Context: politico.eu/article/openai-eu-…
OpenAI offers EU access to new AI hacking model
European cyber and AI authorities in past weeks failed to gain access to superhacking AI, causing anxiety among officials.Pieter Haeck (POLITICO)
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European cyber and AI authorities in past weeks failed to gain access to superhacking AI, causing anxiety among officials.Pieter Haeck (POLITICO)
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Kim Dvash has discovered GhostLock, a technique to lock access to files indefinitely
-relies on regular Windows APIs
-can be exploited from a low-privileged Windows domain user's account
-doesn't use encryption
-doesn't write on disk
-no signals for normal EDRs
SMB deny-share handle research tool. Lock files on an enterprise share with zero writes, zero encryption, and zero alerts in any behavioral defense. Standard user. One API call. No CVE. - kimd155/G...GitHub
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Raelize used Claude to automate a fault injection attack to bypass Secure Boot
raelize.com/blog/ai-fi-giving-…
Raelize provides top-notch embedded device security serrvices like consultancy, testing, research and training.raelize.com
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Attackers are exploiting cPanel flaw CVE-2026-41940 to install the Filemanager backdoor and gain unauthorized admin access.Pierluigi Paganini (Security Affairs)
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The quest for true randomness has roots in cryptography and is a rabbit hole that gets surprisingly deep with alarmingly rapidity. Still, the generation of random-enough numbers is a popular hacker project. Part of the appeal is the way these devices strive to incorporate physical phenomena, and in [Joshua Coleman]’s case, his Neon Entropy (Pseudo) Random Number Generator uses a trio of vintage neon lamps.Neon lamps discharge at rates that vary unpredictably. They’re also pretty to look at.
[Joshua] chose neon lamps in part because the discharge rate of an energized lamp is a variable, physical process that makes a good source of entropy. They also have an attractive visual appeal that fits the concept [Joshua] had in mind. Unlike random number generators that kick off by measuring radiation or some other imperceptible thing, it’s possible — at least in a sense — to see this one working.
The small variations in the three neon lamps are measured optically by three TEPT4400 ambient light sensors (isolated from the neon lamps themselves) and turned into analog signals. A Raspberry Pi Pico W reads these signals, then uses them in a process that culminates in SHA-256 64-bit values that can be used as random seeds.
There’s also a web dashboard that shows everything live, furthering the “watch it work” concept [Joshua] is aiming for. The video below shows the project in action if you want to see how the sausage gets made.
Earlier we mentioned how random number generators are popular projects among hackers, and here are a few selected ones. Don’t miss the stylish glow and slick enclosure of this Nixie tube RNG, or the lava lamp RNG which is in fact not a gimmick. And while it is commonly understood that meaningful randomness must come from outside a digital chip, uninitialized internal volatile RAM — if accessed correctly — can be a remarkably good source of entropy.
youtube.com/embed/FoSpGV7inyA?…
Il Texas ha fatto causa a Netflix per uso illecito dei dati degli utenti dal 2022, quando introdusse gli spot negli abbonamenti più economici.
Netflix avrebbe raccolto dati come la posizione, il dispositivo utilizzato, i termini inseriti nella barra di ricerca e altro, e li avrebbe venduti a società specializzate nella raccolta e nell’aggregazione di dati senza il consenso informato dell’utente.
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"An unauthenticated attacker can remotely execute arbitrary code via the CWMP protocol on the ipTIME router."
Vendor is unresponsive
ssd-disclosure.com/iptime-pre-…
Summary An unauthenticated attacker can remotely execute arbitrary code via the CWMP protocol on the ipTIME router.Noamr (SSD Secure Disclosure)
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TanStack has published a post-mortem of its supply chain attack
Blames hack on three vulnerabilities chained together, involving pull requests, GitHub actions, and OIDC tokens extracted from memory
tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-c…
On 2026-05-11, an attacker chained a pull_request_target Pwn Request, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and OIDC token extraction from runner memory to publish 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages on …tanstack.com
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wdym utm_source=chatgpt.com? you needed chatgpt to link to a blog post?pl.fediverse.pl
@Informatica (Italy e non Italy)
Una rete globale di criminali utilizza strumenti sofisticati venduti su Telegram per aggirare sistemi di riconoscimento facciale delle banche, alimentando il mercato del riciclaggio
L'articolo Le soluzioni per aggirare il riconoscimento biometrico sono in vendita su Telegram proviene da
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WannaCry showed how unpatched flaws and leaked cyber tools can cripple global systems, reshaping cybersecurity defenses worldwide.Pierluigi Paganini (Security Affairs)
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Some of the CYBERWARCOM talks have made their way on YouTube
youtube.com/playlist?list=PLah…
Partagez vos vidéos avec vos amis, vos proches et le monde entierCYBERWARCON (YouTube)
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Dietro il successo di Farage in UK il solito schema: i soldi (anzi, le crypto) dei miliardari sociopatici per conquistare i voti del popolo incazzato (e tradito dalla "sinistra")
Il ruolo centrale di Christopher Harborne, principale finanziatore di Farage, socio miliardario di #Tether e di Bitfinex. I precedenti di Mercer che fu decisivo per lanciare Trump, e di Thiel per Vance
markliera.substack.com/p/dietr…
Il ruolo centrale di Christopher Harborne, principale finanziatore di Farage, socio miliardario di Tether e di Bitfinex. I precedenti di Mercer che fu decisivo per lanciare Trump, e di Thiel per VanceMarco Liera (Il Capitale - di Marco Liera)
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As the foremost boffins of Europe toil deep underneath the border between Switzerland and France in their never-ending quest to truly understand the fabric of the Universe, they rely on a vast amount of electronics. The PCB layout team at the particle accelerator thus work with a huge array of parts, for which of course they create KiCad libraries. Now the folks at CERN have made those libraries available as open source, so you can benefit from their work.
The libraries themselves can be found in a GitLab repository, and at the moment are offered only for KiCad version 9.x. We tried installing it in our KiCad 10.0 installation and it refused complaining of a missing JSON file, but we’re assuming that with more time and effort we could have made it happen. We’re told official 10.x compatibility is on the way.
Browsing the repository shows what a multiplicity of parts are included, so we can see this becoming a standard install for many people and the CERN footprints turning up in many projects featured here.
Thanks [Daniel] for the tip!
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L’algoritmo del trauma: Batman e il costo nascosto dell’eccellenza
📌 Link all'articolo : redhotcyber.com/post/lalgoritm…
A cura di Daniela Farina
#redhotcyber #news #solitudine #vuotointrospettivo #crisidesiderio #bisognodiamore
Batman diventa la metafora della società della performance: burnout, trauma, stress cronico e resilienza tossica raccontano perché milioni di persone stanno imparando a non vivere più.Daniela Farina (Red Hot Cyber)
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With International Anti-Ransomware Day taking place on May 12, Kaspersky presents its annual report on the evolving global and regional ransomware cyberthreat landscape.
Ransomware remains one of the most persistent and adaptive cyberthreats. In 2026:
According to Kaspersky Security Network, the share of organizations affected by ransomware decreased in 2025 across all regions compared to 2024.
Percentage of organizations affected by ransomware attacks by region, 2025 (download)
Despite the formal decrease, organizations across all sectors continue to face a high likelihood of attack, as ransomware operators refine their tactics and scale their operations with increasing efficiency. Kaspersky and VDC Research have found that in the manufacturing sector alone, ransomware attacks may have caused over $18 billion in losses in the first three quarters of the year.
In 2026, ransomware operators increasingly prioritize neutralizing endpoint defenses before executing their payloads. Tools commonly referred to as “EDR killers” have become a standard component of attack playbooks. This reflects a continuing trend toward more deliberate and methodical intrusions.
Attackers attempt to terminate security processes and disable monitoring agents, often by exploiting trusted components such as signed drivers. This technique is called Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) and allows adversaries to blend into legitimate system activity while gradually degrading defensive visibility.
Thus, evasion is no longer an opportunistic step but a planned and repeatable phase of the attack lifecycle. As a result, organizations are increasingly challenged not just to detect ransomware but also to maintain control in environments where security controls themselves are actively targeted.
We predicted that quantum-resistant ransomware would appear in 2025. Looking back at the previous year, we see that advanced ransomware groups indeed started using post-quantum cryptography as quantum computing evolved. The encryption techniques used by this quantum-proof ransomware could be used to resist decryption attempts from both classical and quantum computers, making it nearly impossible for victims to decrypt their data without having to pay a ransom.
One example is the appearance of the PE32 ransomware family (link in Russian); it leverages the cutting-edge ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism) standard to secure its AES keys. This specific cryptographic framework was recently selected by NIST as the primary standard for post-quantum defense.
Within the PE32 ransomware architecture, this is realized through the Kyber1024 algorithm, a robust mechanism providing Level 5 security, roughly equivalent in strength to AES-256. Its primary function is the secure generation and transmission of shared secrets between parties, specifically engineered to withstand future quantum computing attacks. This shift toward post-quantum readiness is part of a broader industry trend; for instance, TLS 1.3 and QUIC protocols have already adopted the X25519Kyber768 hybrid model, which fuses classical encryption with quantum-resistant security.
In 2025, the share of ransoms paid dropped to 28%. As a response to this, one of the developments in the 2026 landscape is the growing prevalence of extortion incidents in which no file encryption takes place at all. Instead, attackers leave out the “ware” in “ransomware” and focus on extracting sensitive data and leveraging the threat of public disclosure as their primary means of extortion. ShinyHunters is an excellent example of such a group, using a data leak site to publicize its victims.
By avoiding encryption, attackers may aim at reducing the likelihood of immediate detection, shortening the duration of the attack, and eliminating dependencies on stable encryption routines. Often, this model is used alongside traditional tactics in so-called double extortion schemes, but an increasing number of campaigns rely exclusively on data theft.
For victims, this shift fundamentally changes the nature of the risk. While backups remain effective against encryption-based disruption, they provide no protection against data exposure, regulatory consequences, and reputational damage. Ransomware is therefore evolving from a business continuity issue into a broader data security and compliance challenge.
The ransomware ecosystem continues to evolve toward a highly industrialized and specialized model, with initial access remaining as one of its most critical components. In 2026, many ransomware operators keep relying on IABs (initial access brokers), a network of intermediaries who supply pre-compromised access to corporate environments, aiming to no longer perform full intrusions themselves.
This “access-as-a-service” model is fueled by credential theft operations, and the widespread availability of compromised accounts harvested through infostealers and phishing campaigns.
The primary access vectors offered for sale have not changed: RDP, VPN, and RDWeb are still the top access vectors. Consequently, remote access infrastructure remains the primary attack surface for initial access sales. In response to the measures against public exposure of RDP access points to the internet, attackers are now targeting RDWeb portals, which are frequently vulnerable and occasionally inadequately safeguarded.
The result is a threat landscape where unauthorized access is increasingly commoditized, and the barrier to launching ransomware attacks declines. This means that preventing initial compromise is only part of the challenge; equal emphasis must be placed on detecting misuse of legitimate credentials and limiting lateral movement within already-breached environments.
Telegram channels and underground forums increasingly function as platforms for the distribution and sale of compromised datasets and access credentials including those that were obtained as a result of ransomware attacks.
Advertisements posted on these resources typically include the nature of the access, a description of the exfiltrated or compromised data, price terms, and contact information for prospective buyers. In addition, some malicious actors mention their collaboration with other ransomware groups. Lesser-known gangs can use this name-dropping to promote themselves
Multiple threat actors not related to ransomware groups distribute datasets downloaded from ransomware blogs on underground forums and Telegram. By re-publishing download links and files, they spread compromised data as well as information on the ransomware attack within the community.
The ransomware itself is also sold or offered for subscription on the dark web platforms. The sellers underscore the uniqueness of their malware, as well as its encryption and defense evasion features.
Law enforcement agencies are actively shutting down dark web platforms and ransomware data leak sites. A major underground forum, RAMP, which also functioned as a platform for threat actors to advertise their ransomware services and publish service‑related updates, was seized by authorities in January 2026. Another underground forum, LeakBase, where malicious actors distributed exfiltrated and compromised data, was seized in March 2026. In 2025, law enforcement agencies seized well-known forums like Nulled, Cracked, and XSS. Also in 2025, the DLSs of BlackSuit and 8Base ransomware groups were seized. These takedowns cause inconvenience to ransomware coordination, specifically for initial access brokers and affiliates, though similar forums are expected to fill the void over time.
RansomHub’s sudden dormancy in 2025 marked a shift, and Qilin became the dominant player from Q2 onward. According to Kaspersky research, Qilin was the most active group executing targeted attacks in 2025.
Each group’s share of victims according to its data leak site (DLS) as a percentage of all reported victims of all groups during the period under review (download)
Qilin stands out as one of the fastest-growig and dominant RaaS platforms. Its combination of high-volume operations and structured affiliate model positions it as a central player in the current ecosystem.
Clop, the second most active group in 2025, is distinguished through its large-scale, supply-chain-style attacks, exploiting widely used file transfer and enterprise software to compromise hundreds of victims simultaneously. This one-to-many approach sets it apart from more traditional, single-target campaigns.
Third place is occupied by Akira, which remains notable for its consistency and operational stability, maintaining a steady stream of victims without major disruption. Its ability to sustain activity over time makes it one of the most reliable indicators of baseline ransomware threat levels.
Although no longer active, RansomHub stands out for its rapid rise and equally rapid disappearance in 2025, highlighting the volatility of the RaaS market. Its shutdown created a vacuum that significantly reshaped affiliate distribution across other groups.
DragonForce is also notable – not just for its own operations, but for its broader influence within the ransomware ecosystem, including reported involvement in infrastructure conflicts and possible links to the disruption of competing groups. Thus, the group claims that RansomHub “has moved to their infrastructure.” This positions it as more than just an operator and potentially an ecosystem-level actor.
While emerging actors generally operate on a smaller scale, they provide insight into the continuous churn and low barrier to entry within the ransomware ecosystem.
The Gentlemen group caught our attention in early 2026, as they managed to attack a significant number of victims over a short time. This actor is also notable for reflecting a broader shift toward professionalization and controlled operations within the ransomware ecosystem. Unlike many emerging groups that rely on opportunistic attacks and inconsistent leak activity, The Gentlemen demonstrate a more deliberate approach: structured intrusion workflows, selective targeting, and measured communication with victims. This signals a move away from chaotic, high-noise campaigns toward predictable, business-like execution models that are easier to scale and harder to disrupt. Their TTPs include the massive exploitation of hardware very common on big corporations, such as FortiOS/FortiProxy, SonicWall VPN, and Cisco ASA appliances. The group might be comprised of professional cybercriminals who left other prominent groups.
The group is also notable for its emphasis on data-centric extortion strategies, often prioritizing exfiltration and leverage over purely disruptive encryption. This aligns with one of the defining trends of 2026: ransomware evolving into a form of data breach monetization rather than just system denial. By focusing on controlled pressure and reputational risk instead of immediate operational damage, The Gentlemen exemplify how attackers are adapting to lower ransom payment rates and improved backup practices among victims.
Some other groups to take note of in 2026:
Although there is little to say about these groups at the time of writing this report, each of them may be equally likely to disappear from the threat landscape or grow into a prominent threat. That’s why it’s important to track them from their early days. Moreover, collectively, these groups illustrate how dynamic the ransomware landscape is, with new entrants constantly replenishing it.
Despite the growing effort by law enforcement agencies across the globe to seize and disrupt dark web platforms and threat actor infrastructures, ransomware operations remain stable, with new groups quickly taking the place of those who went silent. In 2026, we see a shift towards encryptionless extortion, with data leaks increasingly becoming the main threat to target organizations. At the same time, data encryption is also upgrading to the next level with the emergence of post-quantum ransomware.
To resist the evolving threat, Kaspersky recommends organizations:
Prioritize proactive prevention through patching and vulnerability management. Many ransomware attacks exploit unpatched systems, so organizations should implement automated patch management tools to ensure timely updates for operating systems, software, and drivers. For Windows environments, enabling Microsoft’s Vulnerable Driver Blocklist is critical to thwarting BYOVD attacks. Regularly scan for vulnerabilities and prioritize high-severity flaws, especially in widely used software.
Strengthen remote access: RDP and RDWeb connections should never be directly exposed to the internet, only through VPN or ZTNA (Zero Trust Network Access). It’s highly recommended to adopt multi-factor authentication on everything; the architecture may require continuous authentication for access, as one valid credential captured is enough to cause a breach. Monitoring the underground for stolen employee credentials is essential. Audit open ports across the entire attack surface. The adoption of the “Principle of Least Privilege” (PoLP), where users, systems, or processes are granted only the minimum access rights, such as read, write, or execute permissions, necessary to perform their specific job functions, is highly recommended.
Strengthen endpoint and network security with advanced detection and segmentation. Deploy robust endpoint detection and response solutions such as Kaspersky NEXT EDR to monitor for suspicious activity like driver loading or process termination. Network segmentation is equally important. Limit lateral movement by isolating critical systems and using firewalls to restrict traffic. Complete and immediate offboarding for employees is necessary as well as periodic permission reviews, with automatic revocation of unused access. Sessions with complete logging for privileged accounts are more than necessary. Monitoring the traffic divergence to new sites or even to legitimate endpoints can help the defenders to spot a new insider threat.
Invest in backups, training, and incident response planning. Maintain offline or immutable backups that are tested regularly to ensure rapid recovery without paying a ransom. Backups should cover critical data and systems and be stored in air-gapped environments to resist encryption or deletion. User education is essential to combatting phishing, which remains one of the top attack vectors. Conduct simulated phishing exercises and train employees to recognize AI-crafted emails. Kaspersky Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) can help develop and test an incident response plan to minimize potential downtime and costs.
The recommendation to avoid paying a ransom remains robust, especially given the risk of unavailable keys due to dismantled infrastructure, affiliate chaos, or malicious intent. By investing in backups, incident response, and preventive measures like patching and training, organizations can avoid funding criminals and mitigate the impact.
Kaspersky also offers free decryptors for certain ransomware families. If you get hit by ransomware, check to see if there’s a decryptor available for the ransomware family used against you.
Manifesti, e "costituzioni" sono fanfaronate di chi essendosi arricchito vuole anche sentirsi importante. E come sempre non c'è carenza di cantori che diano a questi ignoranti una dignità culturale.
Da oggi, lo script dell'episodio su dk.dataknightmare.eu!
A new TrickMo Android trojan focused on stealth and persistence, moving its command-and-control traffic to the TON network.Pierluigi Paganini (Security Affairs)
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Con un po’ di tempo e la curiosità di cosa sia capace l’Intelligenza Artificiale nel creare autonomamente non solo codice ma codice per creare videogiochi, ho chiesto alla IA di Google, Gemini, di …st2wok (ossessioni e contaminazioni by francesco mazzetta)
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Vi spiego come l'AI legge le nostre parole ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, tutti i modelli di Intelligenza Artificiale che usate ogni giorno non leggono parole. Leggono token.Marco Camisani Calzolari
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Esce Astra Linux 1.8.5: Miglioramenti e Nuove Funzionalità di Sicurezza
📌 Link all'articolo : redhotcyber.com/post/esce-astr…
A cura di Carolina Vivianti
#redhotcyber #news #astraLinux #linux #sistemOperativi #cybersecurity #sicurezzaInformatica
Scopri le novità di Astra Linux 1.8.5, con miglioramenti della sicurezza e nuove funzionalità per amministratori e utenti. Leggi ora!Carolina Vivianti (Red Hot Cyber)
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🚀 Gli speaker della RHC Conference 2026
📍𝗤𝘂𝗮𝗻𝗱𝗼: Martedì 19 Maggio con ingresso dalle ore 8:45
📍𝗗𝗼𝘃𝗲: Teatro Italia, Via Bari 18, Roma (Metro Piazza Bologna)
📍𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗴𝗿𝗮𝗺𝗺𝗮: redhotcyber.com/linksSk2L/prog…
📍𝗜𝘀𝗰𝗿𝗶𝘇𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗲 conferenza di Martedì 19 Maggio: rhc-conference-2026.eventbrite…
#redhotcyber #rhcconference #conferenza #informationsecurity #ethicalhacking
Registrazione per l'evento Red Hot Cyber Conference 2026 del 19 Maggio 2026 presso il Teatro Italia di Roma, in Via Bari 18.Eventbrite
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Il 12 maggio 2017 il mondo cambiò per sempre.
📌 Link all'articolo : redhotcyber.com/post/la-storia…
#redhotcyber #CyberSecurity #WannaCry #Ransomware #ThreatIntelligence #CyberThreats
Il 12 di maggio del 2017, è stata una giornata particolare. Per molti non significherà nulla, ma altri la ricorderanno bene, perché è stata una giornata convulsa e movimentata in quanto il mondo venne catapultato nella prima infezione globale da rans…Massimiliano Brolli (Red Hot Cyber)
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Sei FOBO? La paura di essere rimpiazzati da un prompt inizia a farsi sentire!
📌 Link all'articolo : redhotcyber.com/post/sei-fobo-…
A cura di Carolina Vivianti
#redhotcyber #news #intelligenzaartificiale #aziendecognitiva #efficiente #lavorodiroutine
Scopri come gli agenti di intelligenza artificiale stanno cambiando il mondo del lavoro e come le aziende possono sfruttare questa tecnologia per aumentare la produttività e ridurre i costi. Leggi ora!Carolina Vivianti (Red Hot Cyber)
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Between 2000 and 2002 the Fisher Price Pixter was sold to children as an educational handheld toy with a touch screen that enabled drawing and listening to music in addition to cartridge-based games and more. It was followed up by multiple new iterations of the system, but as an ecosystem didn’t last beyond 2007. This has left much of the system in obscurity, with people like [Dmitry] doing their best to reverse-engineer, dump and document what they can, such as recently for the entire range of Pixter devices and most of the games.
One of the reasons why [Dmitri] got interested in the second-generation Pixter Color originally was as a potential PalmOS porting target, which gives somewhat of an idea of how these devices were meant to be used.
With absolutely no remaining known official documentation on how to develop software for the hardware reverse-engineering posed somewhat of a challenge. Fortunately this was made somewhat easier by the Pixter Color using the ARM-based LH7541, but worse by just how much of a minimal ARM7 implementation the SoC is. This was meant to go into a cheap-ish kid’s toy after all.
Where things got wild was that the firmware implements a 16-bit stack-based virtual machine, possibly due to initially having selected a completely different SoC. From here things get even crazier with how audio output is implemented, with [Dmitry] descending into a long-winded rant on this and all the weird things encountered during reverse-engineering.
After the Color Pixter its Multimedia sibling with slightly better SoC was also reverse-engineered, as well as the Classic device that started it all. This particular device uses an 8-bit VM, but a black-blob 6502 processor, which is rather astounding for a 2000-era device, but then again it was meant to be a toy.
In addition to getting a lot of reverse-engineering woes off his chest, [Dmitri] also details how he reverse-engineered and dumped the cartridges, as well as writing emulators to ensure that the Pixter legacy will endure, for better or worse.
Top image: Pixter with opened case. (Credit: Raimond Spekking, Wikimedia)
You normally think of fiber optic as something used in network cables. However, scientists employ dedicated fibers to detect earthquakes. In simple terms, they fire a laser down the fiber and watch reflections caused by imperfections. When vibrations hit the cable, it changes the defects, which show up in the return pattern. However, with the right techniques, those vibrations could just as easily be from people speaking near the cable.
If you are alarmed, there’s good news and bad news. The good news is that the technique seems to be limited to coils of fiber that are not buried, and you have to be within about 5 meters of the fiber. The bad news is that there is plenty of dark cable all over the place. Besides, if researchers can do this successfully, you would imagine three-letter agencies around the world could do it even better.
There have been several recent papers about the same topic. Of course, you can also read laser bounces from windows. Noisy keyboards can also give you away.
Title image from [Compare Fibre] via Unsplash.
Redditors have caught Google secretly updating its Chrome terms of service to remove a line that guaranteed that local AI models won't send data to Google servers.
That's now gone, meaning your local AI sends data to Google, so it's not that local.
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Now, whether or not cloudflare can be actually punished -for- racketeering, given they "just" "host" the service instead of running it directly? prrrobably not under this administration.
But y'know.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racketee…
It's pretty obvious that this is a racket.
Cloudflare: "You've got some lovely infrastructure here. Shame if something... Happened to it."
flyingpenguin.com/can-someone-…
Can Someone Please Explain Whether Cloudflare Blackmailed Canonical?flyingpenguin
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In this 3,000+ word deep-dive for my blog and newsletter ~ this week in security ~ I explore the most pressing threats to face the internet this year. This includes surveillance and choking online access to governments going rogue, and more, and why they pose a risk.
this.weekinsecurity.com/the-mo…
From surveillance and choking online access to governments going rogue, these are the most pressing threats to face the internet and its billions of users today.Zack Whittaker (~this week in security~)
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If you ride a motorcycle, you know it is a bit of an art to manage the transmission on a typical bike. Electric motorcycles lose some of that. You usually just have a throttle and a brake. No transmission and, crucially, no clutch. Honda just patented a simulated clutch for those who want the old-school experience, according to [Ben Purvis], writing for Australian Motorcycle News.
This isn’t just a do-nothing lever on the handlebar. There’s haptic feedback to feel when the clutch engages. The motor responds to your actions on the lever. If you pull the clutch in part of the way, the motor loses power up to the point where there is no engine power with the clutch fully in.
Most interestingly, the software understands that when you raise the throttle with the clutch in and then release the clutch, you expect a sudden burst of torque, and it will accommodate the request.
If you are a casual driver, this may seem like a gimmick. However, according to the post, motocross racers rely on precise power control like this.
If you do your own conversion, you could probably do something similar. Or, we suppose, a new build, if you prefer.
It's a day ending in "y".... so there's a supply chain attack happening on npm
socket.dev/blog/tanstack-npm-p…
Socket detected 84 compromised TanStack npm package artifacts modified with suspected CI credential-stealing malware.Socket Research Team (Socket)
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It has now spread from npm to PyPI, and has hit OpenSearch, Mistral AI, Squawk, Guardrails AI, and others, a total of 416 malicious artifacts. TeamPCP is taking credit, latest update in our post:
socket.dev/blog/tanstack-npm-p…
Socket detected 84 compromised TanStack npm package artifacts modified with suspected CI credential-stealing malware.Socket Research Team (Socket)
Carmaker Skoda discloses a security breach of its online site
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I post possono essere di diversi tipi:
1) post pubblicati manualmente
2) post pubblicati da feed di alcune testate selezionate
3) ricondivisioni manuali di altri account
4) ricondivisioni automatiche di altri account gestiti da esperti di cybersecurity
NB: purtroppo i post pubblicati da feed di alcune testate includono i cosiddetti "redazionali"; i redazionali sono di fatto delle pubblicità che gli inserzionisti pubblicano per elogiare i propri servizi: di solito li eliminiamo manualmente, ma a volte può capitare che non ce ne accorgiamo (e no: non siamo sempre on line!) e quindi possono rimanere on line alcuni giorni. Fermo restando che le testate che ricondividiamo sono gratuite e che i redazionali sono uno dei metodi più etici per sostenersi economicamente, deve essere chiaro che questo account non riceve alcun contributo da queste pubblicazioni.
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Dr. Christopher Kunz
in reply to Catalin Cimpanu • • •Orkut! I actually had an Orkut profile.
In roughly chronological order: FIDO, Usenet, various forums and mailing lists, XING, Twitter, Facebook, WoW, LinkedIn and hopefully the last one for now: Fediverse.
The most persistent and enduring online home for me have been mailing lists. Not bad for a technology that was "dead any minute now" for the last 25 years.