Anyone who was around for the various wars and conflicts of the early 2000s probably recalls the video clips showing guided bombs finding their targets. The black-and-white clips came from TV cameras mounted in the nose of the bomb, and were used by bombardiers to visually guide the warhead to the target — often providing for a level of precision amounting to a choice of “this window or that window?” It was scary stuff, especially when you thought about what was on the other side of the window.

Surprisingly, television-guide munitions aren’t exactly new, as this video on TV-guided glide bombs in WWII indicates. According to [WWII US Bombers], research on TV guidance by the US Army Air Force started in 1943, and consisted of a plywood airframe built around a standard 2000-pound class gravity bomb. The airframe had stubby wings for lift and steerable rudders and elevators for pitch and yaw control. Underneath the warhead was a boxy fairing containing a television camera based on an iconoscope or image orthicon, while all the radio gear rode behind the warhead in the empennage. A B-17 bomber could carry two GB-4s on external hardpoints, with a bulky TV receiver provided for the bombardier to watch the bomb’s terminal glide and make fine adjustments with a joystick.

In testing, the GB-4 performed remarkably well. In an era when a good bombardier was expected to drop a bomb in a circle with a radius of about 1,200′ (365 meters) from the aim point, GB-4 operators were hitting within 200′ (60 meters). With results like that, the USAAF had high hopes for the GB-4, and ordered it into production. Sadly, though, the testing results were not replicated in combat. The USAAF’s 388th Bomber Group dropped a total of six GB-4s against four targets in the European Theater in 1944 with terrible results. The main problem reported was not being able to see the target due to reception problems, leaving the bombardiers to fly blind. In other cases, the bomb’s camera returned a picture but the contrast in the picture was so poor that steering the weapon to the target was impossible. On one unfortunate attack on a steel factory in Duren, Germany, the only building with enough contrast to serve as an aiming point was a church six miles from the target.

The GB-4’s battlefield service was short and inglorious, with most of the 1,200 packages delivered never being used. TV-guided bombs would have to wait for another war, and ironically it would be the postwar boom in consumer electronics and the explosion of TV into popular culture would move the technology along enough to make it possible.

youtube.com/embed/s0eTF8L5vUg?…

hackaday.com/2024/11/14/retrot…

Outdone only by nuclear fusion, the process of nuclear fission releases enormous amounts of energy. The ‘spicy rocks’ that are at the core of both natural and artificial fission reactors are generally composed of uranium-235 (U-235) along with other isotopes that may or may not play a role in the fission process. A very long time ago when the Earth was still very young, the ratio of fissile U-235 to fertile U-238 was sufficiently high that nuclear fission would spontaneously commence, as happened at what is now the Oklo region of Gabon.

Although natural decay of U-235 means that this is unlikely to happen again, we humans have learned to take uranium ore and start a controlled fission process in reactors, beginning in the 1940s. This can be done using natural uranium ore, or with enriched (i.e. higher U-235 levels) uranium. In a standard light-water reactor (LWR) a few percent of U-235 is used up this way, after which fission products, mostly minor actinides, begin to inhibit the fission process, and fresh fuel is inserted.

This spent fuel can then have these contaminants remove to create fresh fuel through reprocessing, but this is only one of the ways we have to extract most of the energy from uranium, thorium, and other actinides like plutonium. Although actinides like uranium and thorium are among the most abundant elements in the Earth’s crust and oceans, there are good reasons to not simply dig up fresh ore to refuel reactors with.

All About The Neutrons

A photo of yellow cake uranium, a solid form of uranium oxide produced from uranium ore. Yellow cake must be processed further before it is made into nuclear fuel. Courtesy of Energy Fuels Inc.
Forming nuclei as heavy as uranium requires something more than the standard nuclei-forming process (s-process) in the average star. An integral part of nuclear astrophysics, the s-process stands for ‘slow’ and refers to the rate of neutron capture of nuclei. Essentially it refers to the number of neutron captures that happen before nuclear decay can occur. The s-process is sufficient to create many of the elements we know from the periodic table heavier than iron (Fe) via various decay chains, with the remaining elements requiring the much higher neutron-density flux of the rapid, or r-process.

The difference between the s- and r-process is quite severe, with the s-process requiring seed nuclei from the proton, or p-process, while the r-process with many orders of magnitude higher neutron capture events can create its own own nuclei and from them the heavy elements such as the actinide series that include americium, plutonium, as well as a range of synthetic elements commonly referred to as the transuranium elements: the transuranics. Within an astrophysical context, however, neutron stars are probably the biggest source of these heavier elements.

Once this proverbial stardust has gone through planet formation, the first multicellular life can evolve into intelligent life over the course of a few million years. After this, said intelligent life can then proceed to dig up uranium ore for use in a nuclear fission reactor.

During the millions of years that humanity took to evolve to this point, however, the fissile U-235 has largely undergone decay already, while the fertile U-238 isotope, whcih can become fissile upon neutron capture, now makes up most of the uranium ore recovered today. This is why for certain types of fission reactors that use slow neutrons the uranium fuel is ‘enriched’, meaning that the amount of U-235 in it is increased from the approximate natural 0.7% to 3 – 5% for use in LWRs.

After the optional enrichment step, fuel fabrication can commence. The typically ceramic fuel pellets are then inserted into a fission reactor and the U-235 is exposed to a neutron source that then kickstarts a nuclear chain reaction.

Reprocessing And Pyroprocessing

Schematic view of PWR fuel assembly (Credit: Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel)
The exposure of fissile isotopes to neutrons results in rapid nuclear decay, along well-known decay chains into a range of different isotopes. Some of these are helpful – like fissile Pu-239 – but minor actinides, Pu-240 as well as other isotopes that are formed inside the ceramic LWR fuel pellets will interfere with the nuclear chain reaction, reducing its efficiency. After replacing such spent fuel with fresh fuel, the spent LWR fuel can then be processed in a number of ways to use up the remaining fissile isotopes, the primary ones being reprocessing and pyroprocessing.

Effectively, the spent LWR fuel isn’t so different from the uranium ore, with the isotopes being separated from the ceramic material rather than the minerals in uranium ore. This process can be performed in a few ways:

• hydrometallurgy – dissolving into an aqueous solution, e.g. PUREX.
• electrometallurg – using electric current.
• pyrometallurgy – smelting the pellets to separate the metal from the mineral.

Of these hydrometallurgy is the oldest method, as well as the one most commonly used. France’s La Hague reprocessing plant processes about 1700 tons of spent fuel per year using the PUREX (plutonium-uranium-extraction) method which uses concentrated nitric acid to assist in separating the uranium and plutonium via solvent extraction steps along which various other isotopes (e.g. neptunium for Pu-238 production) can be separately recovered.

The remaining liquid after PUREX contains about 3% of the original used fuel material, which is generally disposed of as high-level waste with this reprocessing process. The recovered uranium and plutonium is then used together with fresh uranium to create a blend (mixed oxide, or MOX) fuel that can be used in LWRs again. There are a few variations on the basic PUREX process, but they all come with various trade-offs and the necessity for a long and tedious process.

This is where pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) and fast neutron reactors (FNRs) can provide the missing link to fully close the uranium fuel cycle.

Fast Neutrons

Overview of the thermal energy transfer in the Natrium reactor design. (Source: TerraPower)
The PHWR reactor uses so-called ‘heavy water’ (deuterium), which unlike its lighter sibling does not moderate neutrons, thus allowing for a PHWR to also work with fast neutrons. Unlike the slower, thermal neutrons in water-moderated LWRs, this means that these reactors can also use much more of the fertile isotopes in the fuel. An interesting approach here is the direct use of spent LWR fuel in Canadian-designed CANDU PHWRs, called DUPIC. Normally CANDU reactors use either natural or only slightly enriched uranium fuel, using which they can achieve very high burn-up rates.

This DUPIC method does not require any reprocessing, but takes the ceramic fuel and merely puts it into fuel assemblies that work in the CANDU reactor. This and similar approaches are being trialed by South Korea, and China.

Effectively the use of PHWRs is similar to FNRs, which are a popular choice for closing the uranium fuel cycle, including the currently under construction Natrium reactor by TerraPower. By increasing the selection of available neutrons (thermal and fast), FNRs can effectively function as a breeder (turning fertile isotopes into fissile ones) while burning up all fissile isotopes. As this includes minor actinides and transuranics, this means that in an FNR theoretically every single last bit of radioactive fuel can be used, leaving no radioactive waste to handle. Through a constant process of neutron capture within the reactor, the isotopes will rush through their decay chains until finally reaching a state where their nuclear cross-spectrum no longer makes them viable nuclear fuel, or a radiological hazard.

So why is that we don’t fully burn up uranium fuel fully today, but instead usually use a once-through fuel cycle?

It’s The Economy, Silly

Schematic overview of dry cask storage of spent LWR fuel. (Credit: NRC)
One defining characteristic of nuclear fission plants is that the fuel costs end up being practically a rounding error over their operating life. This is defined both by the abundance of uranium ore and the relatively small amounts of it needed by an LWR’s roughly two-yearly refuel cycle. Although countries like France reprocess virtually all of their LWR fuel, this is more a part of their energy independence strategy, even if it has the benefit of minimizing the amount of nuclear waste. While the PUREX process results in high-level waste, this type of waste also decays very rapidly, reaching background levels within a matter of decades.

With the current resurgence in new nuclear construction, uranium commodity prices have also gone up, along with newly (re)opened uranium mines getting a lot of investor interest. Although uranium is incredibly abundant in the soil (with much more dissolved in the oceans), economics says that with more economical ways to close the uranium fuel cycle, reprocessing, reusing and burning up uranium fuel becomes the logical approach.

Before even tapping into fertile isotopes like thorium 232, the uranium we can extract today for energy production should be enough to last us many thousands of years. All because of the neutron flux in stars capturing all this energy, which is a process that continues to this day throughout the Universe.

Featured image: Solar flare on the Sun’s surface. (Credit: NASA)

hackaday.com/2024/11/14/the-li…

L’FBI, la NSA e le agenzie dell’alleanza di intelligence Five Eyes, che unisce le agenzie di intelligence di Australia, Canada, Nuova Zelanda, Stati Uniti e Gran Bretagna, hanno pubblicato un elenco delle 15 vulnerabilità più sfruttate nel 2023. La stragrande maggioranza dei problemi presenti in questo elenco sono ancora sotto attacco attraverso l’utilizzo di exploit 0-day.

“Nel 2023, gli aggressori hanno utilizzato più vulnerabilità zero-day per compromettere le reti aziendali rispetto al 2022, consentendo loro di condurre operazioni informatiche contro obiettivi con priorità più elevata”, scrivono gli autori del documento.

Notano inoltre che la maggior parte delle vulnerabilità 0day più “popolari” nel 2023 sono state inizialmente sfruttate dagli aggressori in attacchi attivi, mentre nel 2022 meno della metà delle vulnerabilità apparteneva a questa categoria.

Il rapporto evidenzia che 12 delle 15 vulnerabilità del nuovo elenco hanno ricevuto correzioni nel 2023. Ciò significa che gli hacker concentrano i loro attacchi specificatamente sui giorni 0, sfruttando le vulnerabilità quando sono già diventate note, ma non sono ancora presenti delle correzioni.

“L’utilità delle vulnerabilità diminuisce nel tempo man mano che sempre più sistemi vengono aggiornati o sostituiti. Gli aggressori beneficiano sempre meno degli exploit 0-day, grazie agli sforzi internazionali degli esperti di sicurezza informatica per ridurre la durata di sfruttamento di un exploit collegato ad una vulnerabilità 0-day”, affermano le forze dell’ordine.

L’elenco delle vulnerabilità più sfruttate nel 2023 è il seguente:

Il leader nella “classificazione” è stato il bug monitorato con il CVE-2023-3519 in NetScaler ADC/Gateway, che consente l’esecuzione di codice remoto su server senza patch. Ricordiamo che l’anno scorso migliaia di server, compresi quelli appartenenti a organizzazioni di infrastrutture critiche statunitensi, sono stati colpiti da attacchi di hacker con questa vulnerabilità.

Le forze dell’ordine raccomandano alle organizzazioni di tutto il mondo di affrontare immediatamente queste vulnerabilità e di implementare sistemi di gestione delle patch per ridurre al minimo i rischi di potenziali attacchi alle loro reti. Dopotutto, lo sfruttamento dei bug elencati nel rapporto continuerà probabilmente anche nel 2025.

L'articolo Ecco a voi i 15 bug più Pericolosi del 2023: L’Elenco Pubblicato dalle Agenzie di Intelligence proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

It’s not much of a secret that Texas’ nearly completely isolated grid is in a bit of a pickle, with generating capacity often being handily outstripped during periods of extreme demand. In a latest bid to fight this problem, smart thermostats are being offered to customers, who will then participate in peak-shaving. The partnership between NRG Energy Inc., Renew Home LLC, and Alphabet Inc. will see about 650,000 of these thermostats distributed to customers.

For customers the incentive would be mostly financial, though the details on the potential cost savings seem scarce. The thermostats would be either a Vivint (an NRG company) or Google Nest branded one, which would be controlled via Google Cloud, allowing for thermostat settings to be changed to reduce the load on the grid. This is expected to save ‘300 MW’ in the first two years, though it’s not clear whether this means ‘continuously’, or intermittent like with a peaker natural gas plant.

Demand curtailment is not a new thing, with it being a big thing among commercial customers in South Korea, as we discussed within the topic of vehicle-to-grid energy storage. Depending on how it is implemented it can make a big difference, but it’ll remain to see how regular consumers take to the idea. It also provides more evidence for reducing grid load being a lot easier than adding grid-level storage, which is becoming an increasingly dire topic as more non-dispatchable solar and wind power is added to the grid.

hackaday.com/2024/11/14/smart-…

Non ho mai usato friendica ma sono pratico con il fediverso sopratutto con mastodon sull'istanza livellosegreto.it

Su mastodon, almeno su quel server, non è possibile scrivere tanto testo, quindi ho deciso di aprire qui un profilo pubblico.

Quello di cui vorrei ogni tanto parlare (preferisco la qualità alla quantità) è ciò che mi appassiona, ovvero:
-opensource e privacy (grapheneos, aosp, fdroid, scelte di vita relative)
-dipendenza dalla tecnologia (approccio alla vita sana e alternative contro le dipendenze tecnologiche, in tutti i sensi possibili)
-musica (ascolto musica da veramente una vita, ho una cultura immensa e vorrei condividerla e ascoltare ciò che propongono di bello gli altri)
-cinema (ne guardo assai poco ma un tempo ero fissato con il cinema asiatico!)
-vita sotto la salute mentale (ero hikikomori e ora vivo con assistenza psichiatria, sarebbe interessante parlarne approfonditamente senza dare informazioni banali)
-altro (non mi viene in mente molto ora ma spero apprezzerete i vari argomenti!!)

Non ho app del fediverso ma faccio tutto via browser quindi, essendo che mi sono appena iscritto, mi ci vorrà un po' per ingranare e crearmi un feed interessante! Spero che comunque sia gradita la mia presenza qui.

Un saluto!

Kaspersky’s Global Research and Analysis Team constantly monitors known and emerging cyberthreats directed at the financial industry, with banks and fintech companies being the most targeted. We also closely follow threats that aim to infiltrate a wider range of industries, namely ransomware families that are financially motivated.

These observations, as part of our Kaspersky Security Bulletin, help us devise predictions about how the financial cyberthreat landscape will change over the year. This report outlines notable attack trends we expect to face, to help businesses and individuals protect from them. Let’s first look into our predictions for 2024 to see how they turned out, explore the key events in the financial cyberthreat landscape during the year, and then try to predict the trends for 2025.

How accurate were the 2024 predictions?

1. Increase in AI-powered cyberattacks

   
   ✅ True

   The prediction that anticipated an upsurge in cyberattacks leveraging machine learning tools turned out to be true. In 2024, we saw cyberattacks boosted by AI emerge not only through emails, manipulated ads, phishing attacks (approximately 21% of phishing emails are now generated by AI) and other content, but also as an effective way to bypass biometric authentication. Machine learning tools allowed criminals to open new accounts using leaked data, impersonating the victims and bypassing security mechanisms used in the KYC (know-your-customer) process, manipulating and changing faces, videos, pictures, etc. Threat actors like Gringo 171 specialized in developing these tools, selling them to any criminal interested in bypassing biometrics authentication. As an example, in one recent case, Brazilian Federal Police arrested criminals who were using AI-powered tools to open bank accounts for money laundering. They opened thousands of accounts, creating fake faces and easily bypassing biometric checking.

2. Fraudulent schemes targeting direct payment systems

   
   ✅ True

   The prediction that cybercriminals would exploit direct payment systems like PIX, FedNow and UPI through clippers and mobile banking Trojans was confirmed. We saw the appearance of GoPIX, a banking Trojan in Brazil targeting the PIX real-time payment system and implementing clipboard monitoring as a way of changing keys and stealing payments. The same technique was used in a Trojan targeting Android devices. Other banking Trojan families already implemented cryptocurrency stealing functionality by targeting the sites directly, or intercepting user clipboard.

   While there haven’t been any major publicly reported fraud cases directly tied to the FedNow system as of October 2024, concerns about the potential for fraud remain high. FedNow, the Federal Reserve’s real-time payment service, allows for instant fund transfers, but its rapid nature can be exploited by fraudsters, especially in the form of authorized push payment (APP) fraud.

   Regarding UPI, the national direct payment system of India, scammers spammed UPI IDs with multiple collect requests. It’s easy to crack a UPI ID as it is generally formed with the user’s mobile number followed by the UPI provider name. Scammers can obtain victims’ phone numbers, as they are widely used in public — for online shopping, in malls, restaurants and so on. Users have been getting many fraudulent money collect and autopay requests from Netflix, Google Pay, etc. in their UPI accounts. In some cases, these are authentic UPI autopay requests initiated by fraudsters from their Netflix accounts, making an unsuspecting user essentially pay for the scammer’s subscription.

   Finally, we have noticed a rise in fake instant payment apps in Latin America, used to carry out different kinds of scams. In this context, cybercriminal groups are developing apps that convincingly mimic monetary transactions, displaying a fake receipt without any real connection to transactional systems, to trick sellers into engaging in illegal or loss-making transactions. These apps are sold on dark web forums to scammers who use them to make fake purchases on behalf of small businesses.

3. Global adoption of Automated Transfer Systems (ATS)

   
   ☑️ Partially true

   The prediction suggested that attacks with mobile ATS will become adopted globally. While mobile banking Trojans using ATS were already a reality, their global adoption is still underway. One of the groups behind the development of a particular malware family using this technique in Brazil was planning to expand their attacks to Europe by launching a test version of the malware. However, before they had a chance to spread out, they were arrested following a Kaspersky notification to the Brazilian police.

   Moreover, with Google continuing to restrict even further the Accessibility permission in newer Android versions, we believe it will be harder for malware in general to apply the ATS trick in future mobile banking Trojan developments, as this needs accessibility settings enabled.

4. Resurgence of the Brazilian banking Trojans

   
   ✅ True

   The prediction that attacks by the Brazilian banking Trojans would become more extensive, and Grandoreiro would gain momentum was confirmed. The Brazilian banking Trojans arose in 2024 as a global threat, targeting many countries and expanding their reach. The most prevalent families in 2024 have been Guildma, Javali, Melcoz, Grandoreiro (the Tetrade group). Other families are Banbra, BestaFera, Bizarro, ChePro, Casbaneiro, Ponteiro, and Coyote. Grandoreiro expanded to target more than 1700 banks in 45 countries, on every continent, and even the arrest of several gang members didn’t stop them. In the top 30 banking Trojan families we detected worldwide, 11 are of Brazilian origin and account for 22% of all detections on our users in 2024 (according to the KSN statistics gathered from January to October 2024).

5. Ransomware target selection

   
   ✅ True

   The prediction suggested that ransomware groups would turn to more targeted, highly selective attacks. In 2024, ransomware groups have intensified their focus on high-value targets, with larger organizations, particularly those whose revenue exceeds $5 billion, continuing to be the primary marks due to a likelihood of extracting higher ransoms from these. This trend aligns with a shift toward targeting of financial services and especially banking institutions, there being a marked increase in attacks. Banks alone accounted for 20% of ransomware incidents in this sector. The average ransom demand rose by $400,000 from 2023 to 2024, underscoring attackers’ pursuit of higher payouts. However, while the most skillful ransomware operators have homed in on high-profile sectors, other groups continue to strike broadly, impacting the government, healthcare, and education sectors. This dual approach drove a 21.5% rise in ransomware incidents from Q1 to Q2 2024 and a year-over-year increase of 4.3% in the first half of the year, suggesting that, despite a selective trend, ransomware still remains a widespread threat across industries.

6. Open-source backdoored packages

   
   ✅ True

   The prediction anticipated a worrying increase in open-source backdoor packages, which we observed to be true. The XZ Backdoor was a major incident affecting Linux distributions when backdoored packages ended up inside popular OSS. We did an extensive analysis of this backdoor here, here and here. Unfortunately, it wasn’t the only one, as we saw many other similar incidents this year.

7. Decrease in 0-days, increase in 1-day exploits

   
   ❌ False

   The prediction that crimeware actors would shift from zero-day to first-day exploits has proven inaccurate for 2024, as recent trends indicate a sustained and even heightened reliance on zero-day vulnerabilities. According to CVE.org, it registered 28,961 vulnerabilities in their catalog in 2023, while January through November 2024, the program registered 29,004, the highest number ever recorded.

   According to the Rapid7 2024 Attack Intelligence Report, the use of zero-day exploits has surged, with 53% of widely exploited CVEs recently beginning as zero-day attacks — a trend observed in two of the last three years. This focus on zero-days has been reinforced by the sophisticated and orchestrated nature of recent attacks, where 23% of widespread threat CVEs have been attributed to high-value zero-day vulnerabilities. The commercial market for zero-day exploits is also booming, with brokers offering significant payouts, such as up to $2 million for iPhone zero-days. In contrast, there is no evidence pointing to a rise in first-day exploit usage among crimeware actors, underlining that zero-day attacks remain a primary tactic in the cybersecurity threat landscape.

8. Exploitation of misconfigured devices and services

   
   ✅ True

   The prediction regarding the exploitation of misconfigured devices and services has proved accurate in 2024, as evidenced by the EMERALDWHALE operation. This global campaign specifically targeted misconfigured Git setups, resulting in the theft of over 15,000 cloud service credentials and unauthorized access to more than 10,000 private repositories. The impact was extensive, compromising various services, including cloud providers and email platforms, which underscores the widespread nature of vulnerabilities relating by misconfiguration. Attackers used private, automated tools to scan, extract, and verify stolen tokens from misconfigured services, significantly expanding their reach and efficiency. This misconfiguration trend also exposed sensitive data stored in configuration files, such as Laravel’s .env files, and highlighted cloud storage vulnerabilities, such as a compromised Amazon S3 bucket containing over a terabyte of sensitive information.

9. Fluid composition of affiliate groups

   
   ✅ True

   The prediction suggesting a more fluid distinction between cybercrime groups has proven accurate. In 2024, the ransomware ecosystem has become increasingly dynamic and adaptable, with affiliates adopting a “multi-platform” approach. Many threat actors are now working with multiple ransomware families simultaneously, allowing them to optimize their operations and mitigate risks associated with relying on a single group. For instance, cybersecurity researchers have observed affiliates actively participating in campaigns for different ransomware families, switching between groups like BlackMatter, and newly emerged ones, such as RansomHub. This strategic approach allows them to maintain a constant stream of attacks by leveraging different ransomware strains depending on the target, potential payout, and current operational status of each RaaS platform. The fragmentation of the ransomware landscape is evident, with the number of groups listing victims rising from 43 to 68 and the emergence of 31 new groups in the past year alone. This decentralization complicates law enforcement efforts, as tracking and containing these groups has become more challenging due to their agile structure and international reach. Smaller groups like Medusa and Cloak are capitalizing on this fluid environment, offering attractive profit-sharing on dark web resources to draw affiliates. For example, Medusa is offering up to 90% profit-sharing to attract affiliates, while Cloak allows affiliates to join without any initial payment. Meanwhile, established platforms continue to evolve their offerings to retain and attract skilled operators.

10. Adoption of less popular / cross-platform languages

    
    ✅ True

    The prediction anticipated that cybercriminals would turn to lesser-known programming languages to evade detection. Multiple threats have emerged from the adoption of fairly new or non-standard programming languages used for malware development. Tooling like KrustyLoader (a loader implant written in Rust), NKAbuse, or even K4Spreader (a loader used by 8220 Gang and written in Golang) has been caught in the wild. Moreover, we saw Trojan spies, banking Trojans and other financially motivated malware developed in Go. These are a clear signal that malware developers make use of these languages not only because of their practicality and easy portability to different OSs, but also because they make analysis a more strenuous task.

11. Emergence of hacktivist groups

    
    ✅ True

    The prediction that saw the rise of hacktivist groups due to global conflicts proved to be true. The hacktivist scene got only bigger and stronger. The presence of new groups in different parts of the world and the increase in surrounding conflicts offer a fertile ground for hacktivism. Currently, groups such as CiberInteligenciaSV, a Salvadoran hacktivist group created in early 2024, can reach up to two or three leaks per day. SiegedSec and GhostSec are two hacktivist groups that are part of an alliance called The Five Families. They continue to attack critical infrastructure, such as ICS/SCADA and GNSS satellite receivers, in various countries, mainly in conflict zones associated with current geopolitical events.

Crimeware predictions for 2025

1. Upsurge in stealer activity

   
   Victims’ information gathered through stealer attacks will lead to an increase in crime: either cybercrime or traditional crime. Lumma, Vidar, RedLine and others will survive disruptive operations by law enforcement, adapt and adopt new techniques. New players among stealer families will appear.

2. Attacks against central banks and open banking initiatives

   
   Central banks are responsible for implementing and running instant payment systems, CBDCs (central bank digital currencies), transferring gigabytes of data among financial entities through open banking initiatives, etc. This will make central banks an interesting target for cybercriminals. Open banking systems rely heavily on APIs to allow the sharing of data. APIs can be vulnerable to abuse, where attackers manipulate API endpoints to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data. We expect the number of attacks targeting central banks and open banking APIs to rise significantly over the year.

3. Increase in supply chain attacks on open-source projects

   
   In the wake of the XZ backdoor incident, the open-source community began to check every commit in OSS projects more thoroughly. This increased vigilance is likely to uncover both new attempts and previously successful backdoors implanted through malicious commits. Furthermore, a high success rate and associated impact increase the popularity of this tactic.

4. New blockchain-based threats

   
   The ever-growing use of blockchain in new technology and the increasing adoption of cryptocurrency as a means of payment makes blockchain-related threats a fertile field. New protocols emerge with a need for a secure and private network based on blockchain and peer-to-peer communications, which eases the distribution and diverse usage of new malware based on these obscure protocols. This comes tied to the increasing use of modern programming languages like Go and Rust, languages that are chosen by these blockchain-based protocols to develop their SDKs, and we expect the trend of using these languages for malware development to continue.

5. Expansion of Chinese-speaking crimeware worldwide

   
   We saw several crimeware families of Chinese origin covertly emerge, targeting users outside their common area of attack, Asia, and switching to users in Europe and LATAM, mainly through Android banking Trojans and phishing campaigns that aim to clone credit cards. But we also saw some advanced attacks such as DinodasRAT. We expect an even more noticeable expansion of Chinese crimeware to other countries and markets as it explores new opportunities and increases the frequency of its attacks.

6. Synthetic data poisoning through ransomware

   
   Ransomware will turn to modifying victims’ data or injecting invalid data into targeted infrastructures, rather than merely encrypting. This “data poisoning” technique will make it more difficult or impossible to recover businesses’ original data assets even after decryption.

7. Quantum-resistant ransomware

   
   Advanced ransomware groups will start using post-quantum cryptography as quantum computing evolves. The encryption techniques used by this “quantum-proof” ransomware will be made to resist decryption attempts from both classical and quantum computers, making it nearly impossible for victims to decrypt their data without having to pay a ransom.

8. Weaponization of regulatory compliance by ransomware attackers

   
   Attackers will examine a targeted company’s regulatory responsibilities and purposefully encrypt or alter data in ways that may result in serious compliance violations. The attackers will then add additional financial and legal pressure to the extortion scheme by threatening to alert regulators if their demands are not met.

9. Ransomware-as-a-service proliferation

   
   The RaaS model will continue to make it easier for cybercriminals to design and execute attacks. Less experienced actors will be able to launch sophisticated attacks with kits as inexpensive as $40, increasing the number of incidents.

10. More AI and machine learning on the defense side

    
    Today, numerous cybersecurity solutions already leverage artificial intelligence to address common vulnerabilities, such as configuration errors, alert handling and more. In the future, we will see AI increasingly adopted in cyberdefense to accelerate anomaly detection, reduce the duration of analysis through predictive capabilities, automate response, and strengthen policies to counter emerging threats. AI will accelerate detection and bolster defenses against evolving threats. This shift is backed by a significant increase in real-time machine learning applications, which are reshaping cyberdefense by enhancing adaptability and reducing manual workloads. As threat actors also turn to AI, the stakes rise for defenders to evolve equally advanced, adaptive strategies.

11. Upsurge in financial cyberattacks targeting smartphones

    
    We see that while the number of attacks on PCs using traditional banking or financial malware is decreasing, financial cyberthreats for smartphones are on the rise: the global number of users who encountered mobile financial threats in 2024 increased twofold (by 102%) compared to 2023. We expect this number to grow further, capturing the attention of both malicious actors and potential victims.

securelist.com/ksb-financial-a…