ANOTHER WEEK, ANOTHER DIGITAL POLITICS. I'm Mark Scott, and will be in Washington next week — come say hello at an event I'm co-hosting on March 11 with Katie Harbath (and her excellent Anchor Change newsletter.)

I'll also be in Geneva on March 24 for a discussion on tech sovereignty and data governance (sign up here) and will be co-hosting another tech policy gathering in London on March 27 (sign up for more upcoming details here.)

— Under the Trump 2.0 administration, tech policy is now inextricably tied to trade and foreign policy. That's not so different than from before.

— The European Commission is reassessing its focus on digital regulation. That change is almost exclusively down to internal, not external, pressures.

— Artificial intelligence companies are in an arms race to sign up as many publishers worldwide to feed their large language models.

Let's get started:

Washington: same message, different delivery

AFTER DONALD TRUMP'S MEETING WITH Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office last week, tech policy is certainly not at the top of anyone's agenda when it comes to souring transatlantic relations. But as I get ready for a week in North America (Washington: March 10-12; Montréal: March 13-14), it's time to unpack what the first six weeks of the new Trump administration means, both for America and the rest of the world, when it comes to digital.

At first glance, there appears to be a significant shift. In repeated White House executive orders, directives and policy decisions, the US president has signaled his dislike for greater checks on (American) tech companies. Gone is United States support for the global tax revamp, negotiated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Gone is the support for greater content moderation on social media platforms — and the rise of threats if other countries follow that path. Gone is Washington's support for checks on artificial intelligence, including parts of an White House executive order from a Joe Biden-era. Gone is support for TikTok's ban within the US — a policy that Trump championed during his first term.

Taken as a whole, it feels like a upending of Washington's consensus that technology firms needed to be reined in; that cooperation with like-minded allies helped promote US economic interests; and that pushing back against foreign adversaries, in the online world, was a national security priority.

And yet, I'm not so sure.

It's sometimes easy to forget how past administrations acted when a new White House resident has his feet under the table. Dating back to Barack Obama's time in charge, consecutive US presidents have repeatedly pushed back against greater checks — from non-US countries — even when they promoted potential curbs at home. Obama, for instance, famously chided members of the European Parliament when they suggested that Google should be broken up. Let's leave aside the fact those lawmakers didn't have such powers. But fast forward a decade, and the European Union has never realistically considered forcing the split of these tech giants. But do you know who has? The US Department of Justice and its ongoing antitrust lawsuit against Alphabet and its dominance over search.

Let's look at other examples. Both Trump 1.0 and Biden's administrations, collectively, were never that excited about revamping the world's global tax regime — mostly because it would allow others to levy taxes against US tech firms. Washington would still come out net positive under those proposals, based on OECD calculations, as the US would earn additional revenue from taxing non-American firms, too. But the idea that pesky foreigners would impose levies on some of the most prominent US companies was something that garnered bipartisan anger.

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Here's what paid subscribers read in February:
— How changing geopolitics affects platform governance, digital competition, internet governance, trade and data protection. More here
— What happens when the US doesn't follow the game plan in combating 'hybrid warfare?;' What lessons to take from the Paris AI Action Summit?; Fact-checkers underpin crowdsourced 'community notes.' More here.
— Germany's federal election is reminder we don't know what happens on social media; The first transatlantic fight over digital won't come around social media rules; What the global tax overhaul would have meant for tech. More here.
— In the wake of the German election, we shouldn't claim 'mission accomplished' when it comes to fighting foreign interference. More here.

I can go on. Yes, the Trump administration has a longstanding opinion that all forms of online safety/content moderation regulation represent an illegitimate attack on free speech. I would disagree with that assessment, but that is the current White House's starting point. And yes, current US officials are open about their willingness to use trade sanctions against regions/countries (the EU and United Kingdom have been specifically name-checked for attention) that impose such regimes that Trump 2.0 believes represent unfair trading practices against US firms.

But as someone who had a front row seat to the crafting of the EU's Digital Services Act, I remember well that the former Biden administration equally pushed back hard against what it similarly believed was unfair practices from Brussels primarily targeted at Silicon Valley. Yes, these officials did it mostly behind closed doors and in support of some tech firms. But the message — while not as vocal or transactional as the current White House — was clear: these content moderation rules are bad, and the EU should cut it out.

Where I do get confused is how part of the Trump 2.0 team appears to be copying, almost word for word, the transparency and accountability parts of international online safety regimes. The same rules, it should be pointed out, that allegedly represent a fundamental threat to people's free speech. The US Federal Trade Commission's recent request for information "regarding technology platform censorship," for instance, includes language around how these firms made their content moderation decisions that would not be out of place in European-style legislation.

"Did the policies or other public-facing representations describe how, when, or under what circumstances the platform would deny or degrade users’ access to its services?," one of the FTC question asks. "Did the platform offer a meaningful opportunity to challenge or appeal adverse actions that deny, or degrade users’ access, consistent with its users’ reasonable expectations based on its representations?," says another. Those questions are equally at the center of what non-US officials want to understand, too.

I get the public differences between how Trump 2.0 and previous administrations have approached these issues. And on other aspects — particularly in relation to artificial intelligence and short-term equality issues on datasets — there are significant differences.

But when I peel back the rhetoric and look at the underlying policies, what are the differences in how the current White House approaches digital compared to its predecessors? In officials like Michael Kratsios, director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Gail Slater, the new head of the US Department of Justice's antitrust division, Trump 2.0 has picked well-qualified policymakers that aren't that different from who was in charge, only months ago, during Biden's time in charge.

One group I haven't mentioned is lawmakers in Congress. Sigh. The US House of Representatives and Senate certainly like to talk a good game on digital policy. (Anyone remember Chuck Schumer's AI Insight forums?) But I remain skeptical about any form of tech legislation making its way through Congress — mostly because it's not a high priority in the current political climate.

Some officials talk about renewed impetus for federal privacy rules (I've heard that before.) Others say more targeted legislation around online kids safety could win bipartisan support. Again, I have doubts.

But, if you take the recent US Inflation Reduction Act and US Chips Act — and their impact on the American domestic tech industry, as whole — then the view of Congress doesn't look too bad. Yes, the future of some of that legislation is in jeopardy under Trump 2.0. But, combined, the laws doubled down on US tech investment; provided federal subsidies to entice companies to spend locally; and positioned the country on a favorable footing in the increasingly geopolitical world that encompasses tech in 2025.

To me, that feels like a pretty familiar pitch no matter who currently resides in the White House.

Chart of the Week

TO COMPETE IN THE CUT-THROAT AI RACE, companies are rushing to pen deals with some of the largest newsletters and media outlets in the world.

The goal? To feed these firms' large language models with high-quality content that can make sophisticated systems more lifelike when they respond to real-world queries.

For publishers, it's a race for survival. Many have argued that AI companies have already scraped their sites — and the New York Times has sued OpenAI and Microsoft. But for others, these tech companies offer a new revenue opportunity to keep their legacy media businesses afloat.
Source: Ezra Eeman — which publishers have signed partnerships with individual AI firms

Brussels: different message, same delivery

CONVENTIONAL WISDOMS DICTATES that Brussels is firing on all cylinders. The EU has its shiny online safety rules (the Digital Services Act) and digital antitrust legislation (the Digital Markets Act), as well as the upcoming Artificial Intelligence Act — the world's first comprehensive rulebook for the emerging technology. In Ursula von der Leyen, the returning German head of the European Commission, the EU's executive branch, the 27-country bloc has a leader who helped pass those rules. Now, she's ready to wield them aggressively.

That is outdated thinking.

Yes, the EU is in the midst of implementing new digital rules, many of which have never been tested before. The Digital Markets Act's shift to ex ante oversight, or allowing regulators to determine where market abuse may happen before it occurs, is a significant departure from decades of competition jurisprudence, for instance. The Digital Services Act's transparency and accountability provisions for social media companies and search engines — that do not require platforms to remove legal content, to be clear — are being watched by other countries eager to follow that approach.

And yet, the political and economic winds have significantly shifted in Brussels.

For now, let's leave aside the increasingly fraught relationship between the EU and US after decades of close ties. Within the bloc, ongoing sluggish economic output and a failure to capture the next generation of technology advances by European firms have fundamentally altered how EU officials now approach questions around digital policymaking. At the center of that switch is last year's report from Mario Draghi, the former head of the European Central Bank. In his analysis, the ex-Italian prime blamed overburdensome regulation — including the AI Act and the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, or comprehensive privacy regime — for hamstringing the bloc's economy compared to international rivals.

That ethos has taken hold at the top of the European Commission. I would disagree that all regulation/legislation leads to poor economic outcomes, especially in the digital space. Personally, a lack of coordination EU-wide capital markets and a failure to create a "digital single market" across the 27 countries is more to blame for Europe's lack of tech champions. For me, generations of tech regulation is a secondary issue when, say, a Swedish startup founder can not easily reach out to an Italian investor to back her company to sell into a unified online market from Finland to Greece. But hey, I'm not a former head of the European Central Bank.

This 'de-regulate at all costs!' mantra is now playing out in how Brussels approaches digital. When I saw Henna Virkkunen, the newly-appointed European Commission executive vice president in charge of tech, at the Paris AI Action Summit, the Finnish politician wanted to talk about the EU's Apply AI Strategy and AI Factories initiative — policies aimed at using public funds to jumpstart European companies' use of the emerging technology. In her 10 minute speech, I counted at least 10 references to "innovation," and only a couple of mentions of "regulation." It's not a perfect metaphor for what's happening. But it's pretty close.

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To a degree, this makes sense. The EU's economy remains sluggish, and Brussels can't realistically compete with Beijing and Washington on the global stage if it doesn't have a homegrown tech industry. That goes for everything from AI startups to industrial champions making electric vehicles. All the best (or worst?) digital rules in the world don't matter if non-EU countries look at how that legislation hasn't helped local businesses, and say 'no thanks.' Caveat: such legislation is also about protecting citizens' from harm, but I digress.

This change of focus — where even returning EU officials who helped to craft these rules in the previous European Commission's tenure are shifting their policymaking approach — will inevitably have an impact on how digital rules are created.

Already, Brussels has shelved its so-called AI Liability Directive over concerns it would harm growth. I have questions about how future investigations, under the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act, will be pushed if such probes signal to all countries (both EU and non-EU) that the bloc isn't open for business. The AI Act's full implementation is still about 18 months away, and I equally question what resources will be provided to make sure those rules are effective given the change in political priorities at the top of the European Commission.

Much of this nuance is getting lost in the EU-US diplomatic spat over Washington's aversion to Brussels' regulatory rulebook. European fears over American retaliatory tariffs are certainly worrying many within the EU — both inside the so-called Brussels Bubble and across national capitals.

But it's the 180-degree internally-focused turn within the 27-country bloc that's driving the wider change in the EU's mood music around digital regulation.

No, the existing rules aren't going away — and will lead to likely enforcement actions against (some) American firms, given the ongoing probes into Meta, Alphabet and X, among others. Yet the era of 'let them have more digital rules!' is over within the EU. And that shift is coming from within, not from outside.

What I'm reading

— The geopolitical race on AI is fundamentally reshaping international data flows and leading to regulatory fragmentation, argue Christopher Kuner and Gabriela Zanfir-Fortuna for the Future of Privacy Forum.

— Japan approved new AI legislation that represents a so-called 'light touch' approach to the technology, and will require companies to voluntarily cooperate with Tokyo's safety measures. More here and here.

— The European Union and India held their second Trade and Technology Council meeting in New Delhi on Feb 28. Here are the outcomes.

— OpenAI updated its analysis on how malign actors were using its technology for 'malicious uses.' More here.

— The European Fact-Checking Standards Network condemned a recent police raid on its Serbian member organization Istinomer.rs. More here.

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