Scientia Potentia Est

Michiaki Ikeda was a chubby-faced six-year-old when the nuclear age smacked him in the face with a blinding flash of light. Just as he was stepping out of an elevator at Nagasaki Medical University’s hospital, a nuclear weapon code-named Fat Man detonated seven hundred meters away from him. The bomb had the explosive equivalent in force of more than twenty kilotons of TNT and flattened almost everything within a kilometer radius. The concrete hospital building was mostly left standing, but the majority of the people inside were killed. The steel elevator shaft likely saved his life.
When he came to, it was pitch-dark, and the first sensation he recalled was the sound of something burning. Then the smell of smoke reached his nostrils, bringing him to his feet. As he stumbled out into what had been the hospital’s corridor, his eyes adjusted to the darkness, and he realized he was standing on dirt. The wood floors had been blown away. In the corner, he saw a nurse on the ground surrounded by shattered glass, and her face covered in blood. To Michiaki, it was as if someone had poured a bucket of blood over her head. Yet her eyes were open, and she was staring at him.
“Call the ambulance service,” she ordered, her expression a mix of shock and rage.
He looked around, but all he could see were shards of glass and wood panels blown from the ground. He crawled out a window frame and stepped down into what had been, just a little while before, a tranquil garden with water. Now, as he looked up, he could see some trees were toppled and the ones that still stood were in flames. When his eyes moved from the burning treetops down to the ground, the scene was pure horror. The hospital’s garden was strewn with corpses with hair burned into frizzy clumps. Some had eyeballs hanging down on their cheeks, and faces with their lips and flesh burned away, leaving the teeth and jaw exposed. There were some bodies with stomachs bloated to twice their normal size, and others with internal organs spilling out.
He fled the burning hospital grounds and instinctively started walking toward the city, thinking he would find help. Instead, he found more horror. The main boulevards of Nagasaki were cluttered with debris of blown-out buildings. The living were walking, their arms dripping with scorched flesh outstretched in front of them to avoid the pain of having burned skin touch their bodies. Dazed, they walked down the street, calling for water and looking for help that was not there.
Three days earlier, the United States had dropped an atomic bomb called Little Boy, which used highly enriched uranium, on Hiroshima, instantly killing some seventy thousand people.
Many more would die later from burns and radiation sickness.
Nagasaki had not been the primary target of Fat Boy, a plutonium implosion bomb. A B-29 Superfortress, Bockscar, was planning to drop Fat Boy on the city of Kokura, but cloud cover forced the pilot to divert to Nagasaki, a secondary target.
Nagasaki’s natural geography of mountains and valleys protected part of the population, preventing many of the immediate deaths that took place in Hiroshima, but the city center was devastated.
Along with a bomb, a second airplane flying over Nagasaki dropped canisters containing scientific instrumentation. The canisters also contained copies of a personal letter several Manhattan Project scientists addressed to a prominent Japanese scientist. “You have known for several years that an atomic bomb could be built if a nation were willing to pay the enormous cost of preparing the necessary material,” the letter, written by the nuclear physicist Luis Alvarez, read. “Now that you have seen that we have constructed the production plants, there can be no doubt in your mind that all the output of these factories, working 24 hours a day, will be exploded on your homeland.”
In Japan, the bomb had now decimated two cities. Six-year-old Michiaki was fortunate: miraculously uninjured, he was found by a nurse and taken to a bomb shelter in the mountains, where he was eventually reunited with his family. Michiaki did not know anything about what had happened that day. He only knew that this was not like the other bombings the city endured during the war, a routine so common that residents often ignored the sirens warning of enemy aircraft. “I had no clue what a nuclear or atomic bomb was—that something like that existed,” he recalled. “I just thought it was many, many big bombs that had fallen.”
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The bomb dropped on Nagasaki was the third atomic device ever detonated. The first atomic explosion, called the Trinity Test, was conducted in secrecy on July 16, 1945, at Alamogordo, New Mexico. Americans learned about this new weapon after Little Boy was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6 of that year. The New York Times announced the nuclear age to the world with the headline “First Atomic Bomb Dropped on Japan; Missile Is Equal to 20,000 Tons of TNT; Truman Warns Foe of a ‘Rain of Ruin.’ ”
In Japan, however, what little news was reported about Hiroshima was only that incendiary bombs were used.
Speaking the day the bomb on Hiroshima was dropped, President Harry Truman revealed not just the existence of this terrifying new weapon but a massive project conducted in secrecy to build it. Across the country, over two and a half years, as many as 125,000 people had been involved in this secret project, Truman announced. Many workers did not even know exactly what they were working on, only that it was an important war project. “We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history,” he said, “and won.”
Truman was right: Less than a week after Nagasaki was bombed, the Japanese emperor announced the country’s unconditional surrender, telling the nation in a broadcast speech that despite great sacrifice “the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage.” More directly, he acknowledged the devastation wrought in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, saying “the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.”
A few weeks after the Japanese surrender, Herbert F. York, a young physicist who had been one of the thousands of workers on the secret project Truman had referred to, brought his father to Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where uranium had been enriched for the Little Boy bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The work inside the plant itself was still secret, but its existence no longer was. Standing at the top of a hill, York pointed down proudly to the facility hidden in the valley below, where he had labored in secret for two years of the war. “We have made war obsolete,” he triumphantly told his father. It did not take York long to realize he was completely wrong.
In Japan, the power of the atomic bomb left people feeling helpless. In America, for that brief moment, it made people feel invincible. The idea that this same powerful weapon could soon threaten the United States had not yet sunk in. It would soon. The United States might have beaten the rest of the world in building an atomic bomb, but the Germans during the war had achieved something that the Americans, British, and Soviets had not: a guided ballistic missile. The V-2, a liquid-propelled rocket developed by Wernher von Braun and his team of scientists, could travel more than two hundred miles, with an engine thrust eighteen times greater than anything the Allies had achieved. The Nazis used it to terrorize England during the war.
The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki hastened the end of World War II, and it also marked the beginning of a new war for scientific talent and engineering. The atomic bomb had proved that knowledge was power, and whatever nation had the most knowledge would have an edge in the next war. The Soviet Union might have been allies with the United States in its victory over Germany, but the two countries’ interests diverged even before Japan surrendered. In Germany, the Soviets and the Americans were already engaged in a race to capture knowledge.
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Standing in Frankfurt’s Hauptbahnhof in 1949, twenty-eight-year-old William Godel paused to admire the grand arches and curved glass above the train terminal. Outside, most of the city was still many feet deep in rubble—the aftermath of bombing during the war. It was not just the station’s neo-Renaissance design Godel was admiring but also the fact that it had survived the war with only superficial damage. The strategic bombing of Germany had been highly effective at causing civilian casualties but not at stopping the industrial war machine.
“Hey, you,” an American woman snapped. “Come put this baggage aboard and I’ll give you a cigarette.”
“Jawohl, gnädige Frau,” Godel answered, picking up her bag. As he carried it to the train, he walked with a slight limp—a war injury, something not uncommon to see in a German man his age in Frankfurt; Germany was flooded with crippled veterans. The train station was also filled with Americans, mostly military service members and their families stationed in Germany. The Americans who walked through the station were smartly dressed, whether in military uniform or civilian clothing. The Germans, on the other hand, shambled about the train station in threadbare suits. Germany was still under Allied occupation. The Americans controlled Frankfurt, and many still harbored a deep resentment of the Germans.
Sometimes the Americans would tell him a compartment was for “Americans only.” Godel was accustomed to being given orders by Americans in the train station, and the woman’s request to carry her bag was a relief; it meant that he was passing for what he was meant to pass for: Hermann Buhl, a former member of Germany’s Wehrmacht, and not an American covert operative. The young American was posing as a German veteran so he could slip across Soviet-occupied areas in Germany and Austria, and even into the Soviet Union, recruiting Russian and German scientists, engineers, and military officers to work for the United States. His German was fluent, but not native, good enough to pass with the Americans and Russians, and even Germans, in many cases. German veterans could quickly figure out he was not really exWehrmacht, but that did not so much matter; they had other things to worry about in the late 1940s. “It was a high-risk undertaking, replete with forged documents, black-market funds, bribery, loose women, and all manner of illegalities and immoralities,” he later wrote. He was also on his own when it came to the Russians. “Don’t get caught,” one army general told him, “because I cannot help you worth a damn over there.”
Godel’s work was under the larger rubric of Operation Paperclip, the military intelligence program that was scooping up German scientists and engineers to bring to the United States. The project, so named for the paper clip attached to each scientist’s dossier, had already garnered the biggest bounty: von Braun and his team of rocket scientists. At the end of the war, von Braun had actively sought out the American military, knowing that he and his team would likely fare better with the United States than with the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1945, the Soviets dispatched specialized military intelligence teams to Germany to gather anything that could be found in the way of military technology, including missiles, radar, and nuclear research. The Soviets took Peenemünde, where von Braun and his rocket team had been based, but they had already fled, taking much of their design work with them. “This is absolutely intolerable,” Joseph Stalin said. “We defeated Nazi armies; we occupied Berlin and Peenemünde; but the Americans got the rocket engineers. What could be more revolting and
and more inexcusable?”
The Soviets eventually took whatever they could, sending hundreds of German personnel back to the Soviet Union, not to mention trainloads of equipment. The Soviets’ hunt for technical expertise was broad, but it also lacked focus. As von Braun put it, “The Americans looked for brains, the Russians for hands.”
In Germany before the war, von Braun had been part of a visionary group that dreamed of building rockets for space travel but agreed to work for the military, and eventually the Nazis, on weapons. In going with the Americans, he hoped again to work on space travel. Instead, von Braun and more than a hundred other rocket scientists were taken to the United States, initially to Fort Bliss, Texas, and relegated to showing the Americans how to build and operate the V-2. Unsure of what to do with the Germans, and unwilling to give them money to design new rockets, let alone fulfill von Braun’s ambitions of space travel, the Americans allowed his team to languish in the South.
The Soviets did not suffer from indecision, however. Using captured German know-how, the Soviets moved forward swiftly with designing rockets that could travel even greater distances than the V-2. “Do you realize the tremendous strategic importance of machines of this sort?” Stalin told a senior Russian rocket scientist after the war. “It could be an effective straightjacket for that noisy shopkeeper, Harry Truman. We must go ahead with it, comrades.” In the Soviet Union, the goal was clear. “What we really need,” said Pavel Zhigarev, the commander in chief of the Soviet air forces, “are long-range, reliable rockets that are capable of hitting the American continent.”
As the Soviets moved forward with their ballistic missile program, William Godel, disguised as Hermann Buhl, was on a parallel mission: trying to collect intelligence on Soviet military capabilities. He was growing increasingly convinced that the American military was pursuing weapons based on its own bureaucratic interests and not based on what intelligence was telling it was needed.
William Hermann Godel was born as Hermann Adolph Herbert Buhl Jr. on June 29, 1921, in Denver, Colorado, to Hermann Buhl Sr. and Lumena Buhl, German immigrants. Hermann Buhl Sr. died of pneumonia in 1931, and Lumena soon married another German immigrant, named William Frederick Godel, who ran his own insurance business and prior to World War II served as the German consul in Denver. The next year, Lumena’s new husband legally adopted his stepson and, at the suggestion of the judge, officially changed the boy’s name to William H. Godel. Relations between the two were icy at best. At one point, the younger Godel built a shack in the backyard to avoid living in the same house as his adoptive father.
After high school, Godel attended the New Mexico Military Institute in Roswell and then, later, Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. He initially went to work for the War Department’s military intelligence division, but when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Godel was commissioned as an officer in the Marine Corps and participated in the initial landings in the Pacific. He was wounded twice, including at Guadalcanal in January 1943, where he was hit by a hand grenade. The fragments shattered the bone in his left leg and destroyed a good portion of its muscle. He was awarded the Purple Heart and sent back home to recuperate. For the rest of his life, he would need a leg brace and walk with a limp.
Godel desperately wanted to stay in the Marine Corps and insisted he was fit to serve, but by 1947, after a series of medical reviews, he lost the battle. The wound in his left leg was still not completely healed, and Godel was forcibly retired from the Marine Corps, declared medically unfit for service. He made enough of a name for himself that after the war General William “Wild Bill” Donovan, the wartime head of the Office of Strategic Services, recruited Godel to Washington to work as an intelligence research specialist for the army focusing on the Soviet Union.
It was a chaotic but exciting time to be involved in intelligence. Before the war, intelligence was regarded as something of a dirty business. “Gentlemen don’t read other people’s mail,” Secretary of State Henry Stimson declared in 1929, when explaining why the United States should halt its cryptanalysis work. Pearl Harbor and World War II might have discredited that view, but there was still nothing approaching a robust intelligence machine even after the war ended. There were, however, powerful personalities lobbying for power, particularly those who formed part of a close-knit community of military and intelligence operatives who had served together in World War II. Men like the air force brigadier general Edward Lansdale, a legendary spy, and William Colby, the future director of the CIA, emerged during this period. So, too, did William Godel.
In 1947, Harry Truman signed the National Security Act, which attempted to impose order on the bureaucratic chaos that emerged after World War II. The war had created a multitude of people and organizations vying for power, and the legal reorganization was supposed to bring some clarity with the establishment of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency while also streamlining the Department of Defense and creating the Department of the Air Force, splitting it off from the army. The National Security Act, in reality, simply spawned an array of new organizations all competing for resources. The army, the navy, and the newly created air force all claimed ownership of rocket and missile research, while the CIA also saw a need for military technology that could collect intelligence on the Soviet Union.
The most important of those new technologies was, as Stalin rightly pointed out, an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM. It would be a categorically different military capability; by the early 1950s, the Soviet Union was building bombers that could carry nuclear weapons to the East Coast of the United States, but they could also be potentially detected and intercepted. In the United States, computer scientists were already hard at work developing computer systems that could link radars together, to allow the military to stop incoming Soviet bombers, but there was in the 1950s no existing technology that could conceivably stop an ICBM attack. Even if a missile were detected by radar, the military would have just seconds to respond, and then there was little to be done to stop it: it would be like trying to shoot a bullet out of the sky.
In the immediate years after World War II, there was initially little enthusiasm in the White House for investing in such long-range missiles. In 1947, President Truman, who had promised to bring federal debt under control, slashed the military’s rocket and missile programs. Funding was tight, and it was being fought over. The army, the navy, and the air force all had their own rocket and missile programs, each with justifications, often tenuous, for why that work properly belonged to them. The seeming triumph of American technology was short-lived. The United States had spent millions gathering up German technical talent, but when von Braun proposed research to his Pentagon masters to build more complicated rockets or—his ultimate goal—to design rockets that could travel into space, he was refused. It was a time of “professional gloom” for him and his team.
Yet the Soviets by 1949 had already developed a new ballistic missile, called Pobeda, or “Victory,” that could fly higher and carry more than the V-2 rocket. That same year, on August 29, the Soviet Union set off its first atomic bomb on the Kazakh Steppe, ending America’s monopoly on nuclear weapons. A little more than a month later, China fell to communism, and in June 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea. Truman, who thought he would demilitarize, was suddenly left dealing with twin threats of a Soviet nuclear and conventional buildup in Europe and a growing communist threat in Asia. The only choice for politicians in Washington seemed to be developing weapons even more powerful than those that had destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
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On November 1, 1952, Herbert York made a call to the nuclear physicist Edward Teller with a brief message. It was “zero hour,” York told Teller, who was watching a seismometer at the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley. Fourteen minutes passed, and then Teller called back with his own coded response: “It’s a boy.”
That “boy” was Ivy Mike, a 10.4-megaton hydrogen bomb that had just exploded in the clear blue waters of Eniwetok Atoll, vaporizing the island of Elugelab and creating, as Richard Rhodes described it, “a blinding white fireball three miles across.” The device, designed by Teller and Stanislaw Ulam, was a thousand times more powerful than the bomb that went off in Hiroshima. York, the young physicist who just seven years earlier had proudly told his father that war was obsolete, was now in charge of recruiting the scientists to design a new class of weapons whose power was so great that at one point it was feared the explosion would ignite the atmosphere and vaporize the oceans. Ivy Mike was a test of the world’s first thermonuclear weapon, known as the Super. This new bomb did more than create a new generation of superweapons; it also eliminated one of the last arguments against developing ICBMs. Thermonuclear weapons with yields in the many-megaton range meant that accuracy was no longer critical; with a big enough bang, hitting the target precisely was not as important. And once the thermonuclear weapon could be reduced in size, the military did not need bombers to haul weapons over long distances; it could pack them on an ICBM.
Three days after Ivy Mike exploded, Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had served as the supreme commander of the Allied forces in Europe during World War II, was elected president in a landslide, running on a campaign that focused heavily on battling communism. “World War II should have taught us all one lesson,” he declared. “The lesson is this: To vacillate, to hesitate—to appease even by merely betraying unsteady purpose—is to feed a dictator’s appetite for conquest and to invite war itself.”
By the time Eisenhower took office in January 1953, the Korean War was already drawing to a close, and he was alarmed by the growth in the federal budget. In the past two decades, spending had grown twenty-fold to more than $80 billion, and over half of that was going directly to the Pentagon. To rein in military spending, Eisenhower instituted a policy called New Look, which turned to nuclear weapons as a cost-effective way to offset drawdowns in conventional forces. It was fortuitous timing for rocket enthusiasts. Von Braun and his team had moved in 1950 to Huntsville, Alabama, where they were finally working on a new missile, called the Redstone. In Washington, Eisenhower was met with a flood of reports and panels making the case for rocket technology: both as weapons that could reach the Soviet Union and as a way to carry satellites into space. Rand, a newly established think tank funded by the air force, produced a series of reports proposing an earth-orbiting satellite as a military capability. Because satellites did not yet exist, there was still a question of national sovereignty: Would a satellite that flew over another country, such as the Soviet Union, be regarded as a violation of its airspace?
In 1954, the Technological Capabilities Panel, appointed by Eisenhower to look at the potential of a “surprise attack” by the Soviet Union, offered a solution: the United States would launch a purely scientific satellite as a pretext to establish “freedom of space,” which would then pave the way for military satellites. With all three of the military services developing separate technologies, the question was which should get to build the first rocket to space.
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As the military services battled over a nascent space program, William Godel in the 1950s was in the midst of a different war in the intelligence world. Back in Washington, D.C., he worked as an assistant to General Graves Erskine, the Pentagon’s director of special operations. Godel quickly earned a reputation as the go-to guy for special assignments, particularly those that combined intelligence with science. Whether it was recruiting foreign scientists to work with the Pentagon or formulating plans for Operation Deep Freeze, which established the American presence in Antarctica (and earned him an eponymous plot of frozen water, the Godel Iceport), Godel was known as a man who could get things done.
Godel was also often called in to deal with the turf wars in areas like psychological operations. Frustrated by the lack of coordination for such operations—covert and overt—across government, President Truman in 1951 established the "Psychological Strategy Board" and appointed Godel as a member. The job brought Godel into periodic battles with the CIA, though many of them were petty. Official correspondence from the time mentions CIA officials clashing with Godel about everything from the CIA director’s refusal to attend a Pentagon function for visiting dignitaries to whether the CIA was providing a Hollywood studio with film footage of American prisoners of war held in North Korea. But the infighting was bad enough that Frank Wisner, the head of the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination, banned Godel from his buildings.
It might have been run-ins like those that prompted a security investigation into Godel, something that was not unusual in an era when information dug up from background investigations was used as a blunt weapon to oust political enemies. In 1953, Pentagon security officials interviewed Godel after reports surfaced that his adoptive father had been a Nazi sympathizer.
While denying the allegation, Godel also distanced himself from the man who raised him. “I didn’t care for him,” Godel said. “I had no personal association with him other than as a man who has been very nice to my mother since I left in ’38.”
The investigation did not stop Godel’s upward trajectory in government, however. In 1955, Donald Quarles, then the assistant secretary of defense for research and development, assigned Godel to the National Security Agency, a part of government so highly classified at the time that its existence was not even acknowledged. The NSA had been established in 1952, bringing together the communications intelligence and code-breaking capabilities that had emerged from World Wars I and II. Like the rest of the Defense Department, the NSA was being scrutinized by the Eisenhower administration, which was unhappy with the quality of strategic intelligence. Godel was supposed to help straighten out the NSA’s overseas operations and cut back ineffective foreign bases. For Godel, the NSA assignment combined his twin interests in intelligence and technology. In a later unpublished interview, Godel had a simple description of his mission: he was a hatchet man. In 1955, the year Godel was assigned to scale back the NSA, a copy of his security interview, which included questions raised about his adoptive father’s Nazi sympathies, was sent over to the FBI at the personal request of J. Edgar Hoover to review. It is unclear what the FBI chief was looking for, but two years later Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson wrote back to Hoover: “Glad to know you think [Godel’s] doing a fine job.” Godel’s role by then had earned him consideration for a top slot at the NSA.
Godel might have been doing a fine job, but the NSA, like the rest of the defense and intelligence community, was about to become embroiled in yet a new crisis. The same year that Quarles sent Godel to revamp the NSA, he also appointed a panel to decide which rocket proposal would take the United States into space. The problem was that there was no civilian rocket program; only the military services were developing the technology that could launch a satellite into space. The air force’s plan was to launch an ICBM into space, and the army proposal would have involved relying on former Nazi scientists working at a military arsenal. The navy’s rocket, while the least mature, had the advantage of not being associated with a weapon. In the end, the panel passed over the army’s German rocket team and the air force’s ICBM, selecting instead the navy proposal, a rocket that was still in development. “This is not a design contest,” an outraged von Braun protested. “It is a contest to get a satellite into orbit, and we are way ahead on this.”
Von Braun’s concerns were ignored, even as over the next two years the navy fell behind schedule. The delays did not spark much concern among America’s political leaders, and particularly not for President Eisenhower, who still believed that the United States was ahead of the Soviet Union.
Then, in the fall of 1957, the CIA and the NSA were monitoring Soviet launches of intermediate-range missiles from Kapustin Yar, in western Russia, unaware of a much more important launch that was being prepared in Kazakhstan. Twelve years after winning a scientific gamble on nuclear weapons, Americans were about to face the reality that the horror the six-year-old Michiaki experienced in Nagasaki could soon reach the continental United States. The United States would no longer be invulnerable, and war was anything but obsolete.

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