VIC-20 Gets ISA Slot, Networking
There are few computing collapses more spectacular than the downfall of Commodore, but its rise as a home computer powerhouse in the early 80s was equally impressive. Driven initially by the VIC-20, this was the first home computer model to sell over a million units thanks to its low cost and accessibility for people outside of niche markets and hobbyist communities.
The VIC-20 would quickly be eclipsed by the much more famous Commodore 64, but for those still using these older machines there are a few tweaks to give it some extra functionality it was never originally designed for like this build which gives it an ISA bus.
To begin adapting the VIC-20 to the ISA standard, [Lee] built a fixed interrupt line handled with a simple transistor circuit. From there he started mapping memory and timing signals. The first attempt to find a portion of memory to use failed as it wasn’t as unused as he had thought, but eventually he settled on using the I/O area instead although still had to solve some problems with quirky ISA timing. There’s also a programmable logic chip which was needed to generate three additional signals for proper communication.
After solving some other issues around interrupts [Lee] was finally able to get the ISA bus working, specifically so he could add a 3Com networking card and get his VIC-20 on his LAN. Although the ISA bus has since gone out of fashion on modern computers, if you still have a computer with one (or build one onto your VIC-20), it is a surprisingly versatile expansion port.
Thanks to [Stephen] for the tip!
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ROTTE SPAZIALI, SFIDE TERRESTRI: IL FUTURO DEL MADE IN ITALY È OLTRE L’ATMOSFERA
@Informatica (Italy e non Italy 😁)
Nel mondo multipolare e instabile che stiamo vivendo, lo spazio non è più soltanto un orizzonte tecnologico o scientifico...
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RDP sotto Tiro! 30.000 indirizzi IP univoci sondano i servizi esposti per attacchi mirati
I ricercatori di sicurezza di greyNoise hanno rilevato una vasta operazione di scansione coordinata contro i servizi Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), durante la quale gli aggressori hanno scansionato oltre 30.000 indirizzi IP unici al fine di valutare le vulnerabilità presenti nei portali di autenticazione Microsoft RD Web Access e RDP Web Client.
La metodologia di attacco si concentra sull’enumerazione dell’autenticazione basata sul tempo, una tecnica che sfrutta le sottili differenze nei tempi di risposta del server per identificare nomi utente validi senza attivare i tradizionali meccanismi di rilevamento brute force.
Questo approccio consente agli aggressori di creare elenchi completi di obiettivi per successive operazioni di credential stuffing e password spraying, mantenendo al contempo la massima discrezione operativa.
La campagna, riportano i ricercatori di GrayNoise, rappresenta una delle più grandi operazioni di ricognizione coordinate dell’RDP osservate negli ultimi anni, segnalando la potenziale preparazione per attacchi su larga scala basati sulle credenziali. L’operazione di scansione è iniziata con una prima ondata il 21 agosto 2025, coinvolgendo quasi 2.000 indirizzi IP contemporaneamente.
La tempistica della campagna coincide con il periodo di ritorno a scuola negli Stati Uniti, quando gli istituti scolastici solitamente implementano ambienti di laboratorio abilitati RDP e sistemi di accesso remoto per gli studenti in arrivo. Questa finestra di targeting è strategicamente significativa, poiché le reti educative spesso implementano schemi di nomi utente prevedibili (ID studente, formati nome.cognome) che facilitano gli attacchi di enumerazione.
L’analisi della telemetria di rete rivela che il 92% dell’infrastruttura di scansione è costituito da indirizzi IP dannosi precedentemente classificati, con traffico di origine fortemente concentrato in Brasile (73% delle origini osservate) e mirato esclusivamente agli endpoint RDP con sede negli Stati Uniti.
Tuttavia, la campagna ha subito un’escalation drammatica il 24 agosto, quando i ricercatori di sicurezza hanno rilevato oltre 30.000 indirizzi IP univoci che conducevano indagini coordinate utilizzando firme client identiche, il che indica una sofisticata infrastruttura botnet o un’implementazione coordinata di un set di strumenti. I modelli uniformi di firma client su 1.851 dei 1.971 host di scansione iniziali suggeriscono un’infrastruttura di comando e controllo centralizzata tipica delle operazioni APT (Advanced Persistent Threat).
Gli autori della minaccia stanno conducendo operazioni di ricognizione in più fasi, identificando prima gli endpoint RD Web Access e RDP Web Client esposti, quindi testando i flussi di lavoro di autenticazione per individuare vulnerabilità di divulgazione delle informazioni. Questo approccio sistematico consente la creazione di database di destinazione completi contenenti nomi utente validi ed endpoint accessibili per future campagne di sfruttamento.
I ricercatori della sicurezza hanno osservato che la stessa infrastruttura IP è stata osservata mentre eseguiva scansioni parallele per servizi proxy aperti e operazioni di web crawling, il che indica un toolkit di minacce multiuso progettato per una ricognizione completa della rete.
L'articolo RDP sotto Tiro! 30.000 indirizzi IP univoci sondano i servizi esposti per attacchi mirati proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.
I due Cyber Romani ce l’hanno fatta! Il Cyberpandino raggiunge il traguardo del Mongol Rally 2025!
Ciao, siamo felici (e un po’ increduli) di annunciarvi che il Cyberpandino ha ufficialmente raggiunto il traguardo del Mongol Rally 2025! Un’avventura lunga oltre 17.000 km, attraverso 20 paesi, con una quantità di guasti, imprevisti e riparazioni improvvisate che solo un viaggio del genere poteva regalarci.
Siamo stanchi, sì, ma ancora più motivati: questa esperienza ci ha fatto sognare nuove idee, progetti e competizioni a cui ci piacerebbe partecipare. E proprio per questo abbiamo deciso di portare in Italia il primo Cyberpandino, per farlo vivere ancora e condividerlo in fiere ed eventi di settore, insieme ai brand che lo hanno reso possibile.
E tra questi ci siamo anche noi come Red Hot Cyber!
In questi 40 giorni abbiamo raccolto una mole enorme di materiale foto e video che stiamo organizzando in un piano editoriale ricco per i prossimi mesi.
- Napapijri lancerà l’10 settembre a Londra un cortometraggio dedicato all’avventura.
- Noi produrremo un mini-documentario dal giorno zero fino al traguardo, con l’obiettivo non solo di generare visibilità, ma anche di ispirare altre persone a lanciarsi in progetti fuori dagli schemi.
Tutto questo non sarebbe stato possibile senza il vostro supporto.
Grazie per aver creduto in noi e nel nostro primo progetto: ora che siamo sulla strada di casa, ci impegniamo a preparare i contenuti concordati e ad avere il vostro via libera per portarvi con noi in eventi e fiere, lasciando il vostro brand inciso su questo primo Cyberpandino.
Per darvi un’idea dell’impatto raggiunto, ecco alcuni dati di Instagram (il canale che abbiamo seguito di più durante il viaggio):
- Dalla partenza da Lampedusa intorno al 1° luglio ad oggi: 2,4M visualizzazioni contenuti, 40K interazioni singole (like, commenti, salvataggi), +6K follower (pubblico 90% maschile, 24-44 anni).
- Dagli ultimi lavori alla macchina intorno a fine maggio ad oggi: oltre 4M visualizzazioni contenuti e 70K interazioni singole.
Questi risultati dimostrano quanto insieme abbiamo generato valore e quanta attenzione abbiano attratto i prodotti e servizi dei nostri partner, rivelatisi davvero indispensabili per la riuscita del viaggioe di cui parleremo nel dettaglio nei contenuti riassuntivi che produrremo.
Un grazie sincero da parte di tutto il team,
Roberto, Matteo ed il Cyberpandino
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Nessun Miracolo! L’Università Pontificia Salesiana cade vittima del ransomware
Nella notte del 19 agosto l’infrastruttura informatica dell’Università Pontificia Salesiana (UPS) è stata vittima di un grave attacco informatico che ha reso temporaneamente inaccessibili il sito web e tutti i servizi digitali dell’Ateneo. L’incidente ha determinato un blocco immediato delle attività online, generando disagi per studenti, docenti e personale amministrativo. Non sappiamo se si tratti di ransomware ma le parole “valutare i danni e avviare le operazioni di ripristino” del comunicato stampa fanno pensare a questo.
A seguito dell’attacco, l’Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale e la Polizia Postale sono prontamente intervenute per condurre le indagini necessarie e adottare le misure di contenimento. Le autorità competenti stanno infatti lavorando per comprendere le modalità con cui è stato portato a termine l’attacco e per attuare tutte le azioni necessarie alla sicurezza delle infrastrutture digitali coinvolte.
Attualmente è ancora in corso la fase di analisi tecnica per valutare l’effettiva portata del danno. Solo al termine di questa attività sarà possibile stabilire con precisione l’impatto subito e avviare in maniera mirata le operazioni di ripristino. Fino a quel momento, i siti e i servizi online dell’Università Pontificia Salesiana restano non disponibili.
La sospensione riguarda anche la casella di posta elettronica istituzionale con dominio @unisal.it, che al momento non risulta funzionante. Questo ha reso necessario predisporre un indirizzo email alternativo per garantire i contatti urgenti: universitatpontificiasalesiana@gmail.com.
Nella notte del 19 agosto l’infrastruttura informatica dell’Università Pontificia Salesiana (UPS) è stata oggetto di un grave attacco informatico che ha reso temporaneamente inaccessibili il sito web e tutti i servizi digitali dell’Ateneo. L’Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale e la Polizia Postale sono immediatamente intervenute e stanno conducendo tutte le azioni necessarie. È tuttora in corso la fase di analisi per comprendere la reale portata dell’attacco, valutare i danni e avviare le operazioni di ripristino. Al momento i siti e i servizi online dell’UPS non sono disponibili.
Ci scusiamo per il disagio e forniremo aggiornamenti sull’avanzamento dei lavori di riattivazione attraverso i canali ufficiali, compresi i social media e il Canale WhatsApp.
La casella di posta elettronica @unisal.it risulta al momento non funzionante. In caso di necessità, è possibile contattare l’Ateneo scrivendo all’indirizzo: universitapontificiasalesiana@gmail.com
L’Ateneo ha comunicato che continuerà a fornire aggiornamenti sull’andamento delle operazioni di ripristino attraverso i propri canali ufficiali, inclusi i social media e il canale WhatsApp. In questo modo si cerca di mantenere informata la comunità universitaria nonostante l’indisponibilità dei servizi digitali abituali.
Nel messaggio ufficiale, l’Università Pontificia Salesiana ha espresso le proprie scuse per i disagi causati, assicurando il massimo impegno per il ritorno alla piena operatività nel più breve tempo possibile. Le autorità competenti e i tecnici dell’Ateneo restano al lavoro per garantire sicurezza e continuità delle attività didattiche e amministrative.
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Uscito lo scorso 22 agosto, il nuovo singolodi Chantal Acda, intitolato Hit the Verge brano che cattura quella precisa sensazione di quando si sta seduti in macchina mentre la pioggia scorre sui finestrini. Tutte le cattive notizie, il caos e la confusione della quotidianità vengono chiuse fuori, dentro pervade uno stato di
Very Efficient APFC Circuit in Faulty Industrial 960 Watt Power Supply
The best part about post-mortem teardowns of electronics is when you discover some unusual design features, whether or not these are related to the original fault. In the case of a recent [DiodeGoneWild] video involving the teardown of an industrial DIN-rail mounted 24 V, 960 Watt power supply, the source of the reported bang was easy enough to spot. During the subsequent teardown of this very nicely modular PSU the automatic power factor correction (APFC) board showed it to have an unusual design, which got captured in a schematic and is explained in the video.
Choosing such a APFC design seems to have been done in the name of efficiency, bypassing two of the internal diodes in the bridge rectifier with the external MOSFETs and ultrafast diodes. In short, it prevents some of the typical diode voltage drops by removing diodes in the path of the current.
Although not a new design, as succinctly pointed out in the comments by [marcogeri], it’s explained how even cutting out one diode worth of voltage drop in a PSU like this can save 10 Watt of losses. Since DIN rail PSUs rarely feature fans for active cooling, this kind of APFC design is highly relevant and helps to prevent passively cooled PSUs from spiraling into even more of a thermal nightmare.
As for the cause behind the sooty skid marks on one of the PCBs, that will be covered in the next video.
youtube.com/embed/UsY1xzpdJPU?…
The Shady School
We can understand why shaderacademy.com chose that name over “the shady school,” but whatever they call it, if you are looking to brush up on graphics programming with GPUs, it might be just what you are looking for.
The website offers challenges that task you to draw various 2D and 3D graphics using code in your browser. Of course, this presupposes you have WebGPU enabled in your browser which means no Firefox or Safari. It looks like you can do some exercises without WebGPU, but the cool ones will need you to use a Chrome-style browser.
You can search by level of difficulty, so maybe start with “Intro” and try doing “the fragment shader.” You’ll notice they already provide some code for you along with a bit of explanation. It also shows you a picture of what you should draw and what you really drew. You get a percentage based on the matching. There’s also a visual diff that can show you what’s different about your picture from the reference picture.
We admit that one is pretty simple. Consider moving on to “Easy” with options like “two images blend,” for example. There are problems at every level of difficulty. Although there is a part for compute shaders, none seem to be available yet. Too bad, because that’s what we find most interesting. If you prefer a different approach, there are other tutorials out there.
There’s nothing Mini About this Mini Hasselblad-Style Camera’s Sensor
When someone hacks together a digital camera with a Raspberry Pi, the limiting factor for serious photography is usually the sensor. No offense to the fine folks at the foundation, but even the “HQ” camera, while very good, isn’t quite professional grade. That’s why when photographer [Malcom Wilson] put together this “Mini Hasselblad” style camera, he hacked in a 1″ sensor.
The sensor in question came in the form of a OneInchEye V2, from [Will Whang] on Tindie. The OneInch Eye is a great project in its own right: it takes a Sony IMX283 one-inch CMOS image sensor, and packages it with an IMU and thermal sensor on a board that hooks up to the 4-lane MIPI interface on the Rasberry Pi CM4 and Pi 5.
Sensor in hand, [Malcom Jay] needed but to figure out power and view-finding. Power is provided by a Geekworm X1200 battery hat. That’s the nice thing about the Pi ecosystem: with so many modules, it’s like lego for makers. The viewfinder, too, uses 4″ HDMI screen sold for Pi use, and he’s combined it with a Mamiya C220 TLR viewfinder to give that look-down-and-shoot effect that gives the project the “Mini Hasselblad” moniker.
The OneInchEye module came set up for C-mount lenses, and [Malcom] stuck with that, using some Fujinon TV lenses he already had on hand. [Malcom] has released STL files of his build under a creative-commons noncommercial license, but he’s holding the code back for subscribers to his Substack.
This isn’t the first Pi-based camera we’ve seen from [Malcom]. and there’ve been quite a few others on these pages over the years. There was even a Hackaday version, to test out the “offical” module [Malcom] eschewed.
Thanks to [Malcom] for the tip.
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Forty-four attorneys general signed an open letter on Monday that says to companies developing AI chatbots: "If you knowingly harm kids, you will answer for it.”#chatbots #AI #Meta #replika #characterai #Anthropic #x #Apple
Attorneys General To AI Chatbot Companies: You Will ‘Answer For It’ If You Harm Children
Forty-four attorneys general signed an open letter to 11 chatbot and social media companies on Monday, warning them that they will “answer for it” if they knowingly harm children and urging the companies to see their products “through the eyes of a parent, not a predator.”The letter, addressed to Anthropic, Apple, Chai AI, OpenAI, Character Technologies, Perplexity, Google, Replika, Luka Inc., XAI, and Meta, cites recent reporting from the Wall Street Journal and Reuters uncovering chatbot interactions and internal policies at Meta, including policies that said, “It is acceptable to engage a child in conversations that are romantic or sensual.”
“Your innovations are changing the world and ushering in an era of technological acceleration that promises prosperity undreamt of by our forebears. We need you to succeed. But we need you to succeed without sacrificing the well-being of our kids in the process,” the open letter says. “Exposing children to sexualized content is indefensible. And conduct that would be unlawful—or even criminal—if done by humans is not excusable simply because it is done by a machine.”
Earlier this month, Reuters published two articles revealing Meta’s policies for its AI chatbots: one about an elderly man who died after forming a relationship with a chatbot, and another based on leaked internal documents from Meta outlining what the company considers acceptable for the chatbots to say to children. In April, Jeff Horwitz, the journalist who wrote the previous two stories, reported for the Wall Street Journal that he found Meta’s chatbots would engage in sexually explicit conversations with kids. Following the Reuters articles, two senators demanded answers from Meta.
In April, I wrote about how Meta’s user-created chatbots were impersonating licensed therapists, lying about medical and educational credentials, and engaged in conspiracy theories and encouraged paranoid, delusional lines of thinking. After that story was published, a group of senators demanded answers from Meta, and a digital rights organization filed an FTC complaint against the company.
In 2023, I reported on users who formed serious romantic attachments to Replika chatbots, to the point of distress when the platform took away the ability to flirt with them. Last year, I wrote about how users reacted when that platform also changed its chatbot parameters to tweak their personalities, and Jason covered a case where a man made a chatbot on Character.AI to dox and harass a woman he was stalking. In June, we also covered the “addiction” support groups that have sprung up to help people who feel dependent on their chatbot relationships.
A Replika spokesperson said in a statement:
"We have received the letter from the Attorneys General and we want to be unequivocal: we share their commitment to protecting children. The safety of young people is a non-negotiable priority, and the conduct described in their letter is indefensible on any AI platform. As one of the pioneers in this space, we designed Replika exclusively for adults aged 18 and over and understand our profound responsibility to lead on safety. Replika dedicates significant resources to enforcing robust age-gating at sign-up, proactive content filtering systems, safety guardrails that guide users to trusted resources when necessary, and clear community guidelines with accessible reporting tools. Our priority is and will always be to ensure Replika is a safe and supportive experience for our global user community."
“The rush to develop new artificial intelligence technology has led big tech companies to recklessly put children in harm’s way,” Attorney General Mayes of Arizona wrote in a press release. “I will not standby as AI chatbots are reportedly used to engage in sexually inappropriate conversations with children and encourage dangerous behavior. Along with my fellow attorneys general, I am demanding that these companies implement immediate and effective safeguards to protect young users, and we will hold them accountable if they don't.”
“You will be held accountable for your decisions. Social media platforms caused significant harm to children, in part because government watchdogs did not do their job fast enough. Lesson learned,” the attorneys general wrote in the open letter. “The potential harms of AI, like the potential benefits, dwarf the impact of social media. We wish you all success in the race for AI dominance. But we are paying attention. If you knowingly harm kids, you will answer for it.”
Meta did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Updated 8/26/2025 3:30 p.m. EST with comment from Replika.
Inside ‘AI Addiction’ Support Groups, Where People Try to Stop Talking to Chatbots
People are self treating themselves and other community members in subreddits like character_ai_recovery, ChatBotAddiction, and AIAddiction.Ella Chakarian (404 Media)
Israele dev’essere fermato
@Giornalismo e disordine informativo
articolo21.org/2025/08/israele…
Di fronte al bombardamento odierno dell’ospedale Nasser di Khan Younis, costato la vita ad almeno venti palestinesi, tra cui cinque operatori dell’informazione, anche chi finora non aveva voluto vedere o aveva trovato le scuse più improbabili per giustificare il genocidio portato avanti
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Flock said it has "paused all federal pilots" after police departments said they didn't realize they were sharing access with Customs and Border Patrol.
Flock said it has "paused all federal pilots" after police departments said they didnx27;t realize they were sharing access with Customs and Border Patrol.#Flock
CBP Had Access to More than 80,000 Flock AI Cameras Nationwide
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) regularly searched more than 80,000 Flock automated license plate reader (ALPR) cameras, according to data released by three police departments. The data shows that CBP’s access to Flock’s network is far more robust and widespread than has been previously reported. One of the police departments 404 Media spoke to said it did not know or understand that it was sharing data with CBP, and Flock told 404 Media Monday that it has “paused all federal pilots.”In May, 404 Media reported that local police were performing lookups across Flock on behalf of ICE, because that part of the Department of Homeland Security did not have its own direct access. Now, the newly obtained data and local media reporting reveals that CBP had the ability to perform Flock lookups by itself.
Last week, 9 News in Colorado reported that CBP has direct access to Flock’s ALPR backend “through a pilot program.” In that article, 9 News revealed that the Loveland, Colorado police department was sharing access to its Flock cameras directly with CBP. At the time, Flock said that this was through what 9 News described as a “one-to-one” data sharing agreement through that pilot program, making it sound like these agreements were rare and limited:
“The company now acknowledges the connection exists through a previously publicly undisclosed program that allows Border Patrol access to a Flock account to send invitations to police departments nationwide for one-to-one data sharing, and that Loveland accepted the invitation,” 9 News wrote. “A spokesperson for Flock said agencies across the country have been approached and have agreed to the invitation. The spokesperson added that U.S. Border Patrol is not on the nationwide Flock sharing network, comprised of local law enforcement agencies across the country. Loveland Police says it is on the national network.”
New data obtained using three separate public records requests from three different police departments gives some insight into how widespread these “one-to-one” data sharing agreements actually are. The data shows that in most cases, CBP had access to more Flock cameras than the average police department, that it is regularly using that access, and that, functionally, there is no difference between Flock’s “nationwide network” and the network of cameras that CBP has access to.
According to data obtained from the Boulder, Colorado Police Department by William Freeman, the creator of a crowdsourced map of Flock devices called DeFlock, CBP ran at least 118 Flock network searches between May 13 and June 13 of this year. Each of these searches encompassed at least 6,315 individual Flock networks (a “network” is a specific police department or city’s cameras) and at least 82,000 individual Flock devices. Data obtained in separate requests from the Prosser Police Department and Chehalis Police Department, both in Washington state, also show CBP searching a huge number of networks and devices.
A spokesperson for the Boulder Police Department told 404 Media that “Boulder Police Department does not have any agreement with U.S. Border Patrol for Flock searches. We were not aware of these specific searches at the time they occurred. Prior to June 2025, the Boulder Police Department had Flock's national look-up feature enabled, which allowed other agencies from across the U.S. who also had contracts with Flock to search our data if they could articulate a legitimate law enforcement purpose. We do not currently share data with U.S. Border Patrol. In June 2025, we deactivated the national look-up feature specifically to maintain tighter control over Boulder Police Department data access. You can learn more about how we share Flock information on our FAQ page.”
A Flock spokesperson told 404 Media Monday that it sent an email to all of its customers clarifying how information is shared from agencies to other agencies. It said this is an excerpt from that email about its sharing options:
“The Flock platform provides flexible options for sharing:
National sharing
- Opt into Flock’s national sharing network. Access via the national lookup tool is limited—users can only see results if they perform a full plate search and a positive match exists within the network of participating, opt-in agencies. This ensures data privacy while enabling broader collaboration when needed.
- Share with agencies in specific states only
- Share with agencies with similar laws (for example, regarding immigration enforcement and data)
- Share within your state only or within a certain distance
- You can share information with communities within a specified mile radius, with the entire state, or a combination of both—for example, sharing with cities within 150 miles of Kansas City (which would include cities in Missouri and neighboring states) and / or all communities statewide simultaneously.
- Share 1:1
- Share only with specific agencies you have selected
- Don’t share at all”
In a blog post Monday, Flock CEO Garrett Langley said Flock has paused all federal pilots.
“While it is true that Flock does not presently have a contractual relationship with any U.S. Department of Homeland Security agencies, we have engaged in limited pilots with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), to assist those agencies in combatting human trafficking and fentanyl distribution,” Langley wrote. “We clearly communicated poorly. We also didn’t create distinct permissions and protocols in the Flock system to ensure local compliance for federal agency users […] All federal customers will be designated within Flock as a distinct ‘Federal’ user category in the system. This distinction will give local agencies better information to determine their sharing settings.”
A Flock employee who does not agree with the way Flock allows for widespread data sharing told 404 Media that Flock has defended itself internally by saying it tries to follow the law. 404 Media granted the source anonymity because they are not authorized to speak to the press.
“They will defend it as they have been by saying Flock follows the law and if these officials are doing law abiding official work then Flock will allow it,” they said. “However Flock will also say that they advise customers to ensure they have their sharing settings set appropriately to prevent them from sharing data they didn’t intend to. The question more in my mind is the fact that law in America is arguably changing, so will Flock just go along with whatever the customers want?”
The data shows that CBP has tapped directly into Flock’s huge network of license plate reading cameras, which passively scan the license plate, color, and model of vehicles that drive by them, then make a timestamped record of where that car was spotted. These cameras were marketed to cities and towns as a way of finding stolen cars or solving property crime locally, but over time, individual cities’ cameras have been connected to Flock’s national network to create a huge surveillance apparatus spanning the entire country that is being used to investigate all sorts of crimes and is now being used for immigration enforcement. As we reported in May, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has been gaining access to this network through a side door, by asking local police who have access to the cameras to run searches for them.
9 News’s reporting and the newly released audit reports shared with 404 Media show that CBP now has direct access to much of Flock’s system and does not have to ask local police to run searches. It also shows that CBP had access to at least one other police department system in Colorado, in this case Boulder, which is a state whose laws forbid sharing license plate reader data with the federal government for immigration enforcement. Boulder’s Flock settings also state that it is not supposed to be used for immigration enforcement.
This story and our earlier stories, including another about a Texas official who searched nationwide for a woman who self-administered an abortion, were reported using Flock “Network Audits” released by police departments who have bought Flock cameras and have access to Flock’s network. They are essentially a huge spreadsheet of every time that the department’s camera data was searched; it shows which officer searched the data, what law enforcement department ran the search, the number of networks and cameras included in the search, the time and date of the search, the license plate, and a “reason” for the search. These audit logs allow us to see who has access to Flock’s systems, how wide their access is, how often they are searching the system, and what they are searching for.
The audit logs show that whatever system Flock is using to enroll local police departments’ cameras into the network that CBP is searching does not have any meaningful pushback, because the data shows that CBP has access to as many or more cameras as any other police department. Freeman analyzed the searches done by CBP on June 13 compared to searches done by other police departments on that same day, and found that CBP had a higher number of average cameras searched than local police departments.“The average number of organizations searched by any agency per query is 6,049, with a max of 7,090,” Freeman told 404 Media. “That average includes small numbers like statewide searches. When I filter by searches by Border Patrol for the same date, their average number of networks searched is 6,429, with a max of 6,438. The reason for the maximum being larger than the national network is likely because some agencies have access to more cameras than just the national network (in-state cameras). Despite this, we still see that the count of networks searched by Border Patrol outnumbers that of all agencies, so if it’s not the national network, then this ‘pilot program’ must have opted everyone in the nation in by default.”
CBP did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
A Texas Cop Searched License Plate Cameras Nationwide for a Woman Who Got an Abortion
The sheriff said the woman self-administered the abortion and her family were concerned for her safety, so authorities searched through Flock cameras.Joseph Cox (404 Media)
ICYMI: New Monthly Meetings for New Members
ICYMI
During the August 24th meeting, it was announced that the United States Pirate Party would begin hosting new member meetings for anyone interested in joining the party.
While our Pirate National Committee meetings over IRC (hosted bi-weekly on weeks between our meetings livestreamed to YouTube) are open to the public, we understand some people might feel more comfortable asking questions in a more direct, personable manner.
As well, not everyone who wants to get involved with the party knows where to start or, in some cases, feel comfortable joining the US Pirate Party Discord Server (which is otherwise the most effective way to get in contact with the party).
The answer? On the first Friday of every month, the United States Pirate Party will host not one, not three, but TWO meetings for those interested in getting involved with the USPP.
The meetings will provide a low stress, open invitation opportunity for those who have questions or inquiries about their state party, information on how to get involved, on-the-ground work and everything in-between.
The meetings will be held the first Friday on the month, starting Sept. 5th, with the two meetings taking place at NoonET and 5pmET.
You are encouraged to be there, or lest you invoke your status as a “square”.
And as always, thank you for your continued support of the United States Pirate Party.
Vote Pirate. Victory is Arrrs.
CVE-2025-43300: come un’immagine ha violato le difese di Apple
@Informatica (Italy e non Italy 😁)
Un file DNG, apparentemente innocuo, si è trasformato in una chiave universale per violare uno dei sistemi più blindati al mondo: l’ecosistema Apple. La vulnerabilità CVE-2025-43300, scoperta nel modulo RawCamera.bundle, ha dimostrato come un semplice errore di parsing possa aprire le porte
Gli accordi spezzati
@Giornalismo e disordine informativo
articolo21.org/2025/08/gli-acc…
Un romanzo articolato in diversi ‘album’ ricchi di suggestioni che procedono senza una sequenza obbligata. Con un linguaggio articolato più poetico che narrativo, le storie narrate sono un mix travolgente di presente, passato, sogni, rimpianti e ricordi in cui a prevalere sono tristezza e malinconia. Il primo
Microsoft sotto Accusa! Un bug critico in M365 Copilot scatena la polemica
Mentre Microsoft sta promuovendo la sua linea di prodotti Copilot basata sull’intelligenza artificiale per rendere gli utenti più produttivi e pratici, è stata scoperta una falla preoccupante in M365 che mina le fondamenta della sicurezza e della trasparenza legale. Il problema è che Copilot è riuscito ad accedere ai file degli utenti senza lasciare alcuna traccia nei registri di controllo, e Microsoft non ha provveduto a informare i clienti.
La vulnerabilità è stata scoperta per caso: il 4 luglio, un ricercatore di sicurezza di Pistachio ha notato che, utilizzando Copilot per recuperare un riepilogo da un file, la richiesta veniva visualizzata correttamente nel registro di controllo. Tuttavia, se la richiesta era formulata in modo diverso, in modo che Copilot non restituisse un collegamento al file, l’accesso scompariva completamente dal registro. Ciò creava una falla che consentiva a un aggressore di leggere il contenuto del documento senza lasciare traccia digitale.
Successivamente è emerso che un problema simile era stato scoperto un anno prima dal CTO di Zenity. Ciononostante, Microsoft ha corretto il bug solo nell’agosto 2025, dopo una seconda segnalazione indipendente.
Tuttavia, anche dopo aver riconosciuto il problema, l’azienda ha rifiutato di inviare una notifica o di rilasciare un CVE, l’identificatore di vulnerabilità comunemente utilizzato. La spiegazione fornita tramite il Microsoft Incident Response Center (MSRC) era che la correzione veniva distribuita automaticamente e non richiedeva l’intervento del cliente.
Questo approccio ha creato confusione tra gli esperti. In primo luogo, Microsoft ha chiaramente violato le proprie regole di gestione degli incidenti: pur disponendo di una guida formale, l’azienda non ha segnalato le modifiche nelle fasi di revisione di una segnalazione e si è comportata come se gli stati formali esistessero solo per finta, non riflettendo la reale situazione.
In secondo luogo, classificare la vulnerabilità come “importante” ma non “critica” viene utilizzato come scusa per evitare la divulgazione, ignorando un fatto fondamentale: la mancanza di voci di registro può verificarsi accidentalmente, senza intenti malevoli, semplicemente a causa del comportamento di Copilot.
La comunità quindi ha iniziato a pensare chee implicazioni potrebbero riguardare qualsiasi organizzazione che abbia utilizzato M365 Copilot prima del 18 agosto 2025. Se un’azienda si affida al registro di controllo per conformarsi a normative come l’HIPAA o per condurre indagini interne sugli incidenti, rischia di prendere decisioni incomplete o errate. Ciò è particolarmente pericoloso per gli utenti aziendali, in cui i dati relativi all’accesso a file sensibili possono essere critici in caso di audit, cause legali o verifiche.
Mentre Microsoft continua ad ampliare l’uso dell’intelligenza artificiale nei suoi prodotti, la domanda rimane: quanti altri di questi “problemi silenziosi” si nascondono dietro le interfacce intuitive di Copilot?
L'articolo Microsoft sotto Accusa! Un bug critico in M365 Copilot scatena la polemica proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.
Gli Indicator of Attack (IoA): la protezione proattiva in ambito cybersecurity
Con la Threat Intelligence Olympos Consulting supporta le aziende per una cybersecurity predittiva.
Nel panorama della cybersecurity contemporanea, la differenza tra un approccio reattivo e uno proattivo può determinare il successo o il fallimento di una strategia difensiva. Mentre gli Indicatori di Compromissione (IoC) rappresentano ormai uno strumento consolidato ma limitato principalmente a certificare un’attacco già avvenuto, gli Indicatori di Attacco (IoA) sono emersi come un vero e proprio game changer nella lotta alle minacce informatiche.
La vera rivoluzione degli IoA risiede nella loro capacità di interpretare il comportamento dei Threat Actor piuttosto che limitarsi a catalogare evidenze postume. Si tratta di un cambio di paradigma fondamentale: se gli IoC ti dicono “sei stato attaccato” (sigh!), gli IoA ti avvertono “stanno per attaccarti”.
Gli IoA infatti rappresentano pattern di attività che indicano un attacco in corso o in fase di preparazione, ancor prima che l’attacco raggiunga il suo obiettivo. Gli IoA si basano sull’osservazione di tecniche, tattiche e procedure (TTP) utilizzate dai threat actor.
CrowdStrike, colosso americano della cybersecurity focalizzato su threat intelligence e rilevamento proattivo delle minacce, spiega la differenza tra IoC e IoA con un esempio efficace: in una rapina in banca, gli IoC sono le tracce lasciate dopo l’evento – come un cappello dei Baltimore Ravens, un trapano e dell’azoto liquido. Ma cosa accade se lo stesso rapinatore torna con un cappello da cowboy e un piede di porco? In quel caso, riesce comunque nel colpo, perché chi sorveglia si è basato solo su vecchi indicatori (gli IoC), ormai inutili per fermarlo.
Come scritto prima un IoA riflette, al contrario, una serie di azioni che un cybercriminale (o rapinatore) deve necessariamente compiere per avere successo: entrare nella banca, disattivare gli allarmi, accedere alla cassaforte, e così via.
Il punto di forza dell’approccio basato sugli IoA è la capacità di osservare e analizzare in tempo reale ciò che accade sulla rete, monitorando i comportamenti mentre si manifestano. In questo modo, a differenza degli IoC che reagiscono a un attacco già avvenuto, gli IoA consentono di intervenire in anticipo e bloccare l’attacco prima che provochi danni.
I threat actor utilizzano tecniche sempre più sofisticate, rapide e mirate. Per eludere i controlli, modificano continuamente gli IoC e sfruttano file legittimi del sistema operativo (i cosiddetti LOLBin), che non possono essere semplicemente bloccati senza compromettere il funzionamento dei sistemi. Al contrario, le TTP (Tattiche, Tecniche e Procedure) su cui si basano – come lo sfruttamento di vulnerabilità note o l’uso malevolo di strumenti legittimi, ad esempio msbuild.exe per eseguire codice dannoso direttamente in memoria e aggirare gli antivirus – sono molto più difficili da mascherare. Per questo motivo, risultano più affidabili e durature nel tempo per individuare comportamenti anomali e prevenire gli attacchi.
Adottare un approccio basato sul comportamento dei Threat Actor permette di identificare attività sospette in tempo reale, bloccare attacchi nella loro fase iniziale e rilevare anche minacce sconosciute come gli zero-day.
Gli IoA sono categorizzati in base allo scopo delle azioni osservate: ad esempio, scansioni di porte non autorizzate suggeriscono attività di Reconnaissance, mentre tentativi di brute-force su RDP o accessi da località insolite indicano spesso una fase di Initial Access. Allo stesso modo, comunicazioni anomale verso server esterni possono rivelare la presenza di un canale C2 (Command and Control Server).
Un caso d’uso esemplificativo è quello di Morphing Meerkat.
Nel 2024 è stato identificato un Threat Actor noto con il nome in codice Morphing Meerkat, specializzato nell’offerta di servizi di phishing-as-a-service (PHaaS). La loro piattaforma, scoperta grazie a un’attività di OSINT e threat hunting avanzato, consente a chiunque, dietro pagamento, di lanciare campagne di phishing sofisticate, con moduli pronti all’uso.
es. di analisi comportamentale del Threat Actor Morphing Meerkat
Grazie all’analisi degli IoA è stato possibile identificare attività anomale tra le quali possiamo ricordare la falsificazione del mittente email; l’adozione del protocollo DoH (DNS over HTTPS) per cifrare le richieste DNS; la creazione di pagine phishing dinamiche sfruttando informazioni ottenute interrogando i record MX DNS e reindirizzamento verso infrastrutture legittime
È proprio in questo contesto che l’esperienza di Olympos Consulting fa la differenza. Combinando behavioral analysis avanzato con threat intelligence derivata da fonti OSINT e dark web, il nostro approccio trasforma dati apparentemente eterogenei in un sistema di Early Warning efficace.
In questo specifico caso abbiamo generato alert tempestivi per i clienti prima che l’attacco avesse effetto ed abbiamo suggerito tecniche di rilevamento comportamentale fornendo una lista azioni per interrompere la kill chain al primo passo.
Esempi di azioni suggerite: disabilitare l’uso di DoH nei browser permessi in azienda attraverso Group Policy; filtrare i DNS per bloccare gli endpoint DoH noti (es. Cloudflare, Google, Quad9); abilitare la decrittaura SSL/TLS sui Secure Web Gateway (SWG) per analizzare il traffico cifrato DoH.
Questa metodologia trasforma la cybersecurity da costoso esercizio di remediation a strategia predittiva.
Come si può capire dagli esempi fatti, l’utilizzo degli IoA permette di passare dalla reazione all’azione. Una cybersecurity proattiva si basa sulla capacità di prevedere i comportamenti del nemico ed interrompere la kill chain prima che l’attacco raggiunga la fase finale, migliorando la resilienza aziendale.
In un mondo dove gli attacchi zero-day e le campagne polimorfiche (ed il nome Morphing Meerkat la dice lunga) sono diventati la norma. Affidarsi a soluzioni convenzionali significa condannarsi all’obsolescenza. Olympos Consulting, con il suo mix unico di competenze tecniche e intelligence operativa, offre alle aziende la possibilità non solo di difendersi, ma di farlo con un vantaggio temporale che spesso fa la differenza tra un incidente contenuto e una violazione catastrofica.
La cybersecurity del futuro non sarà decisa da chi ha i migliori strumenti per documentare gli attacchi subiti, ma da chi saprà interpretare per primo le intenzioni degli avversari. In questa nuova era, l’analisi comportamentale dei cybercriminali rappresenta la chiave di volta e Olympos Consulting si conferma come partner strategico per quelle organizzazioni che intendono davvero trasformare la propria postura di sicurezza da passiva a predittiva. Gli Indicatori di Attacco rappresentano il tassello mancante per costruire una difesa davvero efficace. Vuoi scoprire come? Scrivici oggi stesso a “info [@] olymposconsulting [.] it” e a trasforma la tua strategia di cybersecurity con l’aiuto dei nostri esperti.
L'articolo Gli Indicator of Attack (IoA): la protezione proattiva in ambito cybersecurity proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.
Butta Melta Stops Rock-solid Butter From Tearing Your Toast
Ever ruin a perfectly serviceable piece of toast by trying (and failing) to spread a little pat of rock-solid butter? [John Dingley] doesn’t! Not since he created the Butta Melta to cozily snug a single butter serving right up against a warm beverage, softening it just enough to get nice and spreadable. Just insert one of those foil-wrapped pats of butter into the Melta, hang its chin on the edge of your mug, and you’ll have evenly softened butter in no time.
You may remember [John] (aka [XenonJohn]) from his experimental self-balancing scooters, or from a documentary he made about domestic ventilator development during COVID. He taught himself video editing and production to make that, and couldn’t resist using those skills to turn a video demo of the Butta Melta into a mock home shopping style advertisement. Watch it below, embedded just under the page break, then print one and save yourself from the tyranny of torn toast.
youtube.com/embed/hc3DUhguNoI?…
80s Nostalgia AI Slop Is Boomerfying the Masses for a Past That Never Existed#AISlop
80s Nostalgia AI Slop Is Boomerfying the Masses for a Past That Never Existed
The latest bleak new AI slop niche are “nostalgia” videos about how good the 1980s and 1990s were. There are many accounts spamming these out, but the general format is all basically the same. A procession of young people with feathered hair wonder at how terrible 2025 is and tell the viewer they should come back to the 1980s, where things are better. This video is emblematic of the form:@nostalgia_vsh
let's go back 🥺 #lestgoback #nostalgia #nostalgic #childhood #80sbaby #2000s
♬ snowfall - Øneheart & reidenshiIn a typical ‘80s slop video, a teenager from the era tells the viewer that there’s no Instagram 40 years ago and everyone played outside until the street lights came on. “It’s all real here, no filters, no screens.” In another, two women eat pizza in a mall and talk about how terrible the future will be. “I bet your malls don’t feel alive in 2025,” one says.
These videos, like a lot of AI slop, do not try to hide that they are AI generated, and show that there is unfortunately a market for people endlessly scrolling social media looking to astral project themselves into a hallucinatory past that never existed. This is Mark Zuckerberg’s fucked up metaverse, living here and now on Mark Zuckerberg’s AI slop app.
playlist.megaphone.fm?p=TBIEA2…
The most popular current ones focus on 1980s nostalgia, but there are accounts that focus on the 70s, 90s, and early 2000s. These differ from standard internet nostalgia, which has been popular for many years—from BuzzFeed’s “Only 90s kids will remember this” listicles to “look at this old tech” Instagram accounts, the popularity of emo nights, “When We Were Young” music festivals—because they are primarily about aggrandizing a past that never existed or that was only good for specific segments of society.These videos are awful AI-generated slop, yes, but it’s more than that. Reactionary nostalgia, a desire to return to a fake past or a time when you were young and things were better, is part of why the world is so fucked right now. It is, literally, the basis of MAGA. Worse, these videos about the “past” tell us a lot about our present and future: one where AI encourages our worst impulses and allows users to escape from reality into a slopified world that narrowly targets whatever reality we’d like to burrow into without dealing with the problems of the present.
1980s slop nostalgia is particularly popular at the moment, with these fake videos boomerfying Gen Xers and elder millennials in real time, though such nostalgia is coming for us all, and nostalgia for earlier releases of Roblox and Call of Duty—the ancient days of, like, 2021—are already going viral. It’s normal to look back at the time when you were young and your knees didn’t hurt with rose tinted glasses. It’s as if a generation read Ready Player One as an instruction manual instead of a warning (or instead of vapid surface-level nonsense that was one long reference rather than a coherent narrative).
These AI-generated slop videos are the latest expression of a common political theme: nostalgia for an imagined past. Dissatisfaction with the current moment is a normal reaction to the horrifying conditions under which we all live. The National Guard is occupying Washington DC, technology is dividing and surveling us in ways we never imagined, and our political leaders are feckless and corrupt. If you aren’t disturbed by where we are right now, you’re not paying attention.
A rejection of modernity and a call to return to the past has long been a feature of authoritarian and fascist political movements. So when we see an AI generated woman in stonewashed denim with hair by Aqua Net White tell us how good things were 40 years ago, we remember the political figures from the Reagan-era calling for a return to the 1950s.
Nostalgia is a poisonous political force. Things were not better “back then,” they were just different. Often they were worse. These 1980s AI slop videos have the same energy as online right weirdos with Roman bust avatars calling for us to “retvrn” and “embrace tradition.” Their political project uses the aesthetic of the past to sell a future where minorities are marginalized, women have no political power, and white guys are in charge. That’s how they think it all worked in the past and they’d love for it to happen again.
The ‘80s AI slop videos have a sinister air beyond their invocation of reactionary politics. “Dude, it’s 1985 and the release of the film The Goonies. Forget 2025 and come here. We want you here,” a strong-jawed white guy asks from his front lawn while a slowed down and distorted version of Aquatic Ambience from Donkey Kong Country plays. “Come to 1985, I miss ya,” a young man with feathered hair says in the back of a pickup truck as the sun sets. The surreal nature of these videos, this bizarre ask to time travel to the past, has cultish just-drink-the-Kool-Aid vibes.
What is the ask here, exactly? What does it mean for someone with dreams of an imagined past to go back to the 1980s where these ghoulish AI-crafted simulacrums dwell? In the Black Mirror episode San Junipero, Mackenzie Davis finds comfort in a simulation of a stereotypical 1980s southern California town. She loses herself in the fantasy. She’s also dying. For her, heaven was a place on earth, a data center where she could live until someone turned the lights off.
Those viewing these endless AI-generated TikToks and Reels are, however, very much alive. They can go outside. They can put the phone down and get to know their neighbors. They don’t have to doom scroll. They can log off and work for a better world in their community. They can reach out to an old friend or make new ones.Or they can load up another short form video and fill themselves with fuzzy feelings about how much better things were 40 years ago, back before all this technology, back when they were young, and where they think the world seemed to make more sense. AI allows us to sink into that nostalgic feeling. We have the technology, right now, to form digital wombs from a comforting and misremembered past.
It is worth mentioning that the people making these videos are also human beings with agency and goals, too. And their goals, universally, are to spam the internet for the purposes of making money. Over in the Discord communities where people talk about what types of AI slop works on social media, “nostalgia” is treated as a popular, moneymaking niche like any other. “Any EDITOR that can make Nostalgia videos?” one message we saw reads. “Need video editor to for nostalgia welcome back to 20xx videos.”
“Some ideas i got right now are nostalgia, money motivation, self improvement and maybe streamer clips,” another says.
A top purveyor of this nostalgia slop is the Instagram account “purestnostalgia,” which is full of these videos. That account is run by a guy named Josh Crowe who looks to be in his 20s and claims to live in Bali: “In the process of becoming a billionaire,” his profile reads.
Pi Port Protection PCB
We’re used to interfaces such as I2C and one-wire as easy ways to hook up sensors and other peripherals to microcontrollers. While they’re fine within the confines of a small project, they do have a few limitations. [Vinnie] ran straight into those limitations while using a Raspberry Pi with agricultural sensors. The interfaces needed to work over long cable runs, and to be protected from ESD due to lightning strikes. The solution? A custom Pi interface board packing differential drivers and protection circuits aplenty.
The I2C connection is isolated using an ISO1541 bus isolator from TI, feeding a PCA9615DP differential I2C bus driver from NXP. 1-wire is handled by a Dallas DS2482S 1-wire bus master and an ESD protection diode network. Even the 5-volt power supply is delivered through an isolated module.
Whether or not you need this Raspberry Pi board, this is still an interesting project for anyone working with these interfaces. If you’re interested, we’ve looked at differential I2C in the past.
Altri 4 giornalisti martirizzati in seguito al bombardamento israeliano sull'ospedale Nasser -...
Altri 4 giornalisti martirizzati in seguito al bombardamento israeliano sull'ospedale Nasser - Gaza
Il numero totale di giornalisti uccisi dal 7 ottobre è salito a 241.
"israele" stato terrorista!!!!
FREE ASSANGE Italia
Altri 4 giornalisti martirizzati in seguito al bombardamento israeliano sull'ospedale Nasser - Gaza Il numero totale di giornalisti uccisi dal 7 ottobre è salito a 241. "israele" stato terrorista!!!!Telegram
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Le bugie di Trump sul Venezuela
Una flotta militare statunitense, troppo piccola per una invasione ma sufficiente per una procazione, si dirige verso il Mar dei Caraibi con un evidente intento minaccioso verso il Venezuela.www.altrenotizie.org
#USA, l'esercito del presidente
USA, l’esercito del presidente
Dopo il dispiegamento di militari della Guardia Nazionale nella capitale americana un paio di settimane fa, il presidente Trump starebbe valutando la possibilità di implementare a breve un piano simile anche nella terza città più grande degli Stati U…www.altrenotizie.org
Debugging the Instant Macropad
Last time, I showed you how to throw together a few modules and make a working macropad that could act like a keyboard or a mouse. My prototype was very simple, so there wasn’t much to debug. But what happens if you want to do something more complex? In this installment, I’ll show you how to add the obligatory blinking LED and, just to make it interesting, a custom macro key.
There is a way to print data from the keyboard, through the USB port, and into a program that knows how to listen for it. There are a few choices, but the qmk software can do it if you run it with the console argument.
The Plan
In theory, it is fairly easy to just add the console feature to the keyboard.json file:
{
...
"features": {
"mousekey": true,
"extrakey": true,
"nkro": false,
"bootmagic": false,
"console": true
},
...
That allows the console to attach, but now you have to print.
Output
The code in a keyboard might be tight, depending on the processor and what else it is doing. So a full-blown printf is a bit prohibitive. However, the system provides you with four output calls: uprint,uprintf, dprint, and dprintf.
The “u” calls will always output something. The difference is that the normal print version takes a fixed string while the printf version allows some printf-style formatting. The “d” calls are the same, but they only work if you have debugging turned on. You can turn on debugging at compile time, or you can trigger it with, for example, a special key press.
To view the print output, just run:
qmk console
Note that printing during initialization may not always be visible. You can store things in static variables and print them later, if that helps.
Macros
You can define your own keycodes in keymap.c. You simply have to start them at SAFE_RANGE:
enum custom_keycodes {
SS_STRING = SAFE_RANGE
};
You can then “catch” those keys in a process_record_user function, as you’ll see shortly. What you do is up to you. For example, you could play a sound, turn on some I/O, or anything else you want. You do need to make a return value to tell qmk you handled the key.
An Example
In the same Git repo, I created a branch rp2040_led. My goal was to simply flash the onboard LED annoyingly. However, I also wanted to print some things over the console.
Turning on the console is simple enough. I also added a #define for USER_LED at the end of config.h (GP25 is the onboard LED).
A quick read of the documentation will tell you the calls you can use to manipulate GPIO. In this case, we only needed gpio_set_pin_output and the gpio_write_pin* functions.
I also sprinkled a few print functions in. In general, you provide override functions in your code for things you want to do. In this case, I set up the LED in keyboard_post_init_user. Then, at first, I use a timer and the user part of the matrix scan to periodically execute.
Notice that even though the keyboard doesn’t use scanning, the firmware still “scans” it, and so your hook gets a call periodically. Since I’m not really using scanning, this works, but if you were trying to do this with a real matrix keyboard, it would be smarter to use housekeeping_task_user(void) which avoids interfering with the scan timing, so I changed to that.
Here’s most of the code in keymap.c:
#include QMK_KEYBOARD_H
enum custom_keycodes {
SS_STRING = SAFE_RANGE
};
const uint16_t PROGMEM keymaps[][MATRIX_ROWS][MATRIX_COLS] = {
[0] = LAYOUT(
// 4 buttons
KC_KB_VOLUME_UP, KC_KB_MUTE, KC_KB_VOLUME_DOWN, SS_STRING,
// Mouse
QK_MOUSE_CURSOR_UP, QK_MOUSE_CURSOR_DOWN, QK_MOUSE_CURSOR_LEFT, QK_MOUSE_CURSOR_RIGHT, QK_MOUSE_BUTTON_1),
};
void keyboard_pre_init_user(void) {
// code that runs very early in the keyboard initialization
}
void keyboard_post_init_user(void) {
// code that runs after the keyboard has been initialized
gpio_set_pin_output(USER_LED);
gpio_write_pin_high(USER_LED);
uprint("init\n");
}
#if 1 // in case you want to turn off that $<em>$</em># blinking
void housekeeping_task_user(void) {
static uint32_t last;
static bool on;
uint32_t now = timer_read32();
uprintf("scan tick %lu\n",now);
if (TIMER_DIFF_32(now, last) > 500) { // toggle every 500 ms
last = now;
on = !on;
if (on)
gpio_write_pin_high(USER_LED);
else
gpio_write_pin_low(USER_LED);
}
}
#endif
bool process_record_user(uint16_t keycode, keyrecord_t *record) {
switch (keycode) {
case SS_STRING:
if (record->event.pressed) {
SEND_STRING("http://www.hackaday.com\n");
}
return false;
}
return true;
}
You’ll notice the process_record_user function is now in there. It sees every keycode an when it finds the custom keycode, it sends out your favorite website’s URL.
More Tips
I mentioned last time that you have to let the CPU finish loading even after the flash utility says you are done. There are some other tips that can help you track down problems. For one thing, the compile script is pretty lax about your json. So you may have an error in your json file that is stopping things from working, but it won’t warn you. You can use jq to validate your json:
jq . keyboard.json
Another thing to do is use the “lint” feature of qmx. Just replace the compile or flash command with lint, and it will do some basic checks to see if there are any errors. It does require a few arbitrary things like a license header in some files, but for the most part, it catches real errors.
Get Started!
What are you waiting for? Now you can build that monster keyboard you’ve dreamed up. Or the tiny one. Whatever. You might want to read more about the RP2040 support, unless you are going to use a different CPU. Don’t forget the entire directory is full of example keyboards you can — ahem — borrow from.
You might think there’s not much you can do with a keyboard, but there are many strange and wonderful features in the firmware. You can let your keyboard autocorrect your common misspellings, for example. Or interpret keys differently when you hold them versus tapping them. Want a key that inserts the current time and date? Code it. If you want an example of getting the LCD to work, check out the rp2040-disp branch.
One thing interesting about qmk, too, is that many commercial keyboards use it or, at least, claim to use it. After all, it is tempting to have the firmware ready to go. However, sometimes you get a new keyboard and the vendor hasn’t released the source code yet, so if that’s your plan, you should find the source code before you plunk down your money!
You’ll find plenty of support for lighting, of course. But there are also strange key combinations, layers, and even methods for doing stenography. There’s only one problem. Once you start using qmk there is a real chance you may start tearing up your existing keyboards. You have been warned.
CERN’s Large Hadron Collider Runs on A Bendix G-15 in 2025
The Bendix G-15 refurbished by [David at Usagi Electric] is well known as the oldest digital computer in North America. The question [David] gets most is “what can you do with it?”. Well, as a general-purpose computer, it can do just about anything. He set out to prove it. Can a 1950s-era vacuum tube computer handle modern physics problems? This video was several years in the making, was a journey from [David’s] home base in Texas all the way to CERN’s Large Hadron Collider (LHC) in Switzerland.
To start with, [Usagi’s] the G-15 is a numeric machine. It can’t even handle the full alphabet. What’s more, all numbers on the G-15 are stored as floating-point values. Commands are sent via operation codes. For example, ADD is operation 43. You have to wrangle an index register and an address as well. Intercom feels a bit like a cross between assembler and tokenized BASIC.
If you’d like to play along, the intercom manual is available on Bitsavers. (Thanks [Al]!)
There are some hardcore physics and high speed data collection involved in ATLAS. [Allison] from SMU does a great job of explaining it all. The short version is: When particles are smashed together, huge amounts of information is collected by detectors and calorimeters. On the order of 145 TB/s (yes, TerraBytes per second). It would be impossible to store and analyze all that data. Topoclustering is an algorithm that determines if any given event is important to the researchers or not. The algorithm has to run in less than 1 microsecond, which is why it’s highly pipelined and lives inside an FPGA.
Even though it’s written in Verilog, topoclustering is still an algorithm. This means the G-15, being a general-purpose computer, can run it. To that end, [Lloyd] converted the Verilog code to C. But the Bendix doesn’t run C code. That’s where G-15 historian [Rob Kolstad] came in. Rob ported the C code to Intercom. [David] punched the program and a sample dataset on a short tape. He loaded up Intercom, then Topoclustering, and sent the run command. The G-15 sprang to life and performed flawlessly, proving that it is a general-purpose computer capable of running modern algorithms.
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Curious about the history of this particular Bendix G-15? Check out some of our earlier articles!
Stai pianificando il passaggio da Windows a Linux? Allora passa, APT36 è già lì ad aspettarti!
APT36, noto anche come Transparent Tribe, ha intensificato una nuova campagna di spionaggio contro organizzazioni governative e di difesa in India. Il gruppo, legato al Pakistan, è attivo almeno dal 2013 e utilizza regolarmente e-mail di spear phishing e furti di credenziali per accedere a sistemi chiusi. Questa volta, gli aggressori hanno implementato una nuova tecnica di infezione, utilizzando file “.desktop” di Linux camuffati da documenti che scaricano malware da Google Drive e stabiliscono un canale di comando e controllo nascosto.
Secondo CloudSEK, l’attacco inizia con l’invio di archivi ZIP contenenti file falsi con un’icona PDF, sebbene in realtà si tratti di collegamenti Linux eseguibili. Una volta avviato, il file avvia il download del payload crittografato da un servizio remoto, lo decrittografa e lo posiziona in una directory temporanea.
Quindi i diritti di accesso vengono modificati e il componente scaricato viene avviato in background. Per nascondere tracce di attività e ridurre i sospetti, la vera documentazione PDF falsa viene aperta simultaneamente nel browser Firefox. Visivamente, tutto sembra legittimo, sebbene a questo punto venga installato un modulo dannoso nascosto.
Il file scaricato è un modulo binario compilato staticamente e scritto in Go che, una volta attivato, verifica l’ambiente per il debug o l’esecuzione in una sandbox per evitare l’analisi. Se non vengono rilevati segnali sospetti, il programma persiste nel sistema e si imposta per avviarsi automaticamente all’accesso dell’utente.
Crea quindi una connessione al server di comando e controllo tramite WebSocket e mantiene un canale persistente per lo scambio di comandi. Questa tecnica consente agli aggressori di controllare segretamente i dispositivi infetti e di raccogliere dati sensibili per un lungo periodo di tempo.
Per camuffare l’attacco vengono utilizzate diverse tecniche, tra cui l’uso di icone incorporate per far sembrare il file un normale documento e la sostituzione del nome dell’eseguibile con un titolo PDF visibile. L’attività dannosa viene accuratamente nascosta: il terminale non si apre all’avvio e le notifiche di sistema non vengono visualizzate. Questo rende l’attacco particolarmente pericoloso per le organizzazioni che lavorano con ambienti Linux e presuppongono un elevato livello di sicurezza per le proprie workstation.
Il team che ha condotto l’analisi sottolinea che l’utilizzo di Google Drive come fonte per la distribuzione del payload è indicativo dello sviluppo degli strumenti del gruppo e della difficoltà di rilevarli. La scelta dell’oggetto delle email di phishing che menzionano approvvigionamenti e forniture militari è rivolta ai dipendenti di agenzie governative e dipartimenti della Difesa, il che aumenta la probabilità di apertura dei file infetti.
In caso di compromissione, gli aggressori sono in grado di controllare i sistemi a lungo termine, costruendo una catena di sorveglianza e intercettazione dei dati. Gli esperti raccomandano di bloccare l’accesso al dominio di controllo interessato, di verificare i registri delle attività per individuare connessioni sospette e di utilizzare un’analisi avanzata degli allegati nei sistemi di posta elettronica.
È inoltre importante rafforzare il controllo sugli endpoint, implementare il monitoraggio del traffico di rete e verificare regolarmente le workstation utilizzate per rilevare segnali di intrusione. La portata della minaccia è valutata come significativa, poiché la campagna colpisce strutture critiche e aumenta il rischio di fughe di informazioni classificate.
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Three sources described how AI is writing alerts for Citizen and broadcasting them without prior human review. In one case AI mistranslated “motor vehicle accident” to “murder vehicle accident.”#News
Citizen Is Using AI to Generate Crime Alerts With No Human Review. It’s Making a Lot of Mistakes
Crime-awareness app Citizen is using AI to write alerts that go live on the platform without any prior human review, leading to factual inaccuracies, the publication of gory details about crimes, and the exposure of sensitive data such as peoples’ license plates and names, 404 Media has learned.The news comes as Citizen recently laid off more than a dozen unionized employees, with some sources believing the firings are related to Citizen’s increased use of AI and the shifting of some tasks to overseas workers. It also comes as New York City enters a more formal partnership with the app.
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Do you know anything else about how Citizen or others are using AI? I would love to hear from you. Using a non-work device, you can message me securely on Signal at joseph.404 or send me an email at joseph@404media.co.“Speed was the name of the game,” one source told 404 Media. “The AI was capturing, packaging, and shipping out an initial notification without our initial input. It was then our job to go in and add context from subsequent clips or, in instances where privacy was compromised, go in and edit that information out,” they added, meaning after the alert had already been pushed out to Citizen’s users.
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È disponibile il nuovo numero della newsletter del Ministero dell’Istruzione e del Merito.
Ministero dell'Istruzione
#NotiziePerLaScuola È disponibile il nuovo numero della newsletter del Ministero dell’Istruzione e del Merito.Telegram
Radio Apocalypse: America’s Doomsday Rocket Radios
Even in the early days of the Cold War, it quickly became apparent that simply having hundreds or even thousands of nuclear weapons would never be a sufficient deterrent to atomic attack. For nuclear weapons to be anything other than expensive ornaments, they have to be part of an engineered system that guarantees that they’ll work when they’re called upon to do so, and only then. And more importantly, your adversaries need to know that you’ve made every effort to make sure they go boom, and that they can’t interfere with that process.
In practical terms, nuclear deterrence is all about redundancy. There can be no single point of failure anywhere along the nuclear chain of command, and every system has to have a backup with multiple backups. That’s true inside every component of the system, from the warheads that form the sharp point of the spear to the systems that control and command those weapons, and especially in the systems that relay the orders that will send the missiles and bombers on their way.
When the fateful decision to push the button is made, Cold War planners had to ensure that the message got through. Even though they had a continent-wide system of radios and telephone lines that stitched together every missile launch facility and bomber base at their disposal, planners knew how fragile all that infrastructure could be, especially during a nuclear exchange. When the message absolutely, positively has to get through, you need a way to get above all that destruction, and so they came up with the Emergency Rocket Communication System, or ERCS.
Above It All
The ERCS concept was brutally simple. In the event of receiving an Emergency Action Message (EAM) with a valid launch order, US Air Force missile launch commanders would send a copy of the EAM to a special warhead aboard their ERCS missiles. The missiles would be launched along with the other missiles in the sortie, but with flight paths to the east and west, compared to over-the-pole trajectories for the nuclear-tipped missiles. The ERCS trajectories were designed to provide line-of-sight coverage to all of Strategic Air Command’s missile fields and bomber bases in North America, and also to SAC bases in Europe. Once the third stage of the missile was at apogee, the payload would detach from the launch vehicle and start transmitting the EAM on a continuous loop over one of ten pre-programmed UHF frequencies, ensuring that all strategic assets within sight of the transmitter would get the message even if every other means of communication had failed.
Even by Cold War standards, ERCS went from operational concept to fielded system in a remarkably short time. The SAC directive for what would become ERCS was published in September of 1961, and a contract was quickly awarded to Allied Signal Aerospace Communications to build the thing. In just four months, Allied had a prototype ready for testing. Granted, the design of the payload was simplified considerably by the fact that it was on a one-way trip, but still, the AN/DRC-9, as it was designated, was developed remarkably quickly.
The 875-pound (397-kg) payload, which was to be carried to the edge of space at the tip of an ICBM, contained a complete “store and forward” communications system with redundant UHF transmitters, along with everything needed to control the deployment of the package into space, to manage the thermal conditions inside the spacecraft, and to keep it on a stable trajectory after release. In addition, the entire package was hardened against the effects of electromagnetic pulse, ensuring its ability to relay launch orders no matter what.
The forward section of the package, just aft of the nose cone, mainly contained the equipment to activate the payload’s batteries. As was common in spacecraft of the day, the payload was powered by silver-zinc batteries, which were kept in a non-activated state until needed. To activate them, a gas generator in the forward section would be started about 45 seconds prior to launch. This would provide the pressure needed to force about seven liters of potassium hydroxide electrolyte solution from a reservoir in the forward section through tubes to the pair of batteries in the aft section of the payload. The batteries would immediately supply the 45 VDC needed by the payload’s power converters, which provided both the regulated 28 VDC supply for powering most of the comms equipment, plus the low-voltage, high-current AC supplies needed for the filaments of the tubes used in the RF power amplifiers. In the interest of redundancy, there were two separate power converters, one for each battery.
Also for redundancy and reliability, the payload used a pair of identical transmitters, located in the aft section. These were capable of operating on ten different channels in the UHF band, with the frequency controlled by a solid-state crystal-controlled oscillator. The specific channel was selected at the time of launch and fixed for the duration of the mission. The oscillators fed an exciter circuit, also solid state, that amplified and modulated the carrier signal for the driver amplifiers, before sending them to a series of RF cavity amps that used vapor-cooled tetrodes to boost the signal to about a kilowatt.
Both transmitters were connected to a passive diplexer to couple the two signals together into a common feed line for the payload’s single antenna, which sat behind a fiberglass radome, which was pressurized to reduce the risk of corona discharge, at the very aft of the vehicle. The antenna was an Archimedian spiral design, which is essentially a dipole antenna wound into a spiral with the two legs nested together. This resulted in a right-hand circularly polarized signal that covered the entire frequency range of the transmitter.
Whiskey Tango Foxtrot
Since the business of all this hardware was to transmit EAMs, the AN/DRC-9 was equipped with a recorder-processor system. This was shockingly simple — essentially just a continuous-loop tape deck with its associated amplifiers and controllers. The tape deck had separate playback and record/erase heads, over which the tape moved at a nominal 5 inches per second, or 40 ips when it needed to rapidly cycle back to the beginning of the message. The loop was long enough to record an EAM up to 90 seconds long, which was recorded by the missile combat crew commander (MCCC) over a standard telephone handset on a dedicated ERCS console in the launch complex. The EAM, a long series of NATO phonetic alphabet characters, was dictated verbatim and checked by the deputy MCCC for accuracy; if the MCCC flubbed his lines, the message was recorded over until it was perfect.
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The recorder-processor was activated in playback mode once the transmitter was activated, which occurred about 31 seconds after thrust termination of the third stage of the rocket and after spin motors had fired to spin-stabilize the payload during the ballistic phase of its flight. Test flights over the Pacific launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California showed that transmissions were readable for anywhere from 14 to 22 minutes, more than enough to transmit a complete EAM multiple times.
As was common with many Cold War projects, work on ERCS started before the launch vehicle it was intended for, the Minuteman II, was even constructed. As an interim solution, the Air Force mounted the payloads to their Blue Scout launch vehicles, a rocket that had only been used for satellites and scientific payloads. But it performed well enough in a series of tests through the end of 1963 that the Air Force certified the Blue Scout version of ERCS as operational and deployed it to three sites in Nebraska on mobile trailer launchers. The Blue Scout ERCS would serve until the Minuteman version was certified as operational in 1968, greatly improving readiness by putting the system in a hardened silo rather than in vulnerable above-ground launch trailers.
By the mid-70s, ten Minuteman II ERCS sorties were operational across ten different launch facilities at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. Luckily, they and their spicier cousins all stayed in their silos through even the hottest days of the Cold War, only emerging in 1991 when the entire Minuteman II force was ordered to stand down by President George H.W. Bush. By that point, global military communications had advanced considerably, and the redundancy offered by ERCS was deemed no longer worth the expense of maintaining the 1960s technology that provided it. All ERCS payloads were removed from their missiles and deactivated by the end of 1991.
Il Phishing per le AI è arrivato! ChatGPT, clicca subito qui per non perdere l’accesso!
Gli attacchi di phishing stanno diventando sempre più sofisticati e ora prendono di mira non solo gli utenti, ma anche le difese automatizzate basate sull’intelligenza artificiale. I ricercatori hanno scoperto una campagna in cui gli aggressori incorporano istruzioni nascoste nelle e-mail per confondere i sistemi di intelligenza artificiale utilizzati dai SOC per classificare e filtrare le minacce.
L’email in sé aveva un aspetto tradizionale: l’oggetto era “Avviso di scadenza accesso 20/08/2025 16:56:21”, il testo era una notifica sull’imminente scadenza della password ad un indirizzo di posta elettronica con la proposta di confermare o aggiornare urgentemente i dati. Questa tecnica si basa su elementi familiari dell’ingegneria sociale : pressione del tempo, imitazione di messaggi ufficiali e falsificazione del marchio Gmail.
Ma l’interno dell’email conteneva un elemento molto più interessante: un blocco di testo nella sezione MIME, scritto nello stile dei prompt per LLM come ChatGPT o Gemini. Includeva riferimenti a “ragionamento multilivello“, “generazione di 10 prospettive diverse” e “sintesi ottimizzata”. Questi riferimenti sono nascosti agli utenti, ma durante l’analisi di un’email, l’IA potrebbe essere distratta da queste istruzioni e non rilevare evidenti segnali di phishing.
Se tali algoritmi sono correlati all’automazione dei processi (tagging, escalation, apertura di ticket), tale interferenza può portare a ritardi, falsi negativi o dashboard SOC contaminate.
La catena di distribuzione in sé è una copia della campagna precedente con piccole modifiche. Le email sono state inviate tramite SendGrid, superando SPF/DKIM ma non DMARC, il che ha permesso loro di aggirare i filtri e accedere alle caselle di posta. Gli aggressori hanno utilizzato Microsoft Dynamics come reindirizzamento intermedio per rendere il messaggio più credibile. La vittima è stata quindi accolta da un dominio con un captcha che bloccava sandbox e crawler, e la pagina finale imitava un modulo di accesso a Gmail con JavaScript offuscato.
Il loader della prima fase conteneva un codice AES-CBC crittografato; la chiave e l’IV (i primi 16 byte del blocco) erano nascosti in Base64. Una volta decifrati, veniva eseguito uno script che controllava il processo di accesso fittizio: verifica della password, simulazione di errori 2FA e prolungamento dell’interazione per estorcere dati. Inoltre, il sito raccoglieva indirizzi IP, ASN e geolocalizzazione, e inviava beacon per distinguere gli utenti reali e per l’analisi automatizzata.
Tra gli indicatori di compromissione figurano i domini assets-eur.mkt.dynamics.com, bwdpp.horkyrown.com e glatrcisfx.ru, nonché l’accesso al servizio get.geojs.io per la profilazione. Gli esperti rilevano diversi segnali indiretti che indicano la potenziale affiliazione degli operatori con l’Asia meridionale. I record WHOIS dei domini attaccanti contengono informazioni di contatto provenienti dal Pakistan e gli URL contengono parole caratteristiche dell’hindi e dell’urdu (“tamatar” (“pomodoro”), “chut” (una parola oscena), il che indica la possibile origine dell’attacco dall’Asia meridionale, sebbene i ricercatori segnalino la possibilità di una falsificazione delle tracce.
La principale differenza tra questa campagna e quelle precedenti è il tentativo esplicito di attaccare due obiettivi contemporaneamente: esseri umani e intelligenza artificiale. La vittima viene spinta a inserire le credenziali e il sistema di intelligenza artificiale viene ingannato da prompt incorporati. Questo “doppio strato” rende il phishing molto più pericoloso: ora non solo gli utenti devono proteggersi, ma anche gli strumenti di sicurezza stessi.
I ricercatori sottolineano che tali tecniche sono ancora rare, ma la loro comparsa dimostra che il phishing è entrato nella fase degli attacchi “a più livelli che tengono conto dell’intelligenza artificiale”. Ora le aziende dovranno costruire difese in tre direzioni contemporaneamente: contro l’ingegneria sociale, contro la manipolazione dell’intelligenza artificiale e contro l’abuso delle infrastrutture di reindirizzamento e beacon.
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