As the fundamental flaw of today’s quantum computers, improving qubit stability remains the focus of much research in this field. One such stability attempt involves so-called topological quantum computing with the use of anyons, which are two-dimensional quasiparticles. Such an approach has been claimed by Microsoft in a recent paper in Nature. This comes a few years after an earlier claim by Microsoft for much the same feat, which was found to be based on faulty science and hence retracted.

The claimed creation of anyons here involves Majorana fermions, which differ from the much more typical Dirac fermions. These Majorana fermions are bound with other such fermions as a Majorana zero mode (MZM), forming anyons that are intertwined (braided) to form what are in effect logic gates. In theNature paper the Microsoft researchers demonstrate a superconducting indium-arsenide (InAs) nanowire-based device featuring a read-out circuit (quantum dot interferometer) with the capacitance of one of the quantum dots said to vary in a way that suggests that the nanowire device-under-test demonstrates the presence of MZMs at either end of the wire.

Microsoft has a dedicated website to their quantum computing efforts, though it remains essential to stress that this is not a confirmation until their research is replicated by independent researchers. If confirmed, MZMs could provide a way to create more reliable quantum computing circuitry that does not have to lean so heavily on error correction to get any usable output. Other, competing efforts here include such things as hybrid mechanical qubits and antimony-based qubits that should be more stable owing to their eight spin configurations.

hackaday.com/2025/02/20/micros…

Whether it’s a game of D&D or encrypting top-secret information, a wide array of methods are available for generating the needed random numbers with high enough entropy for their use case. For a tabletop game this might be a single die but for more sensitive applications a more robust method of generating random numbers is needed. Programmers might reach for a rand() function of some sort, but these pseudorandom numbers don’t cut the mustard for encryption. For that you’ll need a true random number generator (RNG), and this open-source hardware RNG uses one of the better methods we’ve seen.

The device, called RAVA, is based on a property found in many electronic devices called avalanche breakdown. Avalanche breakdown occurs when a high voltage (in this case approximately 25V) is applied in the reverse bias direction, with this device using a pair of Zener diodes. When this high voltage is applied, an “avalanche” of electrons occurs which allows the diodes conduct in the opposite direction that they would when they are forward biased. This isn’t a constant current flow, though; there are slight variations over time which can be amplified and used as the random number generator. The noise is amplified over a series of op amps and then fed to an ATmega32U4 microcontroller which can provide the user with 136.0 Kbit/s of random data.

Unlike other random number generators, this device is based on a method generally accepted to be truly random. Not only that, but since it’s based on discrete hardware it can be accessed directly for monitoring and replacement in case of faults, unlike other methods which are more “black boxes” and are more opaque in their processes which are thus harder to audit. We also appreciate it’s open-source nature as well, and for some more information on it be sure to check out the paper on it in IEEE. If you’re looking for something to generate random numbers but will also bring some extra flair to the next game night, take a look at this radioactive dice replacement.

hackaday.com/2025/02/20/open-s…

LoRa gear can be great for doing radio communications in a light-weight and low-power way. However, it can also work over great distances if you have the right hardware—and the right antennas in particular. [taste_the_code] has been experimenting in this regard, and whipped up a simple yagi antenna that can work at distances of up to 40 kilometers.

The basic mathematics behind the yagi antenna are well understood. To that end, [taste_the_code] used a simple online calculator to determine the correct dimensions to build a yagi out of 2 mm diameter wire that was tuned for the relevant frequency of 868 MHz. The build uses a 3D-printed boom a handle and holes for inserting each individual wire element in the right spot—with little measuring required once the wires are cut, since the print is dimensionally accurate. It was then just a matter of wiring it up to the right connector to suit the gear.

The antenna was tested with a Reyas RYLR998 module acting as a base station, with the DIY yagi hooked up to a RYLR993 module in the field. In testing, [taste_the_code] was able to communicate reliably from 40 kilometers away.

We’ve featured some other unique LoRa antenna builds before, too. Video after the break.

youtube.com/embed/gA5SCXw_E1Q?…

hackaday.com/2025/02/20/diy-ya…

In 1997 a set of DEC tapes were provided by Dennis Ritchie, as historical artifacts for those interested in the gestation of the UNIX operating system. The resulting archive files have recently been analysed by [Yfeng Gao], who has succeeded in recovering a working UNIX version from 1972. What makes it particularly interesting is that this is not a released version, instead it’s a work in progress sitting somewhere between versions 1 and 2. He’s therefore taken the liberty of naming it “V2 Beta”.

If you happen to have a PDP-11/20 you should be able to run this operating system for yourself, and for those of us without he’s provided information on which emulator will work. The interesting information for us comes in the README accompanying the tapes themselves, and in those accompanying the analysis. Aside from file fragments left over from previous users of the same tape, we learn about the state of UNIX time in 1972. This dates from the period when increments were in sixtieths of a second due to the ease of using the mains power frequency in a PDP, so with a 32-bit counter they were facing imminent roll-over. The 1970-01-01 epoch and one second increments would be adopted later in the year, but meanwhile this is an unusual curio.

If you manage to run this OS, and especially if you find anything further in the files, we’d love to hear. Meanwhile, this is not the oldest UNIX out there.

PDP-11/20 image: Don DeBold, CC BY 2.0.

hackaday.com/2025/02/20/unix-a…

Il ruolo dell’informatica forense nel prevenire e risolvere i reati informatici continua ad evolversi parallelamente alle innovazioni tecnologiche, rendendo sempre più vitale un approccio proattivo nel combattere i crimini informatici.

Inoltre la scienza forense informatica, che ha il principale compito di concentrarsi sul recupero, l’analisi e l’esame delle prove digitali – in procedimenti legali o penali – diventa sempre più vitale per la sicurezza informatica e la sicurezza delle informazioni, per questo gli investigatori forensi cercano di perfezionare ogni giorno le loro strategie concentrandosi su indagini svolte ad esempio sui reati informatici, come: frodi e accessi non autorizzati, il furto di proprietà intellettuale, le violazioni di dati, le analisi dei malware e infine le indagini sul traffico non autorizzato e sul traffico di rete in un attacco web. In tal proposito stanno emergendo nuovi strumentazioni per la bonifica contro Trojan Software Spy particolarmente pericolosi e attacchi Man-in-the-middle, una delle minacce più insidiose in rete, poiché il più delle volte una vittima il più delle volte può non rendersi conto di essere stata presa di mira.

Ultimamente vengono sempre più presi di mira i cellulari: questo consente ai criminali di accedere a dati sensibili, intercettare il traffico e le conversazioni o la posizione di un individuo, o addirittura manipolare i dispositivi.

Abbiamo intervistato al riguardo l’esperto in analisi forense Gabriele Gardella della società G&G Computers Forense, che ci ha illustrato il funzionamento di M2Bridge NEW, un progetto Made in Italy nel settore degli AntiSpy, oltre che le diverse minacce parallelamente ad alcune operazioni preliminari di controllo sul dispositivo per testare se si è stati presi di mira da software dannosi.

M2Bridge NEW: monitorare e analizzare il traffico per rilevare i Trojan Software Spy e proteggere contro le minacce digitali più sofisticate

M2Bridge NEW di G&G Computers Forense è un dispositivo che utilizza la tecnologia di Sniffing – “Man in the Middle” passivo, che consente di monitorare e analizzare il traffico dati di qualsiasi cellulare o tablet, rilevando l’eventuale presenza di Trojan – Software Spy in un dispositivo. Ciò diventa spesso necessario per mettere in sicurezza il dispositivo in una convergenza tra sicurezza informatica e sicurezza fisica.
Immagine: M2Bridge New della società G&G Computers Forense

Software spia: le tipologie di attacco e le vulnerabilità da tenere sotto controllo

Per comprendere quanto siano diffusi i software spia e i pericoli in rete basterebbe leggere uno dei rapporti di Amnesty internationalin cui si evidenzia la scoperta – con prove forensi – di come le autorità serbe abbiano utilizzato alcuni prodotti ( tra cui Cellebrite o NoviSpy) per mettere sotto controllo i telefoni cellulari di attivisti e giornalisti. Tali software sfruttavano una vulnerabilità zero-day nei dispositivi Android, aggirando così le impostazioni di sicurezza. Tale vulnerabilità ha interessato infatti milioni di dispositivi in tutto il mondo che utilizzavano i popolari chipset Qualcomm. Successivamente potremmo anche parlare del caso Paragon. Il cui spyware Graphite è stato utilizzato per colpire almeno 90 persone in due dozzine di Paesi. Anche in questo caso sono stati presi di mira giornalisti investigativi e attivisti. Vicenda che ha suscitato un forte dibattito politico in Italia. Ma il software Trojan Spy non è utilizzato solo per la sorveglianza: i dispositivi cellulari sono un punto di accesso per i criminali informatici per ottenere password e informazioni critiche per poi infiltrarsi nelle reti aziendali. Soprattutto è importante considerare che alcuni di questi software spia finiscono nel mercato nero della Drak Web: ciò è accaduto quando l’accesso al software Pegasus è stato messo in vendita per la cifra esorbitante di 1.500.000$, pubblicizzato da “un canale Telegram di supposta origine russa, noto per essere un punto d’incontro per malintenzionati digitali”.

I Trojan-Spy sono software subdoli che ottengono i privilegi di sistema e possono spiare il modo in cui viene utilizzato un dispositivo prendendone il controllo e persino portandolo al KO, oltre a poter monitorare e manipolare i dati o a catturare schermate o ottenere un elenco delle applicazioni in esecuzione. Le possibilità di spionaggio e intercettazione telefonica di questi software spia sono sorprendentemente invasive: un dispositivo sotto controllo può diventare un vero e proprio localizzatore GPS. Abbiamo chiesto a Gabriele Gradella quali pericoli rappresenti un malware di questo tipo alla luce della crescita dei crimini informatici e quale è il pericolo per l’utente infettato da un Trojan-Spy, oltre ai problemi di privacy.

Gabriele Gardella: L’aumento dei crimini informatici rende i Trojan Software Spy particolarmente pericolosi. Questi software malevoli, subdoli e difficili da individuare, possono compromettere seriamente la tua sicurezza e la tua privacy. Tra i principali pericoli vi sono:

1. Il Furto di dati sensibili come le informazioni personali, i dati aziendali e le conversazioni private. Per quanto riguarda le Informazioni personali, I trojan possono rubare password, dati bancari, numeri di carte di credito, documenti d’identità, indirizzi, numeri di telefono e altre informazioni personali, che possono essere utilizzate per furto d’identità, frodi finanziarie o ricatti. Riguardo ai dati aziendali se il tuo dispositivo infetto è utilizzato per lavoro, i criminali informatici possono accedere a informazioni riservate dell’azienda, come progetti, contratti, dati finanziari o segreti industriali, causando gravi danni economici e reputazionali. Infine per ciò che concerne le conversazioni private i malware possono intercettare chiamate, messaggi, email e altre comunicazioni, violando la tua privacy e ottenendo informazioni che possono essere usate contro di te.
2. Spionaggio e controllo remoto: i trojan possono operare una sorveglianza costante: possono attivare la webcam e il microfono del tuo dispositivo a tua insaputa, permettendo ai criminali informatici di spiarti e ascoltarti in qualsiasi momento. In alcuni casi, i criminali possono prendere il controllo completo del dispositivo consentendo loro di rubare dati, installare altri malware, inviare email o messaggi a tuo nome – con rischi economici e relativi alla reputazione – o compiere altre azioni dannose che possono danneggiare il dispositivo.

Ma come mettersi al riparo?

Gabriele Gardella di G&G Computers Forense ci ha parlato delle varie tipologie di attacco alle quali ognuno di noi può essere vulnerabile.

Oltre al popolare Phishing che ci spinge a scaricare allegati dannosi o malware tramite anche ingegneria sociale, esistono purtroppo “Wi-Fi pubblici non sicuri, che possono esporre il cellulare a rischi di intercettazione dei dati” ha evidenziato Gabriele. Oltre poi alla vulnerabilità dei nostri dispositivi, del loro sistema operativo o delle applicazioni scaricate, che possono compromettere la nostra sicurezza, si aggiungono “SMS e chiamate spam, che possono essere utilizzati per inviare link o allegati dannosi, o per truffare la vittima”, ha aggiunto. Per finire vi sono gli attacchi di “SIM swapping”, tramite i quali il numero di telefono della vittima viene trasferito su una nuova SIM card, quindi controllata dal criminale per accedere a messaggi, chiamate, e-mail e altri dati della vittima. Ultimi ma non meno importanti sono gli “attacchi Man-in-the-Middle (MitM), che consistono nell’intercettare le comunicazioni tra il cellulare e un server, per rubare dati o modificare le informazioni scambiate”.

RHC: Quali sono le operazioni preliminari di controllo sul dispositivo per accorgersi di essere stato preso di mira?

Gabriele Gardella: Prevalentemente ci sono fattori che possono allertare l’utilizzatore come:

• Il rallentamento generale del dispositivo, che è diventato più lento del solito, le app si aprono con difficoltà o si bloccano spesso.
• Un surriscaldamento anomalo: Il telefono si surriscalda anche quando non lo si utilizza intensamente.
• Un consumo eccessivo della batteria: La batteria si scarica molto più rapidamente del solito, anche in modalità standby.

M2 Bridge New: da dove nasce il progetto Made in Italy e quali sono le sue caratteristiche principali

Spesso i Trojan-Spy vengono distribuiti attraverso siti Web e false app e rappresentano un problema serio: rimuoverli immediatamente è una priorità elevata. Qui arriva M2 Bridge New di MgExtreme. Abbiamo chiesto a Gabriele Gardella di raccontarci da dove nasce il progetto e quali evoluzioni ha avuto nel tempo per affrontare i nuovi rischi in materia di sicurezza informatica.

Gabriele Gardella: Il progetto prende vita inizio 2021 da un’idea di Marco Muratori (www.mgextreme.com), ancora non esisteva un apparato hardware il tutto veniva gestito da un pc, a maggio dello stesso anno nasce il primo prototipo nominato M2 Bridge ad agosto un’evoluzione di questo ovvero il prodotto definitivo. Luglio 2024 una data veramente importante, grazie ad esperti collaboratori che coordino e supervisiono e un’accurata ricerca ingegneristica, prende vita M2 Bridge New come lo conosciamo oggi.

E’ importante evidenziare chelL’apparato M2 Bridge New è provvisto di regolare certificazione CE, attestandone la conformità agli standard europei di sicurezza e la piena idoneità all’uso e alla commercializzazione. Tale conformità si estende anche nella validità dei report generati.
Immagine: M2Bridge New, Sniffing (Man in the Middle passivo).
RHC: Gli strumenti investigativi hanno fatto molta strada nella scienza forense digitale e continuano a svolgere un ruolo importante nei casi penali e civili. Come avviene l’analisi e la bonifica di un dispositivo con M2 Bridge New? L’intercettazione del traffico rispetta i parametri privacy utente?

Gabriele Gardella: E’ indispensabile che il proprietario del cellulare si trovi nello stesso ambiente in cui è presente M2 Bridge New; ed è sufficiente che si agganci alla rete Wi-Fi locale che M2 Bridge New andrà a generare e segua le indicazioni dell’operatore. Quindi assicuriamo massima riservatezza e rispetto della privacy, infatti il Cellulare o Tablet da analizzare non viene neppure “toccato dall’operatore”.

In automatico verrà generato un Report (pdf in italiano) il quale produce documentazione certificata ammissibile ed utilizzabile in corso di procedimento legale più un file capture.pcap per utilizzo ed analisi da parte di un operatore specializzato in informatica forense. È possibile analizzare qualsiasi dispositivo con qualunque sistema operativo e l’analisi è estremamente veloce e automatizzata.
Immagine: M2 Bridge New,esempio di un file capture.pcap generato automaticamente

RHC: Rilevando uno spyware su un dispositivo si mette in sicurezza una rete di persone: a vostro parere come M2 Bridge New contribuisce alla sicurezza informatica e come può essere utile per una risposta immediata agli incidenti e per comprendere gli attacchi in corso?

Gabriele Gardella:M2 Bridge New, innovazione nella Sicurezza Informatica, rappresenta un salto qualitativo nel campo della cybersecurity, offrendo una soluzione all’avanguardia per la protezione contro le minacce digitali più sofisticate. Questo sistema intelligente è il risultato di un’approfondita analisi delle tattiche utilizzate dai cyber criminali nelle loro campagne contro istituzioni governative, imprese, organizzazioni della società civile e privati cittadini.

L'articolo Informatica forense e indagini digitali: uno strumento di bonifica Made in Italy contro spyware e attacchi Man-in-the-middle proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

La pazienza mi ha fatto visita
E mi ha ricordato
Che le cose belle richiedono tempo per maturare
E crescono lentamente con stabilità.
La pace mi ha fatto visita
E mi ha ricordato
Che posso rimanere calma attraverso le tempeste della vita,
Indipendentemente dal caos che mi circonda.
La speranza mi ha fatto visita
E mi ha ricordato
Che tempi migliori mi aspettano
E che sarà sempre lì per guidarmi e sollevarmi.
L’umiltà mi ha fatto visita
E mi ha ricordato
Che posso raggiungerla
Non riducendo me stessa o facendomi piccola,
Ma concentrandomi sul servire il mondo
E sull’elevare chi mi sta intorno.
La gentilezza mi ha fatto visita
E mi ha ricordato
Di essere più dolce, indulgente e compassionevole
Verso me stessa
E verso chi mi circonda.
La fiducia mi ha fatto visita
E mi ha ricordato
Di non nascondere o reprimere i miei doni e talenti
Per far sentire gli altri più a loro agio,
Ma di abbracciare ciò che mi rende unica.
La concentrazione mi ha fatto visita
E mi ha ricordato
Che le insicurezze e i giudizi altrui
Non sono un mio problema.
Dovrei reindirizzare la mia attenzione
Dagli altri verso di me.
La libertà mi ha fatto visita
E mi ha ricordato
Che nessuno ha controllo sulla mia mente,
Sui miei pensieri e sul mio benessere,
Se non io stessa.
L’amore mi ha fatto visita
E mi ha ricordato
Che non ho bisogno di cercarlo negli altri,
Perché si trova già dentro di me.

Tahlia Hunter

Mad Men

On the evening of October 4, 1957, Neil McElroy was enjoying cocktails in Huntsville, Alabama, fresh from a doomsday tour of the United States. McElroy, who was about to become the secretary of defense, was chatting with the army general John Medaris and the German rocket scientist Wernher von Braun during a casual reception held as part of McElroy’s tour of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. It was one of many visits the secretary designate and his entourage were making around the country as he prepared to lead the Pentagon.
Huntsville should have been the least memorable stop for McElroy, who had been traveling the past few weeks in a converted DC-6 transport aircraft reserved primarily for the secretary of defense. Along the way, he was plied with fine liquor and deluxe accommodations, all while getting a crash course in overseeing a military at the dawn of the age of nuclear Armageddon.
The new position was a big change for McElroy. His last job was heading Procter & Gamble, the consumer products company based in Cincinnati, Ohio. McElroy, who had no prior experience in government, was one of the “industrialists” Eisenhower had brought to the capital in the belief that business-style leadership could help straighten out government.
The media had not been kind to McElroy after Eisenhower picked him to head the Pentagon. The native Ohioan had made his name in the nascent field of “brand management,” penning a famous letter admonishing Procter & Gamble executives on the importance of promoting the company’s soaps to the proper consumer markets so that the products would not compete with each other. “Soap manufacturer Neil McElroy is president’s choice to succeed Wilson,” The Milwaukee Journal declared on August 7. Another report mocked McElroy’s experience in advertising, saying that he had been responsible for “vital activities in persuading housewives to buy one bar of soap or another.”
Now McElroy and his entourage were being wined and dined across the country by military officials pitching their soon-to-be boss on the importance of their aircraft, missiles, and bases in case of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union—all in between plenty of martinis. At Strategic Air Command, near Omaha, Nebraska, they were greeted with a table covered in whiskey, ice, and “fixings,” before being shown the control room, where military commanders could launch a nuclear attack. Later, General Curtis LeMay, the head of Strategic Air Command, personally piloted a demonstration of the new KC-135, a refueling aircraft, for McElroy and his staff.
At Edwards Air Force Base in the high desert north of Los Angeles, the group met General Bernard Schriever, the head of the Western Development Division, which was responsible for developing intercontinental ballistic missiles. McElroy and his entourage took an immediate liking to the air force general, who was “extremely able” and could “shoot golf at par.” In Colorado, at North American Aerospace Defense Command, better known by its acronym NORAD, the group was assigned luxury suites at the Broadmoor, whose mountainview rooms were stocked with bottles of scotch and bourbon. The next day they were briefed on the calculus of a survivable nuclear war, where commanders had to weigh the lives of three million civilians versus protecting a key military site. It was a world, McElroy’s aide, Oliver Gale, wrote, “where horror is as much a part of the scene as manufacturing cost is in the soap business.” The final stop on McElroy’s itinerary was Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, a quiet southern town in Alabama whose economy was rapidly shifting from cotton mills to rocket production. General Medaris, commander of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, was polite but unimpressed by McElroy. The problem with a businessman is that he can “become a sort of czar, surrounded by subordinates who carry out his orders and obey his whims without daring to question his judgment,” he wrote in his memoir just a few years following that meeting. “This gives him the illusion that he knows all the answers. He rarely does, outside his own general field.”
Neither were McElroy and his staff impressed with the army general, who sported a black mustache and was known for dressing in old-fashioned officer riding breeches. Medaris was a “salesman, promoter, who pushes a bit more than might be considered palatable,” wrote Gale, who worked for McElroy at Procter & Gamble and was following him to the Pentagon. Coming from an advertising man, the description was telling. Medaris was trying to sell the services of von Braun and his group of German rocket scientists, who were now based in Huntsville but could not seem to shake their Nazi past. “Von Braun was still wistful about what would have happened if [the V-2s] had all gone off,” Gale recorded in his journal, “not because he was sorry that Germany did not win the war (apparently) but because he was sorry his missiles, his achievements, had not been more successful.”
Even in Huntsville, the Germans found themselves stymied by the military, starved for funds, and frozen out of the space work they desperately wanted. They were stuck working, yet again, on suborbital missiles. The problem was not scientific know-how but classic bureaucratic rivalry. By the fall of 1957, von Braun’s army group had developed the Jupiter-C missile, a four-stage rocket that could have been shot into orbit, if only the army was allowed to launch it. It was not, and so the fourth stage of von Braun’s Jupiter-C was filled with sand, rather than propellant, to ensure it would not leave the atmosphere. Medaris had reason to be skeptical of the incoming defense secretary and his visit. McElroy was replacing Charles “Engine Charlie” Wilson, another captain of industry appointed by Eisenhower. As defense secretary, Wilson threw himself into budget cutting with a passion, carrying out Eisenhower’s New Look defense policy, which emphasized advanced technology, such as nuclear weapons and airpower, over conventional forces. Yet satellites, in Wilson’s view, were “scientific boondoggles.” He did not understand what purpose they would serve for the military. When Wilson had visited Huntsville, army officials tried to impress him with their work, only to have the money-conscious defense secretary interrogate them on the cost of painting wood in his guest quarters.
With McElroy’s visit in the fall of 1957, just days away from becoming secretary of defense, it did not seem apparent to Medaris that the new Pentagon chief would chart a different course. As Medaris, McElroy, and von Braun exchanged pleasantries over drinks, an excited public relations officer interrupted the party with news. The Russians had launched a satellite, and The New York Times was seeking comment from von Braun. “There was an instant of stunned silence,” Medaris recalled.
News of Sputnik was a surprise, but it should not have been. In 1955, the Eisenhower administration announced plans to launch a small scientific satellite as part of the upcoming International Geophysical Year, which would run from July 1957 to December 1958. Not to be outdone, the Soviets countered with their own satellite launch plans. It was always a race, but one in which the United States assumed it had a natural advantage. The Soviet Union could not produce a decent automobile; how could it possibly hope to best the United States in rocket science? In the meantime, American plans for a satellite launch had fallen behind schedule.
However flawed the Soviet Union’s consumer goods industry, the regime had an advantage when it came to military and space research. An authoritarian state could focus resources on a specific goal, like a satellite launch, without the bureaucratic wrangling or public pressures that afflicted a democracy like the United States. The Eisenhower administration, prompted by its civilian scientists, wanted to keep its scientific satellite launches separate from its missile programs, even though the underlying technology was nearly identical. That was why the White House opted instead for the navy’s Vanguard, much to von Braun’s disappointment.
Now, with the soon-to-be defense secretary in front of him, and Sputnik circling overhead, the words began to tumble out of von Braun. “Vanguard will never make it,” the German scientist said. “We have the hardware on the shelf. For God’s sake turn us loose and let us do something. We can put up a satellite in sixty days, Mr. McElroy! Just give us a green light and sixty days!”
“No, Wernher, ninety days,” Medaris interjected.
McElroy had been the guest of honor, but now everyone circled von Braun, peppering the German rocket scientist with questions. Was it really true that the Soviets had launched a satellite? Probably, von Braun replied. Was it a spy satellite? Probably not, though its size and weight, if accurately reported, meant that it could be used for reconnaissance. And what did it all mean? It meant that the Soviets had a rocket with a sizable thrust, von Braun said.
The general and the rocket scientist spent the rest of the evening trying to persuade McElroy to let them launch a satellite. It is likely that the details were well beyond the grasp of McElroy, who had no background in technical issues. The conversation did impart to McElroy at least the importance of the satellite launch, which he might have otherwise missed. At first glance, the satellite did not seem like an immediate threat to the incoming defense secretary. Sputnik weighed 184 pounds and its sole function was to circle the earth, emitting a beep that could be tracked from the ground. For McElroy, the man most closely tied to the response to Sputnik, the launch was something of a fascinating footnote to a pleasant cocktail party. His aide, Gale, devoted more space to describing a recent evening meal of exotic seafood on the coast of California than he did to the world’s first satellite launch. Yet Sputnik was about to trigger a chain reaction that, by the New Year, would engulf all of Washington.
—
Years later, a myth emerged that the Soviet “artificial moon” immediately prompted people around the country to stare up at the sky in fear and apprehension. “Two generations after the event, words do not easily convey the American reaction to the Soviet satellite,” a NASA history covering the time period states. “The only appropriate characterization that begins to capture the mood on 5 October involves the use of the word hysteria.”
In fact, there was no collective panic in the first few days following the launch. It was not immediately clear—except to a small group of scientists and policy makers—why the satellite was so important. For those involved in science and satellites, like von Braun and Medaris, the Soviet satellite circling the earth was proof that politics had hampered the American space effort. Yet for most Americans, the beeping beach ball initially produced a collective shrug.
That Sputnik failed to shake the heartland to its core was best demonstrated in Milwaukee, where the Sentinel’s bold large-type headline on October 5 announced, “Today, We Make History.” In fact, the headline had nothing to do with Sputnik but referred to the first World Series game to be played in Milwaukee. News of Sputnik was buried deep in the paper’s third section, where the reporter noted merely that news of the unexpected launch had “electrified” an international meeting in Washington to discuss satellites.
In the days following the launch of Sputnik, the Washington bureaucracy moved in slow motion. Eisenhower’s attention in the weeks leading up to Sputnik was focused on much more earthbound matters. The standoff over the first attempt to integrate schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, under court order had ended with the president’s sending in federal troops. By comparison, the launch of a satellite armed with nothing more than a beacon did not initially seem like something that was going to capture public attention. At a National Security Council meeting held on October 10, Eisenhower listened as his advisers hashed out ideas for responding to Sputnik. Perhaps the administration should emphasize “spectacular achievements” in science, like cancer research? Or the successful launch of a missile that could travel thirty-five hundred miles? Few in the administration seemed to understand what the Soviets had instinctively grasped: the psychological power of a space launch. General Nathan Twining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned that the United States should not become “hysterical” over Sputnik. Eisenhower saw Sputnik as a political stunt. He also knew something that the public did not know: in addition to the military’s rocket programs, which were public, the United States had been secretly working on the development of spy satellites, which would prove much more important for the strategic balance than a silver ball beeping from the heavens. In the weeks following Sputnik, the administration’s policy was simply to downplay Sputnik’s importance. General Curtis LeMay called it “just a hunk of iron,” and Sherman Adams, Eisenhower’s chief of staff, derided concerns over a space race as “a celestial basketball game.” The more that the administration tried to dismiss the Soviet accomplishment, the more fodder it gave for political opponents to accuse Eisenhower of allowing the United States to fall behind the Soviet Union. For Lyndon Johnson, the Democratic Senate leader, Sputnik was an opportunity to be fully exploited. In his memoir, Johnson wrote that he got the news of Sputnik while hosting a barbecue at his ranch in Texas. That evening, he walked out with his wife, Lady Bird, to look for the orbiting Soviet satellite. “In the West, you learn to live with the Open Sky,” he later wrote. “It is part of your life. But now, somehow, in some new way, the sky seemed alien.” When Johnson looked up in the night sky, what he saw was not Sputnik but a heavenly political gift that would allow him to hammer the Republicans in the months, and possibly years, ahead. “Soon, they will be dropping bombs on us from space like kids dropping rocks onto cars from freeway overpasses,” Johnson proclaimed. Eisenhower, who had so deftly managed his image as a political leader, found himself stumbling. From a technical standpoint, he was more right than wrong. Though the Soviets were somewhat ahead of the United States in booster technology, the United States had a number of strategic advantages that were not known to the public. In addition to the spy satellite technology being developed, the CIA the year before had begun flying a reconnaissance aircraft in the earth’s stratosphere. By flying at seventy thousand feet, the Lockheed U-2 spy aircraft was designed to evade detection by ground radar while flying over the Soviet Union and capturing pictures of military bases. The aircraft—and the flights—were top secret. Also secret was that the U-2 flights had already proved that the “bomber gap”—a suspected Soviet advantage in bombers—did not exist. With news of Sputnik, Eisenhower worried about a perceived “missile gap.”
Eisenhower refused to be swept up in mass hysteria, however. “Now, so far as the satellite itself is concerned, that does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota,” he told a throng of reporters, just days after the Soviet launch. The administration only helped its critics by providing confusing and contradictory statements about the importance of Sputnik. In that initial press conference, Eisenhower claimed that the “Russians captured all of the German scientists in Peenemunde.” In truth, the United States through Operation Paperclip had taken the cream of the crop, but the Germans in the United States were stuck filling the fourth stage of their Jupiter-C with sand. As the weeks passed, the staid articles about Sputnik gave way to sensational coverage. Drew Pearson, the American writer known for his influential Washington Merry-Go-Round column, claimed that “technical intelligence experts” were predicting that the Soviets might try a moon launch on November 7, to commemorate the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. “The same missile that launched the 184-pound Sputnik, our experts say, also could shoot a small rocket 239,000 miles to the moon,” Pearson wrote. “The Russians might fill the nose cone with red dye and literally splatter a Red Star on the face of the Moon.”
Pearson’s moon prediction was an outrageous conflation of conjecture and exaggeration, but on November 3, just a month after Sputnik, the Soviets indeed launched a second, larger satellite. Sputnik 2 carried a dog named Laika on a one-way mission to space. It was taken as purported proof that the Soviets would soon be able to launch a man in space (though unlike with Laika the dog, sending a human into space would require the ability to bring the person back safely to earth). The launch sparked panic in the United States and worldwide protests from animal lovers.
Sputnik tapped into a narrative that artfully wove Hollywood, science fiction, and good oldfashioned fearmongering. The public understood that satellites were somehow connected to the ability to launch ICBMs, but the subtleties of terms like “throw weight,” or the payload a ballistic missile could carry, were not readily apparent. It took some time, politics, and editorializing, but within a few weeks the American public’s initial curiosity and mild apprehension over Sputnik turned to full-blown panic. Eisenhower was right about the science, but he had misjudged the national mood. The administration’s response to Sputnik was a mess, but one thing was clear: the solution was going to be formulated by a soap maker from Cincinnati.
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McElroy arrived in Washington just in time for peak Sputnik hysteria. The new defense secretary’s first few weeks at the Pentagon were marked by an endless parade of military chiefs and presidential advisers, all making suggestions about who should be in charge of space. The air force, not surprisingly, wanted to be in charge of a nascent aerospace force. The navy, which was stumbling with Vanguard, argued incomprehensibly that space was an extension of the oceans. And the army wanted to conquer the moon. Another proposal envisioned creating a tri-service organization. None of the suggestions made a particularly convincing case for ownership or offered a solution to the mismanagement that had led to the current crisis.
One meeting in particular appears to have resonated with McElroy shortly after he arrived at the Pentagon. Ernest Lawrence, the famed nuclear physicist, along with Charles Thomas, a former Manhattan Project scientist and the head of the agribusiness company Monsanto, visited the Pentagon chief and over the course of a meeting that lasted several hours proposed that the secretary establish a central research and development agency with responsibility for all space research. It was a concept that drew on the legacy of the Manhattan Project, the World War II– era government project to build the atomic bomb.
McElroy latched onto the idea, likely because it sounded a lot like the “upstream research” laboratory he had established at Procter & Gamble. Whether the visitors’ suggestion sparked the idea—or merely reinforced a thought he already had—is impossible to know. But on November 7, McElroy wrote to his chief counsel to find out if, as defense secretary, he had the authority to set up a research and development agency without seeking new legislative authorities. The answer from counsel was yes, although it was not clear Congress would agree. By the time McElroy showed up on November 20 on Capitol Hill, his idea had a name, and it was called the Defense Special Projects Agency, a space agency that would make sense of the various rocket programs and other space technology ideas. The new agency would consolidate the Pentagon’s missile defense technology and space programs while also pursuing, as the defense chief put it, the “vast weapon systems of the future.” Many of the members of the President’s Science Advisory Committee were not enthusiastic about this proposal. Fearful of military pressure to hasten an arms race, Eisenhower had purposely selected the panel to represent the interests of the scientific community over military advisers. The scientists on the committee were not necessarily against the Pentagon’s consolidating its rocket programs, though they wondered whether it made sense to place ballistic missile defense and space programs all in one agency. As one committee member put it, missile defense was an urgent priority, while there was “no urgency on Mars.”
More fundamentally, the science advisers were concerned about placing the space agency under military control. They eventually acquiesced, likely because James Killian, the president’s newly appointed science adviser, supported it. The panel did convince the president that a civilian agency, not a Pentagon agency, should ultimately be responsible for nonmilitary space programs. Eisenhower, in his approval of the new organization, made clear that “when and if a civilian space agency is created, these [space] projects will be subject to review to determine which would be under the cognizance of the Department of Defense and which under the cognizance of the new agency.”
The reception within the corridors of the Pentagon to the Defense Special Projects Agency was ice cold. The military services viewed it as an attempt to usurp their authority and steal their money. The new agency was a threat to their turf, and their budgets, and they quickly went on a public offensive to undermine support for the proposal. The air force general Schriever told Congress the new agency would be a “very great mistake.” If the military wanted to prove that it did not need a centralized agency for rocket programs, its best bet was to prove that it could launch a satellite into space on its own. To that end, in December, all eyes were on Vanguard, the navy satellite that Wernher von Braun had warned McElroy was doomed to failure.
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On December 5, 1957, in the midst of Washington battles over the creation of a new research agency, hundreds of reporters and curious onlookers gathered at Cape Canaveral, Florida, to watch the launch of Vanguard. When Sputnik launched in October, John Hagen, the director of the Vanguard program, admitted the navy rocket was five months behind schedule but blamed the Soviet head start on “unethical conduct,” as if a surprise satellite launch were the equivalent of cheating at a tennis game. Now, after hurried preparations, Vanguard Test Vehicle No. 3 was ready for launch. Yet the day of the scheduled launch, technical problems kept pushing back the countdown, and America’s best hope for catching up with the Soviets became the butt of jokes. The Japanese newsmen called the rocket “Sputternik,” the Germans dubbed it “Spaetnik” (a play on the German word for “late”), and the jaded news crews from Washington, D.C., christened it “civil servant,” because it “won’t work and you can’t fire it.” Finally, the next day, December 6, the countdown to launch began. As the count reached zero, Vanguard lifted off. From beaches just two or three miles from the launch site, hundreds of eager people gathered to watch and cheered as shooting flames marked the liftoff, though giant plumes of smoke obscured their view. The few dozen or so official viewers gathered at a hangar not far from the launchpad could see exactly what unfolded: they watched as the navy’s rocket lifted a few feet up and then exploded in a massive fireball, toppling over into the sand. In a sad testament to the failed launch, the satellite itself was thrown out of the third stage of the rocket during the explosion and was found not far away, still emitting the beeping signal that was supposed to mark the United States’ first foray into space.
The day of the Vanguard disaster, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a rare note of “non-concurrence” to the establishment of McElroy’s proposed research agency—a bureaucratic expression of extreme disagreement. Had Vanguard not just gone up in a literal ball of flames, he might have had a stronger argument. The new defense secretary held firm, and the next month Eisenhower formally approved the creation of the new agency. McElroy agreed to just one small change to his proposal: to avoid confusion with other, similarly named endeavors, like the Office of Special Operations, the new division would be called the Advanced Research Projects Agency, or ARPA.
ARPA was still an idea more than an organization, and not everyone in Washington was optimistic that a new government bureaucracy would be the solution. The frenetic days leading up to the new agency’s opening its doors were a mix of highs and lows in the space race. On January 31, 1958, the von Braun team, which had finally been allowed to join the space race, successfully helped launch Explorer 1, based on its Jupiter-C, putting in orbit the first American satellite. That success was quickly overshadowed by the second attempted launch on February 5 of the navy’s Vanguard, which broke apart just shy of a minute after launch.
On February 7, ARPA was officially founded with an intentionally vague two-page directive, which established it as an independent agency that reported directly to the secretary of defense. The directive mentioned no projects, or even specific research areas, not even space. “The Agency is authorized to direct such research and development projects being performed within the Department of Defense as the Secretary of Defense may designate,” the directive read. The only hint as to the ultimate purpose for this new agency came just weeks earlier during President Eisenhower’s State of the Union address: “We must be forward looking in our research and development to anticipate the unimagined weapons of the future.”

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