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By MARK SCOTT

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DIGITAL BRIDGE IS COMING AT YOU a day early this week. I’m Mark Scott, POLITICO’s chief technology correspondent, and if you’ve got time, I’m testifying to a British parliamentary committee on May 23 on digital competition regulation (watch along here) and speaking on a panel, the same day, on trade policy in the digital era (watch that here.) Warning: It’s pretty much the only time you’ll see me in a suit.

OK, let’s get down to business:

— Washington and Brussels are borrowing heavily from each other on social media and artificial intelligence rules.

— The Mozilla Foundation’s Mark Surman on why he’s optimistic on tech rulemaking — and why politicians need to keep going on AI laws.

— Twitter has a new chief executive. Here are three urgent policy areas that Linda Yaccarino needs to sink her teeth into.

EU-US RELATIONS: RULE-SETTER VS. RULE-TAKER

I CONSIDER THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION to be frenemies. Both partners and rivals, Brussels and Washington don’t always have the easiest relationship. But even I have to admit that on a series of thorny digital policymaking issues, the transatlantic relationship is, dare I say it, actually working. There are still some massive problems — U.S. views on European “protectionism,” and European views on U.S. “corporate capture.” But the upcoming EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC) summit at the end of the month offers two glaring examples of how both sides are influencing each other.

First, social media rules. Ever since Republicans took back the U.S. House of Representatives, any form of checks on these platforms has become a no-go area — mostly because these politicians incorrectly believe any restrictions are anathema to the First Amendment. And yet, the U.S. is about to sign up to (nonbinding) commitments at the end of the month that align almost exactly with the EU’s new social media rules, known as the Digital Services Act. In fact, the team implementing that legislation within the 27-country bloc was involved in writing the upcoming TTC communiqué.

“The European Union and the United States consider that online platforms should exercise greater responsibility in ensuring that their services contribute to an online environment that protects, empowers and respects minors,” EU and U.S. officials are expected to say later this month. “We share a common view that data access for researchers is key to help understand systemic risks on online platforms and to advance our understanding of the online ecosystem.” Both those commitments draw almost exclusively from Brussels’ new content rules — and mark a clear sign that Washington is willing to take on some, if not all, of those suggestions.

There’s more. The EU and the U.S. will also unveil (again, nonbinding) principles for “transparent and accountable online platforms” that borrow heavily from Europe’s new social media rulebook. That includes greater protection for kids online and a series of pledges to give outsiders better access to these networks, all in the name of transparency. The goal, according to three EU and U.S. officials, is to announce some form of DSA-lite data-access (voluntary) rules for researchers at the next TTC summit in the U.S. at the end of the year. That would parallel similar, mandatory offerings for these academics that are baked into Europe’s unfolding rules.

But this is not just a one-way street. As part of an extended “Joint Roadmap for Truthworthy AI and Risk Management” (not the catchiest title), U.S. and EU officials will likewise take a page — or many pages — from guidelines recently published by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology. The so-called AI Risk Management Framework lays out four specific pathways for governing the emerging technology to both mitigate potential harms and provide space for innovation.

That falls into four buckets of policymaking — and extends to the latest craze of generative AI that will also get a name-check at the transatlantic tech and trade gathering in Northern Sweden on May 30-31. Suggestions include the specific metrics needed to measure so-called trustworthy AI, or pledges to use the tech for good; how best to check that companies are upholding such standards; and other technical specifications that agencies like NIST do very well, and where the EU, for all its policymaking know-how, often falls down due to a lack on in-house expertise within its institutions.

The goal is not to create a one-size-fits-all approach to AI, but to instead offer voluntary measurement tools and risk-management techniques that, while immensely boring, are crucial if the technology can quickly develop, globally, with the necessary checks in place. Think of it as a set of best practices, and not prescriptive regulation. One caveat: It’s still unclear whether the TTC’s AI Roadmap will comply with Europe’s Artificial Intelligence Act and its requirements to clamp down on “harmful AI.” If that isn’t cleared up, then this whole transatlantic bonhomie could, again, be back to square one.

THE ‘CAKE-AND-EAT-IT’ APPROACH TO DIGTAL RULEMAKING

MARK SURMAN, HEAD OF THE MOZILLA FOUNDATION, the nonprofit organization behind the Firefox browser that advocates for responsible technology and regulation, has a message for politicians: Just keep swimming. As policymakers around the world freak out about generative artificial intelligence — and certain regions and countries push ahead with their own tech regulation on everything from privacy to social media to digital competition — the Canadian feels pretty confident that things are moving in the right direction.

“Keep going on the DSA and enforcement. Keep going on GDPR and making enforcement better. Keep going on the AI Act and figuring out how general purpose AI is regulated,” he told me via Zoom from his California headquarters, in reference to the litany of EU digital proposals to police everything from online content to privacy rights to AI. “All this stuff is happening in terms of regulation, exactly at the right time and at an appropriate speed, in my view.”

For Surman, whose public policy colleagues play a central role in how Western civil society has pushed back against Big Tech players’ dominance of parts of the online landscape, it’s only natural that lawmaking will lag behind fast-developing technologies that track progress in months, if not weeks. “Now is the time to go hard on regulation. It’s not dramatically too late. The DSA and DMA are much more mature runs about at how you think about these topics than the GDPR was,” he added in reference to Brussels’ online content and antitrust reboots, known as the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act, respectively. GDPR refers to the General Data Protection Regulation, the bloc’s revamped privacy laws that came into force almost five years ago.

His take isn’t that we should be complacent in how new rules are created around technology. Instead, Surman prefers to take a “cake-and-eat-it” approach to policymaking: Let’s use all the existing rules and build out new regulation, too, to capture potential digital downsides that lawmakers have yet to get their heads around. “We either have the right stuff or we’re working on the right stuff,” the Mozilla chief executive said. “There’s a shift in our thinking that isn’t in the (policymaking) that’s already moving. Work around collective rights, collective benefits, collective harms, and how data and AI fit into that is needed, too.”

Unlike other policy wonks, Surman also runs a multibillion-dollar tech business — where he can put his money where his mouth is. And that means Mozilla is now moving from just advocating for so-called trustworthy AI to embedding the principles of fairness, accountability and transparency into how it builds and invests in digital products. The nonprofit has set aside $35 million in venture capital funding for fledgling firms in that sector and has earmarked additional money for in-house research and development to create AI-focused tools that embrace trustworthy AI principles.

“If AI is defining the next era of our digitized work, and we want our values to show up in that we need both a market-based strategy and a movement-based strategy,” Surman said. “Building AI, especially into consumer products, like Firefox, people are doing it really fast and irresponsible way. As we explore the market-based piece of it, there’s a reason why we’re going cautiously. There’s a reason why we’re starting with safety and inclusion-focused technologies and not rushing to the end with some big consumer play.”

Mozilla’s boss acknowledges that the slow-and-steady approach likely means the nonprofit will never compete with OpenAI and Google’s Bard in the generative AI hysteria. His pitch is about building the means to rein in some of the risks created by these new tools — mostly because most businesses aren’t worrying about the downsides to the technology. “It’s not about creating the alternative to GPT7,” he said in reference to OpenAI’s technology. “A lot of the leverage is going to be around the edges and on top of these things at this point, and not actually in trying to be as a main competitor and owning one of the (AI) models.”

BY THE NUMBERS

TWITTER’S POLITICAL PRIORITIES

I’M NOT ONE TO GIVE OUT BUSINESS ADVICE. And with Twitter’s faltering business model, its new chief executive, Linda Yaccarino, has enough on her plate. Yet the policymaking world is my bread and butter, so here are some thorny political questions the former NBCUniversal ad executive needs to get ahead of as lawmakers worldwide ask increasingly difficult question of the Blue Bird.

1. What’s your relationship like with governments? Historically, Twitter has been more willing than others to go to the mattresses with governments over things like censorship and free speech, including multiple lawsuits filed against India’s repeated checks on social media. That approach has now shifted under Elon Musk’s tenure as chief executive, including the blocking of content from opposition leaders in Turkey ahead of last weekend’s nationwide election. At some point, Twitter has to decide: How strongly does it want to defend free speech, and at what cost?

2. Who do I call to talk at Twitter? During last year’s mass layoffs, Musk fired almost all of the company’s public policy executives. That means those long-standing relationships with policymakers worldwide were cut off, almost overnight. In Europe, for instance, European Commission officials don’t know to whom to turn within Twitter to ask about how the company will comply with the bloc’s new social media rules. The tech giant needs to rebuild those bridges fast, and not just in Europe.

3. How are you handling the 2024 election tsunami? Next year, the U.S., the EU, the United Kingdom and India (among others) will all hold elections. Frankly, it’s going to be shitshow of misinformation, political skullduggery and potential foreign interference. Twitter remains woefully underprepared to handle its role in these upcoming votes — and is fast losing political goodwill as an impartial place where people can voice their (often politically heated) opinions. Coming up with a comprehensive global election strategy needs to be a top priority.

WONK OF THE WEEK

THE ANNUAL G7 SUMMIT gets underway on Friday in Hiroshima, Japan — the annual gathering of leaders from the West’s largest democracies. We’re focusing on Taro Kono, Japan’s digital transformation minister, and former foreign affairs and defense minister under the country’s now-deceased former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Tokyo has focused on boosting the free flow of data and pushing Western norms on AI under its G7 presidency (check out the summary of the recent meeting of the country’s digital ministers). Kono, a Georgetown graduate who began his career in the electronics industry in the early 1990s, is spending a lot of his time digitizing his ministry’s work and even boasts his own lifesize robot avatar.

“I asked ChatGPT who Kono Taro is and he came back with the wrong answer,” Kono told Bloomberg earlier this month in reference to the generative AI tool. “So you need to be careful.”

THEY SAID WHAT, NOW?

“Video games attract billions of users all over the world. In such a fast-growing and dynamic industry, it is crucial to protect competition and innovation. Our decision represents an important step in this direction,” said Margrethe Vestager, Europe’s competition chief, when announcing that Brussels had approved Microsoft’s $68 billion takeover of Activision — a deal that has been blocked by British antitrust authorities and faces a separate legal challenge by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.

WHAT I’M READING

— Sam Altman, chief executive of OpenAI, explained why regulation was needed for this emerging technology that protects people while also allowing industry to innovate. Read his U.S. Senate testimony here.

— Italy’s competition authority accused Apple of abusing its dominant position in the app market to favor its own services over those of rivals. Read more here.

— Europe’s AI Act is a good first start, but the recent draft from the European Parliament misses the mark on clearly defining what risk management is needed for specific AI use cases, according to Philipp Hacker, a law professor, via LinkedIn.

— Governments from Washington to Brussels to Beijing are increasingly embedding themselves into the technical standard-setting of emerging technologies in ways that bring geopolitics into wonky policy discussions worldwide, claims Tim Ruhlig from the German Council on Foreign Relations.

— U.S. agencies including the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued a joint statement on enforcing existing rules that related to AI “automated systems.”

— France’s privacy regulator announced an action plan on AI that includes upholding data protection standards, auditing AI systems for potential harm, and better understanding how the technology affects society. Read more here.

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📌 Cosedagarante | Questa sera a partire dalle 19,00 sarò ospite a ROADMAP ITALIA su CLASS CNBC per parlare di data protection e privacy

guidoscorza.it/class-cnbc-road…

📌 Cosedagarante |A partire dalle ore 12.00 avrò il piacere di partecipare al Convegno “Digitalmente inclusivi: combattere le disuguaglianze attraverso l’alfabetizzazione digitale” al Forum PA per parlare di digitale, inclusione dei ragazzi, ruolo della scuola e dei genitori. Qui tutte le informazioni lnkd.in/dc6WFN4R

guidoscorza.it/forum-pa-digita…

“Accesso universale alla conoscenza” è da 27 anni lo slogan di Internet Archive. L’organizzazione raccoglie e mette a disposizione di chiunque, gratuitamente, 37 milioni di libri, 16 milioni di file audio e molti altri contenuti nonché servizi come la Wayback machine, il più noto archivio di pagine Web. Una delle maggiori e più evidenti eredità culturali e intellettuali che gli esseri umani possano vantare per raccontare la loro storia.

@Etica Digitale (Feddit)

> Il 25 marzo scorso è arrivata la prima decisione del tribunale: almeno per ora, ha dato ragione agli editori. Per il giudice infatti qualsiasi “presunto beneficio” derivante dalla biblioteca di Internet Archive “non può superare il danno di mercato per gli editori”. E sempre per il giudice sarebbe “irrilevante” il fatto che Internet Archive acquisti i libri prima di farne copie per il suo pubblico online. Secondo i dati ottenuti durante il processo, Internet Archive gestisce attualmente circa 70.000 prestiti di e-book al giorno, scrive The Verge.

Qui è il link al post completo di Laura Carrer per #GuerreDiRete

"Ad aprile 2023 è stata pubblicata dalla Commissione Europea una proposta di Raccomandazione al Consiglio dell’Unione Europea (COM(2023) 206 final) che manda un segnale forte e chiaro in tema di insegnamento dell’informatica nella scuola."

@Etica Digitale (Feddit)

"Vedremo subito cosa contiene. Voglio però prima sottolineare che nel relativo documento tecnico di accompagnamento c’è un esplicito riconoscimento dell’errore strategico commesso. Vi si dice infatti che mentre «è riconosciuta a livello internazionale l’esistenza di una tendenza emergente e marcata nei sistemi educativi verso l’inclusione dell’Informatica come parte dei curriculi nazionali e come parte dell’istruzione per tutti i cittadini» ricordando che «l’Informatica è progressivamente diventata un’importante competenza fondamentale a fianco delle tre-R: lettuRa, scrittuRa, aRitmetica» ciò che è accaduto sul nostro continente è che «per un po’ di tempo, la maggior parte dei sistemi educativi europei sono rimasti in ritardo su questa tendenza, focalizzandosi più sull’alfabetizzazione digitale e sulla digitalizzazione dell’insegnamento». Infine ammette che «Il limite maggiore di questo approccio è che, nonostante fornisca agli studenti i mezzi per usare le tecnologie digitali, non li equipaggia adeguatamente con le capacità di creare, controllare e sviluppare i contenuti digitali»."

Il post completo di @Enrico Nardelli è disponibile su Start Magazine

La videointervista a Brando Benifei, europarlamentare Pd/S&D, uno dei due correlatori al testo con emendamenti alla proposta della Commissione Ue del Regolamento sull’IA.

@Etica Digitale (Feddit)

Il video è su Key4Biz

📌 Cosedagarante| Domani 17 maggio a partire dalle 12.00 parteciperò al Convegno organizzato dal MIUR a FORUM PA intitolato “Digitalmente inclusivi; combattere le disuguaglianze attraverso l’alfabetizzazione digitale” qui tutte informazioni lnkd.in/dc6WFN4R

guidoscorza.it/forum-pa-digita…

Ne parliamo oggi con Mattero Flora per la rubrica Garantismi

guidoscorza.it/minori-online-v…

L’idea è tanto semplice quanto pericolosa: acquistare e processare i dati personali che ciascuno di noi abbandona online, per poi rivenderli ad agenzie di intelligence e forze di polizia di mezzo mondo Potete leggere l’articolo completo qui huffingtonpost.it/rubriche/gov…

guidoscorza.it/si-chiama-echo-…

Vivendo nei campi delle Nazioni Unite in un Sudan in rapido collasso, i rifugiati dall’Etiopia vengono rapiti, portati attraverso il Sahara e torturati per ottenere un riscatto, in una brutale industria multimilionaria.

Rifugiati nell’insediamento di Um Rakuba nel sud-est del Sudan. Fotografia: Ed Ram
L’incubo di Selassie iniziò quando uomini che si dicevano contadini lo presero, promettendogli lavori agricoli.

Dopo essere riuscito a lasciarsi alle spalle la violenza della guerra civile nella sua regione natale del Tigray , nel nord dell’Etiopia, alla fine del 2020, aveva svolto diversi lavori occasionali, raccogliendo sorgo e scavando canali di irrigazione per gli agricoltori vicino a Tunaydbah, un campo profughi nel sud- Sudan orientale.

Questa volta, dopo che Selassie e altri profughi sono saliti a bordo del camion, sono stati condotti nel profondo del deserto, dove i cosiddetti contadini hanno incontrato complici armati di AK-47. È stato solo allora che “ci siamo resi conto di essere stati rapiti”, dice.

Da lì, i profughi sono stati trafficati a nord, fino al confine libico, e venduti a un’altra banda. Nel corso dell’anno successivo, Selassie è stato trattenuto con altri rifugiati provenienti da Somalia, Eritrea ed Etiopia , torturata quasi quotidianamente e trasferita in una serie di angusti magazzini senz’aria nel deserto.

Il campo di Tunaydbah ospita 23.000 rifugiati del Tigray. Fotografia: Ikram N’gadi/MSF
I trafficanti si sono rifiutati di rilasciarlo fino a quando la sua famiglia non ha pagato un riscatto di $ 6.000 (£ 4.800). Dopo che è stato pagato, invece di rilasciarlo, la banda lo ha semplicemente venduto ad altri, che hanno chiesto altri $ 2.000. Dopo che è stato pagato, è stato nuovamente passato a un altro gruppo di rapitori, che ha chiesto la stessa somma.

“Non pensavo che ne sarei uscito vivo”, dice Selassie.

La sua esperienza non è unica. Attivisti e altri tigrini hanno riferito al Guardian che i trafficanti depredano le persone a Tunaydbah e Um Rakuba, due insediamenti che fanno parte di una serie di campi gestiti dalle Nazioni Unite e dal governo sudanese nel Sudan sud- orientale . Insieme, i campi ospitano 70.000 persone fuggite dal Tigray.

I rifugiati sono le ultime vittime della vasta e brutale industria del traffico di esseri umani del Sahara, che si ritiene valga centinaia di milioni di dollari all’anno, che si estende in tutta l’ Africa e intrappola coloro che fuggono da guerre, persecuzioni politiche e difficoltà economiche. Chi non può pagare i riscatti chiesti dalle bande non ha alcuna prospettiva di liberazione.

Alcuni tigrini sono stati rapiti da trafficanti, come Selassie. Altri venduti dai poliziotti sudanesi, che li avevano sorpresi a uscire dai campi senza permesso.

Selassie era originariamente fuggito dal Tigray dopo essere stato coinvolto nella violenza a Mai Kadra , dove lavorava come autista di trattori, nel novembre 2020. Pugnalato al petto e alla gamba, si è riempito le ferite con foglie e pezzi di vestiti strappati.

Sopravvissuti al massacro di Mai Kadra, nell’ospedale di Gondar, nel nord dell’Etiopia, nel 2020. Foto: Eduardo Soteras/AFP/Getty Images
Dopo il suo rapimento da Tunaydbah, la guerra è scoppiata anche in Sudan mentre l’esercito nazionale e il gruppo paramilitare rivale delle Forze di supporto rapido combattono per il controllo. Gli aiuti si sono prosciugati ei rifugiati hanno iniziato a lasciare i campi in cerca di cibo e riparo, esponendosi a ulteriori predazioni mentre il Sudan crolla nell’illegalità.

Un operatore umanitario afferma che il problema della sicurezza dei rifugiati tigrini è stata sollevata con le Nazioni Unite, ma che non sono state prese misure per aiutare. “Non volevano davvero sentirne parlare, ad essere onesti. Sembrava che stessero chiudendo un occhio su alcuni chiari problemi di protezione dei rifugiati”.

I rifugiati tigrini rapiti prima dell’attuale conflitto in Sudan affermano di essere stati portati nei magazzini di Tazirbu, Bani Walid, Kufra e Brak al-Shati, città nel deserto libico, dove sono stati trattenuti insieme a migliaia di altri.

I trafficanti che chiedono il pagamento frustano le loro vittime sui piedi e sulle natiche con cavi e tubi dell’acqua di plastica, affermano diversi rifugiati. Alcuni sono stati bruciati con le sigarette. Selassie dice che i suoi aguzzini lo hanno coperto d’acqua e lo hanno sottoposto a scosse elettriche. Quando gli altri venivano portati fuori, poteva sentire le loro urla.

“Non c’era spazio, eravamo soffocati”, dice. “Le persone si ammalavano, tutti avevano i pidocchi. Le persone erano coperte di croste”.

Mentre si trovava in un magazzino, si è svegliato due volte per scoprire che la persona che dormiva accanto a lui era morta. “Ho visto molti corpi”, dice.

I rifugiati del Tigray in Sudan vengono trafficati a scopo di riscatto

Due donne e un uomo del Tigray affermano di aver subito abusi sessuali dai loro carcerieri in Sudan e in Libia. Una dice che tutte le donne sono state stuprate nel magazzino dove era tenuta a Kufra da trafficanti libici ed eritrei.

“Ci hanno preso ogni volta che volevano”, dice. “Sono stata violentata diverse volte. Minacciavano di metterci incinta se non avessimo pagato”.

Il rifugiato maschio crolla al telefono mentre racconta il suo calvario in un complesso di Omdurman, la città gemella di Khartoum, la capitale del Sudan.

“Un giorno sono andato in bagno. Poi è venuto un ragazzo e mi ha portato in un’altra casa. C’era un altro ragazzo lì dentro. Mi ha tirato dentro e mi ha spinto giù, e io ero sul pavimento. Mi hanno violentato. Sono tornato in bagno e stavo contemplando il suicidio. Ho provato ad allacciarmi la cintura per uccidermi, ma l’uomo è entrato e mi ha fermato. Mi ha rinchiuso dove ero prima con le altre persone.”

All’interno dei magazzini del deserto libico, ai profughi veniva data pasta semplice e acqua salata. Spesso c’era solo cibo sufficiente per un pasto al giorno.

Yohannes, un saldatore di 22 anni di Wukro nel Tigray, parla dall’interno di un magazzino a Brak al-Shati, dove è detenuto con altri 300, per lo più eritrei. È stato malato di malaria e ha sviluppato piaghe su tutto il corpo.

Sulla strada per Tunaydbah nello stato sudanese di Gedaref. Fotografia: Ikram N’gadi/MSF

“È un posto molto caldo”, dice. “Siamo stipati così fitti che non posso voltarmi. Sul pavimento non c’è spazio per sdraiarsi, possiamo solo dormire su un fianco. Non possiamo uscire perché la porta è chiusa. Non te ne vai se non paghi”.

Intrappolato per quasi due anni, Yohannes dice di non avere questa opzione. Nel tentativo di proteggere la sua famiglia, non ha detto loro dove si trova.

“Non ho i soldi, ecco perché sono qui da così tanto tempo”, dice. “Vengo da una famiglia povera… non ho contattato mia madre. Lei è malata.”

Un blackout delle comunicazioni imposto al Tigray durante la guerra significava che la maggior parte non poteva telefonare alle proprie famiglie per chiedere aiuto.

“Sono stato picchiato quando ho detto loro che non potevo chiamare il Tigray perché la rete è chiusa lì”, dice Keshi, uno studente di 21 anni, rapito dal campo di Tunaydbah nel giugno 2021. “Hanno detto: ‘No, stai mentendo a noi.’ Arrivavano ubriachi e ci picchiavano”.

Keshi è stato tenuto in una stanza senza finestre da qualche parte a Kufra. L’esperienza lo ha lasciato parzialmente cieco. “Per nove mesi non abbiamo visto il sole”, dice.

Un trafficante di esseri umani eritreo, parlando a condizione di anonimato, afferma che c’è stato “un forte aumento” nel numero di tigrini che attraversano il Sahara verso la Libia da quando è scoppiata la guerra civile alla fine del 2020. Si sono uniti a una rotta già ben battuta da rifugiati provenienti da altre parti dell’Africa.

Il contrabbandiere, lui stesso un rifugiato, afferma che i trafficanti “possono guadagnare milioni” tenendo ostaggi. Si rifiuta di fornire dettagli sul suo coinvolgimento nel commercio, dicendo solo che trasportava 150 persone all’anno.

Diversi dei profughi intervistati dal Guardian sono riusciti a fuggire dai magazzini del deserto e ora si trovano a Tripoli, la capitale libica. Includono Selassie, il bracciante agricolo.

Anche lì non è al sicuro, dice Selassie. In mancanza di documenti, i profughi sono vulnerabili alle irruzioni della polizia libica, che li rinchiude e chiede tangenti per il loro rilascio, tattiche simili a quelle dei trafficanti.

Manifestanti durante la visita del segretario generale delle Nazioni Unite, António Guterres, al centro di detenzione per migranti di Ain Zara a Tripoli, in Libia. Fotografia: Mahmud Turkia/AFP/Getty Images
Quindi vivono sottoterra. Qualche mese fa Selassie ha provato a prendere una barca dalla Libia, attraverso il Mediterraneo, verso l’Italia con decine di altri. Si capovolse a breve distanza al largo, lasciando una manciata di sopravvissuti.

Selassie è stato tirato fuori dall’acqua dalla guardia costiera libica, che ha ricevuto centinaia di milioni di finanziamenti dall’UE per impedire ai richiedenti asilo di intraprendere il pericoloso viaggio verso l’Europa. Dice che lo hanno consegnato alla polizia.

“Sono stato in prigione per tre mesi e ho pagato loro una tangente di $ 1.600 per essere rilasciato”, dice. “Sono stato fortunato a poter pagare. C’erano circa 2.000 persone lì. Alcuni di loro erano stati detenuti per uno o due anni”.

Selassie si nasconde ancora a Tripoli, giocando al gatto col topo con le autorità libiche, cambiando regolarmente casa per evitare i loro raid. Non sa cosa riserva il futuro.

“Non ho abbastanza soldi per sopravvivere”, dice. “Se posso ottenere un’istruzione e un lavoro in Europa, forse ho speranza di cambiare la mia vita.”

Alcuni nomi sono stati cambiati

FONTE: theguardian.com/global-develop…

tommasin.org/blog/2023-05-15/i…

Original Statement here.

The assessment is made primarily from the perspective of prosecutorial and general law enforcement practice. The perspectives of prevention, improved compliance and other effects on societal, political as well as technical aspects are only examined in their respective interaction with law enforcement in view of the expertise available here.

The proposal for a regulation also has an impact on the activities of the national law enforcement authorities dealing with the crime of child abuse in the digital space.

Compared to a risk-based general intervention also in end-to-end encrypted communication infrastructures, concrete, effective, but always occasion-related criminal prosecution is likely to be a much milder, but (at least) equally suitable means to improve the fight against net-related child abuse.

Without a human, evaluative and legally and criminally competent review of the cases identified as relevant, a reliable identification of criminally relevant cases on the basis of AI alone is unlikely to be possible.

Scanning activities by major internet corporations (of unencrypted messenger messages and emails, hosted files and posted content) should now be mandatory for service providers (including host providers, interpersonal communication services, app stores, access providers).

Age verification: any anonymous use of communication services would become de facto impossible (as effective exclusion of minors would only be achievable through personal identification, not through mere age confirmation)

Targeted detection obligations on the basis of so-called detection orders

• Provider decides whether to use own software or that of the EU Centre against Child Abuse.
• Commitment only possible through fully comprehensive, automated, largely AI-based review of communication content
• Automated scanning of all content of a service are an encroachment on European (and national) fundamental rights
• Scanning of end-to end encrypted content would have to take place on users’ devices (client-side scanning), so that encryption is not completely abolished or technologically weakened.
• Detection orders significantly affect information security (predetermined breaking point for encryption technology with evidenced potential for risk and misuse)
• Private conversations and private image and video files that can be attributed to the private sphere will also have to be noted and examined by a large number of examiners.
• Service providers are to report content deemed relevant to a new EU centre to be set up and remove the material.
• Prior verification by the EU Centre before onward transmission
• Effective legal remedy for both providers and users: inter alia, legal remedy before the courts of the Member State, the competent judicial authority or the independent administrative authority.
• Individual remedies are not a sufficiently suitable corrective for any misuse of detection orders. Providers with vested interests cannot adequately fulfil the legal function for users. Urgent introduction of a strong and independent control mechanism is needed.
• All digital communication services and devices are covered by the regulations, without range or usage thresholds
• Criminal law is applied proportionality, criminal prosecution at any price is not a viable alternative under German and European constitutional law.

Commission proposal in the sense of the classic proportionality triad must be appropriate, necessary and proportionate in the narrower sense

• The detection order does not prove to be fully necessary to achieve the goal of an improved and effective fight against network-related child abuse. Furthermore, it encounters – partly far-reaching – concerns with regard to its appropriateness.
• There are no doubts about the fundamental legitimacy of the purpose
• Means also likely to be suitable, i.e. at least conducive, in relation to the purpose sought.
• Despite possible crowding-out effects to other technologies or providers, the proposed measure is not to be qualified as per se unsuitable
• Significant and, in the end, far-reaching concerns exist with regard to necessity, especially insofar as they are directed against end-to-end encrypted communication
• The Commission proposal assumes a lack of knowledge and information on the part of the law enforcement authorities
• End-to-end encryption of perpetrator communications in the field of net-related child abuse is only in a significantly smaller number of cases a significant obstacle to investigation
• The scope of knowledge arises from a combination of server-side monitoring, the investigation procedures themselves and from third party tips
• Commission moves significantly away from the reality of law enforcement practice with regard to end-to-end encrypted communications. Rather, there is a structural deficit in action due to insufficient technical and personnel resources of the law enforcement agencies.
• Improved European cooperation between investigative authorities through an EU centre can be an essential contribution, also for ensuring a unified European intelligence practice
• Multinational so-called Joint Investigation Teams are to be set up on a permanent basis instead of only on a trial-by-trial basis.
• The risk of innocent citizens being affected by official investigations is significant.
• False-positive reports are a misallocation of resources for the investigating authorities
• Pre-filtering in the EU centre means additional resource requirements

Detection delta

• Hashes for known and classified abuse material.
• AI should detect unknown misuse material but is prone to error and requires invasive methods
• Hashes can significantly minimise the intensity of intervention, which is appropriate in terms of results, and is sufficiently effective
• Closing the detection delta by upgrading the law enforcement authorities
• End-to-end encryption is the only effective means of protecting the confidentiality of digital communications. It is the most important digital protection measure for individuals, businesses, public authorities and law enforcement (including specially protected professions such as defence lawyers). Encryption is either effective or compromised from a technical perspective. Encryption that is weakened or structurally undermined by an instrument such as the discovery order is, in effect, no encryption.

Recommendations

• Empower and strengthen law enforcement agencies.
• Instead of “data retention” rejected by the European Court of Justice, limited IP allocation
• Live extraction of current IP data without a retrograde storage (“login trap”), with a very limited storage period for IP assignment data of one week.
• Improving international cooperation at European level
• EU Centre as a competence and coordination hub
• Netblocks are easy to circumvent, better delete material and prosecute people. “Track instead of just block”

patrick-breyer.de/en/summary-o…

Original Statement here.

The fight against child sexual abuse is an extremely important social task that must be fulfilled with all suitable and appropriate means at our disposal. The so-called chat control, however, significantly exceeds the goal of this task. It hardly offers greater protection for children, but instead it would be Europe’s and Germany’s entry into a disproportionate, unconditional and comprehensive surveillance of private communication.

Implications

• Not compatible with the right to respect for private life under Article 7.
• Incompatible with the right to protection of personal data under Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR).
• From a constitutional point of view, not compatible with the secrecy of telecommunications under Article 10 of the German Basic Law (GG).
• From a constitutional point of view, not compatible with the right to informational self-determination Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 1(1) (GG)
• Mandatory risk assessment lacks clarity in standards and in determining which parameters are used as a basis and to what extent they are weighted.
• Detection orders require service providers to view private communications and information content (all content of all users of a service and, if necessary, break encrypted communication)
• Not compatible with the right to respect for private life under Article 7 CFR
• No exceptions are provided for, not even for professionals with confidentiality requirementssuch as doctors, psychologists, lawyers or state-recognised youth and social workers. Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) provides for a penalty of up to one year’s imprisonment for the unauthorised disclosure of information by persons subject to professional secrecy and thus underlines the special worthiness of protection of this communication.
• Voice messages would also be intercepted despite the special protection afforded to the spoken word by the provision of section 201 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB).
• Infringement of the principle of transparency under Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
• Undifferentiated search for CSA material contradicts the principle of data minimisation under Article 5(1)(c) GDPR.
• According to the case law of the European Court of Justice, unprovoked mass surveillance is not compatible with the EU Dharter of Fundamental Rights (GRCh)
• Lack of data protection supervision (data protection supervisory authorities should only be able to participate with non-binding opinions prior to deployment, Article 7(3) Draft Regulation).
• Detection order: All services and devices on which digital communication takes place or could take place are covered by the provisions of the draft regulation. It is irrelevant whether the services are actually used to exchange abusive material or whether grooming takes place there; a “significant risk” that they could be used for this purpose is sufficient. This means that hosting services, stores for software applications or internet access services are covered by the scope of application. In addition, personal cloud storage, which serves as a backup of one’s own photos on mobile phones and is not shared, is also covered.
• Scanning all textual communication for ‘grooming’ affects everyday conversations of participants of all ages and age constellations.
• False reports and false positives as well as the screening of personal communication will also lead to users only using the respective services to a limited extent or not at all for fear of continuous surveillance (so-called “chilling effects”).
• There are no known technologies that can reliably distinguish between harmless, sexually or romantically charged communication and grooming.

Sensible measures

• Strengthening and expanding the resources of law enforcement agencies
• Prevention of child sexual abuse – also outside the online world
• Require service providers to set up low-threshold reporting channels for affected persons that are linked to law enforcement agencies or other state counselling centres.
• Login traps and quick freeze (targeted investigation after initial suspicion and court order)

Critique

• In my opinion, the draft regulation leads to unjustifiable encroachments on the fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Fundamental rights.
• End of confidential communication, whether by breaking end-to-end encryption or by so-called client-side scanning.
• Mandatory age controls by app and software stores incl. exclusion of certain age groups from software applications leads to a restriction of communication and endangers the possibility of anonymous/pseudonymous internet use.
• Lifting anonymity would have serious consequences in many countries, especially for opposition members or whistleblowers, both within and outside the European Union.
• Technologies for finding CSA material, still have error rates of up to 12% in some cases.
• Once introduced, there is a threat of an expansion of monitored content in Europe as well.
• Apart from official identity documents, such as the German electronic identity card, I am not aware of any technologies that enable reliable, anonymous age verification.
• Alternative technologies, such as AI-based age verification (facial recognition, behavioural analysis) regularly fall short of the necessary level of reliability. They regularly require additional, often sensitive personal data. The collection and recording enables identification, which jeopardises anonymity.
• The use of third-party providers bears the risk that calls are linked and users are identified.
• The lifting of anonymity in certain countries (especially for opposition members, whistleblowers) can have dangerous or even life-threatening consequences.
• As soon as technologies and interfaces are implemented, there is nothing to prevent illegitimate use (by authoritarian states or malicious actors), these would be “surveillance ready” in the future.
• False-positive reports in connection with possible criminal investigations (e.g. in the case of consensual sexting among young people) threaten unnecessary contact with criminal investigation authorities, which could well have a formative character for these young people.
• Chilling effect on the exercise of free will undermines the foundation of a free society.
• The blocking of entire domains regularly leads to excessive blocking (so-called overblocking) and does not meet the requirements of the European Court of Justice for targeting.

patrick-breyer.de/en/summary-o…

Summary of statement found here: kinderschutzbund.de/wp-content…

The proposal and its implications

The EU initiative sends a clear signal to all EU states to take stronger action against sexualised violence against children. We strongly welcome this. To implement this important goal, the directive proposes necessary and correct measures, but goes too far at crucial points.

• Scanning private communications in messenger services or e-mails without any reason is neither proportionate nor effective.
• An environment in which freedom of expression and confidential communication are taken for granted is an essential pillar of democracy and participation.
• Scanning without any reason criminalises children and young people even more often.
• Data protection and child protection should not be played off against each other, children’s rights need both: the right to physical integrity, but also the right to protected communication.
• Only if they can trust that they will not be constantly monitored can they develop the necessary trust in their guardians, teachers and friends that will help them seek help from trusted people when they need it.
• Could lead to millions of legal message exchanges being unfairly targeted by authorities.
• Chat control would create a surveillance structure that could be misused for other purposes.
• The proposal also threatens, for example, certain professions that are bound to secrecy.
• Technology that makes it possible to censor certain content even before it is sent or uploaded endangers people living in (partly) authoritarian countries who are politically active, journalists or people in the LGBTIQ+ communities. This affects children just as much, especially the most vulnerable children.
• It is not justifiable to abolish the confidential private communication guaranteed by the Basic Law by means of algorithms.

Sensible measures for children’s rights online and against cyber grooming:

• Effective age verification (in conformity with fundamental rights: without compulsory identification, without collecting biometric data, without interfering with encrypted communication), in both directions (hiding content from younger users; preventing older users from accessing content used by children).
• Security requirements and mandatory risk assessments for providers (hosting and social media platform providers)
• High-quality, sensitive moderation of chats
• Pattern analysis to detect groomers in order to block and/or report them
• Easily accessible reporting procedures for children and young people who need help
• Server side scanning of public platforms: Mandatory scanning of footage on platforms’ servers and filehosters (searching for known footage with hashes and new data with AI support)
• Establish a central authority (which, like NCMEC, collects data, develops strategies, supports new technical procedures, monitors companies and assists with risk assessments). This must be independent (especially from Europol) and work closely with child protection organisations.
• Invest more in research. Facts, data and figures are needed to put the broad discussion on a reliable basis.
• Strengthen investigative capacities
• Abuse material offered e.g. in closed groups, also on the darknet, could best be discovered by enabling investigators to “patrol” online more often. The legal possibilities to do so exist (e.g. offering artificially generated material as an “entry ticket”).
• Adequate funding for institutions that actively work for the protection of children
• Technical support through Quick-Freeze, governmental reporting centres on the net
• Hold providers accountable (track down/report/delete material, implement transparent protection concepts)
• Prevention and education (e.g. promotion of media literacy)
• Extend the exemption once again so that file hosters can scan their servers and report to the American non-governmental organisation NCMEC (permission is provided by an exception to a data protection regulation, the EU Privacy Directive). In this way, the BKA receives data from the NCMEC (National Center for Missing and Exploited Children) for further investigations.
• Pattern analysis for communication platforms (e.g. incident-related investigation if an account contacts other accounts that have reported abuse).
• Make platform operators more accountable. (In the area of monitoring interaction possibilities, in the case of offerings that are heavily frequented by children, behaviour that points to adult users, switching offerings to child-friendly as soon as their own systems assume that they are dealing with a child as a user).
• Offer an easily accessible explanation in plain language in addition to the imprint/general terms and conditions/privacy policy in order to explain the purpose and background of the website to children and to offer advice and help.
• In the case of providers of discounted “family accounts“, parents and their children would have to make the age statement (not changeable and possibly readable for apps for age verification)
• Focus on prevention, see also the EU Commission’s BIK (Better Internet for Kids) initiative.
• Deletion of illegal material instead of net blocks

Criticism:

• Rejection of the so-called “detection order” described as “chat control”. (At the end of an official and legal procedure to scan the communication of all customers of a provider for weeks and months).
• If service providers do not follow the requirements, the right of the customers is restricted (in the case of the Money Laundering Act, this would mean that the accounts of all customers are monitored if banks are negligent).
• The focus on a technical solution is too one-sided and remains blind to a problem that affects society as a whole.
• Trusting in technology that has the potential for mass surveillance is naïve and ignores the fundamental rights of all people.
• Trusting in a high hit rate of automated systems based on the information provided by the manufacturers is a mistake.
• The regulation focuses exclusively on the dissemination on the internet, but not on the actual production of sexualised violent depictions of children.
• Measures are inadequate to combat dissemination.
• The enormous amount of false reports hinders the investigation of the perpetrators.
• Depictions of sexualised violence by organised groups are hardly disseminated through the channels controlled by this law.
• Fundamental question of how an AI is supposed to distinguish between innocuous and sexualised communication. (Training with which data sets?)
• Technology cannot be a substitute but only a support for investigations.

patrick-breyer.de/en/statement…

📌 A partire dalle dalle 15.00 avrò il piacere di partecipare ai lavori del Convegno “Oltre i confini del web – le digital skills tra diritti, rischi e opportunità” organizzato da Unicollege SSML

guidoscorza.it/oltre-i-confini…

Le forze eritree ostacolano la visita del team di monitoraggio dell’Unione Africana – UA nel Tigray orientale

Kidu Gebretsadkan, capo della sicurezza della zona orientale del Tigray, in una telefonata con Tigrai TV, ha rivelato che alla missione di monitoraggio, verifica e conformità dell’Unione africana è stato negato l’ingresso nelle città di Zalambesa e Dewhan da parte delle forze eritree ancora presenti e occupanti diverse aree nella regione.

Giovedì 11 maggio 2023 la squadra dell’ UA si è recata in zona per verificare la presenza delle forze eritree nell’area e si è vista negare il passaggio dalle stesse forze ad un posto di blocco a Sobeya ed Engal nei pressi di Agarelokoma, Irob.

Il team di monitoraggio dell’ UA è stato creato in concomitanza della firma dell’ accordo di cessazione ostilità per il Tigray firmato il 2 novembre 2022 : il team è deputato a verificare gli sviluppi del processo di tregua sul campo che è subordinato ai punti vincolanti dell’accordo.

Secondo il capo della sicurezza, al checkpoint il team di monitoraggio e verifica ha anche incontrato membri dell’UNOCHA, che stavano trasportando aiuti per la popolazione di Irob e che allo stesso modo si sono visti negare il passaggio nell’area dalle forze eritree.

Il capo della sicurezza ha anche aggiunto che le forze eritree che operano nell’area stanno ancora commettendo crimini atroci tra cui esecuzione, stupro, distruzione di proprietà pubbliche, sparizione forzata e rapimento.

Anche le istituzioni pubbliche, tra cui 16 scuole e 4 centri sanitari nel distretto di Gulomekeda e 5 scuole e un centro sanitario nella città di Zalambessa, rimangono fuori servizio a causa dell’ambiente ostile nella zona.

FONTE: Tigrai TV

tommasin.org/blog/2023-05-12/e…

Today, the two lead committees of the European Parliament voted to fully ban biometric mass surveillance in Europe’s public spaces, namely by using the controversial facial recognition technology. The decision was taken by 57:36:10 votes. The committees also voted to ban Clearview AI-type facial recognition databases, biometric categorisation and emotion recognition in the proposed EU Act on Artificial Intelligence, as long advocated for by Pirate Party MEPs. The committee vote will need to be confirmed by all lawmakers in a plenary vote, and the Parliament will then need to negotiate a compromise with the second chamber representing national governments.

Patrick Breyer, Member of the European Parliament for the German Pirate Party and Greens/EFA leader of the campaign for a ban on biometric mass surveillance, comments:

“Today’s vote is a historic breakthrough for the movement to prevent a China-style dystopian future of biometric mass surveillance in Europe. There is no evidence whatsoever that this error-prone technology ever found a single terrorist. We will continue to fight against facial surveillance technology in our public spaces, because they wrongfully report large numbers of innocent citizens, systematically discriminate against under-represented groups and have a chilling effect on a free and diverse society. In the upcoming plenary vote, monitoring our behavior in public to report us for allegedly ‘abnormal’ activity needs to be added to the list of bans. This mass surveillance technology, which the French government plans to bring to Europe, chills diversity and pushes us into conformity, which is the opposite of the open society we want to live in.“

Marcel Kolaja, Member and Quaestor of the European Parliament and opinion rapporteur for the AI Act in the CULT Committee, comments:

“I believe that prohibiting real-time facial recognition systems, social credit scoring systems, or setting clear rules for technology to monitor students during online tests (e-proctoring) are the main achievements of the negotiated compromise on the AI Act. According to the new rules, artificial intelligence systems will not be able to discriminate against people or violate fundamental human rights. Especially e-proctoring systems became very popular in recent years with the rise of remote learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic. They can evaluate outputs from the camera and microphone on the student’s device, which can lead to mistaken conclusions about a student’s behavior. For example, the system may discriminate against people from poorer backgrounds who live in noisy environments or mistakenly identify a student with a disability or darker skin as cheating. That is why I am happy I was able to achieve including those technologies into the high risks category of AI systems.”

Full text adopted: europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/20… (bans on p. 128 pp.)

patrick-breyer.de/en/ai-act-le…

La moralità della consegna degli aiuti: il sistema del Programma alimentare mondiale punisce i bisognosi?

Analisi di Eden Kassa – 06/05/2023

Gli aiuti umanitari sono un’ancora di salvezza fondamentale per le persone bisognose, ma il furto e lo smarrimento possono mettere a rischio la vita. Ecco perché le organizzazioni umanitarie hanno implementato sistemi sofisticati per garantire che gli aiuti arrivino nelle mani giuste. Dall’attento monitoraggio alle misure di sicurezza ad alta tecnologia, questi sistemi sono essenziali per prevenire i furti e garantire una consegna efficiente. Tuttavia, il saccheggio degli aiuti può talvolta verificarsi a causa di motivi politici o criminali o circostanze estreme.In questi casi, potrebbero esserci soluzioni migliori rispetto alla soppressione degli aiuti. Invece, fornire più aiuti potrebbe essere la risposta.

Le organizzazioni umanitarie hanno implementato vari sistemi per prevenire il furto o lo smarrimento degli aiuti. Garantire che le risorse destinate ad aiutare le persone bisognose siano fornite in modo efficace ed efficiente è fondamentale. Questi sistemi includono un attento monitoraggio, misure di sicurezza e controlli regolari.

“La questione di come ridurre al minimo la corruzione pur rispondendo all’imperativo umanitario di soddisfare bisogni urgenti… La questione non è nuova”.

Uno dei sistemi più cruciali messi in atto è il monitoraggio della distribuzione degli aiuti. Le organizzazioni umanitarie spesso assegnano personale o assumono volontari locali per supervisionare la distribuzione degli aiuti e garantire che raggiunga i destinatari previsti. Questo processo può comportare il monitoraggio del movimento degli aiuti dai magazzini ai centri di distribuzione e, infine, ai beneficiari. Il monitoraggio può includere anche controlli a campione e visite di follow-up per garantire che gli aiuti vengano utilizzati come previsto.

Un altro sistema messo in atto sono le misure di sicurezza. Le organizzazioni umanitarie possono impiegare personale di sicurezza per proteggere le spedizioni di aiuti oi centri di distribuzione da furti o altre minacce. Possono anche utilizzare dispositivi di tracciamento GPS o sistemi di autenticazione biometrica per monitorare le spedizioni di aiuti e garantirne la consegna sicura.

Controlli regolari sono inoltre essenziali per prevenire il furto o lo smarrimento degli aiuti. Le organizzazioni umanitarie possono condurre audit interni o assumere revisori esterni per rivedere regolarmente i loro registri finanziari e le loro operazioni. Questi audit possono identificare eventuali irregolarità o discrepanze e garantire che le risorse degli aiuti vengano utilizzate come previsto.

Il successo di questi sistemi dipende da diversi fattori, tra cui l’efficacia del personale dell’organizzazione e del personale di sicurezza, l’affidabilità della tecnologia utilizzata e il contesto politico e sociale delle regioni in cui vengono erogati gli aiuti. Sebbene questi sistemi possano aiutare a prevenire il furto o lo smarrimento dell’assistenza, nessun sistema è infallibile e possono comunque verificarsi incidenti di furto o smarrimento.
Post su Twitter del maggio 2023 dopo che il Programma alimentare mondiale delle Nazioni Unite e USAID hanno annunciato la sospensione degli aiuti al Tigray, in Etiopia.

In una recente mossa che ha suscitato polemiche, il Programma Alimentare Mondiale (WFP) e l’Agenzia Statale per lo Sviluppo Internazionale (USAID) hanno sospeso la consegna degli aiuti al Tigray a causa di denunce di saccheggi e furti.

Approfondimento: Etiopia, la catastrofica crisi umanitaria del Tigray normalizzata dall’occidente

Mentre alcuni sostengono che la responsabilità sia necessaria per evitare che gli aiuti vengano rubati, altri temono che punire i bisognosi per le azioni di pochi non sia una soluzione praticabile. Le considerazioni etiche sulla consegna degli aiuti sono complesse, e giusto e sbagliato diventano relativi quando teniamo conto del contesto politico e sociale della regione. Il Programma alimentare mondiale avrebbe dovuto sospendere gli aiuti al Tigray o avrebbe potuto esserci un modo migliore per prevenire i furti e garantire la responsabilità senza punire i bisognosi? Partecipa alla conversazione utilizzando #AllowAccessToTigray mentre esploriamo le sfide etiche della fornitura di aiuti e cerchiamo di trovare soluzioni praticabili che bilancino la responsabilità con l’urgente necessità di salvare vite umane.
Post su Twitter del maggio 2023 dopo che il Programma alimentare mondiale delle Nazioni Unite e USAID hanno annunciato la sospensione degli aiuti al Tigray, in Etiopia.

FONTE: medium.com/@kassa83/the-morali…

tommasin.org/blog/2023-05-09/e…