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By MARK SCOTT

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IT’S THURSDAY, AND THAT MEANS ANOTHER DIGITAL BRIDGE. I’m Mark Scott, POLITICO’s chief technology correspondent, and as the great and the good of the transatlantic digital policy world gather on the outskirts of Brussels, you find me filing this dispatch from Seattle. Go figure.

Enough of the bellyaching. Let’s get to it:

— Three years into the EU-U.S. revamp, Brussels is now more like Washington, and Washington is quickly turning into Brussels.

— Europe’s new competition regime is the “ghost of Christmas future” for the U.S. Department of Justice’s antitrust lawsuit against Apple.

— Not everyone’s attempts to rein in the most advanced forms of artificial intelligence should be judged equally.

WHEN DIGITAL POLICYMAKING ENTERS THE SPIDER-RVERSE

THERE’S A POPULAR MEME OF TWO SPIDER-MEN pointing at each other often used when people want to show how things are alike — even identical. That’s the feeling I get looking at what will be announced at the latest (and possibly last?) EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC), a two-day summit that starts Thursday in Leuven, a city just outside Brussels. Officials including U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and European Commission digital chief Margrethe Vestager will meet to reinforce how closely the United States and European Union now view digital policymaking. What’s clear is that over the past three years, Washington and Brussels have rubbed off on each other, sometimes in surprising ways.

Before we get into that — and what that means going forward — let’s do a quick run-through of what will be announced Friday. My colleagues did a pretty good job in last week’s newsletter. But to recap, expected announcements include: greater collaboration on artificial intelligence between the U.S. AI Safety Institute and Commission’s AI Office; closer ties on so-called 6G next-generation telecommunications standards (in part, to push back against China); a three-year continuation of information-sharing on semiconductor supply chains and government subsidies; an agreement to further cooperate against Russian- and Chinese-backed influence operations, with a name check for the Western Balkans; a commitment to joint fund telecom and cybersecurity projects in the Global South, including a new deal in Tunisia; and demands that online platforms protect so-called human rights defenders and give outsiders greater access to social media data.

Phew. However, if you take a step back from this week’s glad-handing, it’s mostly a piecemeal approach to everything from quantum computing and critical emerging technologies to social media and artificial intelligence oversight. In short: It sounds like a lot. But if you think of the gamut of topics to be discussed — over a lavish dinner, public fireside chat and behind-the-scenes meetings — the summit’s outcomes aren’t that spectacular. I would argue that’s a good thing. If you’re going to reforge a once-faulty transatlantic relationship, it’s better to get lost in the wonkery of digital policymaking. Don’t get caught up in “moon shot” announcements that can lead to unrealistic expectations of an EU-U.S. relationship that still has its difficulties.

And that brings me back to the “Spidey meme.” When the TTC was first proposed, in the latter months of Donald Trump’s administration, it would have been unrealistic to suggest Brussels might willingly bend to Washington’s pressure on many issues now openly discussed in these twice-annual summits. Yet, if you consider the U.S.’s overtly anti-China stance, it’s fair to say the EU is more in that camp than at any time before. You can see it in the bloc’s recent economic security package that wouldn’t be out of place coming from the White House. You can see it in the EU’s Chips Act, a multibillion-euro plan to bring some microchip production back to Europe. You can see it in the telecom infrastructure spending in developing economies and the increasingly hawkish position on 6G standards. Not all those plans have come via the TTC. But it’s clear regular meetings with their American counterparts have rubbed off on European officials.

This isn’t a one-way street. Congress may be stuck in second gear, but the spate of digital policy announcements — from the White House and, I would argue, the U.S. Department of Justice (in its antitrust cases) and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (on its similar competition lawsuits and privacy commitments) — from that side of the Atlantic feel overtly European. My recent visit to Washington cemented this view. Gone are the days when U.S. officials would repeat industry talking points about no need for regulation and oversight. Sure, you get that in some agencies. But, overall, the discussion has shifted to what those rules should look like. And with that has come an EU-centric view of transparency, accountability and responsibility that seeps out of Washington’s renewed vision of digital policymaking. It’s hard not to see Brussels’ hand in some of that.

Before I get irate emails, not all of this is down to Washington embracing its “inner Brussels,” or vice versa. The European Commission, on its own, has become more hostile to China and now views digital policymaking through more of a national security lens. After years of missing the boat on tech regulation, the White House is belatedly getting into the game. Regular meetings — often between mid-ranking officials, many of whom have featured in “Wonk of the Week” — have done what the TTC was supposed to do: rekindle personal ties, create an opportunity to share ideas, and compete with a like-minded ally to shape good policy.

Will that continue after this year’s election cycle? There’s goodwill, on both sides, for it to do so, but everyone admits — candidly — that November’s election in the U.S. is such a game-changer that nothing is certain. As someone who, personally, encapsulates the transatlantic relationship, I’m optimistic. Not that the TTC will continue (my bet is that it won’t, at least not in its current form). But the policy osmosis these summits have instilled will stick around long after you stop reading about them in this newsletter. Like it or not, Brussels is more aligned with Washington’s national security-focused stance on digital. And, conversely, Washington is more willing to embrace Brussels-style rulemaking than ever before. If that’s the TTC’s legacy, so be it.

THE MULTIPLE FACES OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

THIS JOB SOMETIMES LETS ME TIME TRAVEL. One day, I’m reading the U.S. Department of Justice-led lawsuit against Apple and its alleged anticompetitive behavior. That includes everything from undermining app developers and harming rival messaging services to crowding out cloud-based games. The next, I’m catching up with EU officials on their investigations into how Meta, Alphabet and Apple may have infringed the bloc’s new antitrust rules. Those probes focus equally — at least when it comes to Alphabet and Apple — on the tech giants potentially undermining app developers; limiting choice for consumers looking to swap to different services; and, for the search giant, potentially stacking the deck in favor of its own products. All of these companies deny any wrongdoing.

So why the time travel reference? For those of us with long memories of digital antitrust cases, what the Department of Justice announced sounds awfully similar to what the European Commission has doing over the last decade. By that, I mean focusing on how a small number of so-called gatekeeper companies have throttled innovation, hampered rivals and cut out consumer choice via a complex web of business decisions that favor their services over those of rivals. You can see it in Brussels’ three–part series of competition decisions against Google. While the search giant’s issues are somewhat different compared with those now facing Apple, the basic premise of the complaint is the same: A dominant smartphone software developer tilted the scales unfairly in its favor. For balance: Google is still appealing those decisions.

Those at the Department of Justice might reject claims that they’re reliving what the Commission already did. And, to be fair, the Apple case — which encompasses everything from smartwatches to messaging apps to financial services payments — is more expansive than anything that Brussels has so far thrown at the companies. But it does really feel like the U.S. is relitigating what the EU has already decided: that you can’t rely on the word of a small number of digital giants to uphold fair competition rules, especially when it involves a complex interplay of hardware, software and third-party developers in often proprietary commercial agreements. If the basic premise is that these companies may abuse their fairly acquired dominant position, then scolding them after the fact just isn’t going to cut it.

Hence why the Commission’s investigations — the first ones opened under the bloc’s Digital Markets Act — are a clear sign to those in the U.S. of what lies ahead. As part of the EU’s new antitrust regime, which will progressively come into force over the next two years, companies designated gatekeepers need to show how they allow others to compete fairly for potential customers — and, more importantly, revenue. That includes providing opt-outs for those seeking alternatives to, say, Apple’s App Store or Google Search. This is based on the belief — ever present in the Department of Justice’s lawsuit — that these companies are likely to lock in users to maximize profit and build barriers for rivals wherever they can.

As part of the new antitrust obligations, companies including Meta, ByteDance and Amazon have been forced to do things that would seem alien to people living outside the EU. Apple, for instance, made a series of changes to its businesses, including opening up its iOS software to rival app stores, allowing people to choose an alternative to its browser and reducing fees for third-party developers. Not everyone — most obviously Apple — is happy about these changes. But it’s a tacit recognition that the status quo — outlined, again, in the Department of Justice’s lawsuit — is not going to fly. For its part, the iPhone maker says these changes will harm users through increased privacy and security risks. Its opponents say Apple hasn’t gone far enough to open its digital walled garden to competition. You can never win.

The EU’s investigations, which will likely take most of a year and may lead to nothing, are the first test to determine whether the gatekeepers’ changes meet the bloc’s new standards. Those outside of Europe, especially in the U.S., may be wondering why EU consumers get more of a choice while they’re stuck with limited options and, for competitors, high fees. It’s a fair argument — one that is also playing out as Brussels enacts its separate online content-moderation rules, known as the Digital Services Act, which gives the bloc greater oversight over platforms in an all-important election year.

It’s true the EU and the U.S. legal systems are sufficiently different such that it’s unrealistic to port Europe’s new competition regime directly across the Atlantic. But at a time when U.S. authorities are aggressively pursuing competition cases against Big Tech (some, ahem, unsuccessfully), it’s a reminder there’s a lot to learn from those who have already trodden that path. Europe’s Digital Markets Act is the “ghost of Christmas future” for the U.S. when it comes to potentially stopping gatekeeping companies from abusing their positions, even before such harm takes place. Litigating the past — which, arguably, is what the Department of Justice is now doing, similar to what the Commission did with its Google’s cases — solves yesterday’s problems, today. Better to think about where future harm may come from and do what you can (albeit, clunkily) before that abuse ever occurs.

BY THE NUMBERS

WHAT ARE ALL THESE AI SAFETY INSTITUTES FOR?

JAPAN HAS ONE. SO DOES THE UNITED KINGDOM. The U.S.’s version is slowly coming together. The EU’s equivalent has a different name, but is about a month old. What am I talking about? The explosion of so-called AI Safety Institutes, quasi-government agencies in charge of mitigating some of the potential downsides of the most advanced forms of artificial intelligence.

This week, the U.S. signed separate collaboration agreementswith both the U.K. and the EU (the Washington-Brussels deal will be announced Friday) to coordinate how these institutes conduct their work. Japan hopes to pen similar relationships in the near future. The goal, according to those involved, is to maximize the impact of such work by sharing best practices with like-minded countries.

That all sounds great. But it’s also true that each country’s regulatory approach to AI governance is markedly different. Some, like the U.K., don’t have any AI legislation on the books. How people define “safety” also significantly differs depending on where you look. I’m not saying these international agreements aren’t worthwhile; it’s just easier to announce them than actually put them into practice.

WONK OF THE WEEK

GIVEN THAT THE BELGIANS WILL NOMINALLY host this week’s EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council summit under their presidency of the Council of the European Union, we’re going for a two-parter this week.

Playing host-with-the-most will be Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo, a Flemish politician who worked at the Boston Consulting Group before turning his hand to politics 15 years ago — he’s served in multiple governments before taking the top job in 2020.

Alongside De Croo will be Hadja Lahbib, Belgium’s minister of foreign affairs, European affairs and foreign trade. Lahbib is a former journalist with expertise in the Middle East and Afghanistan, who took on her ministerial role in the summer of 2022.

THEY SAID WHAT, NOW?

China’s “Ministry of State Security and its state security departments focused on surreptitiously identifying and influencing the foreign policy of other countries, including the United States,” according to a U.S. indictment against a Chinese-government linked company and seven Chinese individuals for alleged efforts to conduct malicious cyber operations against critical networks in the U.S., the U.K. and other nations.

WHAT I’M READING

— A China-backed influence campaign, mostly on Facebook, has continued to endure despite Meta’s efforts to rid its platform of the inauthentic behavior, based on analysis from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

— Sebastian Bay, a Swedish disinformation expert, used Google’s generative AI tools to analyze the company’s submissions detailing how it’s implementing the European Commission’s code of practice on disinformation. It did not do well.

— Katie Harbath, a former senior Meta executive, summarizes takeaways from the Aspen Institute’s recent conference on AI, disinformation and elections. It’s worth a read.

— OpenAI is testing new versions of AI-generated audio, in multiple languages, that will likely have both positive and negative consequences. Take a look at the company’s findings here.

— The Biden administration published a detailed memofrom its Office of Management and Budget explaining how the White House’s executive order on artificial intelligence will be implemented. Janet Haven, executive director of Data & Society, gives her view, while Pam Dixon, executive director of World Privacy Forum, has a more data protection-focused take.

— The growing trend toward so-called data localization worldwide will almost certainly harm human rights and limit the use of technology and the internet for good, according to a four-way discussion with civil society groups facilitated by Freedom House.