The case for dollar clearing is similar to the case for linking all the world's fiber through US data-centers. It's a big lift to ask every seller to price their goods in every potential buyer's currency, and it's a lot to ask every Thai baht holder to race around the world seeking someone who'll sell them Saudi riyals - and then there's the problem of what they do with the change left over from the transaction.

8

Establishing liquid markets for every pair of every currency has the same kind of complexity as the problem of establishing fiber links between every country.

Since the mid-20th century, we've solved this problem by treating the US dollar as a neutral platform. Countries opened savings accounts at the US Federal Reserve and stashed large numbers of US dollars there.

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(When someone says, "China owns umpty-billion in US debt," they just mean, "There's a bank account in New York at the Fed with China's name on it that has been marked up with lots of US dollars.")

Merchants, institutions and individuals that wanted to transact across borders used the SWIFT system, which is nominally international, but which, practically speaking, is extremely deferential to the US government.

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Issuing the world's reserve and reference currency was a source of enormous power for the US, but only to the extent that it used power sparingly and subtly. The power of dollarization depended on most people believing the dollar was mostly neutral - that the US wouldn't risk dollar primacy by nakedly weaponizing the dollar. Dollarization was a bet that America First hawks would have the emotional maturity to instrumentalize the dollar in the most sparing and subtle of fashion.

11

But today, no one believes that the dollar is neutral. First came the Argentine sovereign debt default: in 2001, the government of Argentina wiped out investors who were holding its bonds. In 2005, a group of American vulture capitalists scooped up this worthless paper for pennies, then sued in New York to force Argentina to make good on the bonds, and a US court handed over Argentina's foreign reserves, which were held on US soil.

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That was the opening salvo in a series of events showed everyone in the world that the US dollar wasn't a neutral platform, but was, rather, a creature of US policy. This culminated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which saw the seizure of Russian assets in the USA and a general blockade on Russians using the SWIFT system to transfer money.

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Whether or not you like the fact that Russian assets were transferred to Ukraine to aid in its defense against Russian aggression (I like it, for the record), there's no denying that this ended the pretense that the dollar was a neutral platform. It was a signal to every leader in the world that the dollar could only be relied upon for transaction clearing and foreign reserves to the extent that you didn't make the USA angry at you.

14

Today, Donald Trump has made it clear that the US's default posture to every country in the world is anger. The US no longer has allies, nor does it have trading partners. Today, every country in the world is America's adversary and its rival.

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But de-dollarization isn't easy. It presents the same O(n^2) problem as rewiring the world's fiber: creating deep, liquid markets to trade every currency against every other currency is an impossible lift (thus far), and there's no obvious candidate as a replacement for the dollar as a clearing currency.

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As with fiber, we are in an unsettled period, with no obvious answer, and lots of chaotic, one-off gestures towards de-dollarization. For example, Ethiopia is re-valuing its foreign debt in Chinese renminbi:

bloomberg.com/news/articles/20…

But fiber and dollars aren't the only seemingly neutral platforms that America provided to the world as a way of both facilitating the world's orderly operation and consolidating America's centrality and power on the global stage.

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America is also the world's great digital exporter. The world's governments, corporations and households run on American cloud software, like Google Docs and Office365. Their records are held in Oracle databases. Their messages and media run on iPhones. Their cloud compute comes from AWS.

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The Snowden revelations shook this arrangement, but it held. The EU extracted a series of (ultimately broken) promises from the US to the effect that America wouldn't spy on Europeans using Big Tech. And now, after a brittle decade of half-measures and uneasy peace with American tech platforms, Trump has made it clear that he will not hesitate to use American tech platforms to pursue his geopolitical goals.

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Practically speaking, that means that government officials that make Trump angry can expect to have their cloud access terminated:

apnews.com/article/icc-trump-s…

Trump can - and does - shut down entire international administrative agencies, without notice or appeal, as a means of coercing them into embracing American political goals.

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What's more, US tech giants have stopped pretending that they will not share sensitive EU data - even data housed on servers in the EU - with American spy agencies, and will keep any such disclosures a secret from the European governments, companies and individuals who are affected:

forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacot…

All this has prompted a rush of interest in the "Eurostack," an effort to replicate the functionality of US tech companies' cloud services:

pluralistic.net/2025/10/15/fre…

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But the Eurostack's proponents are really working on the preliminaries to digital sovereignty. It's not enough to have alternatives to US Big Tech. There also needs to be extensive work on migration tools, to facilitate the move to those alternatives. No one is going to manually copy/paste a million documents out of their ministry or corporation's GSuite repository and into a Eurostack equivalent.

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There are a few tools that do this today, but they're crude and hard to use, because they are probably illegal under America's widely exported IP laws.

Faithfully transferring those files, permissions, edit histories and metadata to new clouds will require a kind of guerrilla warfare called "adversarial interoperability."

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Adversarial interoperability is the process of making a new thing work with an existing thing, *against the wishes* of the existing thing's manufacturer:

eff.org/deeplinks/2019/10/adve…

The problem is that adversarial interoperability has been mostly criminalized in countries all around the world, thanks to IP laws that prohibit study, reverse engineering and modification of software without permission.

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Adversarial Interoperability

“Interoperability” is the act of making a new product or service work with an existing product or service: modern civilization depends on the standards and practices that allow you to put any dish into a dishwasher or any USB charger into any car’s c…

^{Electronic Frontier Foundation}

These laws were spread all over the world at the insistence of the US Trade Representative, who, for 25 years, has made this America's top foreign trade priority.

Countries that balked at enacting laws were threatened with tariffs. Virtually every country in the world fell into line:

pluralistic.net/2025/01/15/bea…

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But then Trump happened. The Trump tariffs apply to countries that have voluntarily blocked their own investors and entrepreneurs from making billions by supplying products that unlock and improve America's enshittified tech exports. These blocks also exposed everyone in the world to the data- and cash-plundering scams of US Big Tech, by preventing the creation of privacy blockers, alt clients, jailbreaking kits, and independent app stores for phones, tablets and consoles.

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What's more, the laws that block reverse-engineering are also used to block repair, forcing everyone from train operators to hospitals to drivers to everyday individuals to pay a high premium and endure long waits to get their equipment serviced by the manufacturer's authorized representatives:

pluralistic.net/2024/05/24/rec…

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These US-forced IP laws come at a high price. They allow American companies to pick your nation's pockets and steal its data. They interfere with repair and undermine resiliency. They also threaten security researchers who audit critical technologies and identify their dangerous defects:

pluralistic.net/2024/09/30/lif…

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On top of that, they expose your country to a range of devastating geopolitical attacks by the Trump administration, who have made it clear that they will order American tech companies to brick whole governments as punishment for failing to capitulate to US demands. And of course, all of these remote killswitches can be operated by anyone who can hack or trick the manufacturer, including the Chinese state:

pluralistic.net/2024/10/07/for…

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Speaking of China, isn't this exactly the kind of thing we were warned would happen if we allowed Chinese technology into western telecommunications systems? The Chinese state would spy on us, and, in times of extremis, could shut down our critical infrastructure with a keystroke.

This is exactly what America is doing now (and has been doing for some time, as Snowden demonstrated).

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But it's actually pretty reasonable to assume that a regime as competent and ambitious (and ruthless) as Xi Jinping's might make use of this digital power if doing so serves its geopolitical goals.

And there is a hell of a lot of cloud-connected digital infrastructure that Xi does (or could) control, including the solar inverters and batteries that are swiftly replacing fossil fuel in the EU:

pluralistic.net/2025/09/23/our…

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And if you're worried about China shutting down your solar energy, you should also worry about America's hold on the embedded processors in your country's critical systems.

Take tractors. Remember when Putin's thugs looted millions of dollars' worth of tractors from Ukraine and spirited them away to Chechnya? The John Deere company sent a kill command to those tractors and bricked them, rendering them permanently inoperable:

pluralistic.net/2022/05/08/abo…

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Sure, there's a certain cyberpunk frisson in this tale of a digital comeuppance for Russian aggressors. But think about this for ten seconds and you'll realize that it means that John Deere can shut down *any* tractor in the world - including all the tractors in your country, if Donald Trump forces them to:

pluralistic.net/2025/10/20/pos…

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The national security case for digital sovereignty includes people worried about American aggression. It includes people worried about Chinese aggression. It includes people worried about other countries that might infiltrate and make use of these remote kill switches. And it includes people worried about criminals doing the same.

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True digital sovereignty requires more than building Eurostack data-centers and the software to run on them. It requires more than repealing the IP laws that block cloud customers from migrating their data to those Eurostack servers. It requires the replacement of the cloud software and embedded code that power our infrastructure and administrative tools.

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This is a gigantic task. Ripping out all the proprietary code that powers our cloud software and devices and replacing it with robust, auditable, user-modifiable free/open source software is a *massive* project.

It's also a project that's long overdue. And crises precipitate change. Putin's invasion of Ukraine vaporized every barrier to Europe's solar conversion, rocketing the bloc from ten years behind schedule to fifteen years *ahead* of schedule in just a few years.

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The fact that changing out all the proprietary, opaque, vulnerable code in our world and replacing it with open, free, reliable code is *hard* has no bearing on whether it's *necessary*.

It's necessary. What's more, replacing all the code isn't like replacing dollars, or replacing fiber. It isn't hamstrung by the O(n^2) problem.

Because if the Eurostack code is open and free, it can also be the Canadian stack, the Mexican stack, the Ghanaian stack, and the Vietnamese stack.

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It can be a commons, core tech that everyone studies for vulnerabilities and improves, everyone adds features to, everyone localizes and administers and bears the costs for.

It is a novel and curious form of "international nationalism," a technology that is more like a science. In the same way that the Allies and the Axis both used the same radio technologies to communicate, a common, open digital infrastructure is one that everyone - even adversaries - can rely upon.

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This is a move that's long overdue. It's a move that's in the power of every government, because it merely involves changing your own domestic laws to enable adversarial interoperability. Its success doesn't depend on a foreign state forcing Apple or Google or Microsoft or Oracle to do something they don't want to do:

pluralistic.net/2025/11/01/red…

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The opportunity and challenge of building the post-American internet is part of the package of global de-Americanization, which includes running new fiber and de-dollarization. But the post-American internet is unique in that it is the only part of this project that can be solved everywhere, all at once, and that gets cheaper and easier as more nations join in.

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I'm on a tour with my new book, the international bestseller *Enshittification*!

Catch me next in #Toronto (TOMORROW!), #SanDiego and #Seattle!

Full schedule with dates and links at:

pluralistic.net/tour

eof/