Una nuova ordinanza del Tribunal Judiciaire de Paris impone a diverse VPN popolari di bloccare l'accesso ai siti di streaming sportivo in diretta.
L'ordinanza, rivolta a CyberGhost, ExpressVPN, NordVPN, ProtonVPN e Surfshark, conferma che le VPN sono ora classificate come "intermediari tecnici" ai sensi del Codice dello Sport francese. Inoltre, la "difesa no-log" non è considerata un ostacolo al blocco da parte del tribunale.
Non è il futuro che fa paura. È il presente che fingiamo di non vedere: è parte della guerra cognitiva globale. Va oltre alla propaganda classica ed è più profonda, intima ed epistemica.
In the mid-1700s, Denis Diderot published his Encyclopédie in France, collecting the work of more than 140 authors to summarize the Enlightenment. It quickly landed on the Catholic Church’s banned books list for including contrarian thoughts, and, at one point, his publisher preemptively censored some content without Diderot’s knowledge.
Around the same time, King George III censored the first edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica, requiring the removal of some anatomically correct drawings in an article about midwifery.
So when the 13 newly independent American states ratified the First Amendment a few decades later, it laid the groundwork not only for a free press but also for an encyclopedia that was not censored by an oppressive government.
Today, we celebrate the realization of that dream in the form of Wikipedia, which over the past 25 years has been collaboratively built by unpaid strangers on the internet. Wikipedia went from the source that teachers universally clamored “you can’t trust it” to one of the most reliable sources in a world of “disinformation” and AI-generated slop.
Despite not being written by professional journalists (I edit it myself as a volunteer and used to work for its nonprofit host, Wikimedia Foundation), it’s still able to set trends and drive narratives. For example, in 2011, Wikipedia editors started collating a list of people killed by law enforcement in the U.S., three years before The Washington Post would win a Pulitzer for its version of the same.
And for better or worse, Wikipedia is most likely the largest single source powering today’s AI models. All in all, it’s the largest repository of knowledge in human history.
But it’s important to understand and appreciate that Wikipedia only exists because of the robust free speech and free press protections that exist in the United States.
But it’s important to understand and appreciate that Wikipedia only exists because of the robust free speech and free press protections that exist in the United States.
Kunal Mehta
Wikipedia has never been actively censored in the U.S., nor has any U.S.-based editor ever been arrested for their edits to Wikipedia. There’s never even been a serious threat of censorship of Wikipedia by the federal government. (The FBI once demanded Wikipedia stop using its seal under a law written to stop impersonation of federal agents; Wikipedia’s legal team laughed it off.)
The same cannot be said about Wikipedia in other countries. In France, intelligence operatives held a Wikipedia administrator until he deleted an article about a military radio station, under the guise it contained classified information. Agents made this demand even though the information in question wasn’t classified at all and was mostly based on a documentary that the French air force had worked on and publicly released.
In India, a court required Wikipedia to remove an article about a news agency because it was supposedly defamatory. To top it off, the court then demanded Wikipedia remove the separate article that was written about the court case and removal order!
This kind of censorship shouldn’t happen in the U.S. The Supreme Court ruled the First Amendment protects publishing classified information in a case about the Pentagon Papers. A U.S. court cannot order an article to be taken down, as that would be an unconstitutional prior restraint.
In the U.S., the law known as Section 230 would also protect Wikipedia from defamation claims, and instead require litigants to sue the editor who actually wrote and published the allegedly defamatory content. Those editors would be protected under the First Amendment and the high court’s New York Times v. Sullivan decision, which requires defamation claims from public officials — later expanded to public figures — to meet the much higher standard of actual malice to win (nearly every biography on Wikipedia is of a public figure, by policy).
And to state the obvious, the U.S. has never blocked all of Wikipedia, unlike China (since 2015), Myanmar (since 2021), or Turkey, which did so from 2017 until an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights forced that nation to unblock it in 2020. We know of one editor, Bassel Khartabil, who was executed for their online activity, and a few others who are incarcerated in Belarus and Saudi Arabia.
Certainly, there are plenty of people in power who wish they could censor or control Wikipedia. At first, it was through editing: In 2006, a number of Congressional staffers were caught whitewashing their bosses’ biographies, and, in 2007, someone at the FBI tried to remove images from the Guantánamo Bay detention camp article.
Then, in 2013, Edward Snowden leaked that the National Security Agency was illegally spying on Wikipedia readers and editors, revealing that the U.S. had adopted the same playbook as China. Wikipedia responded by encrypting all connections using HTTPS a few years later, and (unsuccessfully) sued the NSA for First and Fourth amendment violations.
It will require a concerted effort by all of us to not just maintain existing First Amendment protections, but to expand them. That’s the only way Wikipedia will thrive for another 25 years.
🎁 15 января 2026 года крупнейшей энциклопедии в истории интернета исполняется четверть века — ровно 25 лет с момента её основания в 2001 году. Википедия выросла из идеи свободного знания до глобальной платформы с десятками миллионов статей на 300+ языках, служащей фундаментом для образования, исследований и повседневных нужд людей по всему миру, а также площадкой для обучения искусственных интеллектов человеческой культуре.
В течение всего 2026 года сообщество Wikimedia планирует отмечать этот юбилей серией событий, онлайн-акций и материалов, объединённых темой «Knowledge is Human» (Знание это человек) — ведь именно люди, их вклад и сотрудничество сделали Википедию тем, чем она стала.
Википедия существует благодаря волонтёрам, которые ежедневно пишут, проверяют и улучшают статьи. Проект сохраняет свою независимость: без рекламы и платных подписок, полагаясь на добровольные пожертвования и вклад людей, открыто делящихся знаниями.
🏴 Пиратская партия России традиционно поддерживает свободу знаний и информационные свободы, которые являются сердцем Википедии. На страницах русскоязычной версии Википедии есть статья о нашей партии, где можно ознакомиться с нашей историей, целями, принципами и многой другой полезной информацией.
Википедия — это не просто энциклопедия, это символ открытого обмена знаниями и коллективного творчества. Она показывает, как миллионы людей могут объединиться, чтобы создать нечто намного большее, чем просто набор фактов — целый мир знаний, доступный каждому. Эта идеология перекликается с нашими принципами:
свобода информации — право каждого получать и распространять знания без цензуры;
прозрачность и участие — общественные процессы, открытые для вклада каждого;
борьба с монополией на знание — против закрытых систем и БД;
децентрализация и совместное творчество — как основы прямой электронной демократии.
Для нас Википедия — это не только ресурс, но и пример того, каким может быть общество, где информация свободна, а участие каждого ценится.
В эпоху, когда знания всё чаще оказываются под давлением государственных и коммерческих интересов, алгоритмов и корпоративных блоков, Википедия остаётся редким пространством, где человеческое знание по-прежнему доступно всем и каждому. Призываем всех активно участвовать в наполнении Википедии и сохранять своё имя в культуре человечества, включая его будущих небиологических представителей.
As part of its digital sovereignty drive, the European Commission is currently inviting public input on the future of European Open Digital Ecosystems through an open consultation. The idea is to gather perspectives from different parties – developers, civil society, policy makers, public administrators, and industry insiders and ascertain how it could establish and shape the foundations of Europe’s digital future.
The European Pirates will take this opportunity to submit a response to the commission’s call. The discussion below is a starting point for that wider reflection. It outlines key ambitions of the EU’s open digital strategy and highlights several structural bottlenecks that deserve careful attention as Europe defines its next steps.
Amid rapid transformations and politically charged ramifications in the global digital landscape, the European Union has decided to restructure and strengthen its open-source digital ecosystem strategy. Over the past few years, digital infrastructure has quietly become a geopolitical asset. Cloud systems, AI models, data pipelines, and even open-source software now shape economic power, security posture, and democratic resilience. The European Commission initially adopted the strategy in 2020-2023. The call to action is amplified at the Summit on European Digital Sovereignty in Berlin in November 2025.
The underlying idea is simple: Achieve and maintain Europe’s digital sovereignty.
Key Goals Of The Initiative:
Digital sovereignty & independence: Help Europe reduce reliance on non-EU tech companies by making it easier to use, modify, and host digital tools within European infrastructure, giving users and institutions greater control and real choices.
Innovation & competitiveness: Offer shared, reusable tech foundations so startups, small businesses, and researchers can build faster, experiment more, and focus on new ideas instead of starting from scratch.
Security & trust: Open code can be examined by anyone, which makes it easier to spot problems, improve safety, and build public confidence, especially for systems used in sensitive or essential sectors.
Economic growth: Support a stronger digital economy by encouraging collaboration, lowering entry barriers, and creating space for new European tech companies to emerge and scale.
Standards & interoperability: Push for open technologies that work well together across Europe and connect seamlessly, rather than becoming isolated silos.
Strategic autonomy: Strengthen Europe’s digital capabilities, particularly in areas such as AI, to ensure geopolitical independence on an ever-evolving technological platform.
History as a mirror shows that sovereignty can only be attained when something, be it a nation or a system, is built brick by brick. It cannot be purchased off the shelf as a commodity. In the face of current volatile geopolitical situations and ever-evolving technological innovations, the EU’s initiative to build a digital ecosystem is indeed a need of the hour and a duty to its citizens.
But it is essential to recognise that, though the initiative’s ambition is straightforward, it is underpinned by complex challenges. Europe is trying to build an open digital ecosystem while simultaneously operating one of the world’s most assertive regulatory environments. It wants openness without dependency, innovation without loss of control, and sovereignty without isolation. Whether these goals can coexist is no longer a theoretical question. It is now a structural one.
The initiative marks a shift away from reliance on non-European digital infrastructure toward home-grown, openly accessible technologies. But building software is easier than sustaining ecosystems. Open Source does not thrive on policy declarations alone. It survives on developer communities, long-term funding, legal clarity, and trust. In a climate shaped by AI disruption, transatlantic regulatory tensions, and growing corporate consolidation, Europe’s strategy is as much an experiment in governance as it is in technology.
The proposed framework of the EU’s Open Source Initiative works through four interconnected layers:
Digital Governance
Digital Infrastructures Software and Data
Digital Products and Markets
People
In this context, it is critical to analyse the bottlenecks that can impede the development of an open digital ecosystem in Europe. Various views have been put forth by policymakers, developers, industry leaders, and digital rights advocates. Below are a few bottlenecks that must be carefully examined and navigated:
Bottlenecks
1. Regulatory Complexity, Legal Uncertainty, and Burden On Developers
The EU’s AI Act introduces a risk-based way to govern AI. Some uses of AI are completely banned, others need strict oversight, and general-purpose AI must follow rules for transparency and safety.
The main challenge is how these rules affect Open Source projects. Vague definitions, complex requirements, and excessive bureaucracy have worried both developers and civil society groups. Smaller teams may feel discouraged—not because they oppose safeguards, but because complying with the rules may be too much for them.
Recent delays in the European Commission’s AI compliance deadlines in late 2025 demonstrate this problem. If the rules are too strict or confusing, independent developers might stop participating. If the rules are too weak, people may lose trust. Without clearer guidance and more practical expectations for open projects, these rules could slow down Europe’s digital progress by discouraging people from getting involved.
2. Funding Gaps and Ecosystem Support Challenges
Beyond being a cornerstone of Europe’s digital sovereignty, Open Source is a highly viable economic proposition for the EU (contributing approximately €65-95 billion annually and $8.8 trillion globally). But Open Source remains underfunded relative to traditional infrastructure.
This highlights significant gaps in strategy and funding within Europe’s Open-Source ecosystem. Many organisations lack clear plans or long-term investments in Open Source, making it harder to sustain projects and remain competitive.
In this context, it is crucial to pay attention to the EU’s position on digital products and markets. For instance, the global generative AI landscape is dominated by China and the US, with 60% and 12% share, respectively, while Europe ranks third with just 7%. Interestingly, Europe produces 21% of research papers worldwide, but its share of patent filings remains at 2%. The gap is due to the lack of access to venture capital.
Europe is heavily dependent on non-EU countries for critical raw materials and semiconductors. Such heavy reliance on external producers makes the supply chain vulnerable to supply chain disruptions and geopolitical pressures. Without a robust industrial base and competitive markets, the idea of digital sovereignty will remain a far-fetched dream.
3. Harmonising Policy and Technical Implementation
It is essential to recognise that the open-source initiative is not only about passing laws. It is about building systems people are expected to use.
The bottleneck arises when laws, funding mechanisms, and public technology projects become misaligned. If policies advance faster than practical tools, developers are left uncertain. If systems are built without legal and social clarity, adoption slows.
Open Source grows through steady collaboration. It depends more on continuity than on declarations. When coordination weakens, Europe risks producing strong frameworks that struggle to take root beyond official documents.
4. Addressing Cybersecurity Regulation Without Excluding Open Source
Secure networks and compatible systems to software, hardware, data networks, and cloud infrastructure are the mainstay of digital sovereignty that Europe strives to achieve.
The Digital Decade Policy 2030 is focused on improving connectivity across the continent.
A proposed €300 billion investment is in the pipeline as part of the Eurostack initiative, which aims to integrate cloud services, the AI Continent Action Plan, new AI Factories, and shared data spaces into a unified European digital infrastructure.
Despite these efforts, structural weaknesses persist, and cybersecurity remains a significant concern. Fragmentation is another challenge. If EU countries do not work together, they might continue to develop separate, incompatible data-sharing systems. This would make it harder to create a unified European data space.
Digital infrastructure and data systems are key to Europe’s digital future. They support governance, markets, and the protection of individual rights. But sovereignty is not just about having technology. It also means Europe must be able to create, store, manage, and use data in ways that reflect its values.
At this moment, as Europe seeks to shape its digital future, it cannot outsource its strategic technology layers. Digital sovereignty cannot be achieved by focusing solely on the application. Priority investment is needed in foundational systems such as:
Secure networking and VPN tooling
collaborative productivity platforms
web and application security infrastructure
data-centre orchestration and virtualisation layers
5. Skill Gap and Lack of Trust
According to the Commission’s second annual report on the State of the Digital Decade, only 55.6% of Europeans had basic digital literacy. Public trust in EU policies concerning the protection of online rights stands at 45%. This gap of skill and public trust is a matter that needs to be examined critically.
Many people still feel unsure about technology and unconvinced that their rights are truly protected online. When digital policies feel distant, complex, or designed only for experts, people can feel excluded. That loss of trust can quietly weaken Europe’s digital ambitions.
This human side shows that digital sovereignty is more than laws and systems. It is about ensuring people feel confident, included, and able to join the digital world. Without this, even the best strategies risk being about people instead of truly serving them.
Ecosystem and Infrastructure Realities
Beyond geopolitics and regulation lies a quieter layer where Open Source actually lives.
Most projects are maintained by individuals or small teams. This creates vulnerabilities that no sovereignty strategy can ignore.
Critical tools often depend on only a few people. When they burn out or move on, systems falter. Enterprises hesitate to rely on software without clear responsibility structures. When problems arise, there is often no obvious place to turn.
This does not undermine openness. It undermines resilience.
Contribution pathways face similar strain. Companies often want to return improvements to the broader community. Yet limited maintenance capacity, slow review timelines, and project governance constraints frequently push the organisation towards considering an internal/private version. Once that happens, the incentive to contribute back erodes, fragmenting ecosystems and increasing maintenance burdens across the board.
The obstacle here is not motivation. It is the absence of institutional scaffolding.
From ideology to infrastructure: what Europe would need to build
If Europe is serious about Open Source as public digital infrastructure, it must consider new structural instruments, such as:
EU-based sponsorship platforms that reduce friction between developers and funders
public-sector sponsorship obligations tied to software procurement
early-stage funding mechanisms for individual maintainers
Public-funding conditions that require open-source contributions
These are not symbolic gestures. They are the economic foundations of a sustainable open-source ecosystem.
Closing Perspective: The Value of Digital Rights Voices
As Europe navigates regulation, competition, and technological acceleration, digital rights organisations continue to stress an essential point: innovation and rights protection are not opposites.
They argue that digital policy should not only prevent harm, but also actively empower people. That means meaningful transparency, accountability, and the protection of the integrity of Open Source itself.
This perspective reframes Europe’s initiative. It is not only about market position or technological independence. It is about shaping a digital environment where infrastructure supports dignity, autonomy, and democratic choice.
Europe now faces a rare opportunity. It can build an open-source strategy that does more than produce software. It can create a digital public space where innovation is structurally supported, and rights are structurally protected.
As part of its digital sovereignty drive, the European Commission is currently inviting public input on the future of European Open Digital Ecosystems…
This morning, the FBI raided the home of Washington Post reporter Hannah Natanson, reportedly in connection with an investigation of a system administrator accused of accessing and taking home classified intelligence reports.
The following can be attributed to Seth Stern, chief of advocacy at Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF).
“This is an alarming escalation in the Trump administration’s multipronged war on press freedom. The Department of Justice (and the judge who approved this outrageous warrant) is either ignoring or distorting the Privacy Protection Act, which bars law enforcement from raiding newsrooms and reporters to search for evidence of alleged crimes by others, with very few inapplicable exceptions.
“The government has said that Natanson is not under investigation, nor should she be for simply reporting information provided to her by sources. Even the Trump DOJ’s guidelines on searching reporters’ source materials (which were weakened from prior guidelines based on the administration’s proven lies about “fake news”) make clear that it’s a last resort for rare emergencies only. The administration may now be in possession of volumes of journalist communications having nothing to do with any pending investigation and, if investigators are able to access them, we have zero faith that they will respect journalist-source confidentiality.”
Please contact us if you would like further comment.
Running for the Democratic Party nomination, Drew is a fighter and a champion to the causes of the United States Pirate Party.
Drew took on the reigns of captain in August of 2023 and steered the ship back on course in a time of choppy waters. Under his leadership, the Pirate Party held its first in-person conference, endorsed a Presidential candidate for the first time since 2008, and saw the additions of Texas and Florida to the Pirate National Committee.
As his successor, and this is Jolly Mitch speaking, I can promise you that Drew Bingaman’s leadership shaped my opinion of what makes a good leader. Drew’s steady hand, honesty and commitment to betterment are qualities I can only hope to emulate as Captain, and that those qualities are sure to shine as candidate for PA 108.
If his time in the Pirate Party has been any indication, residents of PA’s 108th District have the opportunity to take on a leader that’s truly anti-corruption, pro-common-sense-and-common-folk, and unafraid to speak the truth.
You can see the meeting in which we endorsed Drew here.
We elect our Pirate Council in February. Positions include Captain, First Officer, Quartermaster, PR/Media Director, Activism Director, Swarmwise Director, Web/Info Director, three Arbitrators and two representatives to the US Pirate Party.
Ballots will be sent out by February 13th and are due back by February 27th. We will use the same voting mechanism we used in our previous election. Voters will be emailed a randomly generated id that only the voter will know. Once the election is done, we will delete the ids. In this way, we can ensure that only supporters can vote, while also maintaining the secrecy of votes.
Pirate Parties International condemns the nationwide internet shutdown that has been in effect in Iran since January 8, 2026. This measure is a flagrant violation of international human rights and serves to conceal crimes against humanity.
Since December 28, 2025, hundreds of thousands of Iranians have been protesting against economic crisis and political oppression. The Iranian regime responds with mass violence and total digital blockade:
Scores of protesters and civilians, including children, killed
Civilians are arbitrarily arrested
Media reporting and human rights documentation made impossible
Security forces intensify oppression under cover of digital darkness
The internet shutdown violates fundamental human rights:
Right to freedom of expression (Article 19 ICCPR)
Right to access to information
Right to document human rights violations
Enables crimes against humanity
The UN Human Rights Council has explicitly determined: blanket network shutdowns are never lawful and always constitute violations of human rights.
Iran has operated one of the world’s most repressive internet censorship systems for years:
2019: Six-day internet shutdown during fuel protests
2022: Massive throttling during Mahsa Amini protests
Permanent blocking of YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, WhatsApp
Systematic criminalization of VPNs and encryption
The current total shutdown continues this pattern.
DEMANDS OF PIRATE PARTIES INTERNATIONAL
Immediate restoration of internet access by the Iranian regime
End violence against protesters and release of all arbitrarily detained persons
International sanctions:
Add IRGC to terrorist organization lists
Comprehensive sanctions against regime officials
Invoke UN Security Council
Technological support for Iranian civil society:
Decentralized and secure communication tools
Open-source censorship circumvention tools
Starlink and similar technologies
Long-term digital sovereignty:
Build alternative infrastructure
Develop open-source ecosystems
Implement decentralized network technologies
STATEMENT
Schoresch Davoodi, Board Member of Pirate Parties International and European Affairs Officer of the Pirate Party Germany:
“Iran has been using its technical arsenal for digital oppression for decades – White SIM cards for regime loyalists, criminalization of VPNs, billions invested in surveillance. The current total internet shutdown is not new, but rather the escalation of a decades-old strategy. When the people speak too loudly, the regime shuts down the internet.
Iran needs not less democracy and less freedom – it needs MORE. The Iranian freedom movement deserves our full solidarity and the tools of digital freedom: decentralized networks, open-source tools, and encryption without backdoors.”
ABOUT PIRATE PARTIES INTERNATIONAL
Pirate Parties International fights for data protection, digital freedom, transparency, and citizen rights in the digital age. It is a member-based international umbrella organization with official status at the United Nations (ECOSOC consultative status).
We are grateful to be among the 10 beneficiaries of the 2025 @protonprivacy Lifetime Fundraiser together with organisations working to protect digital rights, including EDRi member @digiges and partners @nlnet & Lighthouse Reports
"Support from the global Proton community will significantly strengthen EDRi’s resilience, empowering us to advocate for robust laws and promote a healthy and accountable technology market." Amber Sinha, EDRi Executive Director
Bislang haben sie noch nichts geschrieben, aber vielleicht brauchen sie ja nur ein wenig Willkommenskultur, dass man sie auch hier als "Stimme der Hochschulen gegenüber Politik und Öffentlichkeit" hören kann?
Every Thursday of the week, Bastian’s Night is broadcast from 21:30 CET.
Bastian’s Night is a live talk show in German with lots of music, a weekly round-up of news from around the world, and a glimpse into the host’s crazy week in the pirate movement.
Il disegno complessivo emerge chiaramente se si guarda oltre il perimetro universitario. Il ministro della Difesa #Crosetto ha recentemente invocato un “ecosistema integrato in cui industria, università, centri di ricerca e difesa lavorino in sinergia”. In una società sempre più autoritaria e militarizzata, un’università autonoma, libera, critica e pluralista [ammesso e non concesso che l'università post-gelminiana lo sia mai stata -NdR] diventa un problema. La riforma a pezzi dell’università va in questa direzione: costruire un sistema più gerarchizzato, meno libero e più facilmente controllabile dalla politica.
La maggioranza di governo avanza una riforma dell'università spezzata in tre frammenti: governance, ANVUR e reclutamento. Il rischio più grande? Che opporsi a una riforma sbagliata significhi difendere uno status quo indifendibile.
EFFecting Change: il costo umano della verifica dell'età online
Gli obblighi di verifica dell'età si stanno diffondendo rapidamente e stanno inaugurando una nuova era di sorveglianza online, censura ed esclusione per tutti, non solo per i giovani.
Age verification mandates are spreading fast, and they’re ushering in a new age of online surveillance, censorship, and exclusion for everyone—not just young people.
Candidate News – Timothy Grady, independent gubernatorial from Ohio and candidate endorsed by the Pirate Party, was a guest on Talk the Plank! on Saturday. You can check out that episode here.
Hunter Rand, Pirate candidate running in the nonpartisan Sparks City Council race in Nevada, appeared on the US Transhumanist Party‘s Virtual Enlightenment Salon on Sunday, which you can find here.
Another Pirate candidate will be properly revealed on Wednesday, one which we are proud to reveal more than happy to endorse. During last night’s meeting, the endorsement was made official and is no secret to anyone watching last night’s meeting. Even as such, the official announcement will come Wednesday.
Committee News – No major updates from IT Committee. Outreach Committee met and discussed different ideas to help state parties, including business cards and in-person recruiting. Platform committee has been asked to explore both the idea of term limits and #ProjectNoCap, the latter being a Mr. Beat started project to uncap the United States House of Representatives.
Massachusetts – Preparations are actively being made for the 2026 Pirate National Conference in Boston. The conference will be hybrid with both in-person and online options to attend. The conference will take prior to the FIFA World Cup, and given Boston will play host, it is advised that those looking to attend book early before prices begin to rise. The conference will begin June 6th and is expected to conclude on the 7th. We WILL be on a boat for the conference.
You can check out the latest Pirate National Committee meeting here.
10 января 2026 года прошла очередная Генеральная Ассамблея Пиратского Интернационала (Pirate Parties International).
Пиратскую партию России на Генассамблее представляли члены Федерального Штаба ППР Александр Исавнин, Григорий Дизер, Валерия Клестова и член Контрольно-ревизионной комиссии ППР Николай Воронов.
Ключевое приветствие и вступительное слово произнесла Лилия Кайра Куюмджу (председатель Пиратской партии Германии), подчеркнув ценности свободы, цифровых прав и международного сотрудничества внутри Пиратского движения.
Поступили отчёты от руководящих органов PPI: Совет (Board) — обзор деятельности за 2025 год, участие в международных форумах и конференциях, деятельность в ООН. Казначей (Treasurer), Арбитражный суд (Court of Arbitration) и Независимый аудитор (Lay Auditor) — отчёты и замечания.
Ассамблея рассмотрела и утвердила бюджет PPI на 2026 год.
На Генассамблее приняты две важных для мирового пиратского движения резолюции:
1. Солидарность с иранским движением за свободу и против избирательной цензуры в сфере защиты цифровых прав
1. Народная партия Ирана подтверждает свою непоколебимую солидарность с иранским народом, призывая к немедленному включению Корпуса стражей исламской революции (КСИР) в список террористических организаций на территории всего ЕС, введению всеобъемлющих санкций против должностных лиц режима и активной поддержке диаспорных сетей, противостоящих влиянию режима и цифровым репрессиям.
2. Мы осуждаем все формы цензуры, включая систематические цифровые репрессии иранского режима и западные механизмы «доверенной маркировки» в рамках DSA, которые позволяют осуществлять избирательный контроль над контентом, как это показано в деле HateAid. Мы призываем партии-члены выступать за реформы, отдающие приоритет устойчивому, плюралистическому диалогу, а не технократическому контролю.
3. Партиям-членам Международной организации пиратских партий настоятельно рекомендуется без исключения интегрировать универсальные права человека в свои платформы, способствуя открытым, плюралистическим и устойчивым внутренним дебатам, избегая при этом избирательного активизма, игнорирующего режимы, подобные иранскому, или усиливающего внутренние догмы, – обеспечивая тем самым, чтобы наше движение оставалось неукротимым, устойчивым, последовательным и заслуживающим доверия.
2. Рамочная основа этического регулирования искусственного интеллекта
По мере того как искусственный интеллект (ИИ) и машинное обучение (МО) все глубже интегрируются в общественную инфраструктуру, рынок труда и судебные системы, пиратское движение осознает как преобразующий потенциал, так и экзистенциальные риски для неприкосновенности частной жизни и автономии личности. Необходимо обеспечить, чтобы ИИ служил инструментом расширения прав и возможностей человека, а не механизмом социального контроля или непрозрачного корпоративного доминирования. Мы признаем следующие основные принципы:
1. Прозрачность алгоритмов: Любая система искусственного интеллекта, внедряемая в государственном секторе или используемая для принятия важных частных решений (например, в сфере кредитования, трудоустройства или жилищного обеспечения), должна подлежать независимой государственной проверке. Базовая логика и обучающие наборы данных должны быть прозрачными, доступными и проверяемыми.
2. Право на участие человека в процессе принятия решения: Ни одно решение, коренным образом влияющее на правовой статус или средства к существованию человека, не должно приниматься исключительно автоматизированной системой. Граждане должны иметь юридически закрепленное право на содержательную проверку со стороны человека.
3. Запрет массового биометрического наблюдения: Мы выступаем за глобальный запрет на биометрическую идентификацию в режиме реального времени (например, распознавание лиц) в общественных местах как государственными, так и частными организациями.
4. Открытый исходный код как обязательное условие: для обеспечения безопасности и общественного доверия системы искусственного интеллекта, заказываемые или используемые правительствами, должны основываться на свободном и открытом программном обеспечении (FOSS).
Предлагаемые действия Генеральная Ассамблея поручает новому 16-му составу Совета воссоздать Постоянный комитет по политике в области ИИ. Этот комитет будет координировать международные усилия по продвижению этих принципов на уровне ООН и ЕС, особенно с Европейской пиратской партией, стремясь обеспечить их интеграцию в формирующиеся глобальные рамки и правила.
Также проведено несколько выборных сессий: — Заместителем председателя Борды избран Грегори Энгельс, член Пиратской партии Германии, уроженец Москвы и наш большой друг; — членами Борды избраны на двухлетний срок Себастьян Кроне, Карлос Поло и член Федерального Штаба ППР Григорий Дизер; — альтернативными членами Борды избраны Барт Оверкамп, Лилия Кайра Куюмджу, Томас Гал и выдвинутый ППР член ПП Германии Numero6; — аудиторами избраны Ноам Кузар и член КРК ППР Николай Воронов; — также 6 членами CoA избраны Миа Утц, Александр Колер, Охад Шем Тов, Майлз Уитикер.
Кроме того, было принято заявление о солидарности с ПП США в связи с ситуацией в США: Пиратский Интернационал выражает свою поддержку Пиратской партии США в связи с недавним убийством Рене Николь Гуд сотрудником Федеральной иммиграционной и таможенной службы (ICE). Пусть в Соединенных Штатах или любой другой стране не будет убежища для врагов свободы.
Пиратская партия России является членом-учредителем и неотъемлемой частью Пиратского Интернационала, что мы в том числе закрепили в Уставе и Программе. И, несмотря на мировые дезинтеграционные процессы и всеобщее недоверие, мы продолжим активно участвовать в стирании границ, стремиться к созданию и развитию инструментов и ресурсов для построения более справедливого мира, сохранения существующих и создания новых возможностей.
Security by Design instead of Surveillance by Default. That is Parliament’s line on #ChatControl and it is the only one that actually protects children without spying on millions of innocent citizens. Hold the line in 2026! Read the full interview: euperspectives.eu/2025/12/brey… [link fixed]
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Mercoledì 15 ottobre torniamo con il Logout di TWC Roma, il ritrovo per tech workers che vogliono incontrarsi dopo lavoro: un'occasione per socializzare, conoscersi, parlare del nostro lavoro e come organizzarci nei prossimi mesi!
Ci vediamo mercoledì 21 gennaio, alle 18.30, da Vox Populi a San Lorenzo!
For journalists who work online, the most dangerous assumption is that press freedom is territorial. It is not. In the digital age, journalists publish globally by default, and states increasingly assert criminal jurisdiction globally as well.
The recent assertion of U.S. authority to seize (kidnapping is such an “ugly” word) Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro illustrates a broader and deeply unsettling truth: Once a state claims jurisdiction, the limiting factor is not law, but power. For journalists, that reality has been quietly unfolding for decades.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction and the press
Domestic law (and law enforcement) does not stop at the border. Most countries reserve the “right” to prosecute those outside the country whose actions are directed inside the country, or which impact that country’s laws, citizens, or property.
The concept of “extraterritorial” jurisdiction of domestic law was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1922 in United States v. Bowman, where the court noted that certain criminal statutes apply extraterritorially by their nature when they protect national interests. This is commonly called the “protective” principle of extraterritorial application of law. In the cyber era, courts have applied this doctrine aggressively to online conduct, including speech, publication, and data access.
Journalists are not exempt. While the First Amendment provides robust protection against U.S. prosecution for publishing truthful information of public concern, those protections are not portable. They do not bind foreign courts, nor do they prevent foreign states from asserting jurisdiction over content accessible within their borders.
Journalists prosecuted for online speech abroad
One of the earliest and most influential cases illustrating this problem is LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc., a 2000 French case where the court asserted jurisdiction over Yahoo, a U.S. company, for hosting Nazi memorabilia auctions accessible from France, where French law prohibited the display of Nazi materials.
Although Yahoo ultimately resisted enforcement in U.S. courts, the case established the principle that online publication can subject speakers and publishers to the criminal law of any country where the content is accessible. Countries routinely attempt to enforce their own laws — terrorism, defamation, etc., over the activities of journalists outside their borders.
For example, in Akçam v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights recognized the chilling effect of Turkey’s criminal laws on speech, including academic and journalistic commentary. But Turkish prosecutors continue to attempt to use Interpol red notices — which alert law enforcement agencies worldwide to locate and detain an individual — to have foreign journalists prosecuted.
In 2023, Russian authorities issued criminal charges against foreign reporters for coverage of the war in Ukraine, alleging dissemination of “false information” about the Russian military — conduct that would be core protected speech in the United States — in violation of the Russian criminal code.
If other countries adopt the Maduro precedent, a foreign country can enforce its laws against U.S. journalists simply by force or power.
China has attempted to use Article 12 of the Cybersecurity Law of the PRC to prosecute those who disseminate online content that “endangers national security” or “damages the public interest” of China. Foreign journalists have been detained, expelled, or prosecuted for online reporting hosted on servers outside China but accessible within it. The Maduro regime itself cracked down on journalists within its own borders, prosecuting them for crimes like terrorism, incitement, and conspiracy.
The United States recently proposed to require those entering the country to provide border agents with access to five years of their social media history, threatening to use this information to ban, arrest, detain, or punish those whose history indicates some vaguely defined “un-American” political persuasion. Moreover, the U.S. government spent years attempting to obtain jurisdiction over Australian WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange for his publication from abroad of materials the U.S. government claimed could not be published under U.S. law.
There is no ‘there there’
Typically, if speech is permitted (or protected) in the jurisdiction in which it is uttered or published, but prohibited or regulated in another country, the “injured” country has few remedies to go after the speaker/publisher. While it can charge the person with a crime and request that they be extradited, extradition treaties typically require that the conduct be considered “criminal” in both countries. And many countries (including the U.S.) do not typically extradite their own citizens.
Add to that the fact that most extradition treaties also permit the host country to resist extradition for “political speech” or “political activity,” and that an extradition request is subject to both a legal and political process. In addition, the likelihood that a U.S. journalist would be extradited to China, Turkey, or another country for First Amendment-protected activity is small — not nonexistent, but small.
Countries may, however, consider the activities of journalists to constitute violations of surveillance, theft, intellectual property, threat, defamation, or espionage laws, increasing the chance that they will be treated as nonpolitical offenses. Put simply, we extradite whom we want to countries we want for purposes we want. And that’s what other countries do as well.
Kidnapping, rendition, and the Ker–Frisbie Doctrine
What the Maduro case shows is that governments (including the U.S. government) reserve either the right or the pure ability to invade the territorial sovereignty of other nations to obtain jurisdiction over those (including heads of state) we believe have violated U.S. law. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the authority of the U.S. to “kidnap” persons overseas and bring them to U.S. courts — and presumably the opposite applies as well.
Under what is called the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, the domestic courts do not look at the way the court obtained jurisdiction over the defendant (unless this “shocks the conscience”), but simply look at whether the defendant is physically present.
In the 1886 case Ker v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that a defendant abducted from Peru could still be tried in U.S. court. It affirmed the principle in 1952 in Frisbie v. Collins. In the 1992 case United States v. Alvarez-Machain, after U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents abducted a doctor in Mexico and brought him to trial in the U.S., the court noted that the U.S./Mexico extradition treaty was just “one way” to obtain jurisdiction over a person. Apparently, kidnapping is another. As a federal appellate court made clear five years later in United States v. Noriega, this principle applies to foreign heads of state as well.
What this means for journalists
For journalists, the implication is sobering. Publishing an article, hosting leaked documents, or reporting on state misconduct online can expose a reporter to criminal liability in jurisdictions with radically different views of press freedom.
The fact that the work is lawful — and even celebrated — in the United States offers no protection abroad. We saw that when Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi was abducted and dismembered by the Saudi government at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey.
What typically “saves” journalists is that foreign countries may fear invading the territorial sovereignty of the host nation. This is why most prosecutions of journalists occur in the country in which they are operating. Russia’s prosecutions of Alsu Kurmasheva, a Russian-American journalist working for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Wall Street Journal correspondent Evan Gershkovich follow this pattern, as does the Turkish government’s detention of freelance journalist Lindsey Snell in Turkey in 2016.
In a networked world, journalism is inherently transnational, but press freedom is not.
However, if a journalist can be lured into a compliant country, or if other countries adopt the Maduro precedent, a foreign country can enforce its laws on people in the U.S. simply by force or power. Instructive is the case of Henry Liu, a Chinese American critic of the Taiwanese government, which hired Taiwanese gang members to kill him in California, or the attempted murder in Brooklyn, New York, of Iranian-American journalist Masih Alinejad.
While journalists and others may be protected by the First Amendment, that protection typically applies only if they are physically in the United States, and assumes that the U.S. has no interest in extraditing the journalist to another country. With the Maduro precedent extending the authority to kidnap those who we perceive to have violated the law of one nation, other nations can be expected to follow suit. It’s no longer about what White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller called “international niceties” but is about “a world, … the real world, … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.”
Law as narrative, power as reality
The lesson for journalists is not that the law is meaningless, but that it is secondary. Power determines who is charged, who is seized, and who is left alone. Law supplies justification after the fact.
In a networked world, journalism is inherently transnational, but press freedom is not. For journalists who work online, the question is no longer merely, “Is this lawful where I am?” It is, “Who might claim jurisdiction, and what can they do to enforce it?”
The answer, increasingly, depends less on courts than on geopolitics.
In cyberspace, publication is global. So is exposure.
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