In late July 2024, we detected a series of ongoing targeted cyberattacks on dozens of computers at Russian government organizations and IT companies. The threat actors infected devices using phishing emails with malicious shortcut attachments. These shortcuts were used to deliver malware that received commands via the Dropbox cloud service. Attackers used this malware to download additional payloads onto infected computers, in particular tools used by the APT31 group and an updated CloudSorcerer backdoor. We dubbed this campaign EastWind.

Below are the most interesting facts about the implants used in this campaign:

• The malware downloaded by the attackers from Dropbox has been used by APT31 since at least 2021. We named it GrewApacha.
• The attackers updated the The CloudSorcerer backdoor (described by us in early July 2024) ) after we published our blogpost. It currently uses LiveJournal (a social network popular in Russia) and Quora profiles as initial C2 servers.
• The attacks additionally deploy a previously unknown implant with a classic backdoor functionality, which we dubbed PlugY. It is loaded via the CloudSorcerer backdoor, and its command set is quite extensive. It supports three different protocols for communicating with C2, and what’s more, its code resembles that of the DRBControl backdoor (aka Clambling), which several companies attribute to the APT27 group.

Technical information

As mentioned above, the attackers used spear phishing to gain an initial foothold into the organizations. They sent malicious emails with attached RAR archives to target organizational email addresses. These archives had the following names:

• инициативная группа из Черниговского района Приморского края.rar (translates as advocacy group from Chernigov district of Primorsky Krai.rar)
• вх.rar

They contained the following files:

• .con folder, which contained:
  
  • 1.docx, a legitimate decoy document
  • desktop.exe, a legitimate file
  • VERSION.dll, a malicious file

  
  

• A malicious shortcut with a name similar to that of the archive.

When clicked on, the shortcut executed the following command:
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c .con\1.docx & echo F | move .con\doc %public%\Downloads\desktop.exe & move .con\docs %public%\Downloads\VERSION.dll & start /b %public%\Downloads\desktop.exe && exit
This command opens the document contained in the archive, copies the files desktop.exe and VERSION.dll to the C:\Users\Public\Downloads folder, and then launches the desktop.exe file.

Note the use of a similar infection method in an attack on a US organization that involved use of the CloudSorcerer backdoor, reported by Proofpoint in July 2024:

Contents of the malicious archive used in the attack on a US organization

VERSION.dll – a backdoor that uses Dropbox

The attackers use classic DLL sideloading to load the malicious library VERSION.dll into the desktop.exe process:

This library is a backdoor packed using the VMProtect tool. When started, it attempts to contact Dropbox using a hardcoded authentication token. Once connected to the Dropbox cloud, the backdoor reads commands to be executed from the file <computer name>/a.psd contained in the storage. The backdoor supports a total of five commands, named as follows:

• DIR
• EXEC
• SLEEP
• UPLOAD
• DOWNLOAD

The results of running these commands are uploaded to the file <computer name>/b.psd that is stored in the cloud..

GrewApacha: a RAT used by APT31 since 2021

The threat actors used the above backdoor to collect information about infected computers and install additional malware on them. On one of these computers, we observed the download of the following files to the directory C:\ProgramData\USOShared\Logs\User:

• msedgeupdate.exe, a legitimate executable file signed by Microsoft
• msedgeupdate.dll, a malicious library
• wd, a file with an encrypted payload

When the attackers launched msedgeupdate.exe, the malicious library msedgeupdate.dll was loaded into its process by means of DLL sideloading:

While this set of three files resembles the “sideloading triad” that is typical of attacks involving PlugXanalysis of these files revealed that the malware inside them is a RAT of the APT31 group, already described in 2021 and 2023. We dubbed this RAT ‘GrewApacha’.

The behavior of the loader (msedgeupdate.dll) hasn’t changed since the 2023 post was published. As before, it decrypts the payload stored on the drive using the XOR key 13 18 4F 29 0F, and loads it into the dllhost.exe process.

While the GrewApacha loader has not changed since last year, there have been minor differences introduced to the RAT itself. Specifically, the new version now uses two C2 servers instead of one. Through network communications, the cybercriminals first retrieve a webpage with a profile bio on GitHub. This profile contains a string encoded with the Base64 algorithm:

Profile of a user created by the attackers on GitHub

The malware first decodes the string extracted from the GitHub profile, then decrypts it using a single-byte XOR algorithm with the key 0x09, thereby obtaining the address of the main C2 server (for the screenshot above – update.studiokaspersky[.]com).

New version of the CloudSorcerer backdoor

Besides launching the GrewApacha Trojan described above, we found that the attackers also downloaded the CloudSorcerer backdoor onto infected computers. To do that, they downloaded and launched a tool named GetKey.exe that is packed with the VMProtect obfuscator.

The utility receives a four-byte number (the value of the GetTickCount() function at runtime), encrypts it using the CryptProtectData function, and then outputs the number with its ciphertext. The screenshot below shows the code of the tool’s main function:

The attackers used the tool output on their side as a unique key to encrypt the payload file. By handling the encryption with the CryptProtect function, the attackers made it possible to decrypt the payload only on the infected machine.

After running the tool, the attackers downloaded the following files to the infected machine:

• The renamed legitimate application dbgsrv.exe (example name: WinDRMs.exe), signed by Microsoft
• The malicious library dll
• A file with the .ini extension, containing the encrypted payload. The name of this file varied across infected machines.

As in the above case of GrewApacha, this set resembles the “sideloading triad” used in attacks involving PlugX.

IIn most cases, the attackers uploaded files inside a subdirectory of C:\ProgramData, such as C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM. Afterwards, they used the task scheduler to configure the renamed dbgsrv.exe application to launch at OS startup. This involved the schtasks utility (usage example:
schtasks /create /RL HIGHEST /F /tn \Microsoft\Windows\DRM\DRMserver /tr "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\WinDRMs.exe -t run" /sc onstart /RU SYSTEM").
Upon startup of the renamed application, the malicious dbgeng.dll library is loaded into its process, again using DLL sideloading.

This library was programmed to read the previously mentioned .ini file, which contains:

• The ciphertext of a four-byte number generated and encrypted by the GetKey.exe utility
• A PE file compressed with the LZNT1 algorithm and XOR-encrypted using the four-byte number as a key.

Accordingly, the library proceeded to decrypt the four-byte number using the CryptUnprotectData function, use it to decrypt the .ini file, and then load the decrypted file into the memory of the current process.

Analysis of the decrypted .ini files revealed them to be updated versions of the CloudSorcerer backdoor. After we publicly described this backdoor in early July 2024, the attackers modified it: the new version of CloudSorcerer uses profile pages on the Russian-language social network LiveJournal and the Q&A site Quora as the initial C2 servers:

As with past versions of CloudSorcerer, the profile bios contain an encrypted authentication token for interaction with the cloud service.

PlugY: an implant that overlaps with APT27 tools

Having analyzed the behavior of the newly found CloudSorcerer samples, we found that the attackers used it to download a previously unknown implant. This implant connects to the C2 server by one of three methods:

• TCP protocol
• UDP protocol
• Named pipes

The set of commands this implant can handle is quite extensive, and implemented commands range from manipulating files and executing shell commands to logging keystrokes and monitoring the screen or the clipboard.

Analysis of the implant is still ongoing, but we can conclude with a high degree of confidence that the code of the DRBControl (aka Clambling) backdoor was used to develop it. This backdoor was described in 2020 by Trend Micro and Talent-Jump Technologies. Later, Security Joes and Profero linked it to the APT27 group. The backdoor also has similarities to PlugX.

Our comparison of samples of the PlugY implant (MD5 example: faf1f7a32e3f7b08017a9150dccf511d) and the DRBControl backdoor (MD5: 67cfecf2d777f3a3ff1a09752f06a7f5) revealed that these two samples have the exact same architecture. Additionally, many commands in them are implemented almost identically, as evidenced by the screenshots below:

Command code for retrieving information about connected disks in the DRBControl backdoor (left) and the implant (right)

Command code for retrieving information about the active window in the DRBControl backdoor (left) and the implant (right)

Command code for taking screenshots in the DRBControl backdoor (left) and the implant (right)

Thus, the code previously observed in attacks by APT27 was likely used in developing the implant.

While analyzing the PlugY implant we also noticed that it uses a unique malicious library to communicate with the C2 server via UDP. We found the very same library in the DRBControl backdoor, as well as several samples of the PlugX backdoor, which is popular among Chinese-speaking groups. Apart from DRBControl and PlugX, this library has not been detected in any other malware.

Screenshot of the library communicating with the C2 server via UDP

Tips for attack detection

The implants identified during the attack significantly differ from each other. As such, it’s necessary to use a separate set of IoCs for each malware used in any compromise.

The backdoor that uses Dropbox and is delivered via email can be found by looking for relatively large DLL files (> 5 MB) located in the directory C:\Users\Public. Regular access to the Dropbox cloud in network traffic can serve as an additional indicator of this backdoor’s operation.

The GrewApacha Trojan can be detected by searching for an unsigned file named msedgeupdate.dll in the file system. This file also reaches several megabytes in size.
The PlugY implant that is delivered using the CloudSorcerer backdoor launches a process named msiexec.exe for each user signed to the OS, and also creates named pipes with the name template \.\PIPE\Y. The presence of these two indicators in the system is strong evidence of an infection.

Conclusion

In attacks on government organizations, threat actors often use toolkits that implement a wide variety of techniques and tactics. In developing these tools, they go to the greatest lengths possible to hide malicious activity in network traffic. For instance, the attackers behind the EastWind campaign, for instance, used popular network services (GitHub, Dropbox, Quora, LiveJournal and Yandex.Disk) as C2 servers.

Notably, the EastWind campaign bore traces of malware from two different Chinese-speaking groups: APT27 and APT31. This clearly shows that APT groups very often team up, actively sharing knowledge and tools. To successfully counter such collaborations, we closely monitor the techniques and tactics of APT groups operating around the world.

securelist.com/eastwind-apt-ca…

Sometimes a paper in a scientific journal pops up that makes you do a triple-take, case in point being a recent paper by [Aren Boyaci] and [Arindam Banerjee] in Physical Review E titled “Transition to plastic regime for Rayleigh-Taylor instability in soft solids”. The title doesn’t quite do their methodology justice — as the paper describes zipping a container filled with mayonnaise along a figure-eight track to look at the surface transitions. With the paper paywalled and no preprint available, we have to mostly rely the Lehigh University press releases pertaining to the original 2019 paper and this follow-up 2024 one.

Rayleigh-Taylor instability (RTI) is an instability of an interface between two fluids of different densities when the less dense fluid acts up on the more dense fluid. An example of this is water suspended above oil, as well as the expanding mushroom cloud during a explosion or eruption. It also plays a major role in plasma physics, especially as it pertains to nuclear fusion. In the case of inertial confinement fusion (ICF) the rapidly laser-heated pellet of deuterium-tritium fuel will expand, with the boundary interface with the expanding D-T fuel subject to RTI, negatively affecting the ignition efficiency and fusion rate. A simulation of this can be found in a January 2024 research paper by [Y. Y. Lei] et al.

As a fairly chaotic process, RTI is hard to simulate, making a physical model a more ideal research subject. Mayonnaise is definitely among the whackiest ideas here, with other researchers like [Samar Alqatari] et al. as published in Science Advances opting to use a Hele-Shaw cell with dyed glycerol-water mixtures for a less messy and mechanically convoluted experimental contraption.

What’s notable here is that the Lehigh University studies were funded by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), which explains the focus on ICF, as the National Ignition Facility (NIF) is based there.

This also makes the breathless hype about ‘mayo enabling fusion power’ somewhat silly, as ICF is even less likely to lead to net power production, far behind even Z-pinch fusion. That said, a better understanding of RTI is always welcome, even if one has to question the practical benefit of studying it in a container of mayonnaise.

Following the recent US court ruling on Google’s market dominance, Washington may be aligning more closely with the Brussels approach to tech competition regulation, hinting at possible enforcement measures.

euractiv.com/section/competiti…

“Le erbacce devono essere estirpate dalla radice altrimenti non faranno altro che rispuntare da un’altra parte“, questo è il cybercrime.

La prima metà del 2024 ha visto un costante aumento dell’attività dei gruppi di estorsione, nonostante gli sforzi significativi delle forze dell’ordine per reprimerli.

Secondo Unit 42, il numero di nuovi post di compromissione dei dati ha raggiunto 1.762, ovvero una media di 294 post al mese. Questo dato conferma che il livello di minaccia dei ransomware rimane elevato, nonostante le operazioni riuscite che non producono specifiche pubblicazioni

Si distinguono in particolare 6 gruppi, che rappresentano oltre la metà di tutti gli incidenti registrati. Sebbene gruppi BlackCat e LockBit abbiano ridotto la loro attività a causa dell’intervento delle forze dell’ordine, nuovi autori di minacce hanno preso il loro posto.

Tra questi spiccano RansomHub e DragonForce.
Confronto dei 6 principali gruppi di ransomware per (tutto il 2023 e la prima metà del 2024)
I settori più colpiti dagli attacchi sono stati il ​​manifatturiero, la sanità e l’edilizia. Il settore manifatturiero è risultato essere il più vulnerabile, con il 16,4% di tutti gli attacchi, confermando l’importanza del settore per il ransomware.

Anche il settore sanitario, pur essendo altamente suscettibile alle interruzioni, ha subito attacchi significativi, con il 9,6% di tutti gli incidenti segnalati. Al terzo posto si colloca invece il settore edile con il 9,4%
Settori colpiti dal ransomware nella prima metà del 2024
Gli Stati Uniti si sono rivelati il ​​Paese con il maggior numero di vittime di ransomware: il 52% di tutti gli incidenti. Tra i primi dieci paesi più colpiti figurano anche Canada, Regno Unito, Germania, Italia, Francia, Spagna, Brasile, Australia e Belgio.
Paesi in cui le organizzazioni sono state colpite dal ransomware nella prima metà del 2014
Gli analisti sottolineano che il motivo principale dell’aumento dell’attività ransomware nel 2024 è stato il rapido sfruttamento delle vulnerabilità recentemente identificate.

I criminali informatici sfruttano attivamente le opportunità per infiltrarsi nelle reti delle vittime, aumentare i privilegi e spostarsi lateralmente all’interno dei sistemi compromessi.

Nella prima metà del 2024 le forze dell’ordine hanno condotto con successo una serie di operazioni che hanno portato all’arresto di figure chiave e al sequestro delle infrastrutture di alcuni dei gruppi più noti. Tuttavia, nonostante questi sforzi, le minacce continuano ad evolversi.

Nuove fazioni stanno riempiendo il vuoto creato dalla chiusura dei player più anziani, evidenziando la necessità di un monitoraggio e un aggiornamento continui delle misure di difesa.

L'articolo 6 Gruppi Criminali sono i responsabili del 50% degli Attacchi Ransomware proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

Remember when dead batteries were something you’d just toss in the trash? Those days are long gone, thankfully, and rechargeable battery packs have put powerful cordless tools in the palms of our hands. But when those battery packs go bad, replacing them becomes an expensive proposition. And that’s a great excuse to pop a pack open and see what’s happening inside.

The battery pack in question found its way to [Don]’s bench by blinking some error codes and refusing to charge. Popping it open, he found a surprisingly packed PCB on top of the lithium cells, presumably the battery management system judging by the part numbers on some of the chips. There are a lot of test points along with some tempting headers, including one that gave up some serial data when the battery’s test button was pressed. The data isn’t encrypted, but it is somewhat cryptic, and didn’t give [Don] much help. Moving on to the test points, [Don] was able to measure the voltage of each battery in the series string. He also identified test pads that disable individual cells, at least judging by the serial output, which could be diagnostically interesting. [Don]’s reverse engineering work is now focused on the charge controller chip, which he’s looking at through its I2C port. He seems to have done quite a bit of work capturing output and trying to square it with the chip’s datasheet, but he’s having trouble decoding it.

This would be a great place for the Hackaday community to pitch in so he can perhaps get this battery unbricked. We have to admit feeling a wee bit responsible for this, since [Don] reports that it was our article on reverse engineering a cheap security camera that inspired him to dig into this, so we’d love to get him some help.

Nonostante lo scetticismo di alcuni analisti, l’intelligenza artificiale generativa comincia a portare benefici concreti alle imprese. Questa conclusione può essere tratta sulla base dei risultati di uno studio condotto dal Gruppo Nazionale di Ricerca commissionato da Google Cloud.

L’indagine ha coinvolto 2.508 dirigenti senior di varie aziende. I risultati hanno mostrato che il 61% degli intervistati ha già implementato strumenti di intelligenza artificiale generativa nei propri processi produttivi. Tra questi, l’86% ha notato una crescita dei ricavi superiore al 6%.

L’intelligenza artificiale generativa ha ottenuto risultati particolarmente impressionanti nel campo dell’aumento della produttività del lavoro. Il 43% degli intervistati ha riferito che l’intelligenza artificiale ha avuto un impatto significativo sulla produttività dei dipendenti. Quasi la metà stimava che la produttività fosse più che raddoppiata.

L’intelligenza artificiale generativa ha anche aiutato le aziende a espandere le proprie attività. Il 39% dei dirigenti intervistati ha notato un impatto positivo della tecnologia sulla crescita aziendale. Di questi, il 77% ritiene di essere riuscito a migliorare il processo di acquisizione di nuovi clienti.

Migliorare l’esperienza dell’utente è un’altra area in cui l’intelligenza artificiale generativa ha preso il sopravvento. Il 37% degli intervistati ha notato cambiamenti significativi in ​​questo ambito. L’85% di loro ha riscontrato un aumento del coinvolgimento degli utenti: un aumento del traffico, delle percentuali di clic e del tempo trascorso sul sito. Inoltre, l’80% ha notato un aumento della soddisfazione del cliente.

Anche la sicurezza non è stata lasciata incustodita, con l’intelligenza artificiale generativa che mostra risultati promettenti anche in questo settore. Il 56% dei dirigenti ha confermato che la tecnologia ha contribuito a rafforzare la sicurezza delle proprie organizzazioni. La maggior parte di loro (82%) ha notato che è diventato più facile individuare le minacce e il 71% ha segnalato una riduzione dei tempi per risolvere i problemi.

Tuttavia, vale la pena notare che i dati di questo studio differiscono significativamente dalle statistiche dell’US Census Bureau. Secondo l’Ufficio di presidenza, solo il 5,4% delle aziende statunitensi ha utilizzato l’intelligenza artificiale da febbraio. Anche nel settore dell’informazione, dove il tasso di adozione è più elevato, ha raggiunto solo il 18%.

Tuttavia, un sondaggio del National Research Group mostra un crescente interesse delle imprese per l’intelligenza artificiale generativa. Il 47% degli intervistati prevede di utilizzare le tecnologie intelligenti per sviluppare nuovi prodotti e servizi. E il 49% intende sfruttare i vantaggi delle reti neurali per aumentare i profitti.

Le grandi aziende tecnologiche stanno promuovendo attivamente l’intelligenza artificiale generativa, cercando di convincere i clienti del suo valore. Ad esempio, il CEO di Amazon Andy Jesse ha affermato che il loro assistente AI per lavorare con il codice chiamato “Q” ha permesso all’azienda di risparmiare 260 milioni di dollari. Tuttavia, questo importo rappresenta meno dell’1% dei guadagni di Amazon per l’anno fiscale 2023.

L'articolo AI Generativa e Business Oggi: Cosa stanno facendo le Aziende? I Numeri del Report di Google Cloud proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

Un team internazionale di ricercatori dell’Università di Tohoku, dell’Università Nazionale di Singapore e dell’Università di Messina in Italia hanno sviluppato un metodo innovativo per convertire l’energia delle onde elettromagnetiche in corrente continua.

La nostra vita quotidiana è piena di onde elettromagnetiche. Gli edifici sono letteralmente pieni di segnali Wi-Fi , connessioni Bluetooth tra telefoni e cuffie wireless, laptop e stampanti. I router wireless emettono energia sotto forma di radiazione di radiofrequenza, che consente la trasmissione dei dati a vari dispositivi.

Gli scienziati hanno proposto di utilizzare l’energia in radiofrequenza in eccesso nell’ambiente per alimentare piccoli gadget. Questo approccio può ridurre significativamente la dipendenza dalle batterie, prolungarne la durata e ridurre l’impatto negativo sull’ambiente. Questa soluzione può essere particolarmente rilevante per le aree remote dove la sostituzione frequente delle batterie è difficile.

In un articolo pubblicato sulla rivista Nature Electronics, i ricercatori spiegano in dettaglio come sono riusciti a migliorare il raddrizzatore tradizionale, aumentando l’efficienza della conversione dell’energia. Un raddrizzatore converte la corrente alternata, in corrente continua, che scorre in una direzione. Questo processo viene eseguito utilizzando vari componenti, principalmente diodi e condensatori.

Le tecnologie esistenti, come il diodo Schottky, hanno avuto difficoltà a convertire l’energia in modo efficiente. Gli scienziati sono riusciti a superare questi problemi sviluppando un raddrizzatore di spin compatto su scala nanometrica (SR). Il dispositivo è in grado di convertire segnali RF wireless ambientali inferiori a -20 dBm in tensione CC.

La sorgente del segnale deve trovarsi nelle immediate vicinanze del dispositivo elettronico. Tuttavia, i ricercatori stanno lavorando attivamente per migliorare la tecnologia. Forse in futuro verrà integrata un’antenna sul chip per migliorare l’efficienza e la compattezza.

Inoltre, gli scienziati stanno sviluppando connessioni serie-parallele per ottimizzare l’impedenza in grandi schiere di raddrizzatori di spin. Per raggiungere questo obiettivo, i progettisti utilizzano interconnessioni su chip per connettere i singoli SR.

Secondo i ricercatori, la tecnologia dei raddrizzatori di spin può essere facilmente integrata nei moduli di raccolta di energia per alimentare dispositivi elettronici e sensori.

Lo studio della tecnologia apre la strada alla creazione di una soluzione energetica autosufficiente e pulita che può aiutare ad affrontare le sfide del futuro.

L'articolo Il tuo Smartphone domani verrà caricato tramite il Wi-Fi proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

Before LCD and LED screens were ubiquitous, there was a time when the cathode ray tube (CRT) was essentially the only game in town. Even into the early 2000s, CRTs were everywhere and continuously getting upgrades, with the last consumer displays even having a semi-flat option. Their size and weight was still a major problem, though, but for a long time they were cutting edge. Wanting to go back to this time with their original Game Boy, [James Channel] went about replacing their Game Boy screen with a CRT.

The CRT itself is salvaged from an old video conferencing system and while it’s never been used before, it wasn’t recently made. To get the proper video inputs for this old display, the Game Boy needed to be converted to LCD first, as some of these modules have video output that can be fed to other displays. Providing the display with power was another challenge, requiring a separate boost converter to get 12V from the Game Boy’s 6V supply. After getting everything wired up a few adjustments needed to be made, and with that the CRT is up and running.

Unfortunately, there was a major speed bump in this process when [James Channel]’s method of automatically switching the display to the CRT let the magic smoke out of the Game Boy’s processor. But he was able to grab a replacement CPU from a Super Game Boy, hack together a case, and fix the problem with the automatic video switcher. Everything now is in working order for a near-perfect retro display upgrade. If you’d like to do this without harming any original hardware, we’ve seen a similar build based on the ESP32 instead.

youtube.com/embed/irHI_2WdQXc?…

Thanks to [Lurch] for the tip!

One of the most sought after substances in the Universe is water – especially in its liquid form – as its presence on a planet makes the presence of life (as we know it) significantly more likely. While there are potentially oceans worth of liquid water on e.g. Jupiter’s moon Europa, for now Mars is significantly easier to explore as evidenced by the many probes which we got onto its surface so far. One of these was the InSight probe, which was capable of a unique feat: looking inside the planet’s crust with its seismometer to perform geophysical measurements. These measurements have now led to the fascinating prospect that liquid water may in fact exist on Mars right now, according to a paper published by [Vashan Wright] and colleagues in PNAS (with easy-read BBC coverage).

InSight’s mission lasted from November 2018 to December 2022 by which time too much dust had collected on its solar panels and communication was lost. During those active years it had used its seismometer (SEIS) to use the vibrations from natural marsquakes and similar to map the internals of the planet. Based on rock physics models and the data gathered by InSight, there is a distinct possibility that significant liquid water may exist in Mars’ mid-crust, meaning at a depth of about 11.5 to 20 km. Most tantalizing here is perhaps that at these depths, enough liquid water may exist today than may have filled Mars’ past oceans.

Since we’re talking about just a single lander with a single instrument in a single location, it would be highly presumptuous to draw strong conclusions, and at these depths we would have no means to access it. Even so, it would offer interesting ideas for future Mars missions, not to mention underground Mars bases.

As battery-to-grid and vehicle-to-home technologies become increasingly mainstream, the potential for repurposing electric vehicle (EV) batteries has grown significantly. No longer just a niche pursuit, using retired EV batteries for home energy storage has become more accessible and appealing, especially as advancements in DIY solutions continue to emerge. Last year, this project by [Dala] showcased how to repurpose Nissan Leaf and Tesla Model 3 battery packs for home energy storage using a LilyGO ESP32, simplifying the process by eliminating the need for battery disassembly.

In the past few months, this project has seen remarkable progress. It now supports over 20 different solar inverter brands and more than 25 EV battery models. The most exciting development, however, is the newly developed method for chaining two EV packs together to create a single large super-battery. This breakthrough enables the combination of, for example, two 100kWh Tesla packs into a massive 200kWh storage system. This new capability offers an accessible and affordable way to build large-scale DIY home powerwalls, providing performance that rivals commercial systems at a fraction of the cost.

With these advancements, the possibilities for creating powerful, cost-effective energy storage solutions have expanded significantly. We do however stress to put safety first at all times.

Hungry for more home powerbanks? We’ve been there before.

youtube.com/embed/skBhH_EwBUE?…

Microsoft Corporation ha riferito che l’Iran sta intensificando i suoi tentativi di interferire nelle prossime elezioni presidenziali americane. Il rapporto, pubblicato il 9 agosto, descrive come gli hacker di stato si stiano preparando a diffondere notizie false e cercando di accedere agli account dei candidati.

Uno degli episodi descritti nel rapporto è un attacco di phishing contro un collaboratore della campagna elettorale di uno dei partiti.

2 mesi fa gli è stata inviata una lettera per conto di un ex consulente il cui account era stato precedentemente compromesso. È stato effettuato anche un tentativo di hackerare l’account di uno degli ex candidati alla presidenza. Microsoft non rivela i nomi degli obiettivi.

In totale, il rapporto menziona le attività di quattro diversi gruppi di hacker, ognuno dei quali opera a modo autonomo. Una campagna di notizie false ha preso di mira entrambi i lati dello scacchiere politico.

Recentemente, uno dei gruppi ha violato le risorse interne della campagna di Trump e ha rubato documenti riservati, incluso un dossier su James David Vance. Inoltre si è verificato un caso di compromissione del conto di un dipendente a livello di governo distrettuale. Secondo gli esperti Microsoft, questo incidente faceva parte di un’operazione più ampia.

Gli analisti di Microsoft notano che la crescente attività degli hacker iraniani riflette la loro tattica caratteristica: iniziare a interferire nelle elezioni più tardi rispetto agli altri attori. Secondo il Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center, gli attacchi informatici dell’Iran sono più mirati a interferire con il processo elettorale stesso piuttosto che a cercare di influenzare le opinioni degli elettori.

Clint Watts, direttore generale del Centro, ha osservato che le azioni degli hacker iraniani possono essere divise in due tipologie. Il primo tipo prevede campagne che mirano a suscitare polemiche e influenzare gli elettori negli stati indecisi con questioni elettorali scottanti. Il secondo tipo di attività si concentra sulla raccolta di informazioni sulle campagne politiche, che possono poi essere utilizzate per affinare le strategie.

Il rapporto menziona che una delle piattaforme di notizie false scoperte da Microsoft si rivolgeva al pubblico liberale e chiamava Donald Trump un “elefante oppioide in un negozio di porcellane”. Un’altra piattaforma, rivolta ai conservatori, si è concentrata sulla riassegnazione di genere e su altre questioni LGBT. Entrambe le piattaforme sono state create da uno dei gruppi iraniani.

Watts ha inoltre sottolineato che un altro gruppo di hacker potrebbe prepararsi ad azioni più estreme. I personaggi politici o le comunità possono dover affrontare minacce e provocazioni. L’obiettivo finale di queste azioni sarà quello di creare caos, minare l’autorità e seminare dubbi sull’integrità delle elezioni.

In precedenza il governo americano aveva già accusato gli iraniani di aver tentato di interferire nelle elezioni. Uno dei più famosi è stato il caso del gruppo di estrema destra Proud Boys: per suo conto gli hacker iraniani hanno inviato lettere agli elettori democratici.

Altri rapporti Microsoft di quest’anno hanno evidenziato anche i tentativi della Cina di utilizzare l’intelligenza artificiale per influenzare le elezioni.

L'articolo Microsoft Avverte: L’Iran Intensifica gli Attacchi Hacker contro le Elezioni Presidenziali USA proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

A StreamDeck is effectively a really cool box full of colorful buttons that activate various things on your PC. They’re fun and cool but they’re also something you can build yourself if you’re so inclined. [Jason] did just that for his sim racing setup, and he included some nifty old-school tech as well.

An ESP32 is at the core of the build, listening to button presses and communicating with the PC. However, the build doesn’t actually use regular buttons. Instead, it uses infrared sensors wired up in a matrix. This was an intentional choice, because [Jason] wanted the device to be reconfigurable with different paper card overlays. There are ways to do this with regular buttons too, but it works particularly well with the infrared technique. Plus, each button also gets a Neopixel allowing its color to be changed to suit different button maps.

What’s really neat is that the button maps change instantly when a different overlay card is inserted. [Jason] achieved this with an extra row of infrared sensors to detect punched holes in the bottom of the overlay cards.

Once upon a time, even building your own keyboard was an uphill battle. Today, it’s easier than ever to whip up fun and unique interface devices that suit your own exact needs. That’s a good thing! Video after the break.

youtube.com/embed/CaWsJdYNwyQ?…

Construction kit toys are cited by many adults as sparking great creativity and engineering talent in their youth. LEGO, Meccano, K’NEX, Lincoln Logs—these are all great commercial options. But what about printing your very own construction kit at home? Meet Stemfie.

Fundamentally, Stemfie isn’t that different from any other construction kit you might have seen before. It has various beams and flat plates that are full of holes so they can be assembled together in various ways. It also uses bolts, spacers, and small plastic nuts that can be tightened using a special hand tool. Think of a mixture between LEGO Technic and Meccano and that will get you in the ballpark. It includes neat motion components too, including gears, wheels, and even a large flat spring!

What can you build with it? Well, as every construction kit toy says, you’re only limited by your imagination! However, if your imagination is especially small, you can just use the Stemfie 3D YouTube channel for inspiration. It features everything from a ping pong ball catapult to a rubber-band driven car. Plus, since it’s all 3D printed, you can simply scale up the parts and build even bigger designs. Like a giant catapult that can hurl entire water jugs. Fun!

We’ve seen other projects in this vein before. One of our favorites is [Ivan Miranda]’s giant 3D printed assembly kit that he uses to build big monster toys.

youtube.com/embed/8AIVcwuRmV4?…

youtube.com/embed/FtJwLNqRd8E?…

I want to introduce you to a project of mine – a portable router build, and with its help, show you how you can build a purpose-built device. You might have seen portable routers for sale, but if you’ve been in the hacking spheres long enough, you might notice there are “coverage gaps”, so to speak. The Pi-hole project is a household staple that keeps being product-ized by shady Kickstarter campaigns, a “mobile hotspot” button is a staple in every self-respecting mobile and desktop OS, and “a reset device for the ISP router” is a whole genre of a hacker project. Sort the projects by “All Time” popularity on Hackaday.io, and near the very top, you will see an OpenVPN &Tor router project – it’s there for a reason, and it got into 2014 Hackaday Prize semifinals for a reason, too.

I own a bunch of devices benefitting from both an Internet connection and also point-to-point connections between them. My internet connection comes sometimes from an LTE uplink, sometimes from an Ethernet cable, and sometimes from an open WiFi network with a portal you need to click through before you can even ping anything. If I want to link my pocket devices into my home network for backups and home automation, I can put a VPN client on my laptop, but a VPN client on my phone kills its battery, and the reasonable way would be to VPN the Internet uplink – somehow, that is a feature I’m not supposed to have, and let’s not even talk about DNSSEC! Whenever I tried to use one of those portable LTE+WiFi[+Ethernet] routers and actively use it for a month or two, I’d encounter serious hardware or firmware bugs – which makes sense, they are a niche product that won’t get as much testing as phones.

I’ve come to hate these little boxes with a passion. By [www.digitalpush.net], CC BY 4.0Solving these problems and implementing my desired features is quite motivational for me – it’s not just that I need my devices to work for me, it’s also that every time I tackle a project like this, I push some cool tech boundaries, find out a number of fun things I can share with you all, and I end up creating yet another device I use to significantly improve my life. What’s more, routers are a sea of proprietary hardware coupled to proprietary software, and it shows. The Pi-hole project is about cutting profit margins, and the Tor network, so you won’t see them on a commercial device. Your Huawei portable router’s battery died? Good luck sourcing a replacement. Router randomly shutting down because of overheating? Either do something and lose your warranty, or send it away for repair for weeks with no guarantee of having it fixed, and stars help you if it’s made by Asus.

Feature Plan

I need a router with an always-on WiFi AP, LTE, Ethernet and an optional WiFi station interface. As for software, I need it to run a lightweight VPN client like Wireguard and route my traffic through it, as well as run a bunch of quality-of-life features – from reasonable static IP allocation and DNS configurability, to captive portal auto-clicking and DNSSEC. The best part about building your hardware is that you can pick your batteries and can choose cells as large as you desire, so it shouldn’t be hard to make it last a day, either.

You also get to pick your own CPU, LTE modem, power management circuits. Thankfully, I have building blocks for most of these, and I’ve discussed them before – let’s talk CPUs first, and next time, go into LTE modem selection.

You might have seen fun boards throughout the last decade – a half-a-GHz CPU, from 64 to 512 MB of external RAM, WiFi and Ethernet interfaces done in hardware, an SPI flash for firmware, a bunch of GPIOs, OpenWRT shipped by default, and no video output interface in sight. You might have bought one for a generic Raspberry Pi grade project, misunderstanding its purpose. It’s a a router CPU board, put into a maker-friendly form-factor – tt will work wonders for routing packets, but it won’t work well for streaming video. I know, because I bought my first board ever with the intention of running mjpg-streamer on it, and as soon as I set it to a reasonable resolution, the CPU went to 100% consumption in a heartbeat.

Perhaps one of the most promising “router CPU” modules to this day. By [Pinguinguy], CC0 1.0There are plenty of boards like this around – the VoCore, the Carambola boards, the BlackSwift boards I keep nostalgically remembering, LinkIt boards, and the Onion Omega modules. Of these, to the best of my knowledge, the Onion Omega 2 is the most up-to-date of them all, so I got one for cheap locally with a breakout – despite their name, they have nothing to do with Tor routing, though I do aim to change that. The Omega-designed breakout is underwhelming in my eyes – they used a powerbank IC to add battery backup functionality, with all the inefficiency and bugs that entails. As you might already know, you literally don’t need to do that.

Still, it ships with OpenWRT, it’s reasonably open, and it’s got everything I need. I started this project in 2018, but thankfully, I picked well – the Onion Omega repositories are active to this day, which means that, to this day, I can resume my project by just reflashing OpenWRT to a newer version; if you don’t do this, you can’t use the repositories meaningfully, which is a large part of the fun!
Want to prototype a project that contains multiple components? Just tape them to a piece of board while you map it out and test things together!
Could you pick something more powerful? Yes, absolutely – a Raspberry Pi would have a beefier CPU for anything I’d want to hack – in fact, many boards today can boast a faster CPU and better peripherals. My hunch, however, is that native WiFi and Ethernet are an important thing to have – I don’t want to go full USB for everything I need, lest I get throttled by the 480 Mbps restriction. Also, I do want to make sure the module I pick is well-suited for the task in aspects I might not even foresee yet, and it just feels right to use a router CPU.

In short, I’m cool with throttling my Internet uplink in some ways, as long as this gives me a bunch of cool features in return; later on, I can do a market review and see if there’s a more suitable board I could integrate, but until then, I see no boards like this. Do you have better CPU board suggestions for a portable router? Drop them in the comments down below.

Choice Outcomes

So, this is what I set out to do – use an Onion Omega as my personal WiFi repeater, for now, without an LTE uplink integrated. I’ve used it as my portable router, in a half-complete configuration, and here’s what I found. First off, the WiFi adapter allows combined STA (station=client) and AP (access point=hotspot) mode – something that might feel like a pretty nifty feature to you, and it did to me. Initially, I thought this would allow me to do WiFi forwarding easily – and it did, but as soon as I leave the house with the router in my backpack and the STA mode goes inactive, things break.
Test setup, creating an access point with an Ethernet uplink. With two 18650 cells, no LTE enabled, it works for about 20 hours.
Here’s a bug – if you expect an always-on AP and an occasionally active STA, your AP will be regularly glitching out, at least on the Onion Omega, and this is a fundamental problem that might translate into other hardware too. This is because, whenever the STA interface is disconnected, it needs to periodically re-scan the network to see if it needs to reconnect to an AP. Your WiFi radio needs to stop and drop what it’s doing, including any ongoing transmissions, and listen to the aether for a while – switching between different channels while at it. This is very noticeable when doing live audio or video streaming; if you do a local file transfer over the AP’s network and the transfer speed is plotted, there will be visible gaps in the transmission speed.

First lesson – scrutinize cool features like the combined STA+AP modes if you’re actually building a network you want to rely on, especially if you don’t see them – you will notice that many devices don’t come with STA+AP simultaneous connection support out of the box. Sharing an antenna for two different purposes at once feels like an error-prone situation, and if you’re having a connectivity problem, you will want to look into that.

Is the hardware support ideal? No. Is this fun so far? Yes, absolutely, and it gives some cool insights into features you might consider worth building your project around. Does this router beat the performance of a Huawei battery-powered router I used to carry in my pocket? Yep, it already has quite a few important features I always wanted to have, like static IP assignments and an Ethernet port I can use for an uplink. Now, it doesn’t have LTE just yet – let’s talk about that in the next article, showing you how to pick an LTE modem, and what can you do to make the process significantly easier for you.

slowforward.net/2024/08/13/ins…

slowforward

2024-08-13 10:31:16

installance n. : # 0189type : asemic square size : ~ cm 6 x 6record : lowres shotadditional notes : abandoneddate : Aug 6th, 2024time : 4:31pmplace : Rome, via Lancianofootnote : ---copyright : (CC) 2024 differx
.

slowforward.net/2024/08/13/ins…

#000000 #0189 #abandoned #asemic #asemicSquare #card #i0189 #installance #installance0189

installance #0189: asemic square

  installance n. : # 0189 type : asemic square size : ~ cm 6 x 6 record : lowres shot additional notes : abandoned date : Aug 6th, 2024 time : 4:31pm place : Rome, via Lanciano footnote : — c…

^slowforward

slowforward.net/2024/08/13/the…

slowforward

2024-08-13 08:01:50

bopsecrets.org/

bopsecrets.org/comics/return.h…

_
e ci sono anche…

Testi in Italiano

(Text in Italian)

Riflessioni preliminari sulla Guerra del Vietnam (Ngo Van, 1968)
Sulle lotte del Terzo Mondo (Ngo Van, 1968)
In questo teatro… (1970)
Ode sull’assenza di vera poesia oggi questo pomeriggio (1970)
Doppia riflessione (1974)
Avviso riguardo la società dominante e coloro che la contestano (1974)
I ciechi e l’elefante (1975)
La società del situazionismo (1976)
La realizzazione e la soppressione della religione (1977)
Lettera aperta al gruppo “Libertaire” di Tokio (1977)
La breccia in Iran (1979)
Banalità (1979)
La guerra e lo spettacolo (1991)
Sul film di René Viénet: Può la dialettica spezzare i mattoni? (1992)
Due saggi critici sul buddismo impegnato (1993 & 1999)
Confessioni di un garbato nemico dello stato (1997):
parte 1
parte 2
parte 3
Corrispondenza sulla questione della religione (1997-2000)
Riformismo y politica elettorale (2002)
Introduzione ai film di Guy Debord (2003)
Risposta ad un liberale del Midwest (2003)
Porta d’ingresso ai vasti domini (Introduzione) (2004)
Comprendere Debord dialetticamente (2005/2010)
Riflessioni sulla sollevazione in Francia (2006)
Documenti della sollevazione anti-CPE in Francia (2006)
Opinioni francofone sull’Ufficio dei Segreti Pubblici (2007-2008)
Ken Knabb, l’Internazionale Situazionista e la controcultura nord-americana (Jean-Pierre Depétris, 2008)
Introduzione al libro di Ngo Van In the Crossfire: Adventures of a Vietnamese Revolutionary (2010)
Nota sullo stalinismo e sul trotskismo (2010)
Il risveglio in America (2011)
Al di là del voto (2012/2016)

slowforward.net/2024/08/13/the…

#000000 #anarchy #archive #bureauOfPublicSecrets #dance #durruti #ffffff #internationalSituationist #KennethRexroth #Situationism #situationistInternational #Situazionismo

the ‘bureau of public secrets’: an astounding (situationist) archive

_ e ci sono anche…

^slowforward

slowforward.net/2024/08/13/the…

slowforward

2024-08-13 07:31:41

bopsecrets.org/rexroth/prelite…

bopsecrets.org/rexroth/prelite…

slowforward.net/2024/08/13/the…

#000000 #anthology #KennethRexroth #poems #poetry #preLiterate

the poetry of pre-literate peoples

 

^slowforward

Gaming laptops often tend towards implementing more desktop-like hardware in the pursuit of pure grunt. But what if you were to simply buy desktop hardware yourself, and build your own gaming laptop? That would be very cool, as [Socket Science] demonstrates for us all.

The project began with lofty goals. The plan wasn’t to build something rough and vaguely laptop-like. [Socket Science] wanted to build something of genuine quality, that for all intents and purposes, looked and worked like a proper commercial-grade laptop. Getting to that point took a full 14 months, but the final results are impressive.

Under the hood lies an AMD Ryzen 5 5600X and a XFX Radeon RX6600, hooked into an ITX motherboard with some low-profile RAM sticks. Those components were paired with a thin keyboard, a touchpad, and a portable gaming monitor. Getting all that into a thin laptop case, even a custom one, was no mean feat. Ports had to be cut down to size, weird ribbon cables had to be employed, and heatsinks and coolers had to be rearranged. To say nothing of all the work to 3D print a case that was strong and actually worked!

The full journey is quite the ride. If you want to go right back to the start, you can find part one here.

We’ve seen some builds along these lines before, but seldom few that get anywhere near this level of fit and finish. Oftentimes, it’s that kind of physical polish that is most difficult to achieve. All we can say is “Bravo!” Oh, and… video after the break.

youtube.com/embed/SfUCBTpOvCE?…

Numerose vulnerabilità nell’utilità di trasferimento dati Quick Share possono essere utilizzate per eseguire attacchi MiTM e inviare file a dispositivi Windows senza il permesso del destinatario, hanno affermato gli specialisti di SafeBreach.

Quick Share è un’utilità di condivisione file P2P disponibile per gli utenti di dispositivi con Android, Chrome e Windows. Ti consente di inviare file a dispositivi compatibili nelle vicinanze, supportando Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, Wi-Fi Direct, WebRTC e NFC.

Sviluppata originariamente per Android con il nome Nearly Share e rilasciata per Windows nel luglio 2023, l’utilità è stata ribattezzata Quick Share nel gennaio 2024 dopo che Google ha unito la sua tecnologia con Quick Share di Samsung. Google sta inoltre collaborando con LG per preinstallare l’utilità su alcuni dispositivi Windows.

Gli specialisti di SafeBreach hanno studiato il protocollo a livello di applicazione utilizzato da Quick Share per trasferire file tra dispositivi e hanno immediatamente scoperto 10 vulnerabilità, inclusi problemi che consentono l’esecuzione di codice remoto in Windows.

I bug rilevati includono due errori di scrittura di file remoti non autorizzati in Quick Share per Windows e Android, nonché otto problemi in Quick Share per Windows relativi alla connessione Wi-Fi forzata, all’attraversamento di directory remote e al Denial of Service (DoS).

Questi errori consentono la scrittura di file sul dispositivo in remoto (senza l’autorizzazione dell’utente), causano l’arresto anomalo, reindirizzano il traffico a un punto di accesso Wi-Fi specifico.
Catena di attacco sviluppata dai ricercatori
Ora tutte le vulnerabilità sono già state corrette con il rilascio della versione 1.0.1724.0 e agli errori rilevati vengono assegnati due identificatori comuni: CVE-2024-38271 (5,9 punti sulla scala CVSS) e CVE-2024-38272 (7,1 punti sulla scala CVSS ) nella scala CVSS.

Secondo SafeBreach, il protocollo di comunicazione Quick Share è “altamente generico, contiene classi astratte e di base, nonché una classe di gestione per ciascun tipo di pacchetto… Inoltre, abbiamo scoperto che funziona in qualsiasi modalità. Pertanto, anche se il dispositivo è configurato per accettare file solo dai contatti dell’utente, possiamo comunque inviargli un file che non richiede conferma”, affermano i ricercatori.

Pertanto, una volta installato, Quick Share crea un’attività pianificata che controlla ogni 15 minuti per vedere se l’applicazione è in esecuzione e la avvia se necessario. Gli esperti hanno utilizzato il CVE-2024-38271 per creare una catena RCE: l’attacco MiTM ha permesso loro di rilevare quando i file eseguibili venivano scaricati tramite il browser, quindi gli esperti hanno sfruttato il problema di path traversal per sovrascrivere il file eseguibile con il proprio file dannoso

Attualmente i ricercatori di SafeBreach hanno già pubblicato informazioni tecniche dettagliate sulle vulnerabilità scoperte e ne hanno anche presentato una presentazione alla recente conferenza DEF CON 32 .

L'articolo Attenzione a Google Quick Share! Delle Vulnerabilità Critiche Consentono RCE proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

Thomas White, uno dei fondatori dell’organizzazione Distributed Denial of Secrets ( DDoSecrets ), ha recentemente rivelato informazioni sul suo passato criminale. Dopo aver scontato una pena detentiva di cinque anni, White ha condiviso i dettagli delle sue attività con 404 Media.

DDoSecrets, che White ha co-fondato con Emma Best nel 2018, è diventata una piattaforma chiave per la pubblicazione di fughe di dati su larga scala, riempiendo la nicchia precedentemente occupata da WikiLeaks. Tuttavia, è stato rivelato che prima di fondare DDoSecrets, White era profondamente coinvolto in attività criminali sul dark web.

Alla fine del 2013, dopo che l’FBI ha chiuso il famigerato mercato della droga Silk Road e arrestato il suo creatore Ross Ulbricht, White ha assunto il ruolo del suo successore. Sotto lo pseudonimo di Dread Pirate Roberts 2.0, lui, insieme all’utente Defcon (in seguito identificato come ex dipendente di SpaceX Blake Bentall), ha lanciatoSilk Road 2.0. L’investigatore della National Crime Agency Paul Choles ha detto che White “era il capo” dell’operazione.

Le attività criminali di White non si limitavano al traffico di droga. È stato arrestato nel novembre 2014 e, quando la polizia ha perquisito il suo appartamento di Liverpool, ha trovato un laptop contenente 464 immagini di categoria A di abusi sui minori, la classificazione più grave. Inoltre, si è scoperto che White aveva discusso con l’amministratore di Silk Road 2.0 l’idea di creare un sito web per pedofili, sostenendo che avrebbero potuto ricavarne dei soldi. Successivamente ha chiarito che le sue parole erano state dette più come un processo di pensiero provocatorio e non riflettevano le sue vere intenzioni.

Nonostante i suoi trascorsi criminali, White ha iniziato a collaborare con Emma Best nel 2015, utilizzando lo pseudonimo di The Cthulhu per vari progetti di archiviazione e fuga di dati. Questa collaborazione ha infine portato alla creazione di DDoSecrets nel 2018, con White che si è occupato degli aspetti tecnici, tra cui la registrazione del dominio e la configurazione del server. Ha detto che le forze dell’ordine e le agenzie di intelligence erano probabilmente a conoscenza del suo coinvolgimento perché il server era inizialmente registrato a suo nome.

Emma Best ha confermato che tutti i membri di DDoSecrets conoscevano il passato di Thomas White. Informazioni al riguardo non sono state rese pubbliche in precedenza per garantire la sicurezza del lavoro del team e per evitare possibili problemi legali per White legati alla sua partecipazione al progetto.

Il caso di White è rimasto soggetto a rigide restrizioni sulla copertura mediatica fino alla sua conclusione. Nel 2019 è stato condannato a cinque anni e quattro mesi di carcere dopo essersi dichiarato colpevole di traffico di droga, riciclaggio di denaro e creazione di immagini indecenti di bambini. Afferma di non aver avuto alcun coinvolgimento diretto nell’operazione DDoSecrets mentre scontava la pena.

L'articolo Il Passato Segreto di Thomas White: Da Criminale del Dark Web a Fondatore di DDoSecrets proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

While CDs were still fighting for market share against cassettes, and gaming consoles were just starting to switch over to CD from cartridge storage, optical media companies were already thinking ahead. Only two years after the introduction of the original PlayStation, the DVD Forum had introduced the DVD-RAM standard: 2.58 GB per side of a disc in a protective caddy. The killer feature? Essentially unlimited re-writeability. In a DVD drive that supports DVD-RAM, they act more like removable hard drive platters. You can even see hard sectors etched into the media at the time of manufacture, giving DVD-RAM its very recognizable pattern.

At the time, floppy drives were still popular, and CD-ROM drives were increasingly available pre-installed in new computers. Having what amounted to a hard drive platter with a total of 5 GB per disc should have been a killer feature for consumers. Magneto-optical drives were still very expensive, and by 1998 were only 1.3 GB in size. DVD-RAM had the same verify-after-write data integrity feature that magneto-optical drives were known for, but with larger capacity, and after the introduction of 4.7 GB size discs, no caddy was required.

So why didn’t DVD-RAM completely take over removable storage? The gigabyte-size MO drives in 2002 sold for about $400 in 2001 (roughly $721 today), whereas the first 4.7 GB DVD-RAM drives sold in 1998 for $500-$800, with blank discs costing $30 for single-sided and $45 for double-sided, which would have been 9.4 GB total per disc. Around the same time, MO discs with 1.3 GB capacity were often around $20-$25, though they varied widely. So we can see the up-front cost for a DVD-RAM drive was higher, with the media cost per megabyte lower.

Another benefit of DVD-RAM over MO drives was the ability to do hard-drive-like fast random seeks and support various filesystems, allowing non-contiguous data. MO drives were typically quite a bit slower, though they had a decent continuous write speed if writing large blocks of data contiguously. Around this same time, devices like the LS-120 and ZIP drive were trying to replace floppy drives, but their relatively small media sizes of 120 MB / 240 MB and 100 MB / 250 MB couldn’t do the same things DVD could do. Despite this, the Iomega ZIP in particular did have some breakthrough success. This was mostly because of the relatively low drive cost, and the price per 100 MB ZIP disk being $10-$15 on average. These were more expensive per MB than DVD-RAM or MO, but with lower overall consumer investment. So it really seems like the up-front drive costs for DVD-RAM kept them from becoming ubiquitous, though reviews at the time showed that those who bought and used the drives loved them and felt they were an economical way to store and transfer data.
A DVD-RAM disc, with its distinct hard sector pattern clearly visible

DVD-RAM, What’s It Good For?

One of the killer apps for DVD-RAM ended up being Personal Video Recorders, or PVRs. The TiVo introduced consumers to the idea of easy, high-quality timeshifting without having to faff about with the timer feature on their VCRs. A DVD-RAM-based PVR could easily record many shows in high quality, play them back instantly, and be used an essentially unlimited number of times. With the purchase of 3-4 DVD-RAM discs, you could easily record and store your favourite TV shows and later transfer them to another medium for long-term storage. Similarly, DVD-RAM drives in handheld camcorders made a lot of sense, but for various reasons, DVD-RW and some tape formats continued to dominate in that field.

For archival and backup purposes, CD-R, DVD-R and even LTO tape drives were still much more popular. Despite write-once optical media being single-use, the much lower media cost and the rapidly falling price of CD and then DVD burners meant they were much more popular. Many consumers didn’t even realize that their newly purchased DVD burner could almost certainly also support DVD-RAM discs. And for audio and video, write-once media made more sense for the vast majority of end users. Though CD-RW and DVD-RW weren’t quite as popular as the write-once media, they remained more popular than DVD-RAM despite lacking the extreme write endurance of DVD-RAM. It’s hard to say definitively why this is the case, though consumer confusion about all the different blank media formats likely played a part. People were already confused enough about the difference between DVD-R and DVD+R!

Of course, we can’t talk about DVD-RAM’s downfall without mentioning USB flash drives. First introduced commercially around 1999 in sizes of 8 MB, by 2002 drives in the 1 GB – 2 GB capacity were available. These were much smaller and lighter than optical media and had very fast read/write speeds (comparatively) — especially with USB 2.0 becoming popular. Their cost and ubiquity were the death knell not only for DVD-RAM as a portable storage format, but also floppies, magneto-optical, ZIP drives, and essentially everything except for CD-R and DVD-R for audio and movie burning, respectively. While USB drives didn’t have the write endurance of DVD-RAM drives, for most users this wasn’t a problem — they were just transferring office documents, pictures, and other files back and forth between computers. If one started to wear out, another could be cheaply purchased.

So in 2024, is there any use for DVD-RAM left? I recently purchased a pack of 6 brand-new, Japanese-made Panasonic DVD-RAM discs to test out with my USB DVD burner. Essentially all DVD drives still support DVD-RAM, though as Technology Connections discovered in his rundown on the format, the drive firmware support for DVD-RAM seems to be slapdash and lacking in many ways. Write speeds are nowhere near what they should be. On my Arch Linux laptop, I couldn’t believe how slow copy speeds were. iostat showed utilization of less than 1% of the available bandwidth, and with the disc constantly speeding up and spinning down, I was seeing speeds way under 50 kB/s most of the time. Considering DVD-RAM discs support up to 3x (4140 kB/s), something was clearly wrong.

I connected the drive to my Windows 10 virtual machine and saw mostly similar speeds, except when writing an ISO to the drive. Because this seems to be a firmware issue, the usefulness of DVD-RAM for doing backups of important files depends entirely on the drive you happen to own. My idea was to back up all my code, schematic, and PCB design files as they are the most valuable files on my laptop. If I can find a decent drive, I might still follow through — but with 128GB USB drives being less than the cost of the 6 DVD-RAM discs I bought, I can’t say it’s economical, more just for the nerd cred.

For over six years now, Kaspersky’s Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) has been sharing quarterly updates on advanced persistent threats (APTs). These summaries draw on our threat intelligence research, offering a representative overview of what we’ve published and discussed in more detail in our private APT reports. They’re designed to highlight the key events and findings that we think people should know about.

In this latest installment, we focus on activities that we observed during Q2 2024.

Readers who would like to learn more about our intelligence reports or request more information about a specific report, are encouraged to contact intelreports@kaspersky.com.

Most notable findings

In March, a backdoor was discovered in XZ, a compression utility integrated into many popular distributions of Linux. The backdoored library
liblzma is used by the OpenSSH server process sshd. OpenSSH is patched to use systemd features on a number of systemd-based distributions, including Ubuntu, Debian and RedHat/Fedora Linux, and therefore depends on this library (Arch Linux and Gentoo are not affected). The code was inserted in February and March 2024, mostly by Jia Cheong Tan – probably a fictitious identity. The likely goal of the attack was to introduce exclusive remote code execution capabilities into the sshd process by targeting the XZ build process, and then to push the backdoored code to major Linux distributions as a part of a large-scale supply-chain attack. The attackers used social engineering to gain prolonged access to the source/development environment, and extended that access by faking human interactions in plain sight to build credibility for introducing the malicious code.
There are two levels at which the backdoor in the
liblzma library was introduced. The source code of the build infrastructure that generated the final packages was tweaked slightly (by adding an extra file, build-to-host.m4) to extract the next stage script that was hidden in a test case file (bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz). The script then extracted a malicious binary component from another test case file (good-large_compressed.lzma) that was linked with the legitimate library during the compilation process to be shipped to Linux repositories. Some of the big vendors ended up shipping the malicious component in beta and experimental builds without realizing it. The compromise of XZ Utils was given the identifier CVE-2024-3094 and a maximum severity score of 10.
The attackers’ initial goal was to successfully hook one of the functions related to RSA key manipulation. In our analysis of the hook process, we focused on the backdoor’s behavior inside OpenSSH, specifically OpenSSH portable version 9.7p1 (the most recent version). Our analysis revealed a number of interesting details about the functionality of the backdoor.

• The attacker set an anti-replay feature to make sure the backdoor communication couldn’t be captured or hijacked.
• The author hid the public key for backdoor decryption in the x86 code using a custom steganography technique.
• The backdoor hooks the logging function to hide its logs of unauthorized connections to the SSH server.
• The backdoor hooks the password authentication function, which allows the attacker to use any username/password to log in to the infected server without any further checks. It also does the same for public key authentication.
• The backdoor has remote code execution capabilities, which means the attacker can run any system command on the infected server.

You can read our analysis here, here and here.

Chinese-speaking activity

In an earlier report on ToddyCat, we described various tools used to collect and exfiltrate files of interest to this APT threat actor. One of these tools was PcExter, which was initially only used to exfiltrate data previously collected with the help of other tools, such as FileScan. However, we recently found a new version, PcExter 2.0, which has been completely redesigned and rewritten in .NET to be able to collect the data itself, as well as use an improved file search mechanism. We found several versions of this tool, together with a set of special loaders.

In 2021, we published a private report describing the technical details of QSC, a framework that was discovered while investigating an attack on the telecoms industry in South Asia. While our research did not reveal how the framework was deployed, or the threat group behind it, we continued to monitor our telemetry for further detections of the QSC framework. In October 2023, we saw multiple detections of QSC framework files in the West Asia region targeting an ISP. Our investigation revealed that the target machines had already been infected with Quarian Backdoor version 3 (aka Turian) since 2022, and the same attackers used this access to deploy the QSC framework starting from October 10, 2023. In addition to the QSC framework, the attackers also deployed a new backdoor written in Golang, which we named “GoClient”: we saw the first deployment of this GoClient backdoor on October 17, 2023. After analyzing all the artifacts from this campaign, we assess with medium confidence that the CloudComputating threat actor is behind the deployment of the QSC framework and the GoClient backdoor.

Early in 2023, the activities of GOFFEE were discovered when this threat actor used a modified version of a monitored malicious IIS module called Owowa. Since then, GOFFEE has stopped using Owowa, as well as a PowerShell RCE implant VisualTaskel; however, it has continued to conduct intrusions leveraging PowerTaskel, the threat actor’s previous HTA-based infection chain, and has added a new loader, disguised as a legitimate document and distributed via email, to its arsenal.

We recently found a new remote access tool (RAT) with a low detection rate called SalmonQT that was uploaded from a computer in China to a public multi-scanner platform. What caught our attention was that the sample used GitHub’s REST API to accept instructions and upload data, thereby acting as a C2 (command and control) server. At first glance, it appeared that the path to the GitHub repository had been deleted, but on closer inspection, the repository was set to private and the REST API could only be accessed using the correct token. The C2 server was active from early January 2024 up to the completion of our report at the end of June this year. We attribute this newly discovered RAT with low confidence to the threat actor CNC. CNC (aka APT-C-48) is highly focused on Chinese entities.

Middle East

Gaza Cybergang has been active since at least 2012, targeting the Middle East and North Africa. When we first started tracking the group, its attacks were relatively basic in nature, often relying on publicly available malware families such as QuasarRAT. Nevertheless, the group exhibited a particular TTP that we can still see today – going after only a few targets per campaign. At the start of this year we detected several cases involving Gaza Cybergang in which the threat actor adjusted its TTPs slightly. Instead of using
tabcal.exe as a vehicle to sideload its initial access downloader IronWind, the group switched to setup_wm.exe, another legitimate Windows Media Utility file. The lures were also changed to a more generic theme, rather than focusing on a specific geopolitical situation.

Southeast Asia and Korean Peninsula

We discovered Mysterious Elephant in 2023 while investigating attacks using a set of malware families previously associated with other known threat actors, such as SideWinder and Confucius. As we analyzed the infrastructure, we realized that the attacks were not in fact delivered by any of the previously known actors, but by a new threat actor that we dubbed Mysterious Elephant. The threat actor has remained active since then and has launched several attacks since our initial report. We have discovered a wealth of new malware families developed and used by Mysterious Elephant in its recent attacks, as well as recently created infrastructure and updated tools – mostly backdoors and loaders to minimize detection in the early stages of attacks. In our report, we describe the latest attacks delivered by this threat actor and analyze the newly discovered malware samples and associated infrastructure.

Hacktivism

With the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in February 2022, hundreds of different hacktivist groups have emerged on both sides. One such group is -=Twelve=-. This group announced itself in the information sphere by claiming to have hacked various government and industrial enterprises of the Russian Federation. Some of the targets were published on the group’s official channel on its own platform, while others remained in the shadows. While there are several reports on the internet about the Twelve group from various CTI (Cyber Threat Intelligence) vendors that attempt to describe the group’s activities, we have not seen any that detail the tools and techniques used in the attacks. Our report on Twelve provides a detailed overview of the TTPs used by the group, as well as the connections to its infrastructure.

In February, the Institute of Geography and Statistics of Albania (INSTAT) was attacked. The attack was the work of Homeland Justice – a self-described hacktivist group, but suspected of being a state sponsored group – that has been relentlessly attacking Albanian targets, particularly in the government sector, for over three years. The attackers were able to obtain more than 100TB of data, as well as disrupt the official websites and email services of organizations and wipe database servers and backups. One of the main reasons for the attacks is the presence of a Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK) refugee camp on Albanian territory: Homeland Justice considers this group to be a terrorist organization and believes that specific sectors of the Albanian government and certain companies provide them with support and funding. The threat actor conducts ongoing cyber operations aimed at conveying its anti-MEK political message. They are attempting to garner support among the Albanian people for the government to abandon the MEK – their actions are framed within what are known as psychological operations (PsyOps) campaigns.

We have analyzed the group’s campaign history, which spans almost three years of cyberattacks aimed at exerting long-term pressure on the Albanian government and populace. In our report, we cover its main campaigns, ranging from sophisticated operations involving collaboration with allied groups with the same aims, to opportunistic attacks. We also describe the main techniques employed by the group, which range from exploiting internet-facing servers for initial access, lateral movement activities, expanding the attack surface, to using custom wiping malware and ransomware in the final disruptive phase of the cyber operations. Additionally, we examine the group’s persuasion mechanisms, such as amplifying messaging through social networks and news media, sharing stolen data to gain notoriety and advocate for change, and the continual threat of future attacks to induce a state of permanent vigilance among its targets.

Other interesting discoveries

We discovered a new modular malware framework, which we dubbed “Aniseed Vodka”, on a system in East Africa: the system was infected in 2018. The framework consists of a main module, a JSON-formatted configuration file, and a set of plug-ins. The framework is highly configurable, allowing its operator both to specify operating parameters for plug-ins and to schedule plug-in tasks (such as screen capture, webcam capture, and data exfiltration) at specific intervals. The framework employs anti-detection and anti-forensics techniques, enabling it to operate covertly. It uses non-traditional communication channels to evade network detection, using Google Chat as a C2 channel, Gmail to send alerts and Google Drive as an exfiltration channel. The framework we presented in our report is, as far as we know, not publicly known. We have not been able to tie this framework to an existing threat actor.

Our previous report on DinodasRAT showed a wealth of overlaps in features between the Linux backdoor version and its Windows counterpart, as well as additional Linux-specific functionalities such as persistence through systemd or SystemV. In recent months, we were able to collect more relevant samples, giving us a deeper insight into the Linux variant. There are indications that it has been used in campaigns dating back to 2021. Previously identified as XDealer, an ongoing APT campaign using the Windows version of this threat was disclosed by ESET and named “Operation Jacana”. DinodasRAT was also used in a recent APT campaign, which included both its Windows and Linux versions, as described by Trend Micro. In our latest report on the Linux variant of DinodasRAT, we focus on the network communication with the C2 and the operations performed by the malware on the infected machine, beyond establishing persistence and awaiting C2 commands.

In May 2024, we discovered a new APT targeting Russian government entities. The CloudSorcerer malware is a sophisticated cyber-espionage tool used for stealth monitoring, data collection and exfiltration via Microsoft, Yandex and Dropbox cloud infrastructures. The malware uses cloud resources for its C2 servers, accessing them through APIs using authentication tokens. Additionally, CloudSorcerer uses GitHub as its initial C2 server. CloudSorcerer’s modus operandi of is reminiscent of the CloudWizard APT, which we reported on in 2023. However, the malware code is completely different. We believe that CloudSorcerer is a new threat actor that has adopted a similar method of interacting with public cloud services.

In April, we discovered a previously unknown campaign targeting organizations in Russia, including the government sector, using the Telemos backdoor. The malware is delivered via spear-phishing emails as a ZIP file containing one of two types of dropper – a PE64 executable with an .SCR extension or a Windows Script File with a .WSF extension. These drop and execute a PowerShell-based script with backdoor functionality. We found several malicious samples associated with these attacks and were able to restore the original source code. The main purpose of this threat is espionage – collecting data from browsers such as login credentials, cookies and browsing history, as well as collecting files of interest from available drives on the affected system. The operation cannot be tied to a known threat actor at this point.

Final thoughts

While some threat actors’ TTPs remain the same, such as a heavy reliance on social engineering to gain entry to a target organization or compromising an individual’s device, others have updated their toolsets and broadened the scope of their activities. Our regular quarterly reports are designed to highlight the most significant developments related to APT groups.

Here are the key trends we saw in Q2 2024:

• The key highlight this quarter was the backdooring of the XZ compression utility integrated into many popular Linux distributions – in particular, the use of social engineering to gain persistent access to the development environment.
• This quarter we saw APT campaigns focused on Europe, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and Africa targeting a range of sectors including government, military, telecoms and judicial systems.
• The purpose of most APT activities is cyber-espionage, although some campaigns are driven by financial gain.
• Hacktivist attacks have also been a feature of the threat landscape this quarter. Not all of these attacks are focused on areas of open conflict, as illustrated by the attacks on entities in Albania by the Homeland Justice group.

As always, we would like to point out that our reports are the product of our insight into the threat landscape. However, it is important to remember that while we strive for continuous improvement, there is always the possibility that there are other sophisticated attacks that may go unnoticed.

Disclaimer: when referring to APT groups as Russian-speaking, Chinese-speaking or other-language-speaking, we refer to various artifacts used by the groups (such as malware debugging strings, comments found in scripts, etc.) containing words in these languages, based on the information that we obtained directly or that is otherwise publicly known and widely reported. The use of certain languages does not necessarily indicate a specific geographic relation, but rather points to the languages that the developers behind these APT artifacts use.

securelist.com/apt-trends-repo…