In the dispute over plans to search all private messages and photos (#ChatControl) for suspicious content, a proposal by the Spanish presidency has been leaked that ambassadors will discuss on Thursday and is intended to secure a majority for the proposed #ChatControl regulation at the end of the month.

Pirate Party MEP and lawyer Patrick Breyer, who is co-negotiating the bill in the European Parliament, has read the proposal and warns:

“The lip service paid to end-to-end encryption is a mere smokescreen. Communication services like WhatsApp or Signal would still have to turn our smartphones into error-prone scanners and bugs (so-called client-side scanning). Nobody would be able to rely on the subsequent encryption of ‘unsuspicious’ messages.

“What the EU governments want to adopt on 28 September means: Apart from ineffective network blocking and search engine censorship, the proposed chat control threatens to destroy digital privacy of correspondence and secure encryption. Scanning personal cloud storage would result in the mass surveillance of private photos. Mandatory age verification for communications services would end anonymous communication. Appstore censorship for young people would be a kind of digital house arrest for teenagers. The proposal does not include the overdue obligation on law enforcement agencies to report and remove known abusive material on the Internet, nor does it provide for Europe-wide standards for effective prevention measures, victim support and counselling and effective criminal investigations.

“This Big Brother attack on our mobile phones, private messages and photos with the help of error-prone algorithms is a giant step towards a Chinese-style surveillance state. Chat control is like the post office opening and scanning all letters – ineffective and illegal. Even the most intimate nude photos and sex chats can suddenly end up with company personnel or the police. Those who destroy the digital secrecy of letters destroy trust. We all depend on the security and confidentiality of private communication: People in need, victims of abuse, children, the economy and also state authorities.”

patrick-breyer.de/en/chat-cont…

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di Davide Matrone –

Pagine Esteri, 12 settembre 2023. Dalla storica e grandiosa rivoluzione a cavallo tra il XVIII e il XIX secolo, all’abisso in pieno XXI secolo. La storia di questo paese è ricca di avvenimenti di tutto rispetto eppure oggi vive nel baratro. Dal 21 agosto del 1791 al 1º gennaio del 1804 in questo stato, situato nell’isola di Hispaniola, si consumò la prima rivoluzione schiavista della storia moderna. Haiti è stato il primo paese al mondo a vincere una rivoluzione di liberazione anti-coloniale perpetuata da schiavi neri contro gli occupanti francesi. È stata la seconda nazione del continente americano a dichiarare la propria indipendenza, dopo gli Stati Uniti d’America. Inoltre, è stato uno dei 51 paesi che hanno dato vita all’ONU nell’anno 1945.

Nonostante questi grandi avvenimenti, Haiti è oggi il paese più povero del continente americano ed è al posto 155 su 177 nella classifica dei paesi classificati in base al proprio indice di sviluppo umano.

In queste ultime settimane ritorna nuovamente sotto i riflettori per una grave crisi che colpisce la sua popolazione che vive per l’80% in una condizione di povertà degradante. Nell’ultimo anno, si è registrato, inoltre, un aumento esponenziale della violenza con eccidi di massa da parte di bande criminali che “sono legate a una parte del settore politico ed economico del paese” dichiara Robby Glessile, attivista e difensore dei diritti umani haitiano.

Secondo i dati che ci fornisce lo stesso attivista haitiano, dal 1° gennaio al 15 agosto del 2023, le violenze delle bande criminali hanno provocato la morte di 2400 persone. “Queste cifre sono relative ai corpi ritrovati ma molti altri non verranno scoperti perché le bande, in alcuni casi, li fanno semplicemente sparire” dichiara ancora Robby.

Per questa situazione c’è un grande esodo di haitiani che si stanno spostando verso le zone interne del paese, verso le comunità rurali più tranquille. Moltissimi altri invece stanno abbandonando il paese e si stanno rifugiando verso la vicina Repubblica Dominicana o all’estero. Non è la prima volta che gli haitiani devono lasciare il proprio territorio per salvarsi la pelle. La frontiera tra Haiti e la Repubblica Domenicana è tra quelle più calde e transitate del pianeta. Tra i due stati confinanti è in procinto la costruzione di un muro di un’estensione pari a 165 km. Il progetto faraonico fu annunciato due anni fa, dopo il magnicidio del presidente Moise. Ricordiamo che il Muro di Berlino aveva un’estensione di quasi 120 km.

Ho contattato Robby Glessile a cui ho rivolto alcune domande per comprendere cosa succede oggi nel suo paese nativo.

Qual è la situazione e cosa sta facendo l’attuale governo?

La situazione attuale è molto violenta è la popolazione è abbandonata a se stessa e non ha un attimo di tregua. Si sta perpetuando una violenza estrema e brutale da parte di bande criminali che hanno in possesso buona parte del territorio. Il governo non sta facendo assolutamente nulla. L’unica preoccupazione che ha la classe politica è quella di continuare a gestire il potere riscuotendo abusivamente uno stipendio mensile. Eppure l’attuale Primo Ministro quando giunse al potere, aveva promesso che la sua principale preoccupazione sarebbe stata quella di risolvere l’insicurezza. Fino ad oggi la situazione è divenuta sempre più insostenibile.

Come operano queste bande criminali?

Come dicevo, queste bande legate a una parte del settore politico ed economico si muovono in tutto il territorio nazionale. Ricevono armi dall’estero e maggiormente dagli Stati Uniti. Non c’è controllo e freno a questo traffico d’armi che avviene attraverso le dogane che sono dei veri e propri colabrodo.

In questi momenti a poche centinaia di metri dal Palazzo Presidenziale ci sono bande che stanno operando. Il sud del paese è sconnesso dalla capitale Puerto Principe. È praticamente interrotta la circolazione all’interno della capitale e in buona parte del paese. Qualche mese fa la stessa Ministra della Giustizia di Haiti, ha dichiarato che questi territori sono ormai persi e che lo Stato non riesce a controllarli.

Si parla nuovamente di un intervento armato con l’aiuto esterno, vero?

Sì, è cosi. Il governo centrale sta aspettando quest’intervento come ultima soluzione. Molte persone all’interno del paese son convinte che è lo stesso governo che sta lasciando andare le cose affinché la Comunità Internazionale intervenga come mediatore del conflitto. Purtroppo non è la prima volta che si chiede l’intervento dei contingenti internazionali nel paese. Ma sappiamo che i risultati di queste azioni sono stati disastrosi e la situazione è peggiorata e non migliorata. L’unica vittima in questa situazione è ancora una volta il popolo haitiano che non ha nessun appoggio ed è abbandonato dal proprio Stato.

È di questi giorni la notizia del coinvolgimento di un cittadino colombiano nel magnicidio dell’ex Presidente Moise, ucciso nel luglio del 2021. Cosa ci dici?

Da parte della Giustizia haitiana non c’è nessun interesse affinché il popolo sappia cosa successe realmente nella notte tra il 6 e il 7 luglio del 2021. Non c’è volontà politica che si venga a conoscenza dei fatti. Secondo le indagini fin qui condotte, c’è un cittadino colombiano coinvolto nel magnicidio ma attualmente si trova negli Stati Uniti. C’è anche un cittadino haitiano oggi in carcere in quanto accusato di aver partecipato attivamente al piano di assassino dell’ex presidente Moise. Però la giustizia sta camminando a passo di tartaruga. Sebbene questa settimana siano stati chiamati in causa altri 4 cittadini colombiani, il sistema di Giustizia non va oltre. Non penso che con questo governo si arrivi a una conclusione del magnicidio. Gli autori intellettuali sono ancora nascosti e l’attuale sistema di giustizia del paese non ha gli strumenti e la volontà per far luce su questo caso molto complesso.

Intanto il governo degli Stati Uniti ha chiesto ai suoi connazionali di abbandonare il paese dopo le sparatorie avvenute in prossimità dell’Ambasciata statunitense una settimana fa. Una delegazione della Comunità dei Caraibi (CORICOM) alcuni giorni fa è giunta a Porte Principe e si è riunita con il Presidente del paese per circa due ore per trovare in modo congiunto una soluzione alla grave crisi politica e sociale che attraversa il paese delle Antille caraibiche.

Lunedì 11 settembre il presidente della Repubblica Dominicana, Luis Abinader ha sospeso l’emissione di permessi di soggiorno per gli haitiani ed ha chiuso la frontiera con Haiti.

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L'articolo Haiti ostaggio delle bande criminali. La popolazione fugge dalla capitale proviene da Pagine Esteri.

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L'articolo In Cina e Asia – Kim Jong Un è arrivato in Russia: sul tavolo scambio di armi proviene da China Files.

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di Valeria Cagnazzo

Pagine Esteri, 12 settembre 2023 – Tra il 9 e il 10 settembre scorsi, l’India di Narendra Modi ha accolto i leader Mondiali del G20. Al centro delle polemiche la “Dichiarazione finale” ratificata alla conclusione del summit, per le sue generiche condanne alla guerra senza nessun diretto riferimento alla Russia. Nell’agenda del documento, non vincolante per nessuno dei Paesi firmatari, anche lo sviluppo “green” e il cambiamento climatico, l’eliminazione della fame e della malnutrizione, l’uguaglianza di genere, le sfide digitali.

Per il Primo Ministro indiano Modi, nei panni del padrone di casa, un’occasione straordinaria per ribadire il ruolo strategico del Paese, che rappresenta la quinta economia mondiale, e soprattutto la sua figura politica, in grado di dialogare con i leader delle democrazie occidentali. Nonostante, secondo molti report di organizzazioni di diritti umani e le denunce di attivisti e intellettuali da tutto il mondo, il suo governo abbia applicato il bavaglio ai dissidenti, messo in carcere gli oppositori politici e represso nel sangue le minoranze etniche e religiose, prima tra tutte quella musulmana.

Arundhati Roy

Di queste contraddizioni, alla vigilia del G20, aveva parlato ad Al Jazeera la scrittrice e attivista Arundhati Roy, da sempre estremamente critica nei confronti del governo di Modi.

Anche in questa occasione, l’autrice conosciuta nel mondo per il romanzo “Il dio delle piccole cose”, non ha mancato di denunciare i crimini commessi dal governo del suo Paese ai danni delle minoranze e dei più poveri, ma non ha neppure risparmiato i Premier dei governi occidentali che si sono riuniti a New Delhi, ipocriti complici di una dittatura in nome dei propri interessi.

“A nessuno importa” di quello che succede in India, ha dichiarato la scrittrice al giornale. “C’è il G20 e ognuno cercherà di ricavarne un’opportunità, un accordo commerciale, un accordo per una fornitura d’armi, un’intesa di strategia geopolitica”, ha predetto, alla vigilia del summit. “Non è che le singole persone che stanno arrivando qui, che si tratti di capi di Stato o di chiunque altro, non sappiano cosa succede qui. In Paesi come gli Stati Uniti, la Francia, il Regno Unito, i media mainstream sono stati molto critici su quello che sta accadendo in India, ma i governi poi hanno una loro agenda ben diversa.”

Un’agenda che, di fatto, non ha compreso i diritti delle minoranze in India, né le condizioni di vita degli abitanti delle periferie più degradate di New Delhi – che di fatto, prima dell’inizio del summit, sono state ripulite dei loro residenti e abbellite, affinché lo sguardo dei media mondiali non potesse incrinare in queste ore l’immagine edulcorata che Modi stava cercando di dare del suo paese sui palchi del G20.

“Penso che la cosa interessante sia che se tu fossi a Delhi, come me adesso, se guardassi le pubblicità, i manifesti, se vedessi tutti i preparativi che si stanno facendo per il G20, tu saresti perdonato se pensassi che non sia il governo indiano a ospitare il G20, ma il Partito Bharatiya Janata (BJP). Su ogni singolo striscione c’è un grande loto, che è il simbolo di un partito politico, Il BJP di Modi”.

Di fatto, ovunque l’immagine stilizzata di un loto addobba i loghi del G20. Anche il documento finale dei leader mondiali ha una peculiare prima pagina, in cui si succedono fiori di loto colorati che ricordano molto delle uova di Pasqua fuori stagione.

“E’ così pericoloso che il Paese, la Nazione, il governo e le sue istituzioni siano stati tutti confusi con il partito di governo. E che il partito di governo sia stato confuso con Modi, un singolo individuo. E infatti, un partito di governo adesso esiste a malapena, adesso c’è solo un governante. Quindi è come se fosse Modi a ospitare il G20”.

Poi la denuncia su quello che è accaduto dietro alle quinte di un Paese che si preparava a ricevere i leader mondiali: “Le città sono state epurate dai poveri. Gli slums sono stati ripuliti. Le strade sono chiuse, il traffico è silenziato. E’ tutto silenzioso come la morte. E’ come se lui (Modi, ndr) si vergognasse così tanto di noi, di come la città è realmente. E’ stata purgata e sigillata per quest’evento.”

Tutto per “una questione di vanità”, ha detto Roy a proposito di Narendra Modi. “E’ pronto a fare le piroette, e siamo proprio alle porte delle elezioni. Quest’evento non farà che foraggiare la sua campagna. Tutti questi leader occidentali che parlano di democrazie – intendo, tu puoi anche perdonare qualcuno come Trump, perché lui non crede nella democrazia – ma Biden, Macron, tutte queste persone che parlano di democrazia, sanno esattamente cosa sta succedendo qui. Sanno che i musulmani sono stati massacrati, che le case dei musulmani che hanno protestato sono state distrutte dai bulldozer, il che significa che tutte le istituzioni pubbliche – tribunali, magistrati, stampa – sono collusi in questo. Sanno che i musulmani in alcune città hanno delle croci dipinte sulle loro porte (come contrassegni, ndr) e che viene chiesto loro di lasciare le loro case. Sanno che i musulmani sono stati ghettizzati. E che le persone accusate di linciare, di uccidere i musulmani sono adesso alla guida di cosiddette processioni “religiose” all’interno di questi ghetti. Sanno che ci sono delle guardie armate di spade lì fuori, che chiamano all’annientamento (delle comunità musulmane, ndr), allo stupro di massa delle donne musulmane. Sanno tutto questo, ma non gli importa, perché come sempre per alcuni Paesi occidentali, è “democrazia per noi” e “dittatura o qualsiasi altra cosa sia per i nostri amici non bianchi”.

In un ipotetico discorso di apertura del G20, qualora fosse stata invitata ad averne uno, Roy ha immaginato che avrebbe detto che “Sarebbe sconsiderato pensare che il processo che sta portando un Paese di 1,4 miliardi di persone, e che un tempo era una democrazia imperfetta, a cadere in quella che si può solo definire con la parola “fascismo” non influenzerà il resto del mondo”. “Il mio non sarebbe un grido di aiuto”, ha spiegato la scrittrice. “Sarebbe piuttosto dire: Guarda intorno a ciò che sei, a quello che stai contribuendo a creare”.”. E ricorda di quando nel 2002, dopo il massacro anti-musulmano del Gujarat, l’intelligence di Paesi occidentali come il Regno Unito considerava Modi responsabile di “pulizia etnica” e gli era vietato di viaggiare verso gli Stati Uniti. “Adesso è tutto dimenticato, ma si tratta dello stesso uomo”, sottolinea Roy. “E ogni volta che qualcuno gli concede questo spazio per fare piroette e afferma che solo uno come lui avrebbe potuto portare queste persone potenti in India, quel messaggio amplificato dai nostri canali servili, alimenta un senso di insicurezza nazionale, di inferiorità e falsa vanità.”. Un pericolo che, secondo la scrittrice, “non sarà un problema solo per l’India”.

“Anche se abbiamo le elezioni, non ci chiamerei più una democrazia”. La propaganda del partito al potere avrebbe provocato una trasformazione sociale che rende più insidiosamente pericolose le cose per le minoranze residenti in India, ovvero la popolazione non indù. Soprattutto nella stagione delle elezioni alle porte. “Quando dico che “Siamo giunti a una fase diversa adesso”, intendo dire che non è più solo la leadership che dobbiamo temere, ma una parte di questa popolazione indottrinata che è stata resa pericolosa per le minoranze. La violenza non si limita più ai pogrom orchestrati dal governo. Stiamo assistendo incidente dopo incidente alla banalità del male, come l’avrebbe definita Hannah Arendt. Il mondo intero ha visto il video di una piccola classe di scuola nel nord dell’India dove l’insegnante fa alzare in piedi un ragazzino musulmano di sette anni e fa avvicinare tutti gli altri bambini indù a prenderlo a schiaffi”.

“Persone accusate di omicidio, linciaggio, di aver bruciato vivi giovani musulmani, che adesso conducono processioni religiose”, ripete Roy, “Abbiamo una situazione in cui la costituzione è stata più o meno messa da parte. Se vincono le elezioni l’anno prossimo, nel 2026, ci sarà la cosiddetta “delimitazione”, una sorta di manipolazione in cui il numero dei seggi e la geografia dei collegi elettorali sarà modificata, e la componente di lingua indù (in cui il partito BJP è quello più potente), otterrà ancora più seggi”.

“Siamo in una situazione in cui si parla di una nazione, una lingua, una elezione. Ma in realtà, siamo in una situazione in cui abbiamo un dittatore”. E conclude: “Lo stato dell’India è molto precario, molto contestato. Ci troviamo in una situazione in cui la Costituzione è stata effettivamente messa da parte. Ci troviamo in una situazione in cui il BJP è oggi uno dei partiti politici più ricchi del mondo. E tutta la macchina elettorale è più o meno compromessa. Eppure – non solo a causa della violenza contro le minoranze – ma anche a causa della disoccupazione e poiché viviamo in una delle società più diseguali del mondo, abbiamo un’opposizione che si sta formando. Questo governo cerca di schiacciarla perché non crede che debba esserci un’opposizione. Siamo in un momento di cambiamento e non ci aspettiamo che qualcuno al di fuori dell’India si alzi e se ne accorga, perché tutti i loro occhi hanno il simbolo del dollaro sopra e guardano tutti solo a questo Paese come un enorme mercato di un miliardo di persone. Ma si sa, non ci sarà un mercato quando questo Paese scivolerà nel caos e nella guerra, come è già successo in posti come il Manipur. Ciò di cui non si rendono conto è che questo mercato non esisterà più quando questo grande Paese cadrà nel caos. La bellezza e la grandezza dell’India stanno venendo ridotte a qualcosa di piccolo, ringhioso, meschino e violento. E quando tutto questo esploderà, penso che non ci sarà niente di simile”.

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L'articolo G20, Arundhati Roy: “Biden, Macron sanno cosa succede in India ma tacciono” proviene da Pagine Esteri.

Momento storico: per la prima volta un leader degli Stati Uniti entra nella sede centrale del Partito comunista vietnamita, accolto dal segretario generale Nguyen Phu Trong. Hanoi rafforza il rapporto con l'antico nemico, ma prova a rassicurare Russia e Cina

L'articolo Good morning Vietnam. Biden e Hanoi, amici per forza proviene da China Files.

Una società in cui l’uomo che uccide l’animale è definito “assassino” e la morte di un’orsa viene paragonata ad un femminicidio è una società che ha smarrito il senso della misura, e forse anche quello della realtà. È la logica dei social, ormai evidentemente diventata logica generale.

Come ha magistralmente documentato il reporter del New York Times Max Fisher ne “La macchina del caos”, i social si nutrono, e di conseguenza diffondono, prevalentemente sentimenti d’odio, alimentano il senso dell’indignazione morale, ripristinano e istituzionalizzano l’istituto medievale della gogna.

Sui social, e di conseguenza (cosa che la dice lunga circa i meccanismi dell’informazione contemporanea) sui media tradizionali e nel mondo politico, la vicenda dell’orsa Amarena è letteralmente esplosa non tanto sulla spinta del dolore nei confronti dell’animale ucciso, quanto sulla spinta dell’esaltazione al linciaggio dell’uomo che, si immagina per paura più che sadismo, le ha sparato un colpo di fucile. L’uomo si chiama Andrea Leonbruni. Ha 56 anni e, cosa che molti, nell’epoca in cui sempre più persone ritengono che il mangiare carne animale sia una forma di cannibalismo, hanno considerato un’aggravante, di mestiere fa il macellaio.

Sui social sono stati pubblicati il suo nome, la sua foto, l’indirizzo della sua macelleria, l’indirizzo della sua abitazione. Una massa umana prevalentemente anonima lo ha ferocemente insultato, lo ha chiamato “killer”, lo ha minacciato di morte assieme ai suoi familiari. Stesso trattamento è stato riservato all’avvocato che lo difende, Berardino Terra, del foro di Avezzano. Leonbruni vive oggi scortato dai carabinieri; il suo avvocato, pur avendo ricevuto minacce di morte sul telefono di casa, no. Non ancora.

Nel suo libro, che ricostruisce con precisione la storia delle dinamiche dei social, Max Fischer elenca una quantità di casi analoghi. Persone comuni messe alla gogna per una battuta giudicata politicamente scorretta o, come nel caso di Andrea Leonbruni, per un’azione penalmente rilevante. Persone comuni minacciate di morte da migliaia di sconosciuti, costrette a cambiare residenza, licenziate dai propri datori di lavoro terrorizzati dalle ricadute di tanta impopolarità, e in molti casi indotte al suicidio. “L’indignazione morale non è soltanto rabbia verso il trasgressore, ma il desiderio di vedere l’intera comunità scagliarsi contro di lui”, scrive Max Fisher. Un desiderio di violenza, un sentimento da frustrati. Rabbia allo stato puro.

La nostra civiltà è così regredita alla gogna medievale, all’impiccagione in stile selvaggio West. Di questo, più che della morte della povera orsa, una società vagamente sana parlerebbe da giorni. Il fatto che, salvo rarissimi casi, e il direttore Mattia Feltri è tra questi, ciò non accada dà la misura del grado di imbarbarimento e di scombussolamento etico che le società contemporanee stanno vivendo anche e soprattutto a causa dei social, dell’anarchia che ancora li caratterizza, dall’irresponsabilità che accomuna le compagnie del Web e i loro singoli utenti.

L'articolo Indignazione morale e gogna social, il caso del “killer” dell’orsa Amarena proviene da Fondazione Luigi Einaudi.

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Pagine Esteri, 11 settembre 2023. Sono centinaia, secondo la Mezzaluna Rossa, le persone uccise nella città di Derna dalle conseguenze della terribile tempesta che si è abbattuta sulla zona orientale della Libia. Le inondazioni causate dalle forti piogge portate dalla bufera soprannominata “Daniel” hanno causato gravissimi danni alle città, alle infrastrutture, alle abitazioni.

I video postati sui socialnetwork mostrano persone rifugiatesi sui tetti delle case in attesa dei soccorsi. Le abitazioni sono state completamente sopraffatte dall’acqua che ha raggiunto i tre metri.

Il numero dei morti, però, potrebbe essere tragicamente più alto: Osama Hamad, il primo ministro del governo della Cirenaica, con sede a Bengasi, ha dichiarato che sono più di 2.000 i morti e che di diverse migliaia è il numero dei dispersi.

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La città di Derna è circondata dalle montagne. Alcune delle dighe che trattengono le acque sono crollate. Milioni di metri cubi di acqua si sono riversati nella città, distruggendone interi quartieri.

La tempesta “Daniel” ha colpito domenica e lunedì le città Bengasi, Susa, Bayda, al-Marj e Derna.

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L'articolo LIBIA. Cedono le dighe a causa della tempesta: migliaia di morti e dispersi proviene da Pagine Esteri.

La Vergine di Norimberga ha suscitato le più sfrenate fantasie della cultura di massa, ancora di più della Pear of Anguish, ed è presente in qualsiasi museo della tortura in Italia e all’Estero. Spacciata come strumento medievale,Continue reading

The post La Vergine di Norimberga: un Falso appeared first on Zhistorica.

The Saint and allkillersnofillers present: The Adventure with the Saint episodi n°44 Judith Il miglior podcast rocknroll del globo terracqueo !!!! @Musica Agorà

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The Saint and allkillersnofillers present: The Adventure with the Saint episodi n°44 Judith

The Saint and allkillersnofillers present: The Adventure with the Saint episodi n°44 Judith Il miglior podcast rocknroll del globo terracqueo !!!!

^{In Your Eyes ezine}

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L'articolo Minorenni e infantili senili proviene da Fondazione Luigi Einaudi.

Anch’io sono rimasto a dir poco sorpreso dal tono e dal contenuto delle dichiarazioni di domenica del ministro Giorgetti a proposito della cosiddetta tassa sugli extraprofitti delle banche su cui giustamente si sofferma l’editoriale di mercoledì scorso del Foglio. E’ evidente che il ministro ha subìto una decisione tutta politica della Presidenza del Consiglio e parlando di una “versione definitiva” (!) fa capire che spera che il Parlamento procederà a emendare il testo. Tutto questo è segno di una grande confusione, ma apre anche un altro problema non secondario. Una delle cause principali del disordine delle leggi italiane è l’emendabilità dei decreti legge. Infatti le norme dei decreti legge entrano in vigore subito, ma quando sono emendate cessano di essere vigenti ma continuano a esistere nel periodo intermedio e provocano o possono provocare effetti che vanno appositamente regolati. Da qui il caos che è particolarmente grave per le norme fiscali che dovrebbero essere certe. Personalmente penso che un giorno la Corte costituzionale, che già fu costretta a intervenire per bloccare la reiterazione dei decreti legge non convertiti in legge, dovrà porsi il problema della emendabilità dei decreti legge: se il potere esecutivo sottrae al legislativo il potere di fare le leggi, dovrebbe trattarsi non solo di materie che richiedono un intervento “necessario e urgente”, ma anche di formulazioni che impegnano politicamente il governo. Gli emendamenti del Parlamento ai decreti legge sono da un punto di vista politico-costituzionale delle dichiarazioni di sfiducia contro l’esecutivo, perché indicano che il Parlamento disapprova l’uso che un governo ha fatto del potere straordinario di legiferare. Ho sempre pensato che i presidenti delle Camere dovrebbero intervenire su questa materia difendendo le prerogative degli organi deputati alla legislazione che sono le Camere. Più che di nuove norme costituzionali avremmo bisogno di rispettare e di far rispettare quelle che ci sono.

Il Foglio

L'articolo Duplice anomalia: il governo legifera attraverso decreti urgenti che il parlamento poi emenda proviene da Fondazione Luigi Einaudi.

Ad aprire quella che dovrebbe essere una seria campagna elettorale europea – il che vale per tutti i Paesi dell’Unione – è stato uno mai candidato e che mai lo sarà: Mario Draghi. Il tema è quello di avere gli strumenti per far valere la sovranità europea, che è l’opposto del sovranismo. Circa i bilanci statali lo scopo è quello di far valere il rigore, senza rigorismi formali che poi divengono lassismi sostanziali, perché non applicabili. La ricaduta italiana di un simile schema conduce a conclusioni ben diverse da quelle che qualcuno, fantasiosamente, ha voluto trarne: a noi converrebbe che i trasferimenti di sovranità siano più numerosi e veloci, così come ci converrebbe far scendere il debito pubblico maggiormente e più velocemente di quanto ci chiede la Commissione Ue. Entrambe le cose a salvaguardia della sovranità.

Si può dissentire ma, se si ragiona seriamente, occorre farlo contrastandone la sostanza, non sparacchiando castronerie dilapidatrici. Perché il presupposto è: nessuno dei Paesi dell’Unione ha, da solo, la forza di affrontare i problemi posti al di fuori dei propri confini, il che comporta l’impoverimento e l’insicurezza all’interno di quei confini. Nessuno dei nostri Paesi, da solo, è in grado di giocare un ruolo nella vicenda ucraina, per non parlare dell’impossibilità di difendere veramente i propri confini in caso di aggressione. Il nostro scudo difensivo è la Nato ma, in un quadro modificatosi dopo la fine della Guerra fredda e aggravatosi dopo l’invasione russa dell’Ucraina, la Nato stessa non può più essere a conduzione e responsabilità statunitense. Quindi serve una forza armata Ue, il che comporta integrazione dei sistemi produttivi europei nel campo della difesa. Ciascuna moneta nazionale sarebbe un turacciolo nell’Oceano, in balia di forze preponderanti, mentre l’euro è un’imbarcazione imperfetta, ma di stazza assai superiore. Lo spazio nel commercio globale lo trovano le aziende che sanno competere, ma il quadro di protezione e facilitazione è dato dai rapporti politici internazionali, in cui il peso specifico di uno Stato nazionale è largamente inferiore a quello dell’Ue. Ci sono, del resto, le esperienze positive: dalla gestione dei vaccini al debito comune per Ngeu (di cui l’Italia è il principale beneficiario).

Si può ben avversare tutto ciò, ma si deve anche essere capaci di spiegare come oggi il nazionalismo vestito da sovranismo non sarebbe il travestimento di un rattrappimento incapace di difendere i confini anche soltanto dall’ingresso di immigrati, posto che se ne ha continuo e crescente bisogno. Mentre il sovranismo che ha attuale corso in Ue (di estrema destra, ma anche di estrema sinistra) usa un trucco: considera incancellabile la condizione presente, nella quale chiede che ci sia più Nazione nelle scelte. Ma soltanto i fessi possono credere che le protezioni Ue siano incancellabili. Prego chiedere agli inglesi.

Ultimo pezzo, di un ragionamento altamente politico: il vecchio Patto di stabilità fissava degli obiettivi, ma falliva negli strumenti per farli rispettare (e il nostro debito pubblico ne è una dimostrazione); tornare a quello non ha senso, quindi si deve avere non la “elasticità” di cui favoleggiano gli spendaroli, ma l’adattabilità di bilancio: maggiore rigore in crescita, possibile spesa in recessione. Se tale politica fosse nazionale l’Ue si divaricherebbe e noi resteremmo indietro, perché altri avrebbero maggiore capacità di spesa (avendo meno debito). Quindi deve essere una politica europea, il che comporta cessione di sovranità fiscale in cambio di reale sovranità economica. Anche qui si può essere contrari, ma comporta restare prigionieri del debito, perdere sovranità e andarla a recuperare derubando i propri cittadini con una drammatica svalutazione dei risparmi (assai ricchi).

Se le forze politiche facessero politica conserverebbero, naturalmente, la libertà di pensarla diversamente, ma perderebbero quella di parlare costantemente d’altro, divagando nel nulla.

La Ragione

L'articolo Sovranamente proviene da Fondazione Luigi Einaudi.

In recent years, privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) have been an increasingly popular subject on regulators’ and policymakers’ agendas. Whether by issuing guidance about these types of tools (Canada’s Office of the Privacy Commissioner; United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner’s Office; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), setting up regulatory sandboxes (Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Commission; Colombia’s Superintendence of Industry and Commerce); or creating prize challenges (United States and United Kingdom),1 regulators are investing resources and energy to better understand, support the deployment, and potentially regulate PETs.

On June 26, 2023, the Israel Privacy Protection Authority (IPPA) and the Future of Privacy Forum (FPF) brought industry experts, government officials, and academia together in Tel Aviv to discuss experiences and challenges faced towards the adoption of PETs. The in-person event served as the inaugural meeting of an informal Global PETs Network for regulators, providing a platform to discuss the latest developments and projects related to privacy-enhancing technologies among regulators and relevant stakeholders worldwide.

The inaugural meeting, hereinafter referred to as the “PETs Conference,” included the presentation of two case studies, a closed roundtable for regulators, and an open discussion with academia and industry experts, with the discussions being held under Chatham House Rule. This blog analyzes the main challenges raised by participants for adequate implementation of privacy-enhancing technologies, as well as the main takeaways of the discussions.

PETs: an evolving concept gaining increasing attention

As technological developments increase the collection and exchange of personal data across jurisdictions and organizations, privacy-enhancing technologies can help by providing greater security, confidentiality, and protection of personal data. There are several types of PETs, which may be classified based on their functionality. For instance, some tools obfuscate and hide information (i.e., anonymization, synthetic data, differential privacy), other technologies allow for computations on encrypted data (i.e., homomorphic encryption, secure multi-party computation), while others facilitate the training of models without transferring and sharing data to a local server (i.e., federated learning).

Although PETs have received heightened attention from authorities in recent years through different policies and initiatives, the concept is not new. As a term of reference, PETs were first introduced by the predecessor of the Dutch Data Protection Authority and the Information and Privacy Commissioner in Ontario back in 1995, through a joint report that sought to demonstrate that identity-protective elements might be included in the design of information technology systems.2

Ever since, interest in PETs has increased not only through extensive research but also in practice. For instance, federated learning and multi-party computation have proven to be useful when feeding machine learning models with on-device user data to improve digital services and products, without transferring the data to a central server. Public and private sector players use differential privacy to protect identities and privacy of people when publishing large sets of data

While governments and organizations seem to acknowledge the potential benefits of PETs, significant challenges to their effective deployment remain. Some of these challenges include the lack of maturity and high costs associated with some of these technologies, as well as an apparent lack of communication between experts and regulators, resulting in limited regulatory guidance and understanding about the benefits, limitations, and use cases of PETs.

1. Collaboration and a greater understanding of PETs are essential

For some jurisdictions, privacy-enhancing technologies are still seen as a new and complex subject by regulators and companies alike. In that sense, educational resources and guidance can help translate the benefits and limitations of these tools. Although PETs may be encapsulated in one general concept, they differ in technical capabilities and usability. During the PETs Conference, participants praised efforts by regulators and international organizations to conceptualize the functionality and use cases of these technologies and tools. These studies include the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) recently published “PETs Guidance”, as well as the OECD’s 2023 Report on “Emerging Privacy-Enhancing Technologies.”

These efforts are a starting point for greater understanding and certainty about the role of PETs in protecting personal information and privacy, which can lead to more detailed guidance and initiatives. During the meeting, authorities advocated for increased communication and collaboration to advance the understanding of PETs. This not only refers to collaboration for new projects and initiatives but also to leveraging useful and already available information to provide greater guidance and certainty to the industry. For instance, authorities could translate and disseminate available guidance by foreign authorities to their own official languages, where useful, or build their own guidance from previous documents. This kind of exercise can be helpful in providing guidance to the industry faster and in building capacity and technical knowledge within agencies.

2. Regulatory certainty is necessary to boost the adoption of PETs

Secondly, regulatory guidance can provide greater certainty for the deployment and adoption of PETs. During the open discussion with industry stakeholders, some participants indicated that more certainty on regulators’ perceptions of these tools can spur the innovation and deployment of privacy-enhancing technologies. In the long term, guidance can also manifest through metrics to evaluate the success and risks associated with some of the tools.

While some organizations might recognize the value of these tools to offer more privacy-preserving products, barriers to their implementation – such as high investments in time and resources, technical expertise, lack of maturity, and information asymmetries between developers and potential buyers – are a major factor in deciding whether to invest in these tools. However, if these technologies provide an opportunity for more privacy-preserving products and services, regulators should make efforts to ensure that most organizations consider the implementation or integration of PETs, when possible. Authorities have an important role in building trust in the digital ecosystem by providing greater certainty regarding how privacy-enhancing technologies can ensure the protection of personal information.

Importantly, data protection authorities have a special task in identifying how PETs overlap with data protection principles and how these technologies could potentially complement data protection compliance systems. Providing greater certainty in this regard could be definitive to some organizations’ decisions regarding investment and adoption of privacy-enhancing technologies.

Later on in the open discussion, industry representatives highlighted the importance of noticing the dynamics and different incentives created by PETs. In providing guidance and regulatory certainty, authorities should consider that privacy-enhancing technologies can benefit different parties across the chain of data utilization, particularly in cases where a certain technique enables data-sharing across multiple organizations. In this sense, regulators could consider economic and behavioral incentives to foster collaboration between organizations and public institutions.

3. The adoption of PETs requires constant evaluation and review of potential detrimental market outcomes

Regulators and industry participants agreed on the merit of setting standards and certification programs as a viable way to generate more trust in the use and deployment of PETs across organizations. However, they also agreed that regulation and guidance are necessary to ensure the adequate implementation of standards. Importantly, regulators still have an important role in assessing whether standardized tools will be sufficient to comply with data protection regulations, and if additional measures are required to integrate data protection and privacy throughout organizations.

Finally, due to the high costs associated with some PETs, regulators should be cautious of potential barriers to competition that might arise from the deployment of these technologies. If PETs start to be actively promoted within digital services and products, centering privacy as a key market value, regulators must consider that certain companies might be able to get a competitive advantage through the early development and deployment of PETs. To avoid additional market deficiencies caused by privacy-enhancing technologies, regulators have an important task at hand in attempting to strike a balance between privacy and competition concerns.

Conclusion

Regulators, academia, and industry experts seem to agree that further study and understanding of the potential benefits and limitations of privacy-enhancing technologies is necessary. Importantly, if PETs are part of the solution towards privacy-enhanced products and services in the digital ecosystem, regulators must strengthen their efforts to achieve their adequate deployment. Particularly, data protection authorities must indicate the extent to which privacy-enhancing technologies align with data protection and privacy frameworks and should evaluate whether their implementation is enough, or if additional measures are necessary. This assessment requires greater communication and collaboration between regulators, academia, and industry.

Importantly, more regulatory certainty on whether and how organizations should deploy PETs is essential. PETs already face intrinsic barriers to their adoption because they require technical expertise within organizations and are costly to adopt. Regulatory certainty plays an important role in tackling these challenges by providing greater transparency and knowledge about PETs, as well as the technology’s relation to data protection compliance. Regulators and data protection authorities, in particular, should focus on providing more information about the potential of PETs and provide metrics to assess their effectiveness or risks, if possible.

Finally, while PETs can help build more privacy and trust in the digital ecosystem, it is important to note that they are not a fail-safe solution. Authorities and organizations should keep core data protection principles in mind and supplement these technical tools with other organizational and administrative measures.

1The US-UK PETs Prize Challenge was led by the U.K.’s Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) and Innovate UK, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), in cooperation with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

2See: Hes, R. & Borking, John. (1995). Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: The Path to Anonymity. researchgate.net/publication/2…

fpf.org/blog/navigating-privac…

mail art Project: Emergency of Beauty, a tribute to True Love This is an emergency call! We need more beauty here and now.

iyewebzine.com/call-emergency-…

Call: Emergency Of Beauty - 2023

^{simone (In Your Eyes ezine)}

Privacy Week 2023

Dal 25 al 29 settembre torna la Privacy Week, un festival di cui sono co-organizzatore in cui si parla di privacy, cybersecurity, crypto, nuove tecnologie e diritti umani. Si terrà a Milano in diverse sedi molto belle, come l’headquarter di Fastweb, il Museo della Scienza e della Tecnica o nella sede di Banca Sella (fintech district).

Le partecipazioni dal vivo per alcuni eventi sono limitate e su invito, ma tutti gli incontri potranno essere seguiti comodamente da www.privacyweek.it in streaming.

Qui: https://privacyweek.it/exposed puoi trovare tutto il palinsesto e i principali speaker. Tra i nomi più interessanti (per me), devo sicuramente citare: Patrick Breyer, uno dei pochi europarlamentari fermamente contro la sorveglianza di massa; Max Schrems, l’uomo che ha causato l’annullamento del Privacy Shield tra UE e USA e Giacomo Zucco, probabilmente il miglior divulgatore bitcoiner d’Italia (che partecipa per la terza volta).

Ci vedremo sicuramente dal vivo qui:

• Giovedì 28 settembre, dalle ore 20:30 presso Phyd, Via Tortona 31, (Milano) in cui si terrà la Privacy Night con Diego Passoni.
• Venerdì 29 settembre, dalle ore 14: 21 presso House of Stories, Via Enrico Nöe 24, Città Studi (Milano) in cui si terrà l’intervista a Max Schrems e anche Bitcoin Beach, un workshop dal vivo per insegnare persone e commercianti a usare Bitcoin, a cura di Milano Trustless.

Ti consiglio di registrarti sul sito e iscriverti alla newsletter per non perdere nessun aggiornamento, seguire tutti gli eventi e ricevere i dettagli per la partecipazione dal vivo.

Supporta Privacy Chronicles, iscriviti e condividi!

Twitter/X vuole i nostri meme per la sua IA

Tutto ciò che scrivi su Twitter/X sarà usato per allenare i loro modelli di intelligenza artificiale. Questo è ciò che dice l’ultimo aggiornamento alla sezione 2.1:

We may use the information we collect and publicly available information to help train our machine learning or artificial intelligence models for the purposes outlined in this policy.

A luglio di quest’anno Elon Musk aveva dichiarato di voler lanciare una nuova azienda per competere contro chatGPT di OpenAI. Le nostre conversazioni, flame e meme su Twitter/X saranno quindi il carburante con cui Musk allenerà la sua versione di chatGPT.

Se da un lato un algoritmo che fagociterà ogni nostra parola potrebbe non sembrare una grandissima notizia, potrebbe invece esserlo per la libertà d’espressione di tutti noi. Sappiamo infatti che chatGPT è estremamente orientato verso ideologie progressiste di sinistra (un cosiddetto “bias”).

Una versione sviluppata su Twitter/X potrebbe invece offrire una nuova visione, più neutrale, utile a portare un “equilibrio nella Forza” di cui abbiamo estremamente bisogno.

La chimera della Chainanalysis

Lo scorso 23 giugno Elizabeth Bisbee, head of investigations di Chainalysis Government Solutions, ha testimoniato in un giudizio di non conoscere l’accuratezza del software sviluppato dalla sua stessa azienda. Il contesto è quello di un procedimento penale contro Roman Sterlingov, sviluppatore che ha creato uno strumento di Coinjoin per Bitcoin.

Per chi non lo sapesse, potremmo definire la chainanalisys come un settore specialistico dell’informatica forense che ha lo scopo di tracciare e ricostruire il percorso delle transazioni su blockchain e identificare i wallet (e le persone) a cui si riferiscono quelle transazioni.

L’attività di chainanalysis si scontra proprio con strumenti privacy-focused come il Coinjoin, che permettono di mescolare e offuscare le transazioni per rendere estremamente complesso ogni tentativo tracciamento e re-identificazione dei wallet.

Nel corso del giudizio il software di chainanalysis è stato definito come un “black box algorithm” che fa affidamento su “junk science”.

Se il giudice dovesse dare ragione alla difesa, sarebbe indubbiamente un gran brutto colpo per tutte quelle aziende che da qualche anno promettono ai governi di tutto il mondo una bacchetta magica da miliardi di dollari per rintracciare e identificare transazioni su blockchain come Bitcoin o Ethereum.

Weekly memes

Weekly quote

“Tyranny in democratic republics does not proceed in the same way, however. It ignores the body and goes straight for the soul.

The master no longer says: You will think as I do or die. He says: You are free not to think as I do. You may keep your life, your property, and everything else. But from this day forth you shall be as a stranger among us.

You will retain your civic privileges, but they will be of no use to you. For if you seek the votes of your fellow citizens, they will withhold them, and if you seek only their esteem, they will feign to refuse even that. You will remain among men, but you will forfeit your rights to humanity.

Alexis de Tocqueville

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English version

Privacy Week 2023

From September 25th to 29th, Privacy Week returns, a festival of which I am a co-organizer, focusing on discussions about privacy, cybersecurity, crypto, new technologies, and human rights. It will take place in various beautiful venues in Milan, including the headquarters of Fastweb, the Museum of Science and Technology, and the location of Banca Sella (fintech district).

Live participation for some events is limited and by invitation, but all sessions can be conveniently followed via streaming on www.privacyweek.it.

Here: privacyweek.it/exposed, you can find the full schedule and key speakers. Among the most notable names (for me), I must definitely mention: Patrick Breyer, one of the few European parliamentarians staunchly against mass surveillance; Max Schrems, the man who triggered the annulment of the Privacy Shield between the EU and the USA; and Giacomo Zucco, arguably Italy's best Bitcoin advocates and educators (participating for the third time!).

We will definitely see each other in person here:

• Thursday, September 28th, from 8:30 PM at Phyd, Via Tortona 31 (Milan), where the Privacy Night with Diego Passoni will be held.
• Friday, September 29th, from 2:00 PM to 9:00 PM at House of Stories, Via Enrico Nöe 24, Città Studi (Milan), where the interview with Max Schrems will take place, along with Bitcoin Beach, a live workshop to teach individuals and merchants to use Bitcoin, hosted by Milano Trustless.

I recommend registering on the website and subscribing to the newsletter to stay updated, follow all the events, and receive details for live participation.

Twitter/X wants our memes for its AI model

Everything you write on Twitter/X will be used to train their artificial intelligence models. This is what the latest update to section 2.1 states:

"We may use the information we collect and publicly available information to help train our machine learning or artificial intelligence models for the purposes outlined in this policy."

In July of this year, Elon Musk had announced his intention to launch a new company to compete against OpenAI's chatGPT. Our conversations, debates, and memes on Twitter/X will thus be the fuel with which Musk will train his version of chatGPT.

While an algorithm devouring every word we say might not seem like great news, it could indeed be a positive outcome for our freedom of expression. We know that chatGPT is highly oriented towards progressive left-leaning ideologies (a "bias"). A version developed on Twitter/X, on the other hand, might offer a new, more neutral perspective, helpful in bringing a much-needed "balance to the Force."

The Chimera of Chainanalysis

On June 23rd, Elizabeth Bisbee, head of investigations at Chainalysis Government Solutions, testified in a trial that she was not aware of the accuracy of the software developed by her own company. The context is a criminal case against Roman Sterlingov, a developer who created a Coinjoin tool for Bitcoin.

For those unaware, chainanalysis could be described as a specialized field of computer forensics that aims to trace and reconstruct the path of transactions on blockchains and identify the wallets (and individuals) associated with those transactions.

The activity of chainanalysis directly clashes with privacy-focused tools like Coinjoin, which allow transactions to be mixed and obscured, making any attempts at tracking and re-identifying wallets extremely complex.

During the trial, the chainanalysis software was referred to as a "black box algorithm" relying on "junk science." If the defense were to prevail, it would undoubtedly be a significant blow to all those companies that have been promising governments worldwide a multi-billion-dollar magic wand to trace and identify transactions on blockchains like Bitcoin or Ethereum.

privacychronicles.it/p/weekly-…

DSA: What’s in a Name?

The European Union’s (EU) Digital Services Act (DSA) is a first-of-its-kind regulatory framework, with which the bloc hopes to set an international benchmark for regulating online intermediaries and improving online safety. The DSA establishes a range of legal obligations, from content removal requirements, prohibitions to engage in manipulative design and to display certain online advertising targeted to users profiled on the basis of sensitive characteristics, to sweeping accountability obligations requiring audits of algorithms and assessments of systemic risks for the largest of platforms.

The DSA is part of the EU’s effort to expand its digital regulatory framework to address the challenges posed by online services. It reflects the EU’s regulatory approach of comprehensive legal frameworks which strive to protect fundamental rights, including in digital environments. The DSA should not be read by itself: it is applicable on top of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), alongside the Digital Markets Act (DMA), as well as other regulations and directives of the EU’s Data Strategy legislative package.

The Act introduces strong protections against both individual and systemic harms online, and also places digital platforms under a unique new transparency and accountability framework. To address the varying levels of risks and responsibilities associated with different types of digital services, the Act distinguishes online intermediaries depending on the type of business service, size, and impact, setting up different levels of obligations.

Given the structural and “systemic” significance of certain firms in the digital services ecosystem, the regulation places stricter obligations on Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs). These firms will have to abide by higher transparency standards, provide access to (personal) data to competent authorities and researchers, and identify, analyze, assess, and mitigate systemic risks linked to their services. Such systemic risks have been classified into four different categories (Recitals 80-84): illegal content; fundamental rights (freedom of expression, media pluralism, children’s rights, consumer protection, and non-discrimination, inter alia); public security and electoral/democratic processes; and public health protection, with a specific focus on minors, physical and mental well-being, and gender-based violence.

The European Commission designated VLOPs and VLOSEs earlier this year (see Table 1), based on criteria laid out in the DSA and a threshold number of 45 million monthly users across the EU. The DSA obligations for these designated online platforms became applicable on August 25, 2023, with the exception of a transparency database whose publication was postponed for a month following complaints. The full regulation becomes applicable for all covered starting on February 17, 2024.

Table 1 – Mapping the 19 Designated Companies by the European Commission (April 2023)

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

* The companies that sought to challenge their designation as ‘VLOPs’ – the European General Court will be addressing these challenges and will determine whether the European Commission’s designation shall be upheld.

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

However, VLOPs and VLOSEs are not the only regulated entities. All intermediaries that offer their services to users based in the EU, including online platforms such as app stores, collaborative economy platforms, and social media platforms, fall within the scope of the regulation, regardless of their number of users. Notably, micro and small-sized enterprises that do not meet the VLOP/VLOSE criteria, as defined by EU law, are exempted from some of the legal obligations. While “regular” online platforms may have scaled down requirements compared to VLOPs/VLOSEs, their new legal obligations are nonetheless significant and include, among others, transparency regarding their recommendation systems, setting up internal complaint-handling mechanisms, prohibitions on designing their platforms in a way that deceives or manipulates users, and prohibitions on presenting ads based on profiling using special categories of personal data, including personal data of minors.

All providers of intermediary services, including online platforms, covered by the DSA are also “controllers” under the GDPR to the extent that they process personal data and decide on the means and purposes of such processing. As a consequence, they have to comply with both these legal frameworks at the same time. While the DSA stipulates, pursuant to Recital 10, that the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive serve as governing rules for personal data protection, some DSA provisions intertwine with GDPR obligations in complex ways, requiring further analysis. For instance, some of the key obligations in the DSA refer to “profiling” as defined by the GDPR, while others create a legal requirement for VLOPs and VLOSEs to give access to personal data to researchers or competent authorities.

After a brief overview of the scope of application of the DSA and a summary of its key obligations based on the type of covered entity (see Table 2), this blog maps out ten key areas where the DSA and the GDPR interact in consequential ways and reflects on the impact of this interaction on the enforcement of the DSA. The ten interplay areas we are highlighting are:

• Manipulative design in online interfaces;
• Targeted advertising based on sensitive data;
• Targeted advertising and protection of minors;
• Recommender systems free-of-profiling;
• Recommender systems and advertising transparency;
• Access to data for researchers and competent authorities;
• Takedown of illegal content;
• Risk Assessments;
• Compliance function and the DSA legal representative;
• Intermediary liability and the obligation to provide information.

The DSA Applies to Intermediary Services of Various Types and Sizes and Has Broad Extraterritorial Effect

The DSA puts in place a horizontal framework of layered responsibilities targeted at different types of online intermediary services, including:

Recitals 13 and 14 of the DSA highlight the importance of “disseminating information to the public” as a benchmark for which online platforms fall under the scope of the Regulation and the specific category of hosting services. For instance, Recital 14 explains that emails or private messaging services fall outside the definition of online platforms “as they are used for interpersonal communication between a finite number of persons determined by the sender of the communication.” However, the DSA obligations for online platforms may still apply to them if such services “allow the making available of information to a potentially unlimited number of recipients, … such as through public groups or open channels.”

Important carve-outs are made in the DSA for micro and small-sized enterprises, as defined by EU law, that do not meet the VLOP/VLOSE criteria. These firms are exempted from some of the legal obligations, in particular from making available an annual report on the content moderation they engage in, as well as the more substantial additional obligations imposed on providers of online platforms in Articles 20 to 28 – such as the prohibition to display ads based on profiling conducted on special categories of personal data, and obligations for platforms allowing consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders in Articles 29 to 32.

These carve-outs come in contrast with the broad applicability of the GDPR to entities of all sizes. This means, for instance, that even if micro and small-sized enterprises that are online platforms do not have to comply with the prohibitions related to displaying ads based on profiling using special categories of personal data and profiling of minors, they continue to fall under the scope of the GDPR and its requirements that impact such profiling.

The DSA has extra-territorial effect and global coverage, similar to the GDPR, since it captures companies regardless of whether they are established in the EU or not, as long as the recipients of their services have their place of establishment or are located in the EU (Article 2).

The DSA Just Became Applicable to VLOPs and VLOSEs and Will Continue to Roll Out to All Online Platforms

The Act requires that platforms and search engines publish their average monthly number of active users/recipients with the EU-27 (Article 24 – check the European Commission’s guidance on the matter). The first round of sharing those numbers was due on February 17, 2023. Based on the information shared through that exercise, the Commission designated the VLOPs and VLOSEs with additional obligations because of the “systemic risks that they pose to consumers and society,” (Article 33). The designation announcement was made public on April 25.

Four months after the designation, on August 25, 2023, the DSA provisions became applicable to VLOPs and VLOSEs through Article 92. This means that the designated platforms must already implement their obligations, such as conducting risk assessments, increasing transparency of recommender systems, and offering an alternative feed of content not subject to recommender systems based on profiling (see an overview of their obligations in Table 2).

As of February 17, 2024, all providers of intermediary services must comply with a set of general obligations (Articles 11-32), with certain exceptions for micro and small enterprises as explained above.

Table 2 – List of DSA Obligations as Distributed Among Different Categories of Intermediary Service Providers

Pillar obligations	Set of Obligations	Intermediary Services	Hosting Services	Online Platforms	VLOPs/VLOSEs
Transparency measures	Transparency reporting (Article 15)
Requirements on terms and conditions wrt fundamental rights (Article 14)
Statement of reasons (Article 17)
Notice-and-action and obligation to provide information to users (Article 16)
Recommender system transparency (Articles 27 and 38)
User-facing transparency of online advertising (Article 24)
Online advertising transparency (Article 39)
User choice for access to information (Article 42)
Oversight structure to address the complexity of the online intermediary services ecosystem	Cooperation with national authorities following orders (Article 11)
Points of contact for recipients of service (Article 12) and, where necessary, legal representatives (Article 13)
Internal complaint and handling system (Article 20) and redress mechanism (Article 32) and out-of-court dispute settlement (Article 21)
Independent auditing and public accountability (Article 37)
Option for recommender systems not based on profiling (Article 38)
Supervisory fee (Article 43)
Crisis response mechanism and cooperation process (Article 36)
Manipulative Design	Online interface design and organization (Article 25)
Measures to counter illegal goods, services, or content online	Trusted flaggers (Article 22)
Measures and protection against misuse (Article 23)
Targeted advertising based on sensitive data (Article 26)
Online protection of minors (Article 28)
Traceability of traders (Articles 30-32)
Reporting criminal offenses (Article 18)
Risk management obligations and compliance officer (Article 41)
Risk assessment and mitigation of risks (Articles 34-35)
Codes of conduct (Articles 45-47)
Access to data for researchers	Data sharing with authorities and researchers (Article 40)

From Risk Assessments to Profiling and Transparency Requirements – Key Points of Interplay Between the DSA and GDPR

While the DSA and the GDPR serve different purposes and objectives at face value, ultimately both aim to protect fundamental rights in a data-driven economy and society, on the one hand, and reinforce the European single market, on the other hand. The DSA aims to establish rules for digital services and their responsibilities toward content moderation and combating systemic risks, so as to ensure user safety, safeguard fairness and trust in the digital environment, and enhance a “single market for digital services.” Notably, providing digital services is inextricably linked to processing data, including personal data. The GDPR seeks to protect individuals in relation to how their personal data is processed, ensuring that such processing respects their fundamental rights, while at the same time seeking to promote the free movement of personal data within the EU.

While the two regulations do not have the same taxonomy of regulated actors, the broad scope of the GDPR’s definitions of “controllers” and “processing of personal data” are such that all intermediaries covered by the DSA are also controllers under the GDPR in relation to any processing of personal data they engage in and for which they establish the means and purposes of processing. Some intermediaries might also be “processors” under the GDPR in specific situations, a fact that needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Overall, this overlap triggers the application of both regulations, with the GDPR seemingly taking precedence over most of the DSA (Recital 10 of the DSA), with the exception of the intermediary liability rules in the DSA as the updated eCommerce Directive, which take precedence over the GDPR (Article 2(4) of the GDPR).

The DSA mentions the GDPR 19 times in its text across recitals and articles, with “profiling” as defined by the GDPR playing a prominent role in core obligations for all online platforms. These include the two prohibitions to display ads based on profiling that use sensitive personal data or the data of minors, and the obligation that any VLOPs and VLOSEs that use recommender systems must provide at least one option for their recommender systems not based on profiling. The GDPR plays an additional role in setting the definition for sensitive data (“special categories of data”) in its Article 9, which the DSA specifically refers to for the prohibition of displaying ads based on profiling done on such data. In addition to these cross-references, where it will be essential to apply the two legal frameworks consistently, there are other areas of overlap that create complexity for compliance, at the minimum, but also risks for inconsistencies (such as the DSA risk assessment processes and the GDPR Data Protection Impact Assessment). Additional overlaps may confuse individuals concerned regarding the best legal framework to rely on for removing their personal data from online platforms, as the DSA sets up a framework for takedown requests for illegal content that may also include personal data and the GDPR provides individuals with the right to obtain erasure of their personal data in specific contexts.

In this complex web of legal provisions, here are the elements of interaction between the two legal frameworks that stand out. As the applicability of the DSA rolls out on top of GDPR compliance programs and mechanisms, other such areas may surface.

1. Manipulative Design (or “Dark Patterns”) in Online Interfaces

These are practices that “materially distort or impair, either on purpose or in effect, the ability of recipients of the service to make autonomous and informed choices or decisions,” per Recital 67 DSA. Both the GDPR and the DSA address these practices, either directly or indirectly. The GDPR, on the one hand, offers protection against manipulative design in cases that involve processing of personal data. The protections are relevant for complying with provisions detailing lawful grounds for processing, requiring data minimization, setting out how valid consent can be obtained and withdrawn, or how controllers must apply Data Protection by Design and by Default when building their systems and processes.

Building on this ground, Article 25 of the DSA, read in conjunction with Recital 67, includes a ban on providers of online platforms to “design, organize or operate their online interfaces in a way that deceives or manipulates the recipients of their service or in a way that otherwise materially distorts or impairs the ability of the recipients of their service to make free and informed decisions.” The ban seems to be applicable only to online platforms as defined in Article 3(i) of the DSA, as a subcategory of the wide spectrum of intermediary services. Importantly, the DSA specifies that the ban on dark patterns does not apply to practices covered by the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) or the GDPR. Article 25(3) of the DSA highlights that the Commission is empowered to issue guidelines on how the ban on manipulative design applies to specific practices, so further clarity is expected. And since the protection vested by the GDPR against manipulative design will remain relevant and primarily applicable, it will be essential for consistency that these guidelines are developed in close collaboration with Data Protection Authorities (DPAs).

1. Targeted Advertising Based on Sensitive Data

Article 26(3) and Recital 68 of the DSA underline a prohibition of the providers of online platforms to “present” ads to users stemming from profiling them, as defined by Article 4(4) of the GDPR, based on sensitive personal data, as defined by Article 9 of the GDPR. Such personal data include race, religion, health status, and sexual orientation, among others on a limited list. However, it is important to mention that case law from the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) may further complicate the application of this provision. In particular, Case C-184/20 OT, in a judgment published a year ago, expanded “special categories of personal data” under the GDPR to also cover any personal data from which a sensitive characteristic may be inferred. Additionally, the very recent CJEU judgment in Case C-252/21 Meta v. Bundeskartellamtmakes important findings regarding how social media services as a category of online platforms can lawfully engage in profiling of their users pursuant to the GDPR, including for personalized ads. While the DSA prohibition is concerned with “presenting” ads based on profiling using sensitive data, rather than with the activity of profiling itself, it must be read in conjunction with the obligations in the GDPR for processing personal data for profiling and with the relevant CJEU case-law. To this end, the European Data Protection Board has published relevant guidelines for automated decision-making and profiling in general, but also specifically on targeting of social media users.

1. Targeted Advertising and Protection of Minors

Recital 71 of the GDPR already provides that solely automated decision-making, including profiling, with legal or similarly significant effects should not apply to children – a rule that is relevant for any type of context, such as educational services, and not only for online platforms. The DSA enhances this protection when it comes to online platforms, prohibiting the presentation of ads on their interface based on profiling by using personal data of users “when they are aware with reasonable certainty that the recipient of the service is a minor” (Article 28 of the DSA). Additionally, in line with the principle of data minimization provided by Article 5(1) of the GDPR, this DSA prohibition should not lead the provider of the online platform to “maintain, acquire or process” more personal data than it already has in order to assess if the recipient of the service is a minor. While this provision addresses all online platforms, VLOPs and VLOSEs are expected to take “targeted measures to protect the rights of the child, including age verification and parental control tools” as part of their obligation in Article 35(1)(j) to put in place mitigation measures tailored to their specific systemic risks identified following the risk assessment process. As highlighted in a recent FPF infographic and report on age assurance technology, age verification measures may require processing of additional personal data than what the functioning of the online service requires, which could be at odds with the data minimization principles in the absence of additional safeguards. This is an example where the two regulations complement each other.

In recent years, DPAs have been increasingly regulating the processing of personal data of minors. For instance, in the EU, the Irish Data Protection Commission published Fundamentals for a Child-Oriented Approach to Data Processing, the Italian Garante often includes the protection of children in its high-profile enforcement decisions (see, for instance, the TikTok and ChatGPT cases), and the CNIL in France published recommendations to enhance the protection of children online and launched several initiatives to enhance digital rights of children. This is another area where collaboration with DPAs will be very important for consistent application of the DSA.

1. Recommender Systems and Advertising Transparency

A significant area of overlap between the DSA and the GDPR relates to transparency. A key purpose of the DSA is to increase overall transparency related to online platforms, manifesting through several obligations, while transparency related to how one’s personal data are processed is an overarching principle of the GDPR. Relevant areas for this principle in the GDPR are found in Article 5, through extensive notice obligations in Articles 13 and 14, data access obligations in Article 15, and underpinned by modalities on how to communicate to individuals in Article 12. Two of the DSA obligations that increase transparency are laid out in Article 27, which imposes on providers of online platforms transparency related to how recommender systems work, and in Article 26, which imposes transparency related to advertising on online platforms. To implement the latter obligation, the DSA requires, per Recital 68, that the “recipients of a service should have information directly accessible from the online interface where the advertisement is presented, on the main parameters used for determining that a specific advertisement is presented to them, providing meaningful explanations of the logic used to that end, including when this is based on profiling.”

As for transparency related to recommender systems, Recital 70 of the DSA explains that online platforms should consistently ensure that users are appropriately informed about how recommender systems impact the way information is displayed and can influence how information is presented to them. “They should clearly present the parameters for such recommender systems in an easily comprehensible manner” to ensure that the users “understand how information is prioritized for them,” including where information is prioritized “based on profiling and their online behavior.” Notably, Articles 13(2)(f) and 14(2)(g) of the GDPR require that notices to individuals whose personal data is processed include “meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences” of automated decision-making, including profiling. These provisions should be read and applied together, complementing each other, to ensure consistency. This is another area where collaboration between DPAs and the enforcers of the DSA would be desirable. To understand the way in which DPAs have been applying this requirement so far, this case-law overview on automated decision-making under the GDPR published by the Future of Privacy Forum last year is helpful.

1. Recommender Systems Free-of-Profiling

“Profiling” as defined by the GDPR also plays an important role in one of the key obligations of VLOPs and VLOSEs: to offer users an alternative feed of content not based on profiling. Technically, this stems from an obligation in Article 38 of the DSA for VLOPs and VLOSEs to “provide at least one option for each of their recommender systems which is not based on profiling.” The DSA explains in Recital 70 that a core part of an online platform’s business is the manner in which information is prioritized and presented on its online interface to facilitate and optimize access to information for users: “This is done, for example, by algorithmically suggesting, ranking and prioritizing information, distinguishing through text or other visual representations, or otherwise curating information provided by recipients.”

The DSA text further explains that “such recommender systems can have a significant impact on the ability of recipients to retrieve and interact with information online, including to facilitate the search of relevant information,” as well as playing an important role “in the amplification of certain messages, the viral dissemination of information and the stimulation of online behavior.” Additionally, as part of their obligations to assess and mitigate risks on their platforms, VLOPs and VLOSEs may need to adjust the design of their recommender systems. Recital 94 of the DSA explains that they could achieve this “by taking measures to prevent or minimize biases that lead to the discrimination of persons in vulnerable situations, in particular where such adjustment is in accordance with Article 9 of the GDPR,” where Article 9 establishes conditions for processing sensitive personal data.

1. Access to Data for Researchers and Competent Authorities

Article 40 of the DSA includes an obligation for VLOPs and VLOSEs to provide access to the data necessary to monitor their compliance with the regulation to competent authorities (Digital Services Coordinators designated at the national level in the EU Member State of their establishment or the European Commission). This includes access to data related to algorithms, based on a reasoned request and within a reasonable period specified in the request. Additionally, they also have an obligation to provide access to vetted researchers following a request of their Digital Services Coordinator of establishment “for the sole purpose of conducting research that contributes to the detection, identification, and understanding of systemic risks” in the EU, and “to the assessment of the adequacy, efficiency, and impacts of the risk mitigations measures.” This obligation presupposes that the platforms may be required to explain the design, logic of the functioning, and the testing of their algorithmic systems, in accordance with Article 40 and its corresponding Recital 34.

Providing access to online platforms’ data entails, in virtually all cases, providing access to personal data as well, which brings this processing under the scope of the GDPR and triggers its obligations. Recital 98 of the DSA highlights that providers and researchers alike should pay particular attention to safeguarding the rights of individuals related to the processing of personal data granted by the GDPR. Recital 98 adds that “providers should anonymize or pseudonymize personal data except in those cases that would render impossible the research purpose pursued.” Notably, the data access obligations in the DSA are subject to further specification through delegated acts, to be adopted by the European Commission. These acts are expected to “lay down the specific conditions under which such sharing of data with researchers can take place” in compliance with the GDPR, as well as “relevant objective indicators, procedures and, where necessary, independent advisory mechanisms in support of sharing of data.” This is another area where the DPAs and the DSA enforcers should closely collaborate.

1. Takedown of Illegal Content

Core to the DSA are obligations for hosting services, including online platforms, to remove illegal content: Article 16 of the DSA outlines this obligation based on a notice-and-action mechanism initiated at the notification of any individual or entity. The GDPR confers rights on individuals to request erasure of their personal data (Article 17 of the GDPR) under certain conditions, as well as the right to request rectification of their data (Article 16 of the GDPR). These rights of the “data subject” under the GDPR aim to strengthen individuals’ control over how their personal data is collected, used, and disseminated. Article 3(h) of the DSA defines “illegal content” as “any information that, in itself or in relation to an activity … is not in compliance with Union law or the law of any Member State…, irrespective of the precise subject matter or nature of that law.” As a result, to the extent that “illegal content” as defined by the DSA is also personal data, an individual may potentially use either of the avenues, depending on how the overlap of the two provisions is further clarified in practice. Notably, one of the grounds for obtaining erasure of personal data is if “the personal data has been unlawfully processed,” and therefore processed not in compliance with the GDPR, which is Union law.

Article 16 of the DSA highlights an obligation for hosting services, including online platforms, to put mechanisms in place to facilitate the submission of sufficiently precise and adequately substantiated notices. Article 12 of the GDPR, on another hand, requires controllers to facilitate the exercise of data subject rights, including erasure, and to communicate information on the action taken without undue delay and in any case no longer than one month after receiving the request. The DSA does not prescribe a specific timeline to deal with notices for removal of illegal content, other than “without undue delay.” All hosting services and online platforms whose activity falls under the GDPR have internal processes set up to respond to data subject requests, which could potentially be leveraged in setting up mechanisms to remove illegal content pursuant notices as requested by the DSA. However, a key differentiator is that in the DSA content removal requests can also come from authorities (see Article 9 of the DSA) and from “trusted flaggers” (Article 22), in addition to any individual or entity – each of these situations under their own conditions. In contrast, erasure requests under the GDPR can only be submitted by data subjects (individuals whose personal data is processed), either directly or through intermediaries acting on their behalf. DPAs may also impose the erasure of personal data, but only as a measure pursuant to an enforcement action.

VLOPs/VLOSEs will have to additionally design mitigation measures ensuring the adoption of content moderation processes, including the speed and quality of processing notices related to specific types of illegal content and its expeditious removal.

1. Risk Assessments

The DSA, pursuant to Article 34, obliges VLOPs/VLOSEs to conduct a risk assessment at least once per year to identify, analyze, and assess “systemic risks stemming from the design or functioning of their service and its related systems,” including algorithmic systems. The same entities are very likely subject to the obligation to conduct a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) under Article 35 of the GDPR, as at least some of their processing operations, like using personal data for recommender systems or profiling users based on personal data to display online advertising, meet the criteria that trigger the DPIA obligation. A DPIA is required in particular where processing of personal data “using new technologies, and taking into account the nature, scope, context, and purposes of the processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.”

There are four systemic risks that the DSA asks to be included in the risk assessment: dissemination of illegal content; any actual or foreseeable negative effects on the exercise of specific fundamental rights, among which the right to respect for private life and the right to the protection of personal data are mentioned; any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse, electoral processes and public security; and any actual foreseeable negative effects in relation to gender-based violence, the protection of public health and minors, and serious negative consequences to the person’s physical and mental well-being.

Among the elements that a DPIA under the GDPR must include is “an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects” that may arise from how controllers process personal data through new technologies, such as algorithmic systems. Other elements that must be included are the measures envisaged to address these risks, similar to how Article 35 of the DSA requires VLOPs/VLOSEs to put mitigation measures in place tailored to the identified risks. The EDPB has also published guidelines on how to conduct DPIAs.

When conducting the risk assessments required by the DSA, VLOPs/VLOSEs must take into account whether and how specific factors enumerated in Article 34(2) influence any of the systemic risks mentioned. Most factors to consider are linked to how VLOPs/VLOSEs process personal data, such as the design of their algorithmic systems, the systems for selecting and presenting advertisements, and generally their data-related practices.

Both DSA risk assessments and DPIAs are ex-ante risk assessment obligations and both involve some level of engagement with supervisory authorities. The scope of the assessments differ, with the DSA focused on systemic risks and risks that go beyond impact on fundamental rights, and the GDPR’s DPIA focused on any risks that novel processing of personal data may pose on fundamental rights and freedoms and on assessments unique to data protection. However, they also have areas of clear overlap where processing of personal data is involved. DPIAs can potentially feed into DSA risk assessments, and the two processes should be implemented consistently.

1. Compliance Function and the DSA Legal Representative

Under the DSA, in accordance with Article 41, the designated VLOPs/VLOSEs will be obliged to establish a “compliance function,” which can be composed of several compliance officers. This function must be (i) independent from their operational functions; (ii) allocated with sufficient authority, stature and resources; and must have (iii) access to the management body of the provider to monitor the compliance of that provider with the DSA. On top of that, the compliance function will have to cooperate with the Digital Services Coordinator of the establishment, ensure that all risks are identified through the risk assessments and that the mitigation measures are effective, as well as inform and advise the management and employees of the provider in relation to DSA obligations.

All providers of the services designated as VLOPs and VLOSEs who are also controllers under the GDPR are under an obligation to appoint a Data Protection Officer (DPO), as they very likely meet the criteria required by Article 37 of the GDPR due to the nature and scope of their processing activities involving personal data. There are similarities between the compliance function and the DPO, including their independence, reporting to the highest management level, their key task to monitor compliance with the whole regulation that creates their role, or their task to cooperate with the competent supervisory authorities. Appointing two independent roles that have a powerful internal position and with roles that may overlap to a certain extent will require consistency and coordination, which can be supported by further guidance from DPAs and DSA supervisory authorities.

Another role in the application of the two regulations that has many similarities is the role of a “representative” in the EU, in the situations of extraterritorial applicability of the DSA and the GDPR covering entities that do not have an establishment in the EU. In the DSA, this obligation pertains to all online service providers, pursuant to Article 13. If they are processing personal data in the context of targeting their services to individual recipients in the EU or if they monitor the recipients’ behavior, the service provider triggers the extraterritorial application of the GDPR as well. In such cases, they also need to appoint a GDPR representative, in accordance with Article 27. Under the GDPR, the representative acts as a mere “postal box” or point of correspondence between the non-EU controller and processor on one hand and DPAs or data subjects on the other hand, with liability that does not go beyond its own statutory obligations. In contrast, Article 13(3) of the DSA suggests that the “legal representative” could be held liable for failures of the intermediary service providers to comply with the DSA. Providers must mandate their legal representatives for the purpose of being addressed “in addition to or instead of” them by competent authorities, per Article 13(2) of the DSA.

Recital 44 of the DSA clarifies that the obligation to appoint a “sufficiently mandated” legal representative “should allow for the effective oversight and, where necessary, enforcement of this regulation in relation to those providers.” The legal representative must have “the necessary powers and resources to cooperate with the relevant authorities” and the DSA envisages that there may be situations where providers even appoint in this role “a subsidiary undertaking of the same group as the provider, or its parent undertaking, if that subsidiary or parent undertaking is established in the Union.” Recital 44 of the DSA also clarifies that the legal representative may also only function as a point of contact, “provided the relevant requirements of this regulation are complied with.” This could mean that if other structures are in place to ensure an entity on behalf of the provider can be held liable for non-compliance by a provider with the DSA, the representative can also function just as a “postal box.”

1. Intermediary Liability and the Obligation to Provide Information

Finally, the GDPR and the DSA intersect in areas where data protection, privacy, and intermediary liability overlap.

The GDPR, per Article 2, stresses that its provisions shall be read without prejudice to the e-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC), in particular, to “the liability rules of intermediary service providers in Articles 12 to 15 of that Directive”. However, the DSA, pursuant to its Article 89, stipulates that while Articles 12 to 15 of the e-Commerce Directive become null, relevant “references to Articles 12 to 15 of Directive 2000/31/EC shall be construed as references to Articles 4, 5, 6 and 8 of this Regulation, respectively.”

The DSA deals with the liability of intermediary services providers, especially through Articles 4 to 10. With respect to Article 10, addressing orders to provide information, the DSA emphasizes the strong envisaged cooperation between intermediary service providers, national authorities, and also the Digital Services Coordinators as enforcers. This could potentially involve the sharing of information, including in certain cases that already collected personal data, in order to combat illegal content online. The GDPR actively passes the baton on intermediary liability on the DSA, but in the eventuality of data sharing and processing, the intermediary service providers should ensure that they comply with the protections of the GDPR (in particular sections 2 and 3). This overlap signals yet another instance where the two Regulations will be complementary to each other, this time in the case of intermediary liability and the obligation to provide information.

The DSA Will Be Enforced Through a Complex Web of Authorities, And The Interplay With The GDPR Complicates It

Enforcement in such a complex space will be challenging. In a departure from the approach promoted by the GDPR, where enforcement is ensured primarily at the national level and through the One Stop Shop mechanism for cross-border cases coordinated through the European Data Protection Board, the DSA centralizes enforcement of the DSA at the EU level when it comes to VLOPs and VLOSEs, leaving it in the hands of the European Commission.
However, Member States will also be playing a role in ensuring enforcement of the DSA against the intermediary services providers who are not VLOPs and VLOSEs. Each Member State must designate one or more competent authorities for the enforcement of the DSA, and if they designate more, they must choose one to be appointed as their Digital Services Coordinator (DSC). The deadline to designate DSCs is February 2024. Challenges come with the designation of national competent authorities left to the Member States, as it seems that there is no consistent approach related to what type of authority will be most appropriately positioned to enforce the Act. Not all Member States have appointed their DSCs for the time being, but there is a broad spectrum of enforcers that Member States plan to rely on, creating a scattered landscape.

Table 3 – Designated Authorities as Digital Services Coordinators Across the EU Member States

The Digital Services Coordinators will be closely collaborating and coordinating with the European Board for Digital Services, which will be undertaking an advisory capacity (Articles 61-63 of the DSA), in order to ensure consistent cross-border enforcement. Member States are also tasked to adopt national rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the DSA, including fines that can go up to 6% of the annual worldwide turnover of the provider of intermediary services concerned in the preceding financial year (Article 52 of the DSA). Complaints can be submitted to DSCs by recipients of the services and by any body, organization, or association mandated to exercise rights conferred by the DSA to recipients. With respect to VLOPs and VLOSEs, the European Commission can issue fines not exceeding 6% of the annual worldwide turnover in the preceding year, following decisions of non-compliance which can also ask platforms to take necessary measures to remediate the infringements. Moreover, the Commission can also order interim measures before an investigation is completed, where there is an urgency due to the risk of serious damage to the recipients of the service.

The recipients of the service, including users of online platforms, also have a right to seek compensation from providers of intermediary services for damages or loss they suffer due to infringements of the DSA (Article 54 of the DSA). The DSA also applies in out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms with regard to decisions of online platforms related to illegal content (Article 21 of the DSA), independent audits in relation to how VLOPs/VLOSEs comply with their obligations (Article 37 of DSA), and voluntary codes of conduct adopted at the Union level to tackle various systemic risks (Article 45), including codes of conduct for online advertising (Article 46) and for accessibility to online services (Article 47).

The newly established European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT) also plays a role in this enforcement equation. The ECAT will be supporting the Commission in its assessment of VLOPs/VLOSEs with regard to risk management and mitigation obligations. Moreover, it will be particularly relevant to issues pertaining to recommender systems, information retrieval, and search engines. The ECAT will use a principles-based approach to assessing fairness, accountability, and transparency. However, the DSA is not the only regulation relevant to the use of algorithms and AI by platforms: the GDPR, the upcoming Digital Markets Act, the EU AI Act, and the European Data Act add to this complicated landscape.

The various areas of interplay between the DSA and the GDPR outlined above require consistent interpretation and application of the law. However, there is no formal role recognized in the enforcement and oversight structure of the DSA for cooperation or coordination, specifically among DPAs, the European Data Protection Board, or the European Data Protection Supervisor. This should not be an impediment to setting up processes for such cooperation and coordination within their respective competencies, as the rollout of the DSA will likely reveal the complexity of the interplay between the two legislative frameworks even beyond the ten areas outlined above.

Editor: Alexander Thompson

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Extended reality (XR) technologies often rely on users’ body-based data, particularly information about their eyes, hands, and body position, to create realistic, interactive experiences. However, data derived from individuals’ bodies can pose serious privacy and data protection risks for people. It can also create substantial liability risks for organizations, given the growing volume of lawsuits under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) and scrutiny of biometric data practices by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) in their recent Policy Statement. At the same time, there is considerable debate and lack of consensus about what counts as biometric data under existing state privacy laws, creating significant uncertainty for regulators, individuals, and organizations developing XR services.

This blog post explores the intersection of US biometric data privacy laws and XR technologies, particularly whether and to what extent specific body-based data XR devices collect and use may be considered “biometric” under various data protection regimes. We observe that:

• Face templates and iris scans used to authenticate an individual’s identity are regulated biometrics, therefore those use cases in XR are covered by biometric laws.
• Laws with broad definitions of biometrics may apply to systems that use face detection, as seen in emerging case law from Illinois regarding virtual try-on XR applications.
• Organizations have taken steps that reduce their liability risk regarding face-based biometric systems, including by minimizing collection of identifying data or processing biometric data on individuals’ devices.
• Other body-based data not used for identification in XR, like eye-tracking and voice analysis, may also be considered “biometric” if the technology and data are capable of identifying an individual.

A. Face Templates, Hand Scans, and Iris Scans Used to Authenticate an Individual’s Identity Are Regulated Biometrics, Therefore User Authentication in XR is Covered by Biometric and Comprehensive Privacy Laws

In the US, there are three biometric data privacy laws: the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), the Texas Capture and Use of Biometric Identifier Act (CUBI), and the Washington Biometric Privacy Protection Act (BPPA). Other states like California, Connecticut, and Virginia also maintain comprehensive data privacy laws that regulate biometric data, and the FTC regulates “unfair and deceptive” biometric data practices. But because BIPA is the only privacy law to have a private right of action for any person “aggrieved” by a violation of a biometric privacy statute, Illinois cases abound and Illinois courts play a fundamental role in determining the scope of what policymakers, companies, and consumers consider to be “biometric data.”

With the exception of CUBI (and to a certain extent, BIPA), most biometric and comprehensive data privacy statutes tie their definitions of “biometric data” to identification, meaning the laws are intended to regulate unique physiological characteristics that entities use to identify an individual. Generally, each biometric and comprehensive law focuses on five forms of biometric data: retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, hand scan, and face scan. BIPA, in particular, applies to “biometric identifiers,” defined as a “retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry,” as well as “biometric information,” which includes “any information…based on an individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual.” Therefore, any entity that uses technology to scan an individual’s iris, finger, hand, or face to uniquely identify an individual (1:many) or authenticate their identity (1:1) must comply with BIPA’s requirements, unless they fall within one of BIPA’s exemptions or exclusions. The same conclusion applies to CUBI, BPPA, and comprehensive data privacy laws.

XR devices often use iris, face, or hand scans to authenticate a user’s identity to log in to their profile or enable in-app payments. Much like computers or smartphones, more than one user may use a single XR device, so authenticating the specific person using the device at a given time allows for more personalization and secure transactions. As a result, iris or face authentication systems in XR devices are likely covered by U.S. biometric and comprehensive data privacy laws. The laws typically require organizations to obtain user consent before enrolling individuals in this sort of biometric XR system, and BIPA has potentially thorny provisions requiring “written consent,” which can be challenging to implement for many XR applications. The face and eye scans that XR technologies use for authentication may also be considered “sensitive data” under comprehensive data privacy laws, such as the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) or the Connecticut Data Privacy Act, requiring organizations to provide individuals opt-out rights, including the right to opt out of data sales and other transfers.

Most XR authentication technologies employ live capture of biometrics. Iris, face, or hand scans are captured in real-time when an individual first enrolls, and subsequent scans are likewise captured in real-time when the individual authenticates their identity to the device or app. These scenarios are typically covered by biometrics laws as described above. However, there is some uncertainty regarding biometric laws’ application to XR devices that create a biometric template from non-real-time photos, videos, and audio recordings. Most biometric and comprehensive privacy laws exclude photos, videos, and audio recordings from the scope of “biometric data” to varying degrees (with the exception of CUBI and the CPRA). Utah and Virginia’s comprehensive privacy laws, for example, broadly exempt photographs “or any data generated therefrom” from coverage, making their biometric regulations perhaps less likely to apply to photographic scanning. But case law under BIPA shows that these provisions may not exclude “biometric templates” derived from non-real-time photos, videos, or audio recordings. In Shutterfly v Monroe, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that narrowly reading “biometric identifier” only to mean real-time scans would swallow the intent of the law, thus photographic scanning to create “templates” were still within scope. Laws like the Connecticut Data Privacy Act (CTDPA) and the final rules for the Colorado Privacy Act (CPA) that do not exclude photos or data generated from these sources if an entity uses them for identification purposes, or CUBI, which contains no exemptions for photographs at all, are likely to follow this analysis. The FTC’s conception of biometric information similarly and explicitly encompasses photos, videos, audio recordings, and certain data derived from these sources, making it likely that most regulators will still consider “biometric templates” created from photographic scanning subject to applicable biometric regulations.

B. Laws with Broad Definitions of Biometrics May Apply to Systems that Use Face Detection, as Seen in Emerging Case Law from Illinois Regarding Virtual Try-On XR Applications

Despite most laws’ goal to regulate biometric data that is uniquely identifying, several statutes’ text can be interpreted to apply to biometric technologies that merely distinguish a face from other objects or analyze facial characteristics, without identifying a particular individual. Depending on a privacy law’s definition of “biometric data,” courts may hold that the term regulates technologies that utilize data derived from an individual’s face, eyes, or voice even when they are not used for identification purposes. In XR, devices may use inward-facing cameras to conduct facial analysis for non-identification purposes, such as rendering expressive avatars. Augmented reality (AR) products like “virtual try-on” may also use facial analysis for people to visualize how different products – like eyeglasses – might look on them. Like many other XR applications, VTO primarily uses facial scans to detect and correctly align the product with an individual’s physical features, rather than for identification purposes.

Some laws with broad definitions can apply to these non-identification technologies unless a specific exception applies. CUBI does not require “biometric identifiers” to uniquely identify an individual, which has prompted the Texas Attorney General to claim that CUBI applies to the capture of face geometry regardless of whether an entity uses these facial maps for individual identification. The FTC’s conception of biometric technologies also broadly encompasses “all technologies that use or purport to use biometric information for any purpose.” But most notably, BIPA is complex because its definition of “biometric identifiers” does not explicitly require that the data be used for identification (in contrast to the statute’s definition of “biometric information,” which does require identification). As a result, Illinois courts have largely found that any facial scan may create a “biometric identifier,” such as with doorbell cameras, photo grouping, and Snapchat filters. This is true even when that technology’s facial scan feature was not used to identify the individual in the photo or video frame.

Recent BIPA lawsuits brought against companies that offer (VTO) illustrate how broad biometric laws might apply to XR devices that use facial analysis. In Theriot v. Louis Vuitton North America, Inc., a federal court permitted BIPA claims to proceed against Louis Vuitton’s VTO sunglasses application, finding that the technology’s use of facial scans was analogous to BIPA case law holding that face scans derived from photographs constitute biometric identifiers. Other VTO cases have had similar outcomes. Only VTO technology used for healthcare-related purposes, such as trying on prescription eyeglasses, have been found by courts to be outside the scope of BIPA. But this result did not rest on BIPA’s overall definition of biometric data, but rather arose from a narrow exception for “information captured from a patient in a health care setting.” So BIPA may not apply to medical providers’ use of XR apps or other immersive technologies, such as brain computer interfaces (BCIs), for diagnostic purposes, but BIPA’s coverage of non-identifying, non-medical uses remains a source of substantial confusion. This confusion undermines individuals’ understanding of their privacy rights and presents liability risks for organizations.

C. Organizations May Reduce their Liability Risk by Minimizing Collection of Identifying Data or Processing Biometric Data on Individuals’ Devices

Some organizations have taken steps to limit their liability risks by minimizing the collection of identifying data or processing biometric data on individuals’ devices. Case law suggests that some facial detection technologies fall outside the scope of BIPA and other biometric regulations if (1) there is no mechanism for the technology to retain facial scans or link scans to a user’s individual identity or account; and/or (2) all of the data is stored on-device.

First, in Daichendt and Odell v. CVS Pharmacy, the Northern District of Illinois dismissed a case against CVS for its passport photosystem, which scans facial geometry in photos to confirm that they meet government requirements for passports (e.g., a person’s eyes are open, their mouth is closed and not smiling, and eyeglasses are not present). The court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege that CVS’ photosystem enabled CVS to determine their identities, nor did the plaintiffs provide CVS “with any information, such as their names or physical or email addresses, that could connect the voluntary scans of face geometry with their identities.”

Separately, in Apple v. Barnett, the Illinois’ appellate court held that Apple was not subject to BIPA requirements regarding their Face ID on iPhone because the company was not “collecting” or “possessing” users’ biometric data since the data was completely stored on the device and never stored on Apple servers. Thus, XR devices that do not retain facial scans that can link to users’ accounts, or only store data on-device (such as Apple’s recently announced Vision Pro) may be out of scope of even some of the broadest biometrics laws.

D. Eye-tracking and Voice Analysis May Also be Considered “Biometric” if the Technology and Data are Capable of Identifying an Individual

In addition to face-based biometric technologies, most XR devices also use other forms of body-based detection or characterization systems for device functionality, such as voice analysis and eye-tracking. As seen with facial detection, these features are developed to detect or create predictions regarding bodily characteristics or behavior, but the subject is typically not identifiable and PII is typically not retained. For example, XR devices often contain microphones to capture a user’s voice and surroundings, which can enable voice commands, verbal interactions with other users, spatial mapping, and realistic sound effects. XR devices may also maintain inward-facing cameras that collect data about a user’s gaze—where they look and for how long—to enable eye tracking. This may be used to improve graphics and allow for more expressive avatars, including avatars that can display microexpressions.

Whether these systems that collect voice or gaze data are covered by biometric or comprehensive data privacy laws may depend on whether an organization can use the technology to identify an individual, even if not used in that capacity. As seen in CVS Pharmacy, many Illinois courts focus on the capacity of the technology to identify an individual. As an initial matter, biometric and comprehensive privacy laws typically apply to “voiceprints,” and not voice recordings. As stated by the Illinois Attorney General, “a voiceprint, which is a record of mechanical measurement, is not the same as a simple recording of a voice.”

However, the line between a voice recording and a voiceprint is blurry, particularly as it relates to the gray area of natural language processing (NLP)—a kind of artificial intelligence (AI) that can use audio to understand, interpret, and manipulate language. In Carpenter v. McDonald’s Corp., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that McDonald’s drive-through voice assistant technology could be used for identification purposes, and thus could be considered a “voiceprint” under BIPA, since the technology’s patent application states that the technology may capture voice characteristics “like accent, speech pattern, gender, or age for the purpose of training the AI.” In a similar ongoing case against Petco, an Illinois federal judge permitted BIPA claims to proceed regarding employee voice data, stating “[w]hat matters [at the dismissal stage] is not how defendant’s software actually used plaintiffs’ data, but whether the data that Petco gathered was capable of identifying [the employees].” As a result, if an XR device captures vocal characteristics that are capable of unique identification, certain voice data may be considered a “voiceprint” under BIPA. This analytical framework will likely apply to jurisdictions that define biometric data to include biological characteristics that have the potential to identify an individual, such as in the final rules under the Colorado Privacy Act regarding biometric identifiers, or under the FTC’s Policy Statement on Biometric Information.

Whether privacy laws apply to gaze data, however, is even less clear. BIPA lawsuits against online exam proctoring services, autonomous vehicles, and “smart advertising screens” suggest that eye-tracking could be a biometric identifier under BIPA, even if not used for identification. In each of these cases, the technology conducted eye-tracking to determine where a user was looking—whether on the screen, the road, or in the store—but did not identify the individual. Instead, these technologies made inferences about whether someone may be cheating, not paying attention to the road, or what product they were looking at. Plaintiffs in these cases argue that eye-tracking is part of the technology’s collection and analysis of facial geometry, thus making it a “biometric identifier” under BIPA.

Unfortunately, state and federal courts in Illinois have not analyzed whether and to what extent eye tracking, without additional face analysis, constitutes a biometric identifier, nor whether it is a subset of facial analysis. Rather, most cases proceed based solely on the software’s overall facial analysis features, if at all. If courts are prone to equate facial detection scans to “facial geometry,” and voice analysis to “voiceprints,” they may also conflate eye tracking with “a retina or iris scan,” and thus treat eye tracking as a biometric identifier. Or they may follow the BIPA plaintiffs’ analysis, lumping eye-tracking into facial analysis as “facial geometry.” Alternatively, courts could characterize eye tracking as altogether separate from BIPA’s “facial geometry” and “retina or iris scan” categories. In any event, like with voice analysis, if an XR device collects gaze data that could be used for identification purposes, laws with broad biometrics definitions will apply, while other laws that have narrower definitions focused on the data or technology’s current use, may exclude the technology.

Takeaways

Statutory language and court opinions vary in how they define and/or apply to biometric data and identifiers. Though the plain text of most U.S. biometric and comprehensive data privacy laws tie their definition of a “biometric” to the identification of an individual, some laws may be more broadly applied to technologies that use body-based data for non-identification purposes. While most of the body-based data XR collects is not used for identification, litigation brought under BIPA and other state laws suggest that lawmakers and judges may consider certain kinds and uses of such data—for example, AR “facial scans,” eye tracking, and voice— to be biometrics. Whether this will be the case (or continue to be the case) depends on how policymakers draft these laws, and how courts, enforcement bodies, and other parties to litigation interpret statutes regulating biometrics.

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