cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37268108

::: spoiler Dive Deeper
Source: Commission of inquiry into the psychological effects of TikTok on minors.

Recommended reads in french:
- TikTok Commission of Inquiry: Report recommends banning social media for under-15s;
- TikTok Commission of Inquiry: "We saw an ocean of harmful content," says rapporteur Laure Miller.
:::

Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.

With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.

Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.

French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.

Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.

The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.

Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.

Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.

Pro

2025-09-11 17:05:58

French lawmakers urged a social media ban for under-15s and "digital curfew" for older minors

::: spoiler Dive Deeper
Source: Commission of inquiry into the psychological effects of TikTok on minors.

Recommended reads in french:
- TikTok Commission of Inquiry: Report recommends banning social media for under-15s;
- TikTok Commission of Inquiry: "We saw an ocean of harmful content," says rapporteur Laure Miller.
:::

Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.

With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.

Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.

French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.

Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.

The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.

Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.

Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.

Commission d'enquête TikTok : "On a vu un océan de contenus néfastes", témoigne la rapporteure, Laure Miller

Laure Miller (Ensemble pour la République) et Arthur Delaporte (Socialistes) ont présenté les conclusions de la commission d'enquête sur TikTok, lors d'une conférence de presse à l'Assemblée nationale, ce jeudi 11 septembre.

^{Raphaël Marchal (LCP - Assemblée nationale)}

cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37268108

::: spoiler Dive Deeper
Source: Commission of inquiry into the psychological effects of TikTok on minors.

Recommended reads in french:
- TikTok Commission of Inquiry: Report recommends banning social media for under-15s;
- TikTok Commission of Inquiry: "We saw an ocean of harmful content," says rapporteur Laure Miller.
:::

Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.

With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.

Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.

French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.

Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.

The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.

Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.

Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.

Pro

2025-09-11 17:05:58

French lawmakers urged a social media ban for under-15s and "digital curfew" for older minors

::: spoiler Dive Deeper
Source: Commission of inquiry into the psychological effects of TikTok on minors.

Recommended reads in french:
- TikTok Commission of Inquiry: Report recommends banning social media for under-15s;
- TikTok Commission of Inquiry: "We saw an ocean of harmful content," says rapporteur Laure Miller.
:::

Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.

With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.

Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.

French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.

Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.

The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.

Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.

Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.

Commission d'enquête TikTok : "On a vu un océan de contenus néfastes", témoigne la rapporteure, Laure Miller

Laure Miller (Ensemble pour la République) et Arthur Delaporte (Socialistes) ont présenté les conclusions de la commission d'enquête sur TikTok, lors d'une conférence de presse à l'Assemblée nationale, ce jeudi 11 septembre.

^{Raphaël Marchal (LCP - Assemblée nationale)}

cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37268108

::: spoiler Dive Deeper
Source: Commission of inquiry into the psychological effects of TikTok on minors.

Recommended reads in french:
- TikTok Commission of Inquiry: Report recommends banning social media for under-15s;
- TikTok Commission of Inquiry: "We saw an ocean of harmful content," says rapporteur Laure Miller.
:::

Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.

With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.

Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.

French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.

Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.

The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.

Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.

Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.

Pro

2025-09-11 17:05:58

French lawmakers urged a social media ban for under-15s and "digital curfew" for older minors

::: spoiler Dive Deeper
Source: Commission of inquiry into the psychological effects of TikTok on minors.

Recommended reads in french:
- TikTok Commission of Inquiry: Report recommends banning social media for under-15s;
- TikTok Commission of Inquiry: "We saw an ocean of harmful content," says rapporteur Laure Miller.
:::

Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.

With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.

Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.

French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.

Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.

The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.

Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.

Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.

Commission d'enquête TikTok : "On a vu un océan de contenus néfastes", témoigne la rapporteure, Laure Miller

Laure Miller (Ensemble pour la République) et Arthur Delaporte (Socialistes) ont présenté les conclusions de la commission d'enquête sur TikTok, lors d'une conférence de presse à l'Assemblée nationale, ce jeudi 11 septembre.

^{Raphaël Marchal (LCP - Assemblée nationale)}

cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37262246

More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.

Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.

Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.

With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.

Pro

2025-09-11 15:11:21

Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities

More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.

Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.

Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.

With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.

Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities - Atlantic Council

This report explores applying strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities to spyware abuses in California and the UK.

^{bgronemeyer (Atlantic Council)}

cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37262246

More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.

Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.

Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.

With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.

Pro

2025-09-11 15:11:21

Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities

More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.

Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.

Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.

With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.

Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities - Atlantic Council

This report explores applying strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities to spyware abuses in California and the UK.

^{bgronemeyer (Atlantic Council)}

cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37262246

More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.

Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.

Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.

With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.

Pro

2025-09-11 15:11:21

Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities

More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.

Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.

Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.

With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.

Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities - Atlantic Council

This report explores applying strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities to spyware abuses in California and the UK.

^{bgronemeyer (Atlantic Council)}

cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37262246

More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.

Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.

Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.

With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.

Pro

2025-09-11 15:11:21

Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities

More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.

Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.

Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.

With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.

Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities - Atlantic Council

This report explores applying strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities to spyware abuses in California and the UK.

^{bgronemeyer (Atlantic Council)}

cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37262246

More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.

Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.

Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.

With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.

Pro

2025-09-11 15:11:21

Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities

More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.

Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.

Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.

With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.

Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities - Atlantic Council

This report explores applying strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities to spyware abuses in California and the UK.

^{bgronemeyer (Atlantic Council)}

cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37261683

• At their worst, digital ID systems can enable population-wide surveillance; infringe on civil liberties; monitor, predict or influence individuals’ decisions; identify individuals or groups for targeted interventions; and facilitate the tracking, persecution, or differential treatment of marginalised groups.
• There is little evidence to support the government’s claim that digital ID would deter illegal immigration or employment fraud, and many good reasons to believe that mandatory digital ID would burden law-abiding citizens and businesses.
• No matter what is promised at the outset, once in place, a digital ID system is highly likely to be used beyond its initial stated purposes. The government is already considering proposals that would require digital ID for right-to-work and right-to-rent checks. Other reporting suggests that an option under consideration would expand further into everyday interactions such as voting online, signing contracts, paying bills and shopping.
• There are serious doubts about the government’s ability to run an effective and efficient digital ID scheme and prevent against the system failures and inaccuracies that have plagued the eVisa system. There is also significant doubt about the government’s ability to protect the vast amounts of personal data collected in a digital ID scheme – a point which 63% of respondents polled said they were concerned about.
• Far from being a backwards outlier, the UK is in good company with countries that have inherited its legal systems such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in consistently rejecting mandatory ID systems.

Pro

2025-09-11 15:04:10

Checkpoint Britain: the dangers of digital ID and why privacy must be protected.

• At their worst, digital ID systems can enable population-wide surveillance; infringe on civil liberties; monitor, predict or influence individuals’ decisions; identify individuals or groups for targeted interventions; and facilitate the tracking, persecution, or differential treatment of marginalised groups.
• There is little evidence to support the government’s claim that digital ID would deter illegal immigration or employment fraud, and many good reasons to believe that mandatory digital ID would burden law-abiding citizens and businesses.
• No matter what is promised at the outset, once in place, a digital ID system is highly likely to be used beyond its initial stated purposes. The government is already considering proposals that would require digital ID for right-to-work and right-to-rent checks. Other reporting suggests that an option under consideration would expand further into everyday interactions such as voting online, signing contracts, paying bills and shopping.
• There are serious doubts about the government’s ability to run an effective and efficient digital ID scheme and prevent against the system failures and inaccuracies that have plagued the eVisa system. There is also significant doubt about the government’s ability to protect the vast amounts of personal data collected in a digital ID scheme – a point which 63% of respondents polled said they were concerned about.
• Far from being a backwards outlier, the UK is in good company with countries that have inherited its legal systems such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in consistently rejecting mandatory ID systems.

Big Brother Watch warns of “Checkpoint Britain” in vital new report examining the dangers of digital ID — Big Brother Watch

Defending Civil Liberties, Protecting Privacy

^{Big Brother Watch warns of “Checkpoint Britain” in vital new report examining the dangers of digital ID — Big Brother Watch}

cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/37252441

Pro

2025-09-11 11:27:35

How Tim Cook sold out Steve Jobs

How Tim Cook sold out Steve Jobs - Anil Dash

A blog about making culture. Since 1999.

^{Anil Dash}

The ongoing development of artificial intelligence means that humans will simultaneously confront multiple interfaces of AI that exhibit a range of its propensity to contribute to good and bad, progress and destruction, and as act as a perpetrator of violence or a tool for peace. As a dual-use technology, AI can be adopted for military and civilian purposes alike.

Whether on the civilian or military side of adoption, AI contains inherent conflicts. Some of the main sources of conflict that policymakers must attempt to address are about how to ensure human rights values such as individual autonomy are preserved and not destroyed, navigate the organizational culture change necessary to respond to AI political end-uses, construct and upgrade the appropriate institutional arrangements needed for accountability, and ensure safeguards exist to enable trust-building.

The Multiverse of Artificial Intelligence - New Lines Institute

Read the Report Here Introduction In 2021 Amazon and Google won a tender to provide the Israeli government with cloud computing services ranging from “mundane Google Meet video chats to a variety of sophisticated machine-learning tools.

^{rkremzner@newlinesinstitute.org (New Lines Institute)}

https://www.reuters.com/business/blockchain-lender-figure-valued-76-billion-shares-jump-nasdaq-debut-sept-11-2025-09-12/

https://www.reuters.com/business/blockchain-lender-figure-valued-76-billion-shares-jump-nasdaq-debut-sept-11-2025-09-12/

https://www.vanityfair.com/news/story/charlie-kirk-tyler-robinson-memes-meaning

“I don’t know if I would vote for any female,” said state senate hopeful Mylie Biggs, the daughter of GOP Rep. Andy Biggs.

Note: The article is from August 6th, but it's too funny not to post.

Women shouldn’t hold office, says GOP woman now running for office

^{TJ L'Heureux (Phoenix New Times)}

The data, from thousands of coal-burning power plants, oil refineries, steel mills and other industrial facilities, is the country’s most comprehensive way to track greenhouse gases.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/12/climate/epa-emissions-data-collection-halt.html?unlocked_article_code=1.lU8.wpyO.CqGtl_8fwk01

::: spoiler Long game list:

:::

Capcom Retro Revival Pack

Play Super Street Fighter II Turbo with the Capcom Arcade Stadium Complete Pack: 1 & 2 + Ghosts N' Goblins Resurrection in our latest Capcom Bundle!

^{Humble Bundle}

The Dutch state broadcaster has become the latest to announce it will not take part in the 2026 Eurovision Song Contest if Israel also participates.

Archived version: archive.is/newest/middleeastey…

Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.

Dutch state broadcaster latest to withdraw from Eurovision if Israel participates

^{Middle East Eye}

The Iranian foreign minister says Iran and France are close to agreeing to an exchange of prisoners, including the release of an Iranian woman arrested in France over online posts related to the war in Gaza

Archived version: archive.is/newest/independent.…

Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.

Iran expects a prisoner swap with France, including an Iranian woman held in France over Gaza posts

^{Via AP news wire (The Independent)}

Reproductive rights group condemns ruling as ‘backdoor abortion ban’ and says 200 US clinics may face closure

Trump can block Medicaid funds to ‘defund’ Planned Parenthood, court rules

^{Carter Sherman (The Guardian)}

A trial has begun against Istanbul's deposed mayor and Turkish opposition leader, Ekrem Imamoglu, who is accused of forging a university degree.

Archived version: archive.is/newest/dw.com/en/tu…

Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.

Turkey: Erdogan rival Imamoglu stands trial

^{Felix Tamsut (Deutsche Welle)}

Prominent professor Judith Butler among students and faculty investigated for ‘alleged antisemitic incidents’

UC Berkeley shares 160 names with Trump administration in ‘McCarthy era’ move

^{Sam Levin (The Guardian)}

The 73-year-old former chief justice Sushila Karki is being supported by young people to lead the interim government

Archived version: archive.is/newest/independent.…

Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.

Nepal appoints its first ever female prime minister after deadly protests

The 73-year-old former chief justice Sushila Karki is being supported by young people to lead the interim government

^{Rebecca Whittaker (The Independent)}

IOF soldiers are freely posting evidence of their war crimes and crimes against humanity, as independent organisations mount legal challenges

Archived version: archive.is/newest/thecanary.co…

Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.

IOF soldiers post disgusting social media videos

^{Charlie Jaay (The Canary)}

Switzerland-based providers of secure email, VPNs and other digital services say a pending government proposal would be catastrophic to their ability to protect the privacy of users.

Swiss government looks to undercut privacy tech, stoking fears of mass surveillance

^{Suzanne Smalley (The Record)}

Israel evicts 40,000 Palestinians to replace them with 400 settlers as on the ground testimony paints a grim picture

Archived version: archive.is/newest/thecanary.co…

Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.

Isreal evicts Palestinians to ship in settlers

^{Skwawkbox (The Canary)}

https://apnews.com/article/google-privacy-bill-california-lobbying-443c65e3da4b5be3f73a73e5bd49c373

At stake is the review of the EU’s Climate Law, which sets course for the EU to become climate neutral by 2050, but also called for a 2040 climate target to be set in stone.

Archived version: archive.is/newest/euronews.com…

Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.

EU decision on 2040 climate target to be delayed, diplomats say

^{Marta Pacheco (Euronews.com)}

From what we know so far, the suspect seems to be part of the 'groyper' movement of far-right online agitators

Charlie Kirk suspect is a gun-loving Trump supporter - Canary

^{Willem Moore (The Canary)}

No more clinging to false hope after the deputy leader contest: left-wingers should be nowhere near the neo-Thatcherite party

Deputy leader contest was an embarrassment for the Labour left

^{Skwawkbox (The Canary)}

And to punish those who speak ill of him.

The full weight of the federal government is being used to memorialize Charlie Kirk

^{Mother Jones}

Despite two suspected drone attacks, the largest civilian-led maritime effort to challenge Israel’s illegal blockade of Gaza promises to fulfill its mission

Archived version: archive.is/newest/peoplesdispa…

Disclaimer: The article linked is from a single source with a single perspective. Make sure to cross-check information against multiple sources to get a comprehensive view on the situation.