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Online safety's day in court


Online safety's day in court
IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS. I'm Mark Scott, and this edition marks the one-year anniversary for this newsletter. That's 61 newsletters, roughly 130,000 words and, hopefully, some useful insight into the world of global digital policymaking.

To thank all subscribers for your support, I'm offering a one-year additional paid subscription to someone from your network. Please fill in this form, and I will add one additional subscriber (for Digital Guru subscribers, it will be three additional users) for a 12-month period.

Also, for anyone in Brussels, I'll be in town next week from Sept 8 - 11. Drop me a line if you're free for coffee.

— The outcome to a series of legal challenges to online safety legislation will be made public in the coming weeks. The results may challenge how these laws are implemented.

— We are starting to see the consequences of what happens when policymakers fail to define what "tech sovereignty" actually means.

— The vast amount of money within the semiconductor industry comes from the design, not manufacture, of high-end microchips.

Let's get started:



digitalpolitics.co/newsletter0…



Primera edició d'aquesta formació sobre comunicació i llenguatge amb perspectiva feminista amb
@coopolis

22 de setembre, 11 a 13h 📆
Al @Bloc4BCN 📍
Per @marymvillena 🔊

Inscripcions gratuïtes a bcn.coop/formacio/comunicacio-…



“Costruire itinerari formativi secondo la nuova ratio nationalis”. È il tema scelto per l’Incontro nazionale per i formatori dei seminari, che si svolgerà a Salerno, dal 2 al 4 settembre.


Lo mejor de la mañana, un buen Tarro de Guarapo ☕️ y dar gracias a Dios por un nuevo día , por una nueva oportunidad de hacer las cosas bien...

Bienvenido Mes Septiembre

Aquí vamos... ⛈️☔🍀🙏

#1Sept2025

#Telegram #Bluesky
#Sigmal #Mastodon
#Instagram #Facebook



1er septembre 1902 : Sortie du film « Le Voyage dans la Lune » 🚀.
Inspiré des romans « De la Terre à la Lune » de Jules Verne et « Les Premiers Hommes dans la Lune » de H. G. Wells, il s’agit du premier film de science-fiction de l'histoire du cinéma. #CeJourLà #OnThisDay
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le_Voyag…



The revamped #greeter runs tailored #desktop tours on launch or after major updates. Rolling out helps to replace the old #Qt5-based greeter. #Linux #OpenSource #openSUSE news.opensuse.org/2025/08/21/o…



Storm forces Gaza aid flotilla back to Barcelona port
https://www.euronews.com/2025/09/01/storm-forces-gaza-aid-flotilla-back-to-barcelona-port?utm_source=flipboard&utm_medium=activitypub

Posted into Europe News @europe-news-euronews



I see an otherwise-reasonable USAian is once again pretending that GDPR enforces cookie notices because they have a profit incentive.

How boring.

reshared this



Merz eröffnet den Herbst des Streits: Wer die Schwächsten ins Visier nimmt, regiert nicht für alle – sondern spaltet das Land.

#Miosga

reshared this



Ukrainian Colonel Anatoliy Shtefan "Shtirlitz" reports that a missile strike on August 26 eliminated eight officers of Russia’s FSB Border Service.


This weekend I will be at #Connichi !💖

Find me at T17 in the Artist Alley.
I will have new merch, including my brand new carabiners and the summer prints with me! 🤩

#artistalley #connichi2025 #pixelartist



AI web crawlers are destroying websites in their never-ending hunger for any and all content

theregister.com/2025/08/29/ai_…

Yes, of course, we can try to fend them off with logins, paywalls, CAPTCHA challenges, and sophisticated anti-bot technologies. You know one thing AI is good at? It's getting around those walls.

As for robots.txt files, the old-school way of blocking crawlers? Many – most? – AI crawlers simply ignore them.

in reply to Khrys

Would it be possible to troll these things using a TOS page stating: "Access to the content of this site requires a USD 1M, unless you are a human. Click here (or whatever suitable challenge) to confirm you accept these TOS". And then send a bill to the crawlers.



🆕 blog! “A little oddity in the way curl deals with old dates”

For boring technical reasons, computers think the world began on 1st of January 1970. To keep track of the future, they count the number of seconds since that momentous date. So zero seconds represents midnight on that day.

So how do computers deal with dates before The Beatles' Abbey Road was …

👀 Read more: shkspr.mobi/blog/2025/09/a-lit…

#bug #curl #linux #time

Terence Eden reshared this.



At the risk of starting discourse, let me be clear about what I personally mean when I say that ATproto is centralized:

• If the bsky.app domain goes down or is blocked, approximately 99.9% of the ATproto network goes down.
• I personally have no way of using ATproto that doesn't depend on self-hosting or relying on bsky.app. (This one might not hold if I had an invite link.)
• ATproto is not under open governance. Bsky PBLLC has promised to donate it to IETF, but that has not happened IIUC.

in reply to Kuba Suder • @mackuba.eu on 🦋

@mackuba Perhaps a more precise question, then, would be what happens if the Bluesky PDS and AppView both go down? That's not a contrived scenario, to be sure — that Bluesky-the-company was able to block access to the bulk of the ATproto network from Mississippi (a decision I take no issue with, to be sure!) shows that if compelled to, Bluesky-the-company has a significant ability to take down infrastructure.
in reply to Cassandra Granade 🏳️‍⚧️

The Mississippi block is a bit different, because they've done it only on the client level, so using a different client works around that.

But yeah, if all their PDSes and their AppView disappeared, then we'd basically be left with the self-hosters scrambling to put up something AppView-shaped to at least talk between each other and then build up from there.



Suerte Animalitera
#1Sept #LosEscondidos
LottoActivo LaGranjita
SelvaPlus

- (01) CARNERO 🐏
- (10) TIGRE 🐅
- (25) GALLINA 🐔
- (33) PESCADO 🐠

Ñapa - (0) DELFÍN 🐬

#Telegram #Instagram
#Signal #Bluesky
#Mastodon
#LosTosTonesyRefrescos_
#RT 🍀🤞



“No fault evictions” soar under UK Labour government stuffed with landlords - World Socialist Web Site

wsws.org/en/articles/2025/08/3…

Quincy reshared this.








L’intelligenza artificiale a servizio della genetica. Arriva l’AI per decifrare il Dna

[quote]ROMA – L’intelligenza artificiale a servizio della genetica è già realtà e prova ora a raggiungere nuovi traguardi. A farlo è l’azienda statunitense Deepmind che già nel 2020 aveva sfruttato…
L'articolo L’intelligenza artificiale a servizio della genetica. Arriva



“🤯#Switch2のUSB-C_任天堂がまさかの「罠」!?深まる互換性の闇を暴く!#Switch2 #USBC #任天堂の野望 #九01” (1 user) htn.to/2ckjSVm55p #情報処理 #USBC #任天堂 #技術 #消費者 #game #日本 #ビジネス #セキュリティ #tech

·
“50年目のマイドナー計画——所有の民主化か、失敗の教訓か? #経済民主主義 #未来のデザイン #九01 1914ルドルフ・マイドナーのマイドナー計画_昭和スウェーデン史ざっくり解説” (1 user) htn.to/2Rh9UnydeH #北欧 #スウェーデン #経済 #労働 #経済史




Pernille for 3 uger siden:
“Aj mand, nu skal jeg holde fast i den fantastisk afslappethed vi har opnået i ferien og ikke starte for mange projekter op. Det må vi hjælpe hinanden med”.

Mand for 3 uger siden:
“Uhm det siger du nu, men…”

Pernille nu: “Aj hvor fedt, jeg skal da have kolleger til havevandring, starte ny vane med søndagsmorgenbadning med nabo, lære at sy en særk (og kjolen som passer til sgu), plante de frugttræer jeg mangler, tage stiklinger af alt, aldrig sige nej til fede nye brainstorming ideer på arbejde” .
🤯 hvornår har vi ferie igen?

Unknown parent

mastodon - Collegamento all'originale
alf149 (Rolf Amfelt)
@infonauten @holsta @Ruth_Mottram
Det har du ikke råd til, primært pga. prisen på at sende chokoladen.
Gør også svartiden på api’et lidt langsomt.
Unknown parent

mastodon - Collegamento all'originale
Ulf Reese Næsborg
@holsta @Ruth_Mottram @alf149 hvad bliver prisen for API-adgang på Enterprise-niveau?


Flashback 22 years ago, remembering my buddy Zeke and the car’s dog nose radio. As we drove into work he’d be sniffing an air vent, checking the "news”. If something interesting came over the airwaves he’d excitedly verify it in a second vent to the side, stereo if you will.
#DogsOfMastodon #MonDog
Questa voce è stata modificata (2 settimane fa)

reshared this



¡Hoy es el Día de Apreciación de los Rotulistas! Esta gente se lo curra para que los cómics *se oigan*, dadles cariño #lettererappreciationday


Today is house meeting day for us at DMI as we find out where the state's budget cuts will land and who will be affected (i.e. made redundant).

Coincidentally, one of our #Ukraine #AntarcticScience centre colleagues has just sent us a draft deliverable report to review.

They apologise for lack of polish (it's actually really good! And very interesting science looking at climate change impacts in Antarctica) and they appended this photo of their apartment block after a visit by a Russian drone last week.

And suddenly, Danish state budget cuts seem much less worse...

And now I am going to find someone to swear at.

Eye reshared this.



China–Türkiye Leaders Pledge Deeper Ties at SCO Summit thedailycpec.com/china-turkiye…


New post! C’era poi una terza corrente che faceva riferimento al pensatore Julius Evola Read more here collasgarba.wordpress.com/2025…
C’era poi una terza corrente che faceva riferimento al pensatore Julius Evola Non è possibile utilizzare la categoria di destra nell’Italia del secondo dopoguerra senza fare i conti con «“l’invasione” del concetto di destra da parte del fascismo» <1. È quella che è stata


C’era poi una terza corrente che faceva riferimento al pensatore Julius Evola


Non è possibile utilizzare la categoria di destra nell’Italia del secondo dopoguerra senza fare i conti con «“l’invasione” del concetto di destra da parte del fascismo» <1. È quella che è stata più volte rilevata come l’anomalia della destra italiana: antiliberale, antisistema e antimoderna, tanto che essa stessa è arrivata a rifiutare l’etichetta di destra, che dall’evento fondativo della modernità – la rivoluzione francese – aveva tratto origine <2. L’accostamento di destra e (neo) fascismo ha avuto l’effetto di rimuovere la destra dal circuito della legittimità politica. Una riprova in questo senso è la mancata separazione di destra ed estrema destra ❤. Condannati nel ghetto dell’illegittimità, missini e monarchici stentavano a sopravvivere agli albori dell’Italia repubblicana e antifascista. La condanna, però, lungi dall’essere meramente imposta dal sistema, era paradossalmente cercata. Il rapporto tra identità e legittimità costituisce un’utile cartina di tornasole per comprendere le ragioni degli esclusi. È stata la stessa identità a generare illegittimità, che a sua volta li ha relegati ai margini della competizione politica. Tale marginalità ha rilanciato l’orgoglio della diversità e ha alimentato la spirale dell’identità illegittima <4.
Nel 1948 le urne non avevano dato grandi soddisfazioni ai partiti di destra, se si esclude l’effimero successo dell’Uomo Qualunque <5. Tuttavia, alla trascurabile rappresentanza parlamentare non corrispondeva la medesima diffusione nella società. Solo in parte, infatti, la presenza della destra in parlamento rendeva ragione dell’ampiezza della destra nella società e nel mondo imprenditoriale e culturale in senso lato.
Alla luce di queste considerazioni, la riduzione della categoria di destra a neofascismo non è esaustiva. Sia perché il neofascismo aveva ancoraggi culturali e ideologici anche a sinistra e sia, soprattutto, perché non permette di capire l’Italia degli anni Cinquanta, periodo privilegiato per indagare la consistenza e il seguito della destra – sia in Parlamento che nella società – nel nostro Paese.
È necessario, a questo proposito, non cedere alla tentazione di identificare la destra con il fascismo né con il neofascismo. E allargare l’orizzonte a quella che è stata felicemente definita destra “impolitica” o “carsica”. Una destra, cioè, che non solo non si identificava coi due terminali partitici all’estremità dello schieramento politico – Pnm e Msi – ma era anzi assai critica nei loro confronti. Distanziandosi dalla “iper-politicità” delle due formazioni, presentava non di rado spiccate venature di antipolitica e di scetticismo nei confronti del sistema parlamentare in quanto tale. Ciò premesso, il riferimento al fascismo di questa seconda declinazione della destra si presentava piuttosto sfumato. La nostalgia dei “bei tempi andati”, siano essi identificati col Duce o con la Corona, rimaneva nell’alveo di un generico conservatorismo, piuttosto distante da Salò e da contenuti programmatici aggressivi. Era un fronte sociale eterogeneo «sempre pronto a palpitare per generiche cause nobili ma restio a mobilitarsi davvero nell’agone politico» <6. Alla critica per certi versi acuta e formidabile nei confronti del sistema politico non seguiva mai un programma organico e credibile. Tanto era profonda la distanza dai missini, quanto era generica l’attesa delle “forze sane” che avrebbero dovuto soppiantare il tanto vituperato “ciellenismo”. Si trattava di un’attesa che univa industriali di vari settori a intellettuali come Indro Montanelli. Accomunati dal rifiuto del nascente sistema partitocratrico, avevano individuato distorsioni che si sarebbero approfondite nel tempo. Con ogni probabilità, le più preoccupanti erano l’eccessivo potere dei partiti e lo sconvolgimento di credenze consolidate. Ma erano uniti più contro qualcosa che per un progetto comune, eccezion fatta per l’esperienza di Edgardo Sogno. In altri termini, il collante delle varie famiglie e personalità della destra nell’Italia degli anni Cinquanta era l’avversione al comunismo <7. Oltre a dover sopportare, a volte giustamente e altre meno, il fardello del fascismo, l’altro dato strutturale delle destre era, appunto, l’anticomunismo.
È utile passare in rassegna più nel dettaglio le destre in Italia all’indomani del conflitto mondiale, tenendo ben presente anche il contesto internazionale. Fin dalla fondazione, nel dicembre ’46, vari furono i problemi che dovette affrontare il Movimento sociale italiano. Il partito riunì numerosi gruppi e associazioni che erano sorti spontaneamente dopo la guerra. Già durante il conflitto, stando all’attento lavoro di Parlato, si erano poste le basi, con la collaborazione dell’Oss (Office of strategic services) e di alcuni settori del Vaticano <8, per la nascita di un soggetto politico del genere. Dopo la guerra, e in particolare in occasione del referendum del ’46, anche Pci e Dc, con interessi e finalità diverse, si impegnarono a trattare col neofascismo <9. Inoltre, i missini cavalcarono le proteste sorte in seguito alle condizioni di pace e si presentarono come gli unici veri interpreti della nazione italiana <10.
Risolto il problema della sopravvivenza, anche grazie all’amnistia <11, l’altra battaglia era quella della scelta legalitaria rispetto alla clandestinità. Tale scelta, tutt’altro che unanime, suscitò i malumori dei giovani e dei reduci che avevano attivamente partecipato alla Rsi. Era, in termini più generali, la spia della presenza di due anime: una di “sinistra”, repubblicana, antioccidentale e terzaforzista che intendeva combattere il regime ciellenista traditore dello spirito di Salò, e l’altra, più pragmatica, nazional-conservatrice in campo sociale e religioso, filomonarchica e filoatlantica, che voleva inserirsi nel sistema politico parlamentare <12. Principali interpreti della tendenza legalitaria erano Romualdi e Michelini. Per estendere l’area di influenza del partito e far fronte alla sfida comunista, puntavano a trasformare il neofascismo «da fenomeno di conventicole perdenti in forza politica in grado di parlare a molti, se non a tutti» <13. Tuttavia, la strategia del “Senato” missino era destinata a rimanere sulla carta e ad essere soppiantata dall’attivismo di Almirante. Da gennaio ’47 alla vigilia delle elezioni politiche del ’48, la struttura del Msi venne modificata sia a causa di una serie di eventi – arresti, uccisioni e allontanamenti – che misero fuori gioco esponenti del “partito di Romualdi”, sia per la strategia almirantiana. L’approccio di Almirante comportava un radicamento sul territorio prima sconosciuto. Dai comizi nelle piazze al “giornale parlato”, il Msi acquisiva un metodo e una visibilità completamente nuovi <14.
Alla decisiva scadenza elettorale del 18 aprile 1948 il partito si presentava con un programma comprendente la critica serrata alla Costituzione, il rilancio di alcuni nodi irrisolti della politica estera, la socializzazione del lavoro e la valorizzazione della necessaria opposizione nazionale al governo e ai socialcomunisti <15. Il Msi, sulla base di un programma decisamente “sociale”, raccolse però voti soprattutto tra i notabili e i grandi proprietari terrieri del Sud. Eleggendo sei deputati e un senatore, tutti nelle circoscrizioni meridionali, il partito della Fiamma concludeva la fase della clandestinità ma non poteva evitare di fare i conti con l’inattesa geografia dei consensi e con la difformità tra elettori potenziali ed effettivi. Si trattava della forbice tra dirigenti e militanti da una parte ed elettori dall’altra. Una forbice la cui presenza era fisiologica in ogni partito, ma che nel Msi assurgeva a vero e proprio carattere distintivo a causa della grande distanza – nello stesso tempo geografica, storica e ideale – tra attivisti ed elettori. Tale aspetto, ampiamente rilevato dalla storiografia, ha obbligato i dirigenti a retrocedere dalle «originarie velleità barricadiere e ribellistiche» <16, pena la scomparsa del partito stesso. Come ha efficacemente sottolineato Tarchi, «per il Mezzogiorno il fascismo aveva rappresentato un fenomeno di promozione e di accelerazione della mobilità sociale verso l’alto, che non aveva avuto riscontro nella parte più sviluppata del Paese» <17.
Non era certo sufficiente la rappresentanza parlamentare a garantire il crisma della legittimità. Da parte sua, il Msi continuava ad agire in maniera quasi schizofrenica: da un lato riaffermava la propria identità di partito di nicchia, dall’altro si poneva come partito-nazione e «accreditandosi come titolare di una investitura quasi sacrale» <18 si contrapponeva agli altri partiti. In cima all’agenda politica dei missini c’erano battaglie <19. Dal punto di vista interno costituivano una priorità la collocazione del partito nello spazio politico e la conseguente strategia di alleanze, la battaglia contro l’epurazione, i diritti dei combattenti della Rsi e la politica sociale. Da quello internazionale l’adesione al Patto Atlantico, il ruolo dell’Italia come potenza coloniale e la questione di Trieste erano gli argomenti principali.
Questi temi furono oggetto di discussione al secondo congresso, che ebbe luogo a Roma nel 1949 e vide consolidarsi la presenza delle due anime antitetiche su pressoché tutte le questioni sollevate. C’era poi una terza corrente, più culturale e meno politica, che faceva riferimento al pensatore Julius Evola, tradizionalista, antililiberale, antimoderno, anticristiano e fautore di un “razzismo spirituale”. <20 Tale confronto, con diverse sfumature, incontri e scontri più o meno decisivi, ha scandito tutte le fasi della storia del Movimento sociale italiano. <21

[NOTE]1 G. Parlato, La cultura internazionale della destra tra isolamento e atlantismo (1946-1954), in G. Petracchi (a cura di), Uomini e nazioni. Cultura e politica estera nell’Italia del Novecento, Gaspari editore, Udine, 2005, p. 134. Si vedano anche: E. Galli della Loggia, Intervista sulla destra, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1994, pp. 134-135; R. Chiarini, La destra italiana. Il paradosso di una identità illegittima, «Italia contemporanea», n. 185, dicembre 1991, p. 585.
2 M. Revelli, La destra nazionale. Un manuale per capire, un saggio per riflettere, Il Saggiatore, Milano, 1996, p. 63.
3 A titolo di esempio, Ginsborg ha scritto che «le perdite democristiane del 1953 erano andate a vantaggio dell’estrema destra», P. Ginsborg, Storia d’Italia dal dopoguerra a oggi, Einaudi, Torino, 2006, p. 192. Tra gli altri autori che associano la destra all’estremismo si segnalano F. Ferraresi (a cura di), La destra radicale, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1984, p. 13 e P. Di Loreto, La difficile transizione. Dalla fine del centrismo al centrosinistra 1953-1960, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1993, p. 55 n. Anche Bobbio ha espresso le sue perplessità su una distinzione semantica che non è secondaria. Distinguendo «una destra eversiva da una destra moderata, cui dall’altra parte corrisponderebbero una sinistra moderata e una eversiva, si otterrebbe il duplice vantaggio di non forzare il linguaggio e di non usare un criterio di distinzione sbilanciato», N. Bobbio, Destra e sinistra. Ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica, Donzelli, Roma, 1994, p. 63.
4 R. Chiarini, Destra italiana. Dall’Unità d’Italia a Alleanza Nazionale, Marsilio, Venezia, 1995, p. 12.
5 Sull’Uomo Qualunque si vedano: S. Setta, L’Uomo Qualunque 1944-1948, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1975; S. Setta, La Destra nell’Italia del dopoguerra, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1995, pp. 13-18; G. Parlato, La nazione qualunque. Riformismo amministrativo ed europeismo in Guglielmo Giannini, «Storia contemporanea», a. XXV, n. 6, dicembre 1994.
6 R. Chiarini, Destra italiana, cit., pp. 64-65 e 76-77.
7 Si veda soprattutto D. Cofrancesco, Destra e sinistra. Per un uso critico di due termini chiave, Bertani, Verona, 1984, p. 47.
8 G. Parlato, Fascisti senza Mussolini. Le origini del neofascismo in Italia, 1943-1948, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2006. Il ruolo della Chiesa cattolica non va però esagerato. Parlato ritiene infatti (p. 304) «sbrigativa – e, soprattutto, indimostrata – l’affermazione di Murgia secondo la quale “il Movimento Sociale Italiano nasce con la benedizione del Vaticano”», si veda P.G. Murgia, Il vento del Nord, Storia e cronaca del fascismo dopo la Resistenza (1945-1950), Sugarco, Milano, 1975, p. 295.
9 Si vedano P. Buchignani, Fascisti rossi. Da Salò al Pci, la storia sconosciuta di una migrazione politica 1943-1953, Mondadori, Milano, 2007; P. Ignazi, Il polo escluso. Profilo del Movimento Sociale Italiano, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1989,
p. 24.
10 Utile in proposito la riflessione di Neglie: «La Nazione diventò così il terreno eletto per giocare la partita della propria sopravvivenza politica, in un paese ancora preda di fremiti rivoluzionari, di desideri di vendetta, bisognoso di chiarezza e unità di intenti», P. Neglie, Il Movimento Sociale Italiano tra terzaforzismo e atlantismo, «Storia contemporanea», a. XXV, n. 6, dicembre 1994, p. 1170. Si vedano anche M. Revelli, La destra nazionale, cit., pp. 70-71; P. Rosenbaum, Il nuovo fascismo. Da Salò ad Almirante. Storia del Msi, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1975, p. 39.
11 Si veda M. Franzinelli, L’amnistia Togliatti. 22 giugno 1946. Colpo di spugna sui crimini fascisti, Mondadori, Milano, 2006.
12 Si vedano S. Finotti, Difesa occidentale e Patto Atlantico: la scelta internazionale del Msi (1948-1952), «Storia delle relazioni internazionali», a. VI, n. 1, 1988, p. 88; M. Tarchi, Cinquant’anni di nostalgia. La destra italiana dopo il fascismo, Intervista di A. Carioti, Rizzoli, Milano, 1995, p. 32; P.G. Murgia, Ritorneremo! Storia e cronaca del fascismo dopo la Resistenza (1950-1953), Sugarco, Milano, 1976, p. 98. Per una dettagliata analisi dei vari movimenti, tra cui i Far, e personaggi che rifiutarono l’opzione moderata si veda G. Parlato, Fascisti senza Mussolini, cit., pp. 255-269.
13 G. Parlato, Fascisti senza Mussolini, cit., p. 250.
14 Sulla nuova strategia missina si veda G. Parlato, Fascisti senza Mussolini, cit., pp. 269-280; P.G. Murgia, Ritorneremo!, cit., p. 88-92.
15 Sul programma del ’48 si vedano M. Revelli, La destra nazionale, cit., p. 23; G. Roberti, L’opposizione di destra in Italia 1946-1979, Gallina, Napoli, 1988, p. 40. Ignazi lo ha definito un «programma orientato a sinistra», P. Ignazi, Il polo escluso, cit., p. 46.
16 M. Tarchi, Cinquant’anni di nostalgia, cit., p. 32. Si veda anche P. Neglie, Il Movimento Sociale Italiano tra terzaforzismo e atlantismo, cit., p. 1174.
17 M. Tarchi, ibidem, p. 33.
18 R. Chiarini, «Sacro egoismo» e «missione civilizzatrice». La politica estera del Msi dalla fondazione alla metà degli anni Cinquanta, «Storia contemporanea», a. XXI, n. 3, giugno 1990, p. 457.
19 Per un’analisi delle sfide che deve fronteggiare il Msi dal 1949 si veda P. Ignazi, Il polo escluso, cit., pp. 54-59; M. Tarchi, Cinquant’anni di nostalgia, cit., pp. 48-50; P. Rosenbaum, Il nuovo fascismo, cit., p. 197. Sulla situazione dei giovani missini si veda A. Carioti, Gli orfani di Salò. Il “sessantotto nero” dei giovani neofascisti nel dopoguerra 1945-1951, Mursia, Milano, 2008, cap. 4, pp. 118-150.
20 M. Revelli, La destra nazionale, cit., p. 20. Si veda anche D. Lembo, Fascisti dopo la liberazione. Storia del fascismo e dei fascisti nel dopoguerra, dalla Repubblica Sociale al Movimento Sociale Italiano 1945-1956, MA.RO. Editrice,
Copiano (Pv), 2007, pp. 113-116, e A. Jellamo, J. Evola, il pensatore della tradizione, in F. Ferraresi, (a cura di), La destra radicale, cit., pp. 215-252.
21 Si veda P. Ignazi, Il polo escluso, cit., p. 59.
Federico Robbe, Gli Stati Uniti e la Destra italiana negli anni Cinquanta, Tesi di dottorato, Università degli Studi di Milano, Anno accademico 2009-2010

#1947 #1948 #1949 #amnistia #anticomunismo #antipolitica #Congresso #destra #elezioni #FedericoRobbe #GiorgioAlmirante #JuliusEvola #legalitaria #Meridione #MSI #neofascismo #OSS #Sociale #StatiUniti #tendenza #Vaticano





It would be nice to wake up and not feel like I rolled down a hill several times the day before.

in reply to Davriellelouna

Good for them:

I wish the Tunisian people well: they've had better-quality democracy, enough to taste their real rights, & hope they take all the wisdoms/insights of Ghandi, & Nelson Mandela, & systematically force the earning of their civil-rights..

_ /\ _



GLOBAL SUMUD FLOTILLA: PARTITE LE PRIME BARCHE. ALTRE SE NE AGGIUNGERANNO GIOVEDÌ DA CATANIA radiondadurto.org/2025/09/01/g… #solidarietàinternazionale #globalsumudflotilla #INTERNAZIONALI #strisciadigaza #barcellona #Palestina #genova #News #gaza

reshared this



03/08/2025 – [Mediapart] Nucléaire : “Pour en avoir le cœur net, nous prêtons un petit compteur Geiger à la famille”
criirad.org/03-08-2025-mediapa…
"« L’ancien directeur du laboratoire de la Commission de recherche et d’information indépendantes sur la radioactivité (Criirad) publie un livre foisonnant et […]"



Let’s talk about period tracking, health data & privacy. Some apps misuse your data—learn how to protect yourself.

🔗 Read more: datadetoxkit.org/en/health/cycles-of-influence
🔗 Choose a safer app: datadetoxkit.org/en/health/none-of-their-business



Watching season 1 of The White Lotus. Greg is a stone cold legend.

"Come here, crazy. You're not really cuckoo."

#TV #comedy #drama #TheWhiteLotus



Donnarumma al City, Juventus con Openda. Rabiot-Milan: ore calde prima del gong

[quote]MILANO – A poche ore dal gong finale che chiuderà la sessione estiva di calciomercato, previsto alle 20:00, le squadre della serie A sono alla ricerca degli ultimi tasselli per…
L'articolo Donnarumma al City, Juventus con Openda. Rabiot-Milan: ore calde prima del gong su



Χιλιάδες στις συναυλίες. 10 άτομα στο πεδίο ανάγκης.
🙁



I've been working with content and data since the mid-1990s. Most techies see data as bit and bytes. All of it is good. Even if it's badly written, out of data, plain wrong--or whatever. The more data, the better. Don't delete the data because you never know. We can never have enough data.

From this culture comes the crappy AI that we know. Feed it enough data and because of the sheer quantity, intelligence will flow. It's Cult of Volume. A high art of stupidity. Smartest guys in the room?



Australia’s government trial of age‑assurance tech to keep under‑16s off social media says social media age checks can be done, despite errors and privacy risks


cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/36686657

Main Report.

::: spoiler 12 Key Findings
1. Age assurance can be done in Australia privately, efficiently and effectively: Age assurance can be done in Australia – our analysis of age assurance systems in the context of Australia demonstrates how they can be private, robust and effective. There is a plethora of choice available for providers of age-restricted goods, content, services, venues or spaces to select the most appropriate systems for their use case with reference to emerging international standards for age assurance.
2. No substantial technological limitations preventing its implementation to meet policy goals: Our evaluation did not reveal any substantial technological limitations that would prevent age assurance systems being used in response to age-related eligibility requirements established by policy makers. We identified careful, critical thinking by providers on the development and deployment of age assurance systems, considering efficacy, privacy, data and security concerns. Some systems were easier for initial implementation and use than others, but the systems of all technology providers with a technology readiness level (TRL) 7 or above were eventually capable of integration to a user journey.
3. Provider claims have been independently validated
against the project’s evaluation criteria
: We found that the practice statements provided by age assurance providers with a TRL of 7 or above fairly reflected the technological capabilities of their products, processes or services (to the extent applicable to the Trial’s evaluation criteria). Some of the practice statements provided have needed to be clarified or developed during the course of the Trial, but we observed that they offer a useful option for transparency of the capabilities of the available age assurance systems. Those with a TRL below 7 will need further analysis when their systems mature.
4. A wide range of approaches exist, but there is no one-size-fits-all solution for all contexts: We found a plethora of approaches that fit different use cases in different ways, but we did not find a single ubiquitous solution that would suit all use cases, nor did we find solutions that were guaranteed to be effective in all deployments. The range of possibilities across the Trial participants demonstrate a rich and rapidly evolving range of services which can be tailored and effective depending on each specified context of use.
5. We found a dynamic, innovative and evolving age assurance service sector: We found a vibrant, creative and innovative age assurance service sector with both technologically advanced and deployed solutions and a pipeline of new technologies transitioning from research to minimum viable product to testing and deployment stages indicating an evolving choice and future opportunities for developers. We found private-sector investment and opportunities for growth within the age assurance services sector.
6. We found robust, appropriate and secure data handling practices: We found robust understanding of and internal policy decisions regarding the handling of personal information by Trial participants. The privacy policies and practice statements collated for the Trial demonstrate a strong commitment to privacy by design principles, with consideration of what data was to be collected, stored, shared and then disposed of. Separating age assurance services from those of relying parties was useful as Trial participants providing age assurance services more clearly only used data for the necessary and consented purpose of providing an age assurance result.
7. Systems performed broadly consistently across demographic groups, including Indigenous populations: The systems under test performed broadly consistently across demographic groups assessed and despite an acknowledged deficit in training age analysis systems with data about Indigenous populations, we found no substantial difference in the outcomes for First Nations and Torres Strait Islander Peoples and other multi-cultural communities using the age assurance systems. We found some systems performed better than others, but overall variances across race did not deviate by more than recognised tolerances.
8. There is scope to enhance usability, risk management and system interoperability: We found opportunities for technological improvement including improving ease of use for the average person and enhancing the management of risk in age assurance systems. This could include through one-way blind access to verification of government documents, enabling connection to data holder services (like digital wallets) or improving the handling of a child’s digital footprint as examples.
9. Parental control tools can be effective but may constrain children’s digital participation and evolving autonomy: The Trial found that both parental control and consent systems can be done and can be effective, but they serve different purposes. Parental control systems are pre-configured and ongoing but may fail to adapt to the evolving capacities of children including potential risks to their digital privacy as they grow and mature, particularly through adolescence. Parental consent mechanisms prompt active engagement between children and their parents at key decision points, potentially supporting informed access.
10. Systems generally align with cybersecurity best practice, but vigilance is required: We found that the systems were generally secure and consistent with information security standards, with developers actively addressing known attack vectors including AI-generated spoofing and forgeries. However, the rapidly evolving threat environment means that these systems – while presently fairly robust – cannot be considered infallible. Ongoing monitoring and improvement will help maintain their effectiveness over time. Similarly, continued attention to privacy compliance will support long-term trust and accountability.
11. Unnecessary data retention may occur in apparent anticipation of future regulatory needs: We found some concerning evidence that in the absence of specific guidance, service providers were apparently over-anticipating the eventual needs of regulators about providing personal information for future investigations. Some providers were found to be building tools to enable regulators, law enforcement or Coroners to retrace the actions taken by individuals to verify their age which could lead to increased risk of privacy breaches due to unnecessary and disproportionate collection and retention of data.
12. Providers are aligning to emerging international standards around age assurance: The standards-based approach adopted by the Trial, including through the ISO/IEC 27566 Series [Note 1], the IEEE 2089.1 [Note 2] and the ISO/IEC 25000 [Note 3] series (the Product Quality Model) all provide a strong basis for the development of accreditation of conformity assessment and subsequent certification of individual age assurance providers in accordance with Australia’s standards and conformance infrastructure.
:::



Australia’s government trial of age‑assurance tech to keep under‑16s off social media says social media age checks can be done, despite errors and privacy risks


Main Report.

::: spoiler 12 Key Findings
1. Age assurance can be done in Australia privately, efficiently and effectively: Age assurance can be done in Australia – our analysis of age assurance systems in the context of Australia demonstrates how they can be private, robust and effective. There is a plethora of choice available for providers of age-restricted goods, content, services, venues or spaces to select the most appropriate systems for their use case with reference to emerging international standards for age assurance.
2. No substantial technological limitations preventing its implementation to meet policy goals: Our evaluation did not reveal any substantial technological limitations that would prevent age assurance systems being used in response to age-related eligibility requirements established by policy makers. We identified careful, critical thinking by providers on the development and deployment of age assurance systems, considering efficacy, privacy, data and security concerns. Some systems were easier for initial implementation and use than others, but the systems of all technology providers with a technology readiness level (TRL) 7 or above were eventually capable of integration to a user journey.
3. Provider claims have been independently validated
against the project’s evaluation criteria
: We found that the practice statements provided by age assurance providers with a TRL of 7 or above fairly reflected the technological capabilities of their products, processes or services (to the extent applicable to the Trial’s evaluation criteria). Some of the practice statements provided have needed to be clarified or developed during the course of the Trial, but we observed that they offer a useful option for transparency of the capabilities of the available age assurance systems. Those with a TRL below 7 will need further analysis when their systems mature.
4. A wide range of approaches exist, but there is no one-size-fits-all solution for all contexts: We found a plethora of approaches that fit different use cases in different ways, but we did not find a single ubiquitous solution that would suit all use cases, nor did we find solutions that were guaranteed to be effective in all deployments. The range of possibilities across the Trial participants demonstrate a rich and rapidly evolving range of services which can be tailored and effective depending on each specified context of use.
5. We found a dynamic, innovative and evolving age assurance service sector: We found a vibrant, creative and innovative age assurance service sector with both technologically advanced and deployed solutions and a pipeline of new technologies transitioning from research to minimum viable product to testing and deployment stages indicating an evolving choice and future opportunities for developers. We found private-sector investment and opportunities for growth within the age assurance services sector.
6. We found robust, appropriate and secure data handling practices: We found robust understanding of and internal policy decisions regarding the handling of personal information by Trial participants. The privacy policies and practice statements collated for the Trial demonstrate a strong commitment to privacy by design principles, with consideration of what data was to be collected, stored, shared and then disposed of. Separating age assurance services from those of relying parties was useful as Trial participants providing age assurance services more clearly only used data for the necessary and consented purpose of providing an age assurance result.
7. Systems performed broadly consistently across demographic groups, including Indigenous populations: The systems under test performed broadly consistently across demographic groups assessed and despite an acknowledged deficit in training age analysis systems with data about Indigenous populations, we found no substantial difference in the outcomes for First Nations and Torres Strait Islander Peoples and other multi-cultural communities using the age assurance systems. We found some systems performed better than others, but overall variances across race did not deviate by more than recognised tolerances.
8. There is scope to enhance usability, risk management and system interoperability: We found opportunities for technological improvement including improving ease of use for the average person and enhancing the management of risk in age assurance systems. This could include through one-way blind access to verification of government documents, enabling connection to data holder services (like digital wallets) or improving the handling of a child’s digital footprint as examples.
9. Parental control tools can be effective but may constrain children’s digital participation and evolving autonomy: The Trial found that both parental control and consent systems can be done and can be effective, but they serve different purposes. Parental control systems are pre-configured and ongoing but may fail to adapt to the evolving capacities of children including potential risks to their digital privacy as they grow and mature, particularly through adolescence. Parental consent mechanisms prompt active engagement between children and their parents at key decision points, potentially supporting informed access.
10. Systems generally align with cybersecurity best practice, but vigilance is required: We found that the systems were generally secure and consistent with information security standards, with developers actively addressing known attack vectors including AI-generated spoofing and forgeries. However, the rapidly evolving threat environment means that these systems – while presently fairly robust – cannot be considered infallible. Ongoing monitoring and improvement will help maintain their effectiveness over time. Similarly, continued attention to privacy compliance will support long-term trust and accountability.
11. Unnecessary data retention may occur in apparent anticipation of future regulatory needs: We found some concerning evidence that in the absence of specific guidance, service providers were apparently over-anticipating the eventual needs of regulators about providing personal information for future investigations. Some providers were found to be building tools to enable regulators, law enforcement or Coroners to retrace the actions taken by individuals to verify their age which could lead to increased risk of privacy breaches due to unnecessary and disproportionate collection and retention of data.
12. Providers are aligning to emerging international standards around age assurance: The standards-based approach adopted by the Trial, including through the ISO/IEC 27566 Series [Note 1], the IEEE 2089.1 [Note 2] and the ISO/IEC 25000 [Note 3] series (the Product Quality Model) all provide a strong basis for the development of accreditation of conformity assessment and subsequent certification of individual age assurance providers in accordance with Australia’s standards and conformance infrastructure.
:::




Australia’s government trial of age‑assurance tech to keep under‑16s off social media says social media age checks can be done, despite errors and privacy risks


cross-posted from: programming.dev/post/36686657

Main Report.

::: spoiler 12 Key Findings
1. Age assurance can be done in Australia privately, efficiently and effectively: Age assurance can be done in Australia – our analysis of age assurance systems in the context of Australia demonstrates how they can be private, robust and effective. There is a plethora of choice available for providers of age-restricted goods, content, services, venues or spaces to select the most appropriate systems for their use case with reference to emerging international standards for age assurance.
2. No substantial technological limitations preventing its implementation to meet policy goals: Our evaluation did not reveal any substantial technological limitations that would prevent age assurance systems being used in response to age-related eligibility requirements established by policy makers. We identified careful, critical thinking by providers on the development and deployment of age assurance systems, considering efficacy, privacy, data and security concerns. Some systems were easier for initial implementation and use than others, but the systems of all technology providers with a technology readiness level (TRL) 7 or above were eventually capable of integration to a user journey.
3. Provider claims have been independently validated
against the project’s evaluation criteria
: We found that the practice statements provided by age assurance providers with a TRL of 7 or above fairly reflected the technological capabilities of their products, processes or services (to the extent applicable to the Trial’s evaluation criteria). Some of the practice statements provided have needed to be clarified or developed during the course of the Trial, but we observed that they offer a useful option for transparency of the capabilities of the available age assurance systems. Those with a TRL below 7 will need further analysis when their systems mature.
4. A wide range of approaches exist, but there is no one-size-fits-all solution for all contexts: We found a plethora of approaches that fit different use cases in different ways, but we did not find a single ubiquitous solution that would suit all use cases, nor did we find solutions that were guaranteed to be effective in all deployments. The range of possibilities across the Trial participants demonstrate a rich and rapidly evolving range of services which can be tailored and effective depending on each specified context of use.
5. We found a dynamic, innovative and evolving age assurance service sector: We found a vibrant, creative and innovative age assurance service sector with both technologically advanced and deployed solutions and a pipeline of new technologies transitioning from research to minimum viable product to testing and deployment stages indicating an evolving choice and future opportunities for developers. We found private-sector investment and opportunities for growth within the age assurance services sector.
6. We found robust, appropriate and secure data handling practices: We found robust understanding of and internal policy decisions regarding the handling of personal information by Trial participants. The privacy policies and practice statements collated for the Trial demonstrate a strong commitment to privacy by design principles, with consideration of what data was to be collected, stored, shared and then disposed of. Separating age assurance services from those of relying parties was useful as Trial participants providing age assurance services more clearly only used data for the necessary and consented purpose of providing an age assurance result.
7. Systems performed broadly consistently across demographic groups, including Indigenous populations: The systems under test performed broadly consistently across demographic groups assessed and despite an acknowledged deficit in training age analysis systems with data about Indigenous populations, we found no substantial difference in the outcomes for First Nations and Torres Strait Islander Peoples and other multi-cultural communities using the age assurance systems. We found some systems performed better than others, but overall variances across race did not deviate by more than recognised tolerances.
8. There is scope to enhance usability, risk management and system interoperability: We found opportunities for technological improvement including improving ease of use for the average person and enhancing the management of risk in age assurance systems. This could include through one-way blind access to verification of government documents, enabling connection to data holder services (like digital wallets) or improving the handling of a child’s digital footprint as examples.
9. Parental control tools can be effective but may constrain children’s digital participation and evolving autonomy: The Trial found that both parental control and consent systems can be done and can be effective, but they serve different purposes. Parental control systems are pre-configured and ongoing but may fail to adapt to the evolving capacities of children including potential risks to their digital privacy as they grow and mature, particularly through adolescence. Parental consent mechanisms prompt active engagement between children and their parents at key decision points, potentially supporting informed access.
10. Systems generally align with cybersecurity best practice, but vigilance is required: We found that the systems were generally secure and consistent with information security standards, with developers actively addressing known attack vectors including AI-generated spoofing and forgeries. However, the rapidly evolving threat environment means that these systems – while presently fairly robust – cannot be considered infallible. Ongoing monitoring and improvement will help maintain their effectiveness over time. Similarly, continued attention to privacy compliance will support long-term trust and accountability.
11. Unnecessary data retention may occur in apparent anticipation of future regulatory needs: We found some concerning evidence that in the absence of specific guidance, service providers were apparently over-anticipating the eventual needs of regulators about providing personal information for future investigations. Some providers were found to be building tools to enable regulators, law enforcement or Coroners to retrace the actions taken by individuals to verify their age which could lead to increased risk of privacy breaches due to unnecessary and disproportionate collection and retention of data.
12. Providers are aligning to emerging international standards around age assurance: The standards-based approach adopted by the Trial, including through the ISO/IEC 27566 Series [Note 1], the IEEE 2089.1 [Note 2] and the ISO/IEC 25000 [Note 3] series (the Product Quality Model) all provide a strong basis for the development of accreditation of conformity assessment and subsequent certification of individual age assurance providers in accordance with Australia’s standards and conformance infrastructure.
:::



Australia’s government trial of age‑assurance tech to keep under‑16s off social media says social media age checks can be done, despite errors and privacy risks


Main Report.

::: spoiler 12 Key Findings
1. Age assurance can be done in Australia privately, efficiently and effectively: Age assurance can be done in Australia – our analysis of age assurance systems in the context of Australia demonstrates how they can be private, robust and effective. There is a plethora of choice available for providers of age-restricted goods, content, services, venues or spaces to select the most appropriate systems for their use case with reference to emerging international standards for age assurance.
2. No substantial technological limitations preventing its implementation to meet policy goals: Our evaluation did not reveal any substantial technological limitations that would prevent age assurance systems being used in response to age-related eligibility requirements established by policy makers. We identified careful, critical thinking by providers on the development and deployment of age assurance systems, considering efficacy, privacy, data and security concerns. Some systems were easier for initial implementation and use than others, but the systems of all technology providers with a technology readiness level (TRL) 7 or above were eventually capable of integration to a user journey.
3. Provider claims have been independently validated
against the project’s evaluation criteria
: We found that the practice statements provided by age assurance providers with a TRL of 7 or above fairly reflected the technological capabilities of their products, processes or services (to the extent applicable to the Trial’s evaluation criteria). Some of the practice statements provided have needed to be clarified or developed during the course of the Trial, but we observed that they offer a useful option for transparency of the capabilities of the available age assurance systems. Those with a TRL below 7 will need further analysis when their systems mature.
4. A wide range of approaches exist, but there is no one-size-fits-all solution for all contexts: We found a plethora of approaches that fit different use cases in different ways, but we did not find a single ubiquitous solution that would suit all use cases, nor did we find solutions that were guaranteed to be effective in all deployments. The range of possibilities across the Trial participants demonstrate a rich and rapidly evolving range of services which can be tailored and effective depending on each specified context of use.
5. We found a dynamic, innovative and evolving age assurance service sector: We found a vibrant, creative and innovative age assurance service sector with both technologically advanced and deployed solutions and a pipeline of new technologies transitioning from research to minimum viable product to testing and deployment stages indicating an evolving choice and future opportunities for developers. We found private-sector investment and opportunities for growth within the age assurance services sector.
6. We found robust, appropriate and secure data handling practices: We found robust understanding of and internal policy decisions regarding the handling of personal information by Trial participants. The privacy policies and practice statements collated for the Trial demonstrate a strong commitment to privacy by design principles, with consideration of what data was to be collected, stored, shared and then disposed of. Separating age assurance services from those of relying parties was useful as Trial participants providing age assurance services more clearly only used data for the necessary and consented purpose of providing an age assurance result.
7. Systems performed broadly consistently across demographic groups, including Indigenous populations: The systems under test performed broadly consistently across demographic groups assessed and despite an acknowledged deficit in training age analysis systems with data about Indigenous populations, we found no substantial difference in the outcomes for First Nations and Torres Strait Islander Peoples and other multi-cultural communities using the age assurance systems. We found some systems performed better than others, but overall variances across race did not deviate by more than recognised tolerances.
8. There is scope to enhance usability, risk management and system interoperability: We found opportunities for technological improvement including improving ease of use for the average person and enhancing the management of risk in age assurance systems. This could include through one-way blind access to verification of government documents, enabling connection to data holder services (like digital wallets) or improving the handling of a child’s digital footprint as examples.
9. Parental control tools can be effective but may constrain children’s digital participation and evolving autonomy: The Trial found that both parental control and consent systems can be done and can be effective, but they serve different purposes. Parental control systems are pre-configured and ongoing but may fail to adapt to the evolving capacities of children including potential risks to their digital privacy as they grow and mature, particularly through adolescence. Parental consent mechanisms prompt active engagement between children and their parents at key decision points, potentially supporting informed access.
10. Systems generally align with cybersecurity best practice, but vigilance is required: We found that the systems were generally secure and consistent with information security standards, with developers actively addressing known attack vectors including AI-generated spoofing and forgeries. However, the rapidly evolving threat environment means that these systems – while presently fairly robust – cannot be considered infallible. Ongoing monitoring and improvement will help maintain their effectiveness over time. Similarly, continued attention to privacy compliance will support long-term trust and accountability.
11. Unnecessary data retention may occur in apparent anticipation of future regulatory needs: We found some concerning evidence that in the absence of specific guidance, service providers were apparently over-anticipating the eventual needs of regulators about providing personal information for future investigations. Some providers were found to be building tools to enable regulators, law enforcement or Coroners to retrace the actions taken by individuals to verify their age which could lead to increased risk of privacy breaches due to unnecessary and disproportionate collection and retention of data.
12. Providers are aligning to emerging international standards around age assurance: The standards-based approach adopted by the Trial, including through the ISO/IEC 27566 Series [Note 1], the IEEE 2089.1 [Note 2] and the ISO/IEC 25000 [Note 3] series (the Product Quality Model) all provide a strong basis for the development of accreditation of conformity assessment and subsequent certification of individual age assurance providers in accordance with Australia’s standards and conformance infrastructure.
:::