Era l’apice di una giornata di pesca come tutte le altre, quando tirando a bordo la rete a strascico di questa nostra imbarcazione, ci rendemmo all’improvviso conto di aver tratto a bordo un araldo di Yog Sothoth, Mietitore degli Abissi.
You gotta love a place with a beer wall. Southern Tier Pumpking Pumpkin Beer - I will drink this beer every chance I get. One of my two favorites, the other being Warlock, also from Southern Tier. Lock 15 Pretty Boy Peanut Butter Porter - I’ve had this be
You gotta love a place with a beer wall. Southern Tier Pumpking Pumpkin Beer – I will drink this beer every chance I get. One of my two favorites, the other being Warlock, also from Southern Tier. Lock 15 Pretty Boy Peanut Butter Porter – I’ve had this before here, but it’s just too good to pass up. The coffee and peanut butter flavors blend so well, plus it’s so smooth to drink.
A court in Tennessee today sentenced a former employee of a DVD and Blu-ray manufacturing and distribution company used by major movie studios to 57 months in prison for stealing DVDs and Blu-rays of blockbuster movies from the company and selling th…
Coders and tech engineers have saved almost an hour a day by using AI assistants to help them write code and build new technology.
More than 1,000 tech experts used the assistant across 50 different government departments – driving productivity through the Plan for Change.
Follows the government pledging to save time on things that AI can do better and more quickly, in bid to find £45 billion efficiency savings from technology and AI across the public sector.
🇬🇧UK Government coders using AI to each save 28 days a year and build more tech
Coders and tech engineers have saved almost an hour a day by using AI assistants to help them write code and build new technology.
More than 1,000 tech experts used the assistant across 50 different government departments – driving productivity through the Plan for Change.
Follows the government pledging to save time on things that AI can do better and more quickly, in bid to find £45 billion efficiency savings from technology and AI across the public sector.
Coders and tech engineers have saved almost an hour a day by using AI assistants to help them write code and build new technology.
More than 1,000 tech experts used the assistant across 50 different government departments – driving productivity through the Plan for Change.
Follows the government pledging to save time on things that AI can do better and more quickly, in bid to find £45 billion efficiency savings from technology and AI across the public sector.
Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama said Thursday he had appointed the world's first AI-generated government minister to oversee public tenders, promising its artificial intelligence would make it "corruption-free".
Optical blur is an inherent property of any lens system and is challenging to model in modern cameras because of their complex optical elements. To tackle this challenge, we introduce a high‑dimensional neural representation of blur—the lens blur field—and a practical method for acquisition.
The lens blur field is a multilayer perceptron (MLP) designed to (1) accurately capture variations of the lens 2‑D point spread function over image‑plane location, focus setting, and optionally depth; and (2) represent these variations parametrically as a single, sensor‑specific function. The representation models the combined effects of defocus, diffraction, aberration, and accounts for sensor features such as pixel color filters and pixel‑specific micro‑lenses.
We provide a first‑of‑its‑kind dataset of 5‑D blur fields—for smartphone cameras, camera bodies equipped with a variety of lenses, etc. Finally, we show that acquired 5‑D blur fields are expressive and accurate enough to reveal, for the first time, differences in optical behavior of smartphone devices of the same make and model.
Every lens leaves a blur signature—a hidden fingerprint in every photo; With it, we can tell apart ‘identical’ phones by their optics, deblur images, and render realistic blurs.
Optical blur is an inherent property of any lens system and is challenging to model in modern cameras because of their complex optical elements. To tackle this challenge, we introduce a high‑dimensional neural representation of blur—the lens blur field—and a practical method for acquisition.
The lens blur field is a multilayer perceptron (MLP) designed to (1) accurately capture variations of the lens 2‑D point spread function over image‑plane location, focus setting, and optionally depth; and (2) represent these variations parametrically as a single, sensor‑specific function. The representation models the combined effects of defocus, diffraction, aberration, and accounts for sensor features such as pixel color filters and pixel‑specific micro‑lenses.
We provide a first‑of‑its‑kind dataset of 5‑D blur fields—for smartphone cameras, camera bodies equipped with a variety of lenses, etc. Finally, we show that acquired 5‑D blur fields are expressive and accurate enough to reveal, for the first time, differences in optical behavior of smartphone devices of the same make and model.
Optical blur is an inherent property of any lens system and is challenging to model in modern cameras because of their complex optical elements. To tackle this challenge, we introduce a high‑dimensional neural representation of blur—the lens blur field—and a practical method for acquisition.
The lens blur field is a multilayer perceptron (MLP) designed to (1) accurately capture variations of the lens 2‑D point spread function over image‑plane location, focus setting, and optionally depth; and (2) represent these variations parametrically as a single, sensor‑specific function. The representation models the combined effects of defocus, diffraction, aberration, and accounts for sensor features such as pixel color filters and pixel‑specific micro‑lenses.
We provide a first‑of‑its‑kind dataset of 5‑D blur fields—for smartphone cameras, camera bodies equipped with a variety of lenses, etc. Finally, we show that acquired 5‑D blur fields are expressive and accurate enough to reveal, for the first time, differences in optical behavior of smartphone devices of the same make and model.
Every lens leaves a blur signature—a hidden fingerprint in every photo; With it, we can tell apart ‘identical’ phones by their optics, deblur images, and render realistic blurs.
Optical blur is an inherent property of any lens system and is challenging to model in modern cameras because of their complex optical elements. To tackle this challenge, we introduce a high‑dimensional neural representation of blur—the lens blur field—and a practical method for acquisition.
The lens blur field is a multilayer perceptron (MLP) designed to (1) accurately capture variations of the lens 2‑D point spread function over image‑plane location, focus setting, and optionally depth; and (2) represent these variations parametrically as a single, sensor‑specific function. The representation models the combined effects of defocus, diffraction, aberration, and accounts for sensor features such as pixel color filters and pixel‑specific micro‑lenses.
We provide a first‑of‑its‑kind dataset of 5‑D blur fields—for smartphone cameras, camera bodies equipped with a variety of lenses, etc. Finally, we show that acquired 5‑D blur fields are expressive and accurate enough to reveal, for the first time, differences in optical behavior of smartphone devices of the same make and model.
Optical blur is an inherent property of any lens system and is challenging to model in modern cameras because of their complex optical elements. To tackle this challenge, we introduce a high‑dimensional neural representation of blur—the lens blur field—and a practical method for acquisition.
The lens blur field is a multilayer perceptron (MLP) designed to (1) accurately capture variations of the lens 2‑D point spread function over image‑plane location, focus setting, and optionally depth; and (2) represent these variations parametrically as a single, sensor‑specific function. The representation models the combined effects of defocus, diffraction, aberration, and accounts for sensor features such as pixel color filters and pixel‑specific micro‑lenses.
We provide a first‑of‑its‑kind dataset of 5‑D blur fields—for smartphone cameras, camera bodies equipped with a variety of lenses, etc. Finally, we show that acquired 5‑D blur fields are expressive and accurate enough to reveal, for the first time, differences in optical behavior of smartphone devices of the same make and model.
Every lens leaves a blur signature—a hidden fingerprint in every photo; With it, we can tell apart ‘identical’ phones by their optics, deblur images, and render realistic blurs.
Optical blur is an inherent property of any lens system and is challenging to model in modern cameras because of their complex optical elements. To tackle this challenge, we introduce a high‑dimensional neural representation of blur—the lens blur field—and a practical method for acquisition.
The lens blur field is a multilayer perceptron (MLP) designed to (1) accurately capture variations of the lens 2‑D point spread function over image‑plane location, focus setting, and optionally depth; and (2) represent these variations parametrically as a single, sensor‑specific function. The representation models the combined effects of defocus, diffraction, aberration, and accounts for sensor features such as pixel color filters and pixel‑specific micro‑lenses.
We provide a first‑of‑its‑kind dataset of 5‑D blur fields—for smartphone cameras, camera bodies equipped with a variety of lenses, etc. Finally, we show that acquired 5‑D blur fields are expressive and accurate enough to reveal, for the first time, differences in optical behavior of smartphone devices of the same make and model.
Optical blur is an inherent property of any lens system and is challenging to model in modern cameras because of their complex optical elements. To tackle this challenge, we introduce a high‑dimensional neural representation of blur—the lens blur field—and a practical method for acquisition.
The lens blur field is a multilayer perceptron (MLP) designed to (1) accurately capture variations of the lens 2‑D point spread function over image‑plane location, focus setting, and optionally depth; and (2) represent these variations parametrically as a single, sensor‑specific function. The representation models the combined effects of defocus, diffraction, aberration, and accounts for sensor features such as pixel color filters and pixel‑specific micro‑lenses.
We provide a first‑of‑its‑kind dataset of 5‑D blur fields—for smartphone cameras, camera bodies equipped with a variety of lenses, etc. Finally, we show that acquired 5‑D blur fields are expressive and accurate enough to reveal, for the first time, differences in optical behavior of smartphone devices of the same make and model.
Every lens leaves a blur signature—a hidden fingerprint in every photo; With it, we can tell apart ‘identical’ phones by their optics, deblur images, and render realistic blurs.
Optical blur is an inherent property of any lens system and is challenging to model in modern cameras because of their complex optical elements. To tackle this challenge, we introduce a high‑dimensional neural representation of blur—the lens blur field—and a practical method for acquisition.
The lens blur field is a multilayer perceptron (MLP) designed to (1) accurately capture variations of the lens 2‑D point spread function over image‑plane location, focus setting, and optionally depth; and (2) represent these variations parametrically as a single, sensor‑specific function. The representation models the combined effects of defocus, diffraction, aberration, and accounts for sensor features such as pixel color filters and pixel‑specific micro‑lenses.
We provide a first‑of‑its‑kind dataset of 5‑D blur fields—for smartphone cameras, camera bodies equipped with a variety of lenses, etc. Finally, we show that acquired 5‑D blur fields are expressive and accurate enough to reveal, for the first time, differences in optical behavior of smartphone devices of the same make and model.
Since 2021, Apple has been sending notification campaigns to individuals targeted by spyware attacks.
These software programs, such as Pegasus, Predator, Graphite or Triangulation, are particularly sophisticated and difficult to detect.
These complex attacks target individuals because of their status or function: journalists, lawyers, activists, politicians, senior officials, members of management committees in strategic sectors, etc.
Receiving a notification means that at least one of the devices linked to the iCloud account has been targeted and is potentially compromised.
The notification results in the receipt of an iMessage and an alert email sent by Apple (from threat-notifications[at]email.apple.com or threat-notifications[at]apple.com). When logging into the iCloud account, an alert is displayed. The time between the compromise attempt and the receipt of the notification is several months, but remains variable.
The notifications sent report highly sophisticated attacks, most of which employ zero-day vulnerabilities or require no user interaction at all.
The following best practices help to better protect the phone against this type of attack: - Update your devices to the latest version as soon as possible. Apple updates often fix vulnerabilities exploited by spyware; - Enable automatic updates, including security updates; - Separate personal and professional uses as much as possible, ideally by using different devices; - Enable "Isolation Mode" to enhance the security of your Apple devices; - Restart your device regularly, ideally once a day.
More generally, the following measures contribute to your good IT hygiene: - Do not click on suspicious links or attachments; Set up a strong and unique access code; - Use two-factor authentication whenever possible; - Avoid installing unknown apps or apps from alternative app stores.
Since 2021, Apple has been sending notification campaigns to individuals targeted by spyware attacks.
These software programs, such as Pegasus, Predator, Graphite or Triangulation, are particularly sophisticated and difficult to detect.
These complex attacks target individuals because of their status or function: journalists, lawyers, activists, politicians, senior officials, members of management committees in strategic sectors, etc.
Receiving a notification means that at least one of the devices linked to the iCloud account has been targeted and is potentially compromised.
The notification results in the receipt of an iMessage and an alert email sent by Apple (from threat-notifications[at]email.apple.com or threat-notifications[at]apple.com). When logging into the iCloud account, an alert is displayed. The time between the compromise attempt and the receipt of the notification is several months, but remains variable.
The notifications sent report highly sophisticated attacks, most of which employ zero-day vulnerabilities or require no user interaction at all.
The following best practices help to better protect the phone against this type of attack: - Update your devices to the latest version as soon as possible. Apple updates often fix vulnerabilities exploited by spyware; - Enable automatic updates, including security updates; - Separate personal and professional uses as much as possible, ideally by using different devices; - Enable "Isolation Mode" to enhance the security of your Apple devices; - Restart your device regularly, ideally once a day.
More generally, the following measures contribute to your good IT hygiene: - Do not click on suspicious links or attachments; Set up a strong and unique access code; - Use two-factor authentication whenever possible; - Avoid installing unknown apps or apps from alternative app stores.
::: spoiler Disable JavaScript to Access. 1. Open Chrome Settings: Click the three-dot menu (Customize and control Google Chrome) in the top-right corner and select "Settings". 2. Navigate to Site Settings: Go to "Privacy and security" and then click on "Site settings". 3. Find JavaScript Settings: Scroll down to the "Content" section and click on "JavaScript". 4. Disable JavaScript: Toggle the switch to "Don't allow sites to use JavaScript". :::
Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.
With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.
Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.
French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.
Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.
The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.
Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.
Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.
Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.
With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.
Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.
French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.
Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.
The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.
Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.
Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.
Laure Miller (Ensemble pour la République) et Arthur Delaporte (Socialistes) ont présenté les conclusions de la commission d'enquête sur TikTok, lors d'une conférence de presse à l'Assemblée nationale, ce jeudi 11 septembre.
Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.
With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.
Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.
French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.
Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.
The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.
Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.
Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.
Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.
With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.
Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.
French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.
Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.
The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.
Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.
Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.
Laure Miller (Ensemble pour la République) et Arthur Delaporte (Socialistes) ont présenté les conclusions de la commission d'enquête sur TikTok, lors d'une conférence de presse à l'Assemblée nationale, ce jeudi 11 septembre.
Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.
With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.
Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.
French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.
Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.
The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.
Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.
Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.
Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.
With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.
Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.
French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.
Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.
The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.
Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.
Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.
Laure Miller (Ensemble pour la République) et Arthur Delaporte (Socialistes) ont présenté les conclusions de la commission d'enquête sur TikTok, lors d'une conférence de presse à l'Assemblée nationale, ce jeudi 11 septembre.
Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.
With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.
Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.
French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.
Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.
The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.
Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.
Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.
Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.
With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.
Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.
French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.
Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.
The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.
Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.
Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.
Laure Miller (Ensemble pour la République) et Arthur Delaporte (Socialistes) ont présenté les conclusions de la commission d'enquête sur TikTok, lors d'une conférence de presse à l'Assemblée nationale, ce jeudi 11 septembre.
Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.
With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.
Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.
French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.
Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.
The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.
Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.
Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.
Imposing the ban and a 10 pm to 8 am curfew for 15- to 18-year-olds would "send a signal both to children and parents" that social media "is not harmless" for the young, Laure Miller, the MP who compiled a parliamentary inquiry's report, told AFP.
With more than 1.5 billion users worldwide, TikTok -- owned by China-based ByteDance -- has been especially under fire from Western governments in Europe and the US in recent years.
Concerns raised over the platform have included content encouraging suicide, self harm or an unhealthy body image as well as its potential use for foreign political interference.
French President Emmanuel Macron has already backed a social media ban for children and young adolescents, following in the footsteps of Australia which started drafting its own landmark ban for under-16s last year.
Meanwhile TikTok is in legal limbo in America, as President Donald Trump has permitted the platform to continue operating there despite a law requiring its sale.
The service was also singled out as a vector for Russian influence when Romania's presidential election was controversially annulled last year by the country's supreme court.
Launched in March, the French parliamentary committee set out to examine TikTok and its psychological effects on minors after a 2024 lawsuit against the platform by seven families accusing it of exposing their children to content pushing them towards suicide.
Members put forward Thursday's recommendations -- welcomed by Laure Boutron-Marmion, a lawyer representing the families -- after months of testimony from families, social media executives and influencers.
Laure Miller (Ensemble pour la République) et Arthur Delaporte (Socialistes) ont présenté les conclusions de la commission d'enquête sur TikTok, lors d'une conférence de presse à l'Assemblée nationale, ce jeudi 11 septembre.
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.
Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.
Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.
Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.
Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.
Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.
Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.
Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.
Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.
Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
Spyware blasts: Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
More than twenty countries have signed on to the nonbinding Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States since it was launched in April 2025 by the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Its focus is to “tackle the challenges posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities (CCICs).” CCICs encompass a broad array of tools, including spyware—a kind of malicious software that allows “unauthorized remote access to an internet-enabled target device” for surveillance and/or data extraction. One of the pillars of the Code of Practice for States is accountability, under which countries are encouraged to establish or apply national frameworks to regulate the “development, facilitation, purchase, transfer, and use of” spyware.
Establishing new domestic frameworks or even analyzing which existing national or international frameworks apply to spyware-related activity will take significant time, likely years. Meanwhile, new instances of spyware abuses against journalists and other human rights defenders continue. It is therefore not surprising that the Code of Practice for States also recommends measures to incentivize responsible activity, encourage the use of export control and licensing frameworks, and provide support for victims. It is on one such measure for victim support that this report focuses: “procedures for those claiming redress as a result of the irresponsible use of CCICs, including ensuring access to effective judicial or non-judicial remedies.” Specifically, this report explores how existing tort law relating to abnormally dangerous activities in the United States and the UK could provide a ground for bringing cases related to spyware abuses.
Tort law allows individuals to take accountability into their own hands, which is especially important when processes to enact binding obligations on actors involved in developing and selling spyware can take years and there is no guarantee they will be successful. However, tort law differs by country and, within the United States, even by state. This makes research difficult and, at a larger scale, inconsistent. Additionally, litigation is very resource intensive both in terms of money and time and governments are typically shielded from civil liability. It is simply not possible for every victim of a spyware abuse to bring a case against the actor(s) responsible. In that sense, it is not recommended to rely exclusively on tort law for accountability, but to use it as a supplementary measure while continuing to pursue parallel efforts at regulation.
With that framing, this report looks at the possibility of bringing cases under strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities in California and the UK. These two jurisdictions were chosen because of the similarities in their legal systems, the fact that civil cases have been brought in California against spyware developers, and since the UK is one of the countries that launched the Pall Mall Process. The author is not aware of any previous cases brought under this theory of liability with respect to spyware. Given the six-factor definition of abnormally dangerous activities in California, the fact that a court decides whether an activity qualifies, and recent developments regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants and significant damages awards, it could be possible, although still difficult, to bring a case there under this theory related to spyware harms. The development of the same doctrine in the UK, however, cautions against attempting this novel argument there. For UK plaintiffs, more research is needed on alternative grounds under tort.
At their worst, digital ID systems can enable population-wide surveillance; infringe on civil liberties; monitor, predict or influence individuals’ decisions; identify individuals or groups for targeted interventions; and facilitate the tracking, persecution, or differential treatment of marginalised groups.
There is little evidence to support the government’s claim that digital ID would deter illegal immigration or employment fraud, and many good reasons to believe that mandatory digital ID would burden law-abiding citizens and businesses.
No matter what is promised at the outset, once in place, a digital ID system is highly likely to be used beyond its initial stated purposes. The government is already considering proposals that would require digital ID for right-to-work and right-to-rent checks. Other reporting suggests that an option under consideration would expand further into everyday interactions such as voting online, signing contracts, paying bills and shopping.
There are serious doubts about the government’s ability to run an effective and efficient digital ID scheme and prevent against the system failures and inaccuracies that have plagued the eVisa system. There is also significant doubt about the government’s ability to protect the vast amounts of personal data collected in a digital ID scheme – a point which 63% of respondents polled said they were concerned about.
Far from being a backwards outlier, the UK is in good company with countries that have inherited its legal systems such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in consistently rejecting mandatory ID systems.
Checkpoint Britain: the dangers of digital ID and why privacy must be protected.
At their worst, digital ID systems can enable population-wide surveillance; infringe on civil liberties; monitor, predict or influence individuals’ decisions; identify individuals or groups for targeted interventions; and facilitate the tracking, persecution, or differential treatment of marginalised groups.
There is little evidence to support the government’s claim that digital ID would deter illegal immigration or employment fraud, and many good reasons to believe that mandatory digital ID would burden law-abiding citizens and businesses.
No matter what is promised at the outset, once in place, a digital ID system is highly likely to be used beyond its initial stated purposes. The government is already considering proposals that would require digital ID for right-to-work and right-to-rent checks. Other reporting suggests that an option under consideration would expand further into everyday interactions such as voting online, signing contracts, paying bills and shopping.
There are serious doubts about the government’s ability to run an effective and efficient digital ID scheme and prevent against the system failures and inaccuracies that have plagued the eVisa system. There is also significant doubt about the government’s ability to protect the vast amounts of personal data collected in a digital ID scheme – a point which 63% of respondents polled said they were concerned about.
Far from being a backwards outlier, the UK is in good company with countries that have inherited its legal systems such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in consistently rejecting mandatory ID systems.
The ongoing development of artificial intelligence means that humans will simultaneously confront multiple interfaces of AI that exhibit a range of its propensity to contribute to good and bad, progress and destruction, and as act as a perpetrator of violence or a tool for peace. As a dual-use technology, AI can be adopted for military and civilian purposes alike.
Whether on the civilian or military side of adoption, AI contains inherent conflicts. Some of the main sources of conflict that policymakers must attempt to address are about how to ensure human rights values such as individual autonomy are preserved and not destroyed, navigate the organizational culture change necessary to respond to AI political end-uses, construct and upgrade the appropriate institutional arrangements needed for accountability, and ensure safeguards exist to enable trust-building.
Read the Report Here Introduction In 2021 Amazon and Google won a tender to provide the Israeli government with cloud computing services ranging from “mundane Google Meet video chats to a variety of sophisticated machine-learning tools.
New internal government documents shed more light on Canada's struggling housing climate as middle and lower-income households struggle with affordability.
They are televisions from another era, replaced by the flat screen, high-resolution displays of the modern era. Yet cathode-ray tubes are still surprisingly in demand.
The data, from thousands of coal-burning power plants, oil refineries, steel mills and other industrial facilities, is the country’s most comprehensive way to track greenhouse gases.
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