Democracy groups warn of threat ‘Henry VIII’ powers pose to future election integrity
Democracy organisations, privacy groups and academics have written to government ministers to warn that powers in the Data Use and Access (DUA) Bill could threaten the integrity of future elections.
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The draft Bill includes ‘Henry VIII’ powers that could allow a government to make changes to how political parties use the public’s data without having to pass a new law. Clauses 70(4) and 71(5) give the Secretary of State discretion to determine and vary the conditions under which personal data can be processed.
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Executive powers and electoral integrity
These changes could be timed to the advantage of the governing party over its opponents – for example to allow practices that the ruling political party was ready to deploy. The signatories have pointed out that if such changes were made prior to an election, there may be insufficient time for the ICO or Electoral Commission to issue guidance to Political Parties on any new ‘recognized legitimate interest’ basis for a political party to process voter data for election purposes. This could undermine the integrity of a General Election.
A House of Lords Select Committee has shared similar concerns. The 3rd Report of the House of Lords Constitution Committee stated that they “are not satisfied that the case has been sufficiently made to entrust the powers in these clauses to secondary legislation.”
James Baker, Programme Manager at Open Right Group said:
“Political parties are stuck in an arms race as to how they can use data to reach and influence potential voters in order to win elections.
“It’s therefore vital that there are clear and fair rules for how political parties are allowed to use our data. Any changes to these rules must be properly scrutinized by parliament.
“This not just about how our data is being used, it’s about the future of our democracy. At a time when public trust in politicians is low, the Government must act to prevent the Data Bill enabling future abuses of power.”
Tom Brake, Director of Unlock Democracy said:
“A few months before the General Election, Lucy Powell MP, now the Leader of the House, talked of Labour’s commitment to “doing legislation better”, with “better planning, better drafting and better scrutiny”. The Henry VIII powers contained in the Bill mean the DUA Bill fails to deliver on those commitments. It must be amended so that it does.”
The letter’s signatories are calling on ministers to amend the Bill to ensure powers to create a statutory instrument to create a recognized legitimate interest basis for sharing personal data can’t be applied to political parties.
Notes to Editor
Henry VIII power are delegated legislative powers that allow the government to override or amend legislation through statutory instruments (SIs). These are passed without meaningful parliamentary scrutiny and no SI has been rejected by the House of Commons since 1979”.
The DUA Bill contains 87 examples of such powers. Read ORG’s briefing on this here.
Last year, an Open Right Group report highlighted the challenges in enforcing how political parties use our data. Moral Hazard: Voter Data Privacy and Politics in Election Canvassing Apps raised concerns about the privacy and security of canvassing apps used by political parties, and raised the question of whether voters’ data is being used unlawfully.
Briefing: Henry VIII powers threaten democracy and UK adequacy
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Briefing: Data Use and Access Bill Henry VIII powers threaten democracy and UK adequacy
Henry VIII clauses are delegated legislative powers that allow the government to override or amend primary legislation as it was enacted by Parliament.
The Data Use and Access Bill makes extensive use of delegated legislative powers and Henry VIII powers: if the Data Bill were to be approved as it is, it would provide 87 quasi-arbitrary powers that the government and its Ministers could use to modify key aspects of UK data protection law via Statutory Instrument.
Briefing
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The Data Bill’s delegated legislative powers are ripe for abuse:
- They lack meaningful parliamentary scrutiny: “no SI has been rejected by the House of Commons since 1979”.1
- The 3rd Report of the House of Lords Constitution Committee stated that they “are not satisfied that the case has been sufficiently made to entrust the powers in these clauses to secondary legislation.”2
- In general, Henry VIII powers do, in the words of the House of Lords, “make it harder for Parliament to scrutinise the policy aims of the bill and can raise concerns about legal certainty”.3 The same report also states that these powers should, “be recognised as constitutionally anomalous”, and their use acceptable “only where there is an exceptional justification and no other realistic way of ensuring effective governance”.
This would allow governments to change primary legislation according to the politics of the day, undermining trust in digital verification services and endangering democratic safeguards. It would also introduce significant risks for the retaining of the UK adequacy status: either these powers would never be used, and thus they don’t need be provided, or they would be used in ways that would guarantee the invalidation of the UK adequacy decision.
Digital Verification Services: mission creep and enforced state monopoly
Clauses 28 and 29 give the government the power to prepare and publish “the DVS trust framework” and “supplementary codes”, which sets out rules concerning the provision of digital verification services, Further, Clause 34 provides the power to refuse registration in the DVS register, and Clause 45 allows to mandate data sharing from public bodies to registered DVS providers.
In a previous iteration of the Bill, Clause 45 would have required Ministers to use their powers to force public bodies to disclose to a DVS provider whether a person had changed their sex. This provision has been removed from the Bill, but the arbitrary nature of this power means that Ministers couldrequire at their sole discretion disclosure of sensitive characteristics such as gender, ethnicity or health conditions. This includes data sharing mandates with the Department of Work and Pension, the Home Office or HM Revenue Service to run background checks on any kind of information or attribute held by public bodies or DVS providers.
Likewise, there is nothing in the Data Bill that would prevent Ministers from imposing burdensome, unreasonable or otherwise arbitrary requirements on DVS providers. This, for instance, could happen if the government was interested in favouring the adoption of its public digital identity system, such as One Login or GOV.UK Wallet, over private providers of DVS services.
Erosion of democratic safeguards and integrity of elections
Clause 70 introduce new legal bases for processing, known as “recognised legitimate interests”, while Clause 71 would introduce exemptions to the purpose limitation principle, known as “list of compatible purposes”.
These powers could be used to undermine the integrity of our elections. Any party in power could change the rules around how electoral data is used just months before an election takes place. Opposition parties might worry Labour (whose election database runs on Experian, the credit agency servers) might use these powers to self-preference themselves and obtain even more access to commercial data.
These powers could also be used to enable and legalise a US-style mass seizure of government data by an unconstitutional agency like DOGE. Whereas DOGE’s misappropriation of government datasets is being successfully challenged on privacy law grounds in the US, a future, “rogue” UK government would only need to lay Statutory Instruments that authorise the illegal appropriation of government data to make their misuse legal. This weakens UK data protection law’s ability to protect the public during the event of a constitutional crisis, and make it easier to by-pass Whitehall departmental decision-making processes that operate under a cabinet style of Government.
Endangering UK adequacy and relationships with the EU
Clause 74 would empower the government to designate categories of data which are not to be considered as “special categories data”, also known as sensitive data. Further, schedule 7 would empower the government to authorise transfers of personal data to third countries on a purely discretionary basis.
If these powers were to be used, at any time, to authorise personal data transfers to a country that does not enjoy adequacy status from the EU, or to restrict the definition of special category data, this would guarantee the revocation or annulment of the UK adequacy status.
These powers were also identified by the EU stakeholders as a main source of concern regarding the continuation of the UK adequacy decision, whose review is due in December 2025. The House of Lords inquiry into UK adequacy concluded that “lawful bases for data processing and the ability to designate legitimate interests by secondary legislation made by Ministers” constituted a significant concern for EU stakeholders and the continuation of the UK adequacy decision.4 Henry VIII powers were also identified by the European Parliament review of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement as a potential barrier to the functioning of such agreement.5
Conclusion and recommendations
Henry VIII clauses introduce unacceptable risks, and are being introduced in the absence of a meaningful justification.
The government has generally argued that these powers would allow ministers to update the law and to adapt it to technological progress. This statement does not hold to scrutiny: the UK GDPR is already principle based and allows both the ICO and the Court System to adapt the interpretation of UK data protection law to a changing reality. Independent regulators and Courts are better suited than the government at doing that, since they are independent and non-partisan. Further, Henry VIII clauses allow Ministers to override Primary legislation: the stated intent of using such a wide-ranging power to merely update legal provisions is suspicious and should be rejected as an unacceptable attempt to interfere with the role of Parliament.
We recommend MPs to reject Clauses 70, 71, 74, 80, 85 and Schedule 7. Further, we recommend MPs to bring Clauses 28, 29, 34 and 45 back to the drawing board in order to introduce meaningful limits to the government discretion when regulating DVS providers.
1 The Hansard Society, Delegated legislation: the problems with the process, p.16, at: hansardsociety.org.uk/publicat…
2 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 3rd Report of Session 2024–25, Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL], p.4 paragraph 13, at: publications.parliament.uk/pa/…
3 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Democracy Denied? The urgent need to rebalance power between Parliament and the Executive, at: publications.parliament.uk/pa/…
4 Lord Ricketts, Letter to Rt Hon Peter Kyle MP re: UK-EU data adequacy, at: committees.parliament.uk/publi…
5 Opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (10.10.2023) within REPORT on the implementation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, at: europarl.europa.eu/doceo/docum…
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Henry VIII powers in Data Use and Access Bill could undermine election integrity
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Joint Letter: Henry VIII powers in Data Use and Access Bill could undermine election integrity
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To Sir Chris Bryant MP, Minister of State at the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
To Rt Hon Angela Rayner MP Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and Deputy Prime Minister
As organisations and individuals concerned with health functioning of democracy, we welcomed the commitment in the Kings Speech to “strengthen the integrity of elections”. We are therefore writing to alert you to the potential for abuse of new powers in the Data Use and Access Bill to remove constraints on the way that political parties use data, and urge you to ensure amendments to prevent such abuse.
Clauses 70(4) and 71(5)1 give the Secretary of State discretion to determine and vary the conditions under which personal data can be processed. We note the 3rd Report of the House of Lords Constitution Committee stated that they “are not satisfied that the case has been sufficiently made to entrust the powers in these clauses to secondary legislation.”2
The new Henry VIII powers would allow any future government to change the rules with minimal parliamentary oversight. Such changes could be timed to advantage the governing party of the day, for example by allowing practices it was ready to deploy, while other parties were not.
They could also be passed in such a manner that there was little or no time for the ICO or Electoral Commission to issue guidance to Political Parties on any new ‘legitimate interest’ basis for a political party to process voter data for election purposes. This would undermine the integrity of elections.
The use of data by parties is very difficult to enforce. The ICO has struggled to be critical or enforce against practices except in extreme circumstances, precisely because it needs a close relationship with political parties3. Moreover, political parties have limited resources, but live in a high stakes environment; they are under pressure do whatever they can do win elections. This can lead, as Open Rights Group recently found, to poor security and to unethical profiling and data mining of voters, unethical attempts to obtain commercial data sets, as well as questionable use of online advertising techniques.4
Any future government will be under internal party pressure to loosen the rules on use of personal data, in order to further any advantage they may have. The powers in the bill give those future governments the means to do so, and to time these changes in such a way that other parties cannot respond. The Bill increases the likelihood of looser rules, undermining democratic trust, by making trivially easy for a government to rewrite them to their short term advantage.
We hope we can work with you to amend the law to ensure how parties process political data can’t be changed with a statutory instrument.
Signed by
Unlock Democracy
Fair Vote UK
Big Brother Watch
Keep Our NHS Public
Open Rights Group
Privacy International
Good Law Project
Prof Vian Bakir,
Professor of Journalism & Political Communication, Bangor University
Prof Angela Daly, Professor of Law and Technology, University of Dundee
Prof Charlotte Heath-Kelly, Professor of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick
1 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/59-01/0179/240179.pdf
2publications.parliament.uk/pa/…publications.parliament.uk/pa/… paragraph 13
3 https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2259371/investigation-into-data-analytics-for-political-purposes-update.pdf
4 Moral Hazard: Voter Data Privacy and Politics in Election Canvassing Apps, (January 2025) Open Rights Group openrightsgroup.org/publicatio…
Briefing: Henry VIII powers threaten democracy and UK adequacy
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ORG response to Cyber Security Bill
Digital rights campaigners, Open Rights Group (ORG) have responded to the publication of the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill.
ORG’s Platform Power Programme Manager James Baker said:
“ORG welcomes legislation to protect and improve the UK’s cyber security. But a key component of any cyber security strategy has to be the promotion of strong encryption for both the state and the public.
“The UK cannot claim to be strengthening the country’s cyber defences while at the same time issuing notices to companies like Apple and demanding that they reduce the security of the services they offer.
“This Bill is also an opportunity to assess and reduce the UK’s dependence on large US corporations for vital government infrastructure. Other countries – such as France and the Netherlands – are already debating how to do this, through open source software for example. The UK is subject to the same risks so needs to assess our dependence in the same way.”
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Pirates at the Paris Defence and Strategy Forum
Our colleague from the Pirate Party of Germany in Munich, Alexander Kohler, recently attended the Paris Defence and Strategy Forum (PDSF). The event was held at the École Militaire in Paris from March 11 to 13. The 2025 forum was themed “Europe at the Crossroads”. The event focused on defense alliances, geopolitical challenges, and the evolving global landscape. Mr. Kohler is the leader of the Pirate Security Conference, which takes place in February each year. For over 10 years the PSC has provided a space to discuss how technological advancements redefine security. The event takes place alongside the Munich Security Conference, drawing in experts who participate in both events. The insights gained from the PDSF help to engage diverse perspectives on digital rights and security policies.
If you are interested in learning more about the PDSF, please read here: parisdefenceandstrategyforum.c…
For more information about the PSC, please read here: events.pirate-secon.net/
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Por qué las criptomonedas tienen valor
A mucha gente le cuesta entender por qué las criptomonedas tienen valor. Piensan que si no están respaldadas por un gobierno o por algo tangible, no pueden tener valor.
Las criptomonedas tienen valor porque los usuarios tienen confianza en estas. Ocurre algo parecido con el dinero fiduciario y el oro. Si nadie creyera que tienen valor, no valdrían nada. Pero ¿por qué hay gente tiene fe en Bitcoin y otras criptomonedas? Además de tener una red que ha estado funcionando sin mayores complicaciones desde 2009, Bitcoin tiene algo que lo diferencia del dinero fiduciario: es escaso. Nunca habrá más de 21 millones de bitcoines.
Por el contrario, los bancos centrales imprimen el dinero que quieren para dirigir la economía desde arriba. Como hay cada vez más dinero, este vale cada vez menos.
Es por ello que, medido en euros o dólares, Bitcoin cada vez es más valioso. Esta escasez digital fue creada en el protocolo de Bitcoin para mantener el valor de la moneda. Si bien es posible crear otra cadena de bloques similar a Bitcoin (al ser este un programa libre) y así crear más monedas, no todo el mundo adoptaría la moneda clon, pues el valor está principalmente en la comunidad de usuarios y en la confianza adquirida con los años. Existen multitud de monedas diferentes que tratan de competir con Bitcoin, pero solo tienen valor porque aportan alguna funcionalidad diferente y cuentan con una comunidad que las respalda.
¿Cómo puede ser algo digital escaso?
A diferencia de otros bienes digitales que pueden ser copiados y pegados sin límite, las criptomonedas funcionan de forma descentralizada con un mecanismo de consenso que garantiza su seguridad y escasez. Este mecanismo de consenso varía según la criptomoneda. El primer mecanismo de consenso utilizado se basa en un proceso conocido como prueba de trabajo, en el cual ordenadores llamados mineros compiten para resolver problemas matemáticos y así validar transacciones.
Como los mineros reciben recompensas económicas por minar, hay una gran red de ordenadores que mantienen la red descentralizada y funcionando las 24 horas, todos los días de la semana. La prueba de trabajo hace que sea casi imposible revertir o modificar una transacción una vez que esta es parte de la cadena de bloque. Como la red es validada por una gran cantidad de actores que reciben recompensas por su contribución y que tienen, por tanto, interés en el correcto funcionamiento de la red, no es económicamente viable acumular más del 50 % de la red para alterar la cadena de bloques maliciosamente.
Cada vez se emite menos
Cada cuatro años, Bitcoin reduce las recompensas que reciben los mineros a la mitad, por lo que cada vez se emiten menos monedas. Los mineros siguen recibiendo recompensas porque hay comisiones que reciben por validar transacciones. En el año 2140 la inflación de Bitcoin será del 0 %, es decir, no se emitirán nuevas monedas. Actualmente la inflación de Bitcoin es menor que la del oro, haciendo que sea uno de los activos más codiciados y que más aumenta de valor.
Ninguna entidad central puede controlar o confiscar tus bitcoines
Otro atractivo que hace que tenga valor Bitcoin es que no puede ser confiscado por banqueros ni por nadie. Tampoco se pueden revertir pagos, como ocurre en el sistema bancario tradicional. Si mantienes segura la clave privada, nadie podrá quitarte tu riqueza.
Permite comerciar internacionalmente
Gracias a la tecnología de cadena de bloque es posible comerciar con cualquier persona del mundo que tenga acceso a Internet. Las criptomonedas han ganado reconocimiento y usuarios a lo largo del planeta, con lo cual aumenta su valor.
Conclusión
Mientras que siga existiendo Internet y personas que valoren y crean en esta tecnología, Bitcoin y otras criptomonedas similares seguirán aumentando de valor a largo plazo, pues son deflacionarias. Las personas que atesoren dinero fiduciario, por el contrario, perderán poder adquisitivo con el tiempo si los bancos centrales siguen emitiendo más dinero.
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Social Media Doesn’t Want What’s Best For You : The Case of Musk and AfD
Ahead of the German national elections last February, Musk declared, on X (ex-Twitter) :
- “If you are unhappy with the situation, you must vote for change, and that is why I’m really strongly recommending that people vote for AfD” in support of AfD.
- “Only the AfD can save Germany,” to reiterate his support while re-posting a video from far-right political activist Naomi Seibt.
A German court ruled that the platform must immediately provide researchers with access to data on politically related content. One of the first major judicial tests of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and specifically its Article 40 on data access and scrutiny.
Varying researches showed that the algorithmic recommender system on X favours AfD content massively and disproportionally (see for example here). This suggests that Musk instructed his staff to align the platform to his personal political believes and to directly interfere in the German elections on 23. February.
Furthermore, there is evidence of Russian interference and misinformation having been spread and amplified by AfD supporters ahead of the German national elections (see here).
The take-away is that social media platforms, with obscure algorithms and no active content moderation are a fertile territory for manipulation.
As pirates, we advocate and call for the effective enforcement of the Digital Services Act, to prevent electoral manipulation in a member state, including through the application of fines. Furthermore, we underline the critical importance of transparency in algorithms especially the ones used by social media as our collective attention is their main trade and for concrete defence mechanisms to be setup to ensure the personal and digital integrity of users, subjected without their knowledge or consent to hostile influence operations.
Authored by Paul Diegel and Florian Roussel
The post Social Media Doesn’t Want What’s Best For You : The Case of Musk and AfD first appeared on European Pirate Party.
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European Parliament Approves Resolution on European Defense: “It’s Time to Stop Relying on Others,” Says Gregorová
Strasbourg, March 12, 2025 – The European Parliament has today adopted a historic resolution on the White Paper on the Future of European Defense. The document emphasizes the need for Europe’s strategic autonomy, reducing dependence on third countries, and strengthening defense cooperation within the EU.
The resolution responds to current security challenges and explicitly identifies Russia and its allies – Belarus, China, North Korea, and Iran – as the greatest threats to the security of the EU and its partners. “We must strengthen our support for Ukraine, expand our defense capabilities, and ensure that Europe is not dependent on the whims of the United States or other powers. There is talk of hundreds of billions for defense, but without a clear plan, these are just empty words. We don’t need more declarations or summits – we need real investments that match the €15 trillion strength of the European economy. Now is the time to show authoritarians around the world that Europe doesn’t just talk – it acts. And we must act now – every day we lose is paid for with Ukrainian blood,” says Gregorová.
“Wars today are not fought only with tanks and missiles but also through disinformation, cyberattacks, and sabotage. I am glad that this resolution clearly states: we must also defend ourselves in the digital space. If we want to protect not only our borders but also our democracy, we need a unified European approach to countering hybrid threats – from cybersecurity to uncovering election manipulation,” warns Gregorová.
As part of the resolution, the European Parliament calls for the swift implementation of the “ReArm Europe” plan, which should ensure long-term investments in the European defense industry and strategic technologies. “If we don’t invest in defense now, we will pay much more in the future – and not just financially. Unpreparedness for the worst-case scenarios would cost us incomparably more than decisive and timely action. We need a clear plan, concrete funding, and real investments; otherwise, we risk not only our security but also our economic stability,” says Gregorová.
“If we are to have real defense capabilities, we must also invest in European arms production and modern military technologies. If we want to protect Europe, we must produce European weapons and send a clear signal to arms manufacturers and investors that this is a long-term commitment by our states,” Gregorová concludes.
The post European Parliament Approves Resolution on European Defense: “It’s Time to Stop Relying on Others,” Says Gregorová first appeared on European Pirate Party.
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Pirates at the United Nations Office in Vienna, 2025!
We are pleased to present the following report from Kay Schroeder, PPI’s representative at the United Nations Office in Vienna. This year is the first time since before COVID that we were able to send representatives to all three UN offices (New York, Geneva, and Vienna). Please let us know if you would also like to visit the UN on behalf of PPI.
Report of Kay Schroeder on UNOV Meetings of the UNODC
The UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) invited its member states to attend the 68th Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Vienna, held from March 10th to 15th. This marked my first appearance as an ECOSOC consultant for Pirate Party International at an international conference, and I was eager to see what it would entail. I dressed in my best outfit (as shown in the picture) and arrived punctually by bike at 10 a.m. on Monday.
As it was the arrival day, most attendees were busy with accreditation, familiarizing themselves with the venue, and reuniting with colleagues. The main event took place in the Plenary Hall of Building M. On the first day, member states presented general statements outlining their perspectives on the UNODC’s work. It was quite a family atmosphere. People were respectful and most of them seemed to know each other for years. I enjoyed the relaxed atmosphere and the openminded intellectualism in the room. It appeared so unpolitical to me, very different from what I recognized in parliaments.
The 68th CND was chaired by Ambassador Shambhu Kumaran, India’s representative to the UN in Vienna.
The event’s agenda included six resolutions for adoption, outlined in the COW (Committee of the Whole) draft proposals. These proposals were deliberated in the COW sessions, chaired by Andranik Hovhannisyan, Armenia’s ambassador to Austria. Additionally, various side events hosted by member states provided in-depth perspectives on their respective challenges and proposed solutions. These sessions were essential for understanding the complexities underlying the negotiations, as drug-related issues differ significantly between countries.
While synthetic drugs were the primary focus, much discussion centered on the repercussions of decisions made during previous CNDs. One memorable side event, organized by the Colombian delegation, explored the environmental impact of cocaine regulation. They highlighted how the drastic reduction in coca cultivation—from 20,000 hectares to 2,000 hectares—had led to a sharp rise in cattle farming, increasing from 6,000 to nearly 600,000. This raised the critical question of which outcome posed a greater threat to the environment.
Environment besides was one of the critical points of the whole event. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), serving as the foundation for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, faced significant criticism and sparked ongoing disagreements regarding the proposals.
The side events were primarily organized by member states that had submitted proposals, often in collaboration with one another. As a result, these events were also joint efforts. Moreover, there were several lectures discussing the progress of drug management, treatment and prevention in specific countries.
The program was extensive, offering a wide array of insightful sessions. This made it necessary for me to carefully decide which events to attend, as all of them appeared highly engaging.
Throughout the week, the Committee of the Whole (COW) worked to refine the wording of each resolution, aiming to maximize the likelihood of their approval by the greatest number of members during the plenary session. The process strongly reminded me of the Liquid Democracy decision making approach, which we also encountered challenges with at Pirate Party Austria.
Each proposal underwent a series of revisions, as countries sought to add, remove, or rephrase elements until a final version emerged that could gain acceptance from all member states. Achieving unanimity proved to be a significant challenge at the UN, drawing notable criticism during Friday’s voting session. Nevertheless, the process unfolded as a continuous, real-time negotiation, much like the Liquid Democracy system, and faced similar challenges.
The importance of precise wording and language was paramount, particularly as each proposal faced opposition from different member states. To secure unanimity, it became evident that the proposals would need to be diluted to a point of near unrecognizability. The legalistic nature of the discussions, along with the increasing tensions throughout the week, was palpable. What began as a warm, familial atmosphere gradually evolved into a more professional and determined environment —still courteous in interactions but resolute in addressing the issues at hand.
The suspense reached its peak on Friday. It was voting day, and everyone was eager to see how things were unfolding. Certain side events were held privately for consultations, leaving the public uninformed about the progress. The COW faced certain expectations, particularly from the UNODC itself, which is acutely aware of the glaring failures in drug policy over recent years. The growing number of addiction-related impairments, particularly due to synthetic opioids like Fentanyl and Ketamine, as well as the rampant spread of pink cocaine—a drug cocktail containing MDMA, Ketamine, and various painkiller ingredients in South America—has led to harsh criticism of their own work.
This was accompanied by accusations directed at various countries, whether between consumers and producers (e.g., the US and China) or between advocates of legalization and proponents of prohibition. Decisions needed to be made, and resolutions had to be adopted. To keep it short. All proposals put forward by the COW were passed by a majority. However, the voting process highlighted weaknesses within the UN structure, similar to those seen in the EU. The U.S. government rejected all proposals, asserting that including the Sustainable Development Goals— viewed by them as a hidden global political agenda—was unacceptable under the principle of national sovereignty.
This critique arose despite the SDGs forming the foundation of the widely endorsed Agenda 2030.
Furthermore, the U.S. government fully rejected the Agenda 2030, calling for its removal during CND69. Argentina, with only one abstention, consistently aligned its decisions with those of the U.S. This stood out to me as a noteworthy and insightful example of advocacy in action.
The U.S. government’s proposal for removal, introduced as item 9, sparked extensive debate, highlighting the tensions among global interest groups. While the EU and its allies firmly opposed the proposal, it found support from the U.S., China, Russia, Iran, and Argentina. This clearly underscored a significant fault line between the states. The issue exposed weaknesses in the decision making, as the EU and its allies secured a majority in the vote due to their numerical advantage, despite not representing the relative population proportion. This outcome led to frustration among the other member states, as they also asserted their sovereignty of interpretation.
In my view, fostering greater cohesion in the future clearly requires institutional reforms, which can be achieved through further democratization.
Those are my findings of the CND 68. I hope you enjoyed the reading. Check out the pictures and stay alert for future updates on my work as ECOSOC consultant for PPI at United Nations.
For more in-depth information about the event, you can explore the CND Blog for live updates from the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs or visit the official page for the 68th Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.
CND Blog – Live reporting from the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs
Session 68 of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.
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