in Canada is getting worse, federal records say
New internal government documents shed more light on Canada's struggling housing climate as middle and lower-income households struggle with affordability.globalnewsdigital (Global News)
New study shows how Amazon trees use recent rainfall in the dry season and support the production of their own rain
New study shows how Amazon trees use recent rainfall in the dry season and support the production of their own rain
Researchers explain how trees in the rainforest efficiently recycle water through rain to keep themselves hydrated in the dry season.The Conversation
BBC - The people who hunt old TVs
'You just can't recreate that glow': The people who hunt old TVs
They are televisions from another era, replaced by the flat screen, high-resolution displays of the modern era. Yet cathode-ray tubes are still surprisingly in demand.Chris Baraniuk (BBC)
Women shouldn’t hold office, says GOP woman now running for office
“I don’t know if I would vote for any female,” said state senate hopeful Mylie Biggs, the daughter of GOP Rep. Andy Biggs.
Note: The article is from August 6th, but it's too funny not to post.
U.S. E.P.A. To Stop Collecting Emissions Data From Polluters
The data, from thousands of coal-burning power plants, oil refineries, steel mills and other industrial facilities, is the country’s most comprehensive way to track greenhouse gases.
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Russian and Chinese Bots Fueling Online ‘Violence’ After Charlie Kirk Shooting
Russian and Chinese Bots Fueling Online ‘Violence’ After Kirk Shooting
Official warns of a “tremendous amount” of the online activity after the shooting.Cameron Adams (The Daily Beast)
[Game Bundle] Capcom Retro Revival Pack
::: spoiler Long game list:
| Game Name |
|---|
| Ghosts N' Goblins Resurrection |
| Dungeons & Dragons: Chronicles of Mystara |
| Strider |
| Capcom Arcade Stadium Complete Pack |
| Super Street Fighter II Turbo |
| Hyper Street Fighter II: The Anniversary Edition |
| STREET FIGHTER II' - Hyper Fighting |
| STREET FIGHTER II - The World Warrior |
| Street Fighter Alpha 3 |
| Street Fighter Alpha 2 |
| Street Fighter Alpha: Warriors' Dreams |
| Street Fighter |
| Super Puzzle Fighter II Turbo |
| Super Gem Fighter Mini Mix |
| Mega Man 2: The Power Fighters |
| Mega Man: The Power Battle |
| CAPTAIN COMMANDO |
| FINAL FIGHT |
| WARRIORS OF FATE |
| Battle Circuit |
| Ghouls 'n Ghosts |
| Ghosts 'n Goblins |
| BIONIC COMMANDO |
| 1944 - The Loop Master |
| 19XX - The War Against Destiny |
| 1943 Kai - Midway Kaisen |
| 1942 |
| 1941 - Counter Attack |
| Progear |
| Giga Wing |
| COMMANDO |
| Three Wonders |
| Vampire Savior: The Lord of Vampire |
| Darkstalkers: The Night Warriors |
| Night Warriors: Darkstalkers' Revenge |
| CYBERBOTS - FULLMETAL MADNESS |
| DYNASTY WARS |
| Knights of the Round |
| Magic Sword |
| The King of Dragons |
| Saturday Night Slam Masters |
| MEGA TWINS |
| Black Tiger |
| Tatakai no Banka |
| Tiger Road |
| Hissatsu Buraiken |
| Capcom Sports Club |
| Last Duel |
| Rally 2011 LED Storm |
| The Speed Rumbler |
| VARTH - Operation Thunderstorm |
| VULGUS |
| LEGENDARY WINGS |
| FORGOTTEN WORLDS |
| Savage Bees |
| CARRIER AIR WING |
| Senjo no Okami II |
| SECTION Z |
| Eco Fighters |
| Hyper Dyne Side Arms |
| Block Block |
| Pnickies |
| Gan Sumoku |
| PIRATE SHIP HIGEMARU |
| Powered Gear - Strategic Variant Armor Equipment |
:::
Capcom Retro Revival Pack
Play Super Street Fighter II Turbo with the Capcom Arcade Stadium Complete Pack: 1 & 2 + Ghosts N' Goblins Resurrection in our latest Capcom Bundle!Humble Bundle
Dutch state broadcaster latest to withdraw from Eurovision if Israel participates
The Dutch state broadcaster has become the latest to announce it will not take part in the 2026 Eurovision Song Contest if Israel also participates.
Archived version: archive.is/newest/middleeastey…
Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.
Iran expects a prisoner swap with France, including an Iranian woman held in France over Gaza posts
The Iranian foreign minister says Iran and France are close to agreeing to an exchange of prisoners, including the release of an Iranian woman arrested in France over online posts related to the war in Gaza
Archived version: archive.is/newest/independent.…
Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.
US | Trump can block Medicaid funds to ‘defund’ Planned Parenthood, court rules
Reproductive rights group condemns ruling as ‘backdoor abortion ban’ and says 200 US clinics may face closure
Turkey: Erdogan rival Imamoglu stands trial
A trial has begun against Istanbul's deposed mayor and Turkish opposition leader, Ekrem Imamoglu, who is accused of forging a university degree.
Archived version: archive.is/newest/dw.com/en/tu…
Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.
UC Berkeley shares 160 names with Trump administration in ‘McCarthy era’ move
Prominent professor Judith Butler among students and faculty investigated for ‘alleged antisemitic incidents’
Nepal appoints its first ever female prime minister after deadly protests
The 73-year-old former chief justice Sushila Karki is being supported by young people to lead the interim government
Archived version: archive.is/newest/independent.…
Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.
Nepal appoints its first ever female prime minister after deadly protests
The 73-year-old former chief justice Sushila Karki is being supported by young people to lead the interim governmentRebecca Whittaker (The Independent)
Update about GPS Jamming in Bulgaria related to the EU Presidents Plane
Israel | IOF soldiers can openly boast about their war crimes on social media
IOF soldiers are freely posting evidence of their war crimes and crimes against humanity, as independent organisations mount legal challenges
Archived version: archive.is/newest/thecanary.co…
Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.
Swiss government looks to undercut privacy tech, stoking fears of mass surveillance
Switzerland-based providers of secure email, VPNs and other digital services say a pending government proposal would be catastrophic to their ability to protect the privacy of users.
Israel evicts 40,000 Palestinians from Hebron for 400 settlers - protected by 4,000 soldiers
Israel evicts 40,000 Palestinians to replace them with 400 settlers as on the ground testimony paints a grim picture
Archived version: archive.is/newest/thecanary.co…
Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.
EU decision on 2040 climate target to be delayed, diplomats say
At stake is the review of the EU’s Climate Law, which sets course for the EU to become climate neutral by 2050, but also called for a 2040 climate target to be set in stone.
Archived version: archive.is/newest/euronews.com…
Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.
Charlie Kirk suspect is a gun-loving Trump supporter
From what we know so far, the suspect seems to be part of the 'groyper' movement of far-right online agitators
Left unable even to get into deputy leader contest proves Labour is dead
No more clinging to false hope after the deputy leader contest: left-wingers should be nowhere near the neo-Thatcherite party
Global Sumud Flotilla vows to continue mission despite attacks
Despite two suspected drone attacks, the largest civilian-led maritime effort to challenge Israel’s illegal blockade of Gaza promises to fulfill its mission
Archived version: archive.is/newest/peoplesdispa…
Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.
Declassified Report Belies UK 'Terrorism' Designation for Palestine Action
The report acknowledges that "the majority" of Palestine Action's activities "would not be classified as terrorism" under the highly contentious Terrorism Act of 2000.
Archived version: archive.is/newest/commondreams…
Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.
Declassified Report Belies UK 'Terrorism' Designation for Palestine Action
The report acknowledges that "the majority" of Palestine Action's activities "would not be classified as terrorism" under the highly contentious Terrorism Act of 2000.brett-wilkins (Common Dreams)
Iran warns it will withdraw from fresh IAEA agreement if Europe invokes "snapback" sanctions
After halting cooperation with it for over two months, Iran signed a deal with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) earlier this month to allow it conditional and limited access to its nuclear sites.
Archived version: archive.is/newest/peoplesdispa…
Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.
With Premiums Set to Rise, Progressives Issue Reminder: 'Medicare for All Would Save $650 Billion' Annually
Health insurance premiums are set to skyrocket, prompting advocates to push for Medicare for All as a more affordable alternative.
With Premiums Set to Rise, Progressives Issue Reminder: 'Medicare for All Would Save $650 Billion' Annually
"Your periodic reminder that health insurance is not healthcare," said one advocate. "It's an unnecessary middleman designed to restrict access to healthcare and exploit people for profit."brad-reed (Common Dreams)
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