Salta al contenuto principale



Google will verify Android developers distributing apps outside the Play store


Google is increasing security measures around sideloading apps by removing anonymity for Android developers who distribute outside of the Play Store. Starting in September next year, Google will require developers in Brazil, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand to verify their identities in order for their apps to be installed on certified Android devices via direct downloads or third-party app stores. This requirement will then roll out globally in “2027 and beyond.”

Under the new requirements, Android developers will need to provide Google with personal details like their legal name, address, email, and phone number, and may need to upload an official government ID. Identity verification is already a requirement for Google Play, so this change mostly impacts developers who solely distribute their apps outside of the Play Store.

#tech




Where can I find "fallback emailer" and set it?


Hello everybody! The question is written in the subject. See screenshot attached [img=https://community.nodebb.org/assets/uploads/files/1756192915329-firefox_screenshot_2025-08-24t20-47-01.480z.png]Firefox_Screenshot_2025-08-24T20-47-01.480Z.png[/img] C

Hello everybody!

The question is written in the subject.
See screenshot attached

Firefox_Screenshot_2025-08-24T20-47-01.480Z.png
Can't find it anywhere and have no clues, what the issue is.

NodeBB 4.4.6 latest on-premise. and self hosted SMTP setup.

SMTP is working with no problems.

Questa voce è stata modificata (2 settimane fa)
in reply to Twissell

Re: Where can I find "fallback emailer" and set it?


Twissell I think the "fallback emailer" is literally just searching for a "mail" executable on the machine.

It's pretty outdated now, since emailing directly from your machine is a good way to just get your emails to land in a spam bin somewhere. We should probably just update this to ℹ️ or ⚠️ instead of an error.




in reply to ZeeFoss

I'd say this list is not about moving towards FLOSS, but more about breaking up with Google services. Some replacements are betters, some worse, but definitely in each column there is at least one non-floss application 🤔

in reply to Davriellelouna

anything but the actual solution. like we had automatics and semi autos back when in the start of the country


disegni picrossici con miku, fuori dal telefono escono sorprese (asset rip giochino Mikulogi)


Prima (cioè, l’altro ieri, ormai si sa come va la roba qui) ho voluto estrarre gli asset da un giochino che ho sul telefono (forse il più gustoso che ho lì, a dire il vero), Hatsune Miku Logic Paint… cioè la fusione delle mie due più grandi passioni — almeno, dopo il rotting, l’avere segreti, […]

octospacc.altervista.org/2025/…


disegni picrossici con miku, fuori dal telefono escono sorprese (asset rip giochino Mikulogi)


Prima (cioè, l’altro ieri, ormai si sa come va la roba qui) ho voluto estrarre gli asset da un giochino che ho sul telefono (forse il più gustoso che ho lì, a dire il vero), Hatsune Miku Logic Paint… cioè la fusione delle mie due più grandi passioni — almeno, dopo il rotting, l’avere segreti, ed un’altra che non dirò. Difatti, il Picross con Miku è alquanto sfizioso, ma prenderne i file per altri usi lo è ancora di più, e nel farlo si scoprono svariate cose. 🤗

Innanzitutto, il gioco è fatto in Unity; chi mai lo avrebbe potuto immaginare? È buono però, perché è bastato dare in pasto ad AssetRipper la cartella estratta dall’APK per ottenere tutti i bei PNG, la musica, e… tutte le griglie dei puzzle in formato TXT (con 0 per indicare caselle vuote, 1 quelle piene, e virgole per fare da padding), evviva!!! (Oltre ad altri metadati in CSV, come i nomi dei puzzle e stringhe varie.) Questi torneranno sicuramente utili per fare una cosa che per motivi octosi non voglio spoilerare (e che per motivi legali non potrei fare, ma dalle cose octose non deriva mai lucro, quindi me ne sbatto il mikuleek). 🤪

Poi, però, ho visto una cosa meno divertente… tutti, e dico tutti, gli asset grafici, proprio gli elementi UI, sono rovinati dalla compressione, almeno in qualche misura! Ci sono ovunque piccoli artefatti di compressione che, a dire il vero, giocando sul telefono non si notano, ma che sono così evidenti anche solo ficcando il naso tra i file, senza zommare chissà quanto per alcuni, che sono pronta a scommettere che giocando sul mio tablet da 10 pollici li vedrei. (Attenzione, sono pronta a scommettere ma non a provare, mi secco ampiamente.) La cosa bella è che sono tutti PNG, non JPEG o WEBP o VFFNCL, quindi… a meno che non sia AssetRipper ad averli forzati in PNG, chi ha lavorato al gioco non è proprio del mestiere. Persino in una manciata di file che nel nome hanno “Uncompressed” (come questo) trovo artefatti, anche se non di tipo JPEG classico. 😪
I vari asset estratti, mostrate su Pignio la cartella root e quella Texture2D, mostrata zoomata l'immagine di sfondo della schermata del titolo; evidenziati con freccette rosse gli artefatti nelle varie immagini visibili. La cartella degli asset estratti, tolta molta monnezza, è circa 200 MB.
Insomma, lo hanno fatto un pochino sciatto questo coso… e a dire il vero forse torna tutto, vedendo le altre sviste di design che ci sono, come la musica che si ripete ad appena qualche secondo, cosa che da alquanto sui nervi, o che completando i picross si sbloccano delle immaginine dei vocaloid (con nessun tasto per condividere o boh, impostare come sfondo) anch’esse molto compresse (e per queste si, lo si nota anche dal telefono). Lato codice francamente penso sia ben fatto, perché bug non ne ho trovati e la UX è ben rifinita… anche se una svista pure lì c’è, e cioè che lo stato in corso di un livello non è salvato se non premendo indietro; in altre parole, se blocco lo schermo del telefono per qualche minuto, e quindi la MIUI di merda uccide la app, quando vado per continuare devo puntualmente ricominciare da capo, perché ho scordato di chiudere per bene. 😶

Boh, veramente boh, però comunque è un giochino okei. Ha 25 puzzle 5×5, 25 10×10, 100 15×15, e 4 compositi di 25 puzzle 25×25, quindi per chi ha 2,79€ in punti premio Google da spendere (“oggi offre Alphabet“) consiglio di provarlo… altrimenti, per i pirati c’è l’APK… o, ancora altrimenti, per gli octosi c’è—NO SPOILER! (E per chi vuole semplicemente frugare tra gli asset, come si nota in foto li ho caricati su Pignio, su pignio.octt.eu.org/item/mikulo…… e si, dovrei sia aggiungere un tasto per scaricare un’intera cartella come ZIP, che in generale migliorare la vista delle cartelle supportando le sottocartelle, ma per ora godetevi il miscuglio disordinato e pace.) 👾

#assets #game #HatsuneMikuLogicPaint #MikuLogi #mobile #picross #puzzle




Trump shooting and Biden exit flipped social media from hostility to solidarity: how political crises cause a shift in the force behind viral online content ‘from outgroup hate to ingroup love’.


The University of Cambridge’s Social Decision-Making Lab collected over 62,000 public posts from the Facebook accounts of hundreds of US politicians, commentators and media outlets before and after these events to see how they affected online behaviour.*

“We wanted to understand the kinds of content that went viral among Republicans and Democrats during this period of high tension for both groups,” said Malia Marks, PhD candidate in Cambridge’s Department of Psychology and lead author of the study, published in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

“Negative emotions such as anger and outrage along with hostility towards opposing political groups are usually rocket fuel for social media engagement. You might expect this to go into hyperdrive during times of crisis and external threat.”

“However, we found the opposite. It appears that political crises evoke not so much outgroup hate but rather ingroup love,” said Marks.

Just after the Trump assassination attempt, Republican-aligned posts signalling unity and shared identity received 53% more engagement than those that did not – an increase of 17 percentage points compared to just before the shooting.

These included posts such as evangelist Franklin Graham thanking God that Donald Trump is alive, and Fox News commentator Laura Ingraham posting: “Bleeding and unbowed, Trump faces relentless attacks yet stands strong for America. This is why his followers remain passionately loyal.”

At the same time, engagement levels for Republican posts attacking the Democrats saw a decrease of 23 percentage points from just a few days earlier.

After Biden suspended his re-election campaign, Democrat-aligned posts expressing solidarity received 91% more engagement than those that did not – a major increase of 71 percentage points over the period shortly before his withdrawal.

Posts included former US Secretary of Labor Robert Reich calling Biden “one of our most pro-worker presidents”, and former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi posting that Biden’s “legacy of vision, values and leadership make him one of the most consequential Presidents in American history.”

Biden’s withdrawal saw the continuation of a gradual rise in engagement for Democrat posts attacking Republicans – although over the 25 July days covered by the analysis almost a quarter of all conservative posts displayed “outgroup hostility” compared to just 5% of liberal posts.





DM me on Spotify: Spotify launches a messaging feature.


cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/36348361


DM me on Spotify: Spotify launches a messaging feature.


Technology reshared this.

in reply to Pro

I'd prefer it if they fixed the app so it doesn't play random shit and subscriptions and notifications actually work.


Apple vs. Facebook is Kayfabe


cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/36347295

::: spoiler Comments
- Hackernews.
:::



Apple vs. Facebook is Kayfabe


::: spoiler Comments
- Hackernews;
- Lobsters.
:::


Technology reshared this.

in reply to zewm

gotta find a way to get into that demographics head space somehow I guess
in reply to thisbenzingring

someone asked me how it's going...

LINDA MCMAHON IS THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION.

NOT FUCKING GOING WELL.





Chinese Hackers Hijack Web Traffic to Spy on Foreign Diplomats


cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/36349920

In March 2025, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) identified a complex, multifaceted campaign attributed to the PRC-nexus threat actor UNC6384. The campaign targeted diplomats in Southeast Asia and other entities globally. GTIG assesses this was likely in support of cyber espionage operations aligned with the strategic interests of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The campaign hijacks target web traffic, using a captive portal redirect, to deliver a digitally signed downloader that GTIG tracks as STATICPLUGIN. This ultimately led to the in-memory deployment of the backdoor SOGU.SEC (also known as PlugX). This multi-stage attack chain leverages advanced social engineering including valid code signing certificates, an adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attack, and indirect execution techniques to evade detection.

This blog post presents our findings and analysis of this espionage campaign, as well as the evolution of the threat actor’s operational capabilities. We examine how the malware is delivered, how the threat actor utilized social engineering and evasion techniques, and technical aspects of the multi-stage malware payloads.

In this campaign, the malware payloads were disguised as either software or plugin updates and delivered through UNC6384 infrastructure using AitM and social engineering tactics. A high level overview of the attack chain:
1. The target’s web browser tests if the internet connection is behind a captive portal;
2. An AitM redirects the browser to a threat actor controlled website;
3. The first stage malware, STATICPLUGIN, is downloaded;
4. STATICPLUGIN then retrieves an MSI package from the same website;
5. Finally, CANONSTAGER is DLL side-loaded and deploys the SOGU.SEC backdoor.

~Figure 1: Attack chain diagram~




Chinese Hackers Hijack Web Traffic to Spy on Foreign Diplomats


In March 2025, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) identified a complex, multifaceted campaign attributed to the PRC-nexus threat actor UNC6384. The campaign targeted diplomats in Southeast Asia and other entities globally. GTIG assesses this was likely in support of cyber espionage operations aligned with the strategic interests of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The campaign hijacks target web traffic, using a captive portal redirect, to deliver a digitally signed downloader that GTIG tracks as STATICPLUGIN. This ultimately led to the in-memory deployment of the backdoor SOGU.SEC (also known as PlugX). This multi-stage attack chain leverages advanced social engineering including valid code signing certificates, an adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attack, and indirect execution techniques to evade detection.

This blog post presents our findings and analysis of this espionage campaign, as well as the evolution of the threat actor’s operational capabilities. We examine how the malware is delivered, how the threat actor utilized social engineering and evasion techniques, and technical aspects of the multi-stage malware payloads.

In this campaign, the malware payloads were disguised as either software or plugin updates and delivered through UNC6384 infrastructure using AitM and social engineering tactics. A high level overview of the attack chain:
1. The target’s web browser tests if the internet connection is behind a captive portal;
2. An AitM redirects the browser to a threat actor controlled website;
3. The first stage malware, STATICPLUGIN, is downloaded;
4. STATICPLUGIN then retrieves an MSI package from the same website;
5. Finally, CANONSTAGER is DLL side-loaded and deploys the SOGU.SEC backdoor.

~Figure 1: Attack chain diagram~





Chinese Hackers Hijack Web Traffic to Spy on Foreign Diplomats


cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/36349920

In March 2025, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) identified a complex, multifaceted campaign attributed to the PRC-nexus threat actor UNC6384. The campaign targeted diplomats in Southeast Asia and other entities globally. GTIG assesses this was likely in support of cyber espionage operations aligned with the strategic interests of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The campaign hijacks target web traffic, using a captive portal redirect, to deliver a digitally signed downloader that GTIG tracks as STATICPLUGIN. This ultimately led to the in-memory deployment of the backdoor SOGU.SEC (also known as PlugX). This multi-stage attack chain leverages advanced social engineering including valid code signing certificates, an adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attack, and indirect execution techniques to evade detection.

This blog post presents our findings and analysis of this espionage campaign, as well as the evolution of the threat actor’s operational capabilities. We examine how the malware is delivered, how the threat actor utilized social engineering and evasion techniques, and technical aspects of the multi-stage malware payloads.

In this campaign, the malware payloads were disguised as either software or plugin updates and delivered through UNC6384 infrastructure using AitM and social engineering tactics. A high level overview of the attack chain:
1. The target’s web browser tests if the internet connection is behind a captive portal;
2. An AitM redirects the browser to a threat actor controlled website;
3. The first stage malware, STATICPLUGIN, is downloaded;
4. STATICPLUGIN then retrieves an MSI package from the same website;
5. Finally, CANONSTAGER is DLL side-loaded and deploys the SOGU.SEC backdoor.

~Figure 1: Attack chain diagram~




Chinese Hackers Hijack Web Traffic to Spy on Foreign Diplomats


In March 2025, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) identified a complex, multifaceted campaign attributed to the PRC-nexus threat actor UNC6384. The campaign targeted diplomats in Southeast Asia and other entities globally. GTIG assesses this was likely in support of cyber espionage operations aligned with the strategic interests of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The campaign hijacks target web traffic, using a captive portal redirect, to deliver a digitally signed downloader that GTIG tracks as STATICPLUGIN. This ultimately led to the in-memory deployment of the backdoor SOGU.SEC (also known as PlugX). This multi-stage attack chain leverages advanced social engineering including valid code signing certificates, an adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attack, and indirect execution techniques to evade detection.

This blog post presents our findings and analysis of this espionage campaign, as well as the evolution of the threat actor’s operational capabilities. We examine how the malware is delivered, how the threat actor utilized social engineering and evasion techniques, and technical aspects of the multi-stage malware payloads.

In this campaign, the malware payloads were disguised as either software or plugin updates and delivered through UNC6384 infrastructure using AitM and social engineering tactics. A high level overview of the attack chain:
1. The target’s web browser tests if the internet connection is behind a captive portal;
2. An AitM redirects the browser to a threat actor controlled website;
3. The first stage malware, STATICPLUGIN, is downloaded;
4. STATICPLUGIN then retrieves an MSI package from the same website;
5. Finally, CANONSTAGER is DLL side-loaded and deploys the SOGU.SEC backdoor.

~Figure 1: Attack chain diagram~





Chinese Hackers Hijack Web Traffic to Spy on Foreign Diplomats


In March 2025, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) identified a complex, multifaceted campaign attributed to the PRC-nexus threat actor UNC6384. The campaign targeted diplomats in Southeast Asia and other entities globally. GTIG assesses this was likely in support of cyber espionage operations aligned with the strategic interests of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The campaign hijacks target web traffic, using a captive portal redirect, to deliver a digitally signed downloader that GTIG tracks as STATICPLUGIN. This ultimately led to the in-memory deployment of the backdoor SOGU.SEC (also known as PlugX). This multi-stage attack chain leverages advanced social engineering including valid code signing certificates, an adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attack, and indirect execution techniques to evade detection.

This blog post presents our findings and analysis of this espionage campaign, as well as the evolution of the threat actor’s operational capabilities. We examine how the malware is delivered, how the threat actor utilized social engineering and evasion techniques, and technical aspects of the multi-stage malware payloads.

In this campaign, the malware payloads were disguised as either software or plugin updates and delivered through UNC6384 infrastructure using AitM and social engineering tactics. A high level overview of the attack chain:
1. The target’s web browser tests if the internet connection is behind a captive portal;
2. An AitM redirects the browser to a threat actor controlled website;
3. The first stage malware, STATICPLUGIN, is downloaded;
4. STATICPLUGIN then retrieves an MSI package from the same website;
5. Finally, CANONSTAGER is DLL side-loaded and deploys the SOGU.SEC backdoor.

~Figure 1: Attack chain diagram~





DM me on Spotify: Spotify launches a messaging feature.






in reply to chobeat

“Google says it has calculated the energy required for its Gemini AI service: Sending a single text prompt consumes as much energy as watching television for nine seconds.”


That's pretty staggering when you consider that it's no longer possible to do a Google search without generating an AI summary. Google processes something like 8 billion searches per day, so if each one of those triggers a prompt equivalent to watching 9 seconds of television, every day the total power cost is equivalent to about 2200 years of TV watching. Per day. And that's just search, for just one tech company.

in reply to chobeat

Ok, but I stopped reading when they quoted the moron Sutskever "I think it's pretty
likely the entire
Surface of the
earth will be
Covered with solar
panels and data
enters."





Apple vs. Facebook is Kayfabe


::: spoiler Comments
- Hackernews;
- Lobsters.
:::
Questa voce è stata modificata (2 settimane fa)


Will Smith's concert crowds are real, but AI is blurring the lines


::: spoiler Comments
- Hackernews.
:::
Questa voce è stata modificata (2 settimane fa)


New Flagships Redefine Form and Function


The smartphone market is shifting, with a renewed focus on design and practical innovation. New releases from Tecno and Apple are sparking a "thinness war," with devices like the Tecno Spark Slim and the rumored iPhone 17 Air pushing the boundaries of sleek design. Beyond aesthetics, manufacturers are integrating more on-device AI for improved privacy and performance, and new camera features like advanced zoom and real-time translation are becoming standard.

Technology reshared this.

in reply to 888

This feels like an incomplete thought that doesn’t go far enough to spark any sort of conversation.
in reply to NOT_RICK

Þe user's first, and only, post. Its oþer contribution is a single emoji reply comment.

80% chance AI bot.

Questa voce è stata modificata (2 settimane fa)

in reply to xc2215x

A fine isnt enough. This platform needs to be permanently shutdown.

This place is breeding grounds for morons, bigots, predators, and other social rejects, and it lets all of them continue thriving. By no comprehensible measure should that be normal, but somehow it is.

in reply to dinckel

Never heard of it, but isn't it the case that if it is shut down, that group of people will just move elsewhere as they have before?
in reply to DigitalDilemma

Correct. And the only choice from then is to continue deplatforming them even further. Bigots and abusers don't deserve to have a voice
in reply to dinckel

But I don't understand why don't they go after the abusers, instead of imposing a fine to the platform. This looks like a criminal case, it's not just a matter that should be left in the hands of the platform to begin with.. so why focus on blaming the platform?

Someone got bullied so hard they died, and the response is to simply ban them and then punish the platform? It sounds like an approach designed by lawyers who just want to make money, instead of actually an attempt to fix/correct the problem.

It's like blaming the email provider for allowing the exchange of messages and video files in a mailing group that was organizing crime.. instead of actually investigating the people who committed the crime and enacting laws / setting precedent that could act as deterrent, independently of which channel was used while committing the crime. Then punish the platform if they are not collaborating or if they are found to be complicit (while investigating the criminals).

Questa voce è stata modificata (2 settimane fa)
in reply to DigitalDilemma

Every time you deplatform a group, it generally shrinks by about 10%. Keep doing it enough and eventually you have a group that's JUST the diehards, and that group is generally so small that they'll burn themselves out.

in reply to agelord

I googled and apparently kick has been doing 180 million revenue yearly, so this is refreshingly high in terms of a fine.
in reply to agelord

I mean, Kick probably could be suspending people who stream for an unhealthily long time, maybe suspend his abusive friends, but they didn't force him to take any actions resulting in his death imo.

What exactly is the crime?

Questa voce è stata modificata (2 settimane fa)
in reply to agelord

Yes. I saw a video on getting around Flock's AI cameras and he mentions the numerous million dollar lawsuits that regularly result from misuse of their data and the glitches that cause people to have guns pointed at their heads by police.

It is a cost of doing business. Saying 'I'll sue you!' To them is as threatening as charging someone a little extra for that order of coffee they made.





How are you "supposed" to download your treasures? Download managers? Or just let the 100GB file sit in firefox download list and potentially get cut off mid-download?


I can never seem to get a download manger to work. I remember I used to be able to do that on windows, but SteamOS is giving me a headache, I'm a noob in linux.

But then again, idk if pausing would even be possible with these 🏴‍☠️ sites.

Questa voce è stata modificata (2 settimane fa)
in reply to DeathByBigSad

Read the wiki, use qbittorrent, setup the VPN with a killswitch for safety. Yarr!
in reply to DeathByBigSad

Wget you just type wget whateverurl.com
Questa voce è stata modificata (1 settimana fa)



Emilio Estevez, Martin Sheen – „Dein Weg“ (2010)

Der einzige Grund für mich, diesen Film zu sehen, war die Konstellation: Martin Sheen vor der Kamera, Emilio Estevez dahinter. Vater und Sohn, die gemeinsam einen Film schaffen, so direkt und sichtbar, ist eine Seltenheit in Hollywood. Der Jakobsweg dagegen wirkte eher wie eine Zumutung. Überstrapaziert von Selbsterfahrungsberichten, überhöht von Kirchenfolklore, in Deutschland endgültig re-popularisiert durch Hape Kerkelings Bestseller. Ein Trend, der mich eher abschreckt. Zumal mir meine ziemlich katholische Kindheit ohnehin wenig Lust auf Pilgerwege hinterlassen hat. (ARD)



How the gas lobby captured the energy crisis response - Corporate Europe Observatory


[00:13:55]

This episode tells the amazing story of how the EU took the brave step of using the climate and cost of living crisis as an opportunity to move away from destructive fossil fuels all together! Obviously, this didn’t happen, but it could have.

This is the forth episode of Corporate Europe Observatory's new podcast series “What's going wrong, and how to put it right?”.