Nella giornata odierna, il gruppo di hacker filorussi NoName057(16) ha lanciato un nuovo canale Telegram in lingua italiana. Il canale ha già visto la pubblicazione di diversi post riguardanti notizie politiche italiane, selezionate dal gruppo come esempi di presunta ostilità nei confronti della Russia. Questa nuova iniziativa segna un’espansione della loro campagna di propaganda, puntando direttamente al pubblico italiano.

Da tempo attivi nel panorama del cyber-attivismo, NoName057(16) si è distinto per una serie di attacchi DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) rivolti contro siti governativi, istituzionali e aziende private dei Paesi ritenuti ostili alla Russia.

L’apertura di un canale Telegram in italiano suggerisce un crescente interesse verso il nostro Paese, sia come target per attacchi informatici sia come potenziale bacino di reclutamento per il progetto DDoSia.

Chi sono gli hacktivisti filorussi di NoName057(16)?

NoName057(16) è un gruppo di hacktivisti filorussi, attivo dal marzo 2022, poco dopo l’invasione dell’Ucraina da parte della Russia. Il collettivo ha guadagnato notorietà per le sue campagne di attacchi DDoS contro infrastrutture critiche e istituzioni governative di diversi Paesi, con l’obiettivo di sabotare servizi e diffondere la loro propaganda.

I loro attacchi hanno preso di mira nazioni come Ucraina, Stati Uniti, Regno Unito, Polonia, Repubblica Ceca, Estonia e Italia, ovvero quei Paesi che hanno espresso il loro sostegno all’Ucraina nella guerra contro la Russia. NoName057(16) si autodefinisce un gruppo patriottico che difende gli interessi della Russia e combatte contro la “propaganda occidentale”.

Il manifesto di NoName057(16)

Il gruppo ha pubblicato un manifesto ideologico, disponibile su Telegram, in cui espone la propria visione del mondo e giustifica le proprie azioni. Nel testo emergono alcuni punti chiave:

• Internazionalismo – crediamo fermamente nella grandezza della Russia nell’arena internazionale. La nostra madrepatria è un baluardo di giustizia, che si ribella alle bugie e all’ipocrisia dell’Occidente collettivo. I combattenti del nostro esercito informatico possono vivere in paesi diversi, ma devono rispettare la Russia.
• Giustizia – uno dei nostri slogan è: “La giustizia non ha nome. “NoName”. Siamo pronti a venire in aiuto delle persone che la pensano come noi in qualsiasi parte del mondo e a fare ogni tentativo per ripristinare la giustizia e punire i loro trasgressori. Aiutiamo coloro che sono più deboli e impariamo da coloro che sono più forti.
• Unità – non ci importa che colore abbia la tua pelle, forma degli occhi, lingua o del luogo di residenza abbiano i nostri combattenti. Una cosa è importante: che siano persone con idee simili alle nostre e che condividano i valori tradizionali della Russia. La parola “russo” ha cessato di essere una nazionalità. “Russo” è ora un’ideologia. L’ideologia di un giusto ordine mondiale e della libertà.

Il tono del manifesto è fortemente propagandistico, con una retorica che mira a giustificare le loro azioni come una forma di resistenza contro un’ipotetica aggressione occidentale.

Il progetto DDoSia: la cyber-armata filorussa

Uno degli strumenti principali di NoName057(16) è il progetto DDoSia, un progetto che consente di coordinare attacchi DDoS su larga scala contro siti web ritenuti ostili alla Russia.

DDoSia è una piattaforma basata su reclutamento di volontari, i quali possono scaricare un software fornito dal gruppo per partecipare attivamente agli attacchi. Più un utente contribuisce agli attacchi, più guadagna in criptovalute. Questo modello di ricompensa ha permesso al gruppo di costruire una rete di cyber-mercenari che, dietro compenso, eseguono attacchi contro obiettivi selezionati.

La particolarità di DDoSia sta nel suo approccio decentralizzato: chiunque può partecipare, senza bisogno di grandi competenze informatiche. Il progetto è strutturato in modo da essere accessibile a un vasto pubblico, rendendo possibile un’ampia mobilitazione contro i bersagli indicati dal gruppo.

Un nuovo fronte della cyber propaganda

L’apertura del nuovo canale Telegram in lingua italiana rafforza l’ipotesi di un aumento della minaccia di NoName057(16) sul territorio italiano, suggerendo un tentativo di espandere la propaganda e il reclutamento in Italia.

Con il lancio di questo canale Telegram in italiano, NoName057(16) non si limita più a colpire obiettivi istituzionali tramite attacchi DDoS, ma sta cercando di influenzare direttamente l’opinione pubblica.

Diffondere contenuti in lingua locale permette loro di:

• Legittimare la loro narrativa agli occhi di un pubblico italiano, cercando di attirare simpatizzanti.
• Diffondere disinformazione su tematiche politiche e internazionali, influenzando il dibattito pubblico.
• Reclutare nuovi membri per il progetto DDoSia o per altre attività legate alla loro causa.

Negli ultimi mesi, attacchi DDoS eseguiti dai NoName hanno già preso di mira diversi siti italiani, tra cui istituzioni governative e aziende strategiche. Le autorità italiane e gli esperti di sicurezza informatica devono monitorare attentamente questi sviluppi, poiché un coinvolgimento più attivo di NoName057(16) in Italia potrebbe:

• Aumentare il numero di attacchi contro siti italiani nei prossimi mesi.
• Esporre utenti italiani a tentativi di reclutamento, soprattutto su Telegram.
• Favorire la diffusione di disinformazione all’interno dell’ecosistema digitale italiano.

NoName057(16) ha dimostrato nel tempo di essere uno dei gruppi hacktivisti filorussi più attivi e pericolosi e duraturi, con una strategia che combina attacchi informatici e propaganda digitale. L’apertura di un canale Telegram in italiano rappresenta un passo significativo nella loro espansione, indicando un interesse crescente verso il nostro Paese.

La sfida ora è capire quanto questa iniziativa possa influenzare il panorama italiano e come le istituzioni possano contrastare la loro azione, proteggendo sia le infrastrutture digitali sia il dibattito pubblico dalla loro propaganda.

L'articolo Gli hacker filorussi di NoName057(16) aprono un canale Telegram in italiano proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

Se volete farvi un regalo, vi consiglio di ascoltare questa interessantissima puntata de "il Mondo", che ascolto quasi tutte le mattine e trovo molto utile per approfondire alcune notizie.

In questa puntata si parla delle ragioni che hanno portato la #spagna ad essere una delle economie maggiormente in crescita nel 2024, ma c'è anche molto di più.

Nella seconda parte viene esposto un ragionamento sul clima che condivido e trovo interessantissimo, sul ruolo di Musk, sul catastrofico ruolo degli Stati Uniti e sulla generale indifferenza di tutti, cittadini ed istituzioni europee.

Crudo, ma da ascoltare per cominciare a cambiare.

Ascoltate e condividetene tutti 😊

Internazionale

2025-02-17 08:57:09

Nella puntata di oggi del Mondo: l’economia spagnola va sempre meglio. Come far ripartire la lotta al cambiamento climatico. Con Mariangela Paone e Ferdinando Cotugno.

Il Mondo

Il Mondo

Il podcast quotidiano di Internazionale. Tutte le mattine alle 6. 30 con Claudio Rossi Marcelli e Giulia Zoli. Scegli una prospettiva più ampia sul mondo.

^{Internazionale}

Large language models (LLMs) are all the rage in the generative AI world these days, with the truly large ones like GPT, LLaMA, and others using tens or even hundreds of billions of parameters to churn out their text-based responses. These typically require glacier-melting amounts of computing hardware, but the “large” in “large language models” doesn’t really need to be that big for there to be a functional, useful model. LLMs designed for limited hardware or consumer-grade PCs are available now as well, but [Binh] wanted something even smaller and more portable, so he put an LLM on a USB stick.

This USB stick isn’t just a jump drive with a bit of memory on it, though. Inside the custom 3D printed case is a Raspberry Pi Zero W running llama.cpp, a lightweight, high-performance version of LLaMA. Getting it on this Pi wasn’t straightforward at all, though, as the latest version of llama.cpp is meant for ARMv8 and this particular Pi was running the ARMv6 instruction set. That meant that [Binh] needed to change the source code to remove the optimizations for the more modern ARM machines, but with a week’s worth of effort spent on it he finally got the model on the older Raspberry Pi.

Getting the model to run was just one part of this project. The rest of the build was ensuring that the LLM could run on any computer without drivers and be relatively simple to use. By setting up the USB device as a composite device which presents a filesystem to the host computer, all a user has to do to interact with the LLM is to create an empty text file with a filename, and the LLM will automatically fill the file with generated text. While it’s not blindingly fast, [Binh] believes this is the first plug-and-play USB-based LLM, and we’d have to agree. It’s not the least powerful computer to ever run an LLM, though. That honor goes to this project which is able to cram one on an ESP32.

youtube.com/embed/SM-fFsE9EDU?…

hackaday.com/2025/02/17/usb-st…

Gli hacker di NoName057(16) riavviano le loro attività ostili contro diversi obiettivi italiani, attraverso attacchi di Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS). Questa volta la ritorsione è contro le frasi del presidente Setrgio Mattarella. Infatti gli hacktivisti riportano sul loro canale telegram il seguente commento:
Il Presidente italiano Sergio Mattarella ha paragonato la Russia al Terzo Reich, provocando una dura reazione da parte del Ministero degli Esteri russo. Mosca ha già promesso che tali dichiarazioni non resteranno senza conseguenze🤬

L'Italia riceve da noi missili DDoS verso i suoi siti web per tali paragoni del russofobo Mattarella
NoName057(16) è un gruppo di hacker che si è dichiarato a marzo del 2022 a supporto della Federazione Russa. Ha rivendicato la responsabilità di attacchi informatici a paesi come l’Ucraina, gli Stati Uniti e altri vari paesi europei compresa l’Italia.

Questi attacchi vengono in genere eseguiti su agenzie governative, media e siti Web di società private. Questi sono i siti che a detta di NoName057(16) sono andati giù nella giornata di oggi.
❌Acqua Novara - servizi idrici
check-host.net/check-report/232ca8fbk19a

❌Acque Veronesi, società di gestione integrata delle acque
check-host.net/check-report/232caa84k651

❌Intesa Sanpaolo (morto al ping)
check-host.net/check-report/232cabb5k642

❌Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.
check-host.net/check-report/232cad71k36e

❌Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.
check-host.net/check-report/232caf32k392

❌Autorizzazione tramite il portale Intesa Sanpaolo
check-host.net/check-report/232cb039k5e2

❌Immobiliare Intesa Sanpaolo
check-host.net/check-report/232cb242kdd3

❌APS - Azienda di autobus di Siena
check-host.net/check-report/232cb5a6k3c9

❌ATAP - Azienda di autobus di Torino (morta al ping)
check-host.net/check-report/232cb7bfke8c

❌Malpensa - Aeroporto di Milano che serve voli internazionali e nazionali (morto su ping)
check-host.net/check-report/232cba2eka0a

Che cos’è un attacco Distributed Denial of Service

Un attacco DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) è un tipo di attacco informatico in cui vengono inviate una grande quantità di richieste a un server o a un sito web da molte macchine diverse contemporaneamente, al fine di sovraccaricare le risorse del server e renderlo inaccessibile ai suoi utenti legittimi.

Queste richieste possono essere inviate da un grande numero di dispositivi infetti da malware e controllati da un’organizzazione criminale, da una rete di computer compromessi chiamata botnet, o da altre fonti di traffico non legittime. L’obiettivo di un attacco DDoS è spesso quello di interrompere le attività online di un’organizzazione o di un’azienda, o di costringerla a pagare un riscatto per ripristinare l’accesso ai propri servizi online.

Gli attacchi DDoS possono causare danni significativi alle attività online di un’organizzazione, inclusi tempi di inattività prolungati, perdita di dati e danni reputazionali. Per proteggersi da questi attacchi, le organizzazioni possono adottare misure di sicurezza come la limitazione del traffico di rete proveniente da fonti sospette, l’utilizzo di servizi di protezione contro gli attacchi DDoS o la progettazione di sistemi resistenti agli attacchi DDoS.

Occorre precisare che gli attacchi di tipo DDoS, seppur provocano un disservizio temporaneo ai sistemi, non hanno impatti sulla Riservatezza e Integrità dei dati, ma solo sulla loro disponibilità. pertanto una volta concluso l’attacco DDoS, il sito riprende a funzionare esattamente come prima.

Che cos’è l’hacktivismo cibernetico

L’hacktivismo cibernetico è un movimento che si serve delle tecniche di hacking informatico per promuovere un messaggio politico o sociale. Gli hacktivisti usano le loro abilità informatiche per svolgere azioni online come l’accesso non autorizzato a siti web o a reti informatiche, la diffusione di informazioni riservate o il blocco dei servizi online di una determinata organizzazione.

L’obiettivo dell’hacktivismo cibernetico è di sensibilizzare l’opinione pubblica su questioni importanti come la libertà di espressione, la privacy, la libertà di accesso all’informazione o la lotta contro la censura online. Gli hacktivisti possono appartenere a gruppi organizzati o agire individualmente, ma in entrambi i casi utilizzano le loro competenze informatiche per creare un impatto sociale e politico.

È importante sottolineare che l’hacktivismo cibernetico non deve essere confuso con il cybercrime, ovvero la pratica di utilizzare le tecniche di hacking per scopi illeciti come il furto di dati personali o finanziari. Mentre il cybercrime è illegale, l’hacktivismo cibernetico può essere considerato legittimo se mira a portare all’attenzione pubblica questioni importanti e a favorire il dibattito democratico. Tuttavia, le azioni degli hacktivisti possono avere conseguenze legali e gli hacktivisti possono essere perseguiti per le loro azioni.

Chi sono gli hacktivisti di NoName057(16)

NoName057(16) è un gruppo di hacker che si è dichiarato a marzo del 2022 a supporto della Federazione Russa. Hanno rivendicato la responsabilità di attacchi informatici a paesi come l’Ucraina, gli Stati Uniti e altri vari paesi europei. Questi attacchi vengono in genere eseguiti su agenzie governative, media e siti Web di società private

Le informazioni sugli attacchi effettuati da NoName057(16) sono pubblicate nell’omonimo canale di messaggistica di Telegram. Secondo i media ucraini, il gruppo è anche coinvolto nell’invio di lettere di minaccia ai giornalisti ucraini. Gli hacker hanno guadagnato la loro popolarità durante una serie di massicci attacchi DDOS sui siti web lituani.

Le tecniche di attacco DDoS utilizzate dal gruppo sono miste, prediligendo la “Slow http attack”.

La tecnica del “Slow Http Attack”

L’attacco “Slow HTTP Attack” (l’articolo completo a questo link) è un tipo di attacco informatico che sfrutta una vulnerabilità dei server web. In questo tipo di attacco, l’attaccante invia molte richieste HTTP incomplete al server bersaglio, con lo scopo di tenere occupate le connessioni al server per un periodo prolungato e impedire l’accesso ai legittimi utenti del sito.

Nello specifico, l’attacco Slow HTTP sfrutta la modalità di funzionamento del protocollo HTTP, che prevede che una richiesta HTTP sia composta da tre parti: la richiesta, la risposta e il corpo del messaggio. L’attaccante invia molte richieste HTTP incomplete, in cui il corpo del messaggio viene inviato in modo molto lento o in modo incompleto, bloccando la connessione e impedendo al server di liberare le risorse necessarie per servire altre richieste.

Questo tipo di attacco è particolarmente difficile da rilevare e mitigare, poiché le richieste sembrano legittime, ma richiedono un tempo eccessivo per essere elaborate dal server. Gli attacchi Slow HTTP possono causare tempi di risposta molto lenti o tempi di inattività del server, rendendo impossibile l’accesso ai servizi online ospitati su quel sistema.

Per proteggersi da questi attacchi, le organizzazioni possono implementare soluzioni di sicurezza come l’uso di firewall applicativi (web application firewall o WAF), la limitazione delle connessioni al server e l’utilizzo di sistemi di rilevamento e mitigazione degli attacchi DDoS

L'articolo Gli Hacker di NoName057(16) Contro Sergio Mattarella: Attacchi DDoS Inondano l’Italia proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

Last year, we saw [How To Make Everything’s] take on [DaVinci’s] machine for cutting threads. However, they stopped short of the goal, which was making accurate metal screw threads. After much experimentation, they have a working solution. In fact, they tried several different methods, each with varying degrees of success.

Some of the more unusual methods included heating a bar red hot and twisting it, and casting a screw out of bronze. The last actually worked well with a normal screw as the mold, although presumably, a good wood or wax shape would have resulted in a workable mold, too.

The real goal, though, was to make the DaVinci machine more capable on its own. The machine uses leadscrews and can cut its own leadscrews, so, in theory, if you improve the machine, it can cut better components for itself, which may make it possible to cut even better leadscrews.

The reality was the machine required some significant rework to correctly cut metal threads. But it does, as you can see in the video below. With some additional scaling of gears, they were able to cut a 20 TPI threaded rod that would take an off-the-shelf nut.

If you missed the original post on the machine, you can still go back and read it. Of course, once you have a threaded rod, you are just a few steps away from a tap, too.

youtube.com/embed/iDiqUx6joOQ?…

hackaday.com/2025/02/16/davinc…

Il Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) ha scoperto una sofisticata campagna di phishing in corso che sfrutta gli inviti di Microsoft Teams per ottenere l’accesso non autorizzato agli account utente e ai dati sensibili.

La campagna, attribuita al gruppo Storm-2372, è attiva dall’agosto 2024 e ha preso di mira un’ampia gamma di settori, tra cui governo, difesa, sanità, tecnologia ed energia in Europa, Nord America, Africa e Medio Oriente.

Il metodo di Storm-2372 si basa sul phishing del codice del dispositivo, una tecnica in cui l’autore della minaccia utilizza falsi inviti a riunioni per indurre gli utenti a fornire token di autenticazione.

Dopo aver ricevuto un invito, gli utenti ignari vengono reindirizzati a una pagina di autenticazione legittima e invitati a immettere un codice dispositivo generato dall’aggressore.

I token rubati consentono all’aggressore di accedere agli account della vittima senza richiedere una password , garantendo l’accesso a e-mail sensibili, storage cloud e altri servizi.

Una volta verificata la violazione iniziale, si osserva che Storm-2372 si sposta lateralmente all’interno delle reti compromesse inviando ulteriori e-mail di phishing dagli account delle vittime.

L’aggressore ha sfruttato anche la Graph API di Microsoft per cercare informazioni sensibili, estraendo dati utilizzando parole chiave come “password”, “admin” e “credenziali”.

Tra i recenti aggiornamenti alle tattiche del gruppo rientra l’uso dell’ID client di Microsoft Authentication Broker per registrare i dispositivi controllati dagli attori, consentendo un accesso persistente e un’ulteriore escalation.

Microsoft ha collegato Storm-2372 agli interessi dello Stato russo a causa dei suoi schemi di attacco e delle sue tecniche operative.

L'articolo Microsoft Teams sotto attacco: Gli hacker russi rubano credenziali con falsi inviti proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

If there are to be yet unimagined weapons affecting the balance of military power tomorrow, we want to have the men and the means to imagine them first.
—JAMES KILLIAN, science adviser to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956

Science as science should no longer be served; indeed scientists ought to be made to serve.
—WILLIAM H. GODEL, former deputy director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1975

Guns and Money

In June 1961, William Godel set off on a secret mission to Vietnam carrying a briefcase stuffed with cash. At a stopover in Hawaii, he converted some of the cash to traveler’s checks to make space for a small bottle of liquor that he carried with him on business trips. Even that did not quite leave enough room, so he moved some of his secret Pentagon papers to another case to make space for the bottle. The money, $18,000, was for a classified project that would play a critical role in President John F. Kennedy’s plan to battle communism in Southeast Asia.
At thirty-nine years old, Godel still wore the short buzz cut of his Marine Corps days, but his reputation had been forged in the world of intelligence. A drinker, a practical joker, and a master bureaucratic negotiator, Godel was the type of man who could one day offer to detonate a nuclear bomb in the Indian Ocean to make a crater for the National Security Agency’s new radio telescope and the next day persuade the president to launch the world’s first communications satellite to broadcast a Christmas greeting. Colleagues described him as someone you could drop in a foreign country, and a few months later he would emerge with signed agreements in hand, whether it was for secret radar tracking stations— something he did indeed set up in Turkey and Australia —or, in this case, winning the support of South Vietnam’s president for a new American proposal. Bill Bundy, a former CIA official and White House adviser, called Godel an “operator” with a “rather legendary reputation for effectiveness” working overseas.
At five feet ten inches tall, Godel was not a physically imposing figure, but he had a way of impressing both admirers and enemies with his presence. “He was one of the more glamorous people to stride the halls of the Pentagon,” recalled Lee Huff, who was recruited by Godel to the Defense Department. Godel was never the most famous man in the Pentagon, but for several years he was one of its most influential. And by the early 1960s, that influence was focused on Southeast Asia.
Godel arrived to the summer heat of Saigon, a congested city of semi-controlled chaos where cycle rickshaws, bicycles, mopeds, cars, and other motorized contraptions wove through the packed streets like schools of fish in a sea. The city was booming economically and culturally, even as it attracted an increasing number of American military advisers, spooks, and diplomats, who were looking to advise South Vietnam’s president on how best to run his newly independent country.
Parisian-style sidewalk cafés still dotted the main city streets, and the city’s French colonial heritage was reflected in everything from the fresh baguettes in the local bakeries to the city’s grand villas. Vietnamese women dressed in the "áo dài", the formfitting silk dress worn over pantaloons, mixed easily with teenage girls clad in miniskirts. It was still several years before the influx of American troops would provide a boon to the city’s brothels, or frequent Vietcong terrorist attacks in Saigon would drive patrons away from sidewalk cafés, but signs of that unrest were on the horizon. In December of the previous year, the Vietcong bombed the kitchen of the Saigon Golf Club, marking the start of a series of terrorist attacks in the capital. In neighboring Laos, a civil war fueled by Soviet and American involvement was spilling over into Vietnam. More disquieting was that the Vietcong, the communist insurgents in South Vietnam, were getting weapons from North Vietnam, using the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the illicit supply route that snaked through Vietnam’s mountains and jungle, and parts of Laos.
Godel had been traveling frequently to Vietnam for more than a decade. What made this trip unusual was that he was now working for the Advanced Research Projects Agency, known by its acronym, ARPA. Founded in 1958 to get America into space after the Soviets launched the world’s first artificial satellite, ARPA had lost its space mission after less than two years. Now the young organization, hated by the military and distrusted by the intelligence community, was struggling to find a new role for itself. Godel figured if ARPA could not battle the communists in space, perhaps it could beat them in the jungles. President Kennedy had taken office just five months prior and was still in the process of formulating a new policy for Southeast Asia. He had already decided to support South Vietnam’s anticommunist president, Ngo Dinh Diem, a Catholic who hailed from a family of Mandarins, the bureaucrats who ran Vietnam under Chinese rule. The month before Godel’s trip, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson visited South Vietnam’s president, calling Diem the “Winston Churchill of Asia,” and in April, Kennedy sent four hundred Green Berets to South Vietnam to serve as special advisers, helping to train the South Vietnamese military and the Montagnards, the indigenous tribes who lived in the country’s central plains. Diem was a deeply religious man, a lifelong bachelor who chose politics over the priesthood. Some in Western circles regarded him as an out-of-touch crackpot; others, like Godel, saw him as a flawed but promising leader. In the early 1960s, South Vietnam was already battling a communist insurgency, but it was a war being fought in the shadows; that summer, astronauts and celebrities still dominated the covers of Life and Time magazines. Yet there were hints that this new conflict was beginning to occupy America’s leaders in Washington. The October 27, 1961, cover of Life magazine featured a soldier peering out from jungle underbrush with the caption “GI trains for guerilla warfare.” The cover lines read, “Vietnam: Our Next Showdown.” Guerrilla warfare was precisely why Godel was in Vietnam. The money he carried with him to Saigon was a down payment on an initial $20 million that the American government expected to allocate for a combat center to develop technology suited for fighting insurgents in Vietnam’s jungles. Located in Saigon and run by ARPA, the combat center would be used to help American military advisers and South Vietnam’s military. Godel, however, was not just focused on Vietnam; ARPA’s Combat Development and Test Center was the starting point for a global solution to counterinsurgency, relying on science and technology to guide the way.
The cash in Godel’s bag, and his list of proposals for Diem, would alter the course of events in Vietnam and more broadly lay the groundwork for modern warfare. From stealthy helicopters that would slip over the border of Pakistan on a hunt for Osama bin Laden to a worldwide campaign using drones to conduct targeted killings, Godel’s wartime experiments would later become military technologies that changed the way America wages war. His programs in Vietnam, many of which arose from that meeting with Diem, would be credited with some of the best and worst military innovations of the century. Within just a few months of that trip, Godel would bring over to Vietnam a new gun better suited for jungle warfare, the Armalite AR-15. He would also send social scientists to Vietnam, hoping that a better understanding of the people and culture would stem the insurgency. Some of Godel’s work became infamous, like a plan to relocate Vietnamese peasants to new fortified villages, known as strategic hamlets. That plan became one of the more resounding failures of the war. Similarly, ARPA’s introduction to Vietnam of chemical defoliants, including "Agent Orange", is now held responsible for countless deaths and illnesses among Vietnamese and Americans.
At its height, the ARPA program he established employed hundreds of people spread across Southeast Asia —more than five hundred in Thailand alone—and then expanded later to the Middle East. The program sought to understand the roots of insurgency and develop methods to prevent it so that American forces would not have to get involved in regional wars they were unprepared to fight. ARPA developed new technologies, sponsored social science research, and published books on counterinsurgency warfare that would later influence a new generation of military leaders fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. More than any single technology, Godel’s single-minded promotion of the need to understand the nature of guerrilla warfare would have an impact decades later, when the army general David Petraeus, and his advisers known as the “strategic whizzes,” found themselves studying the writing of David Galula, whose seminal work, 'Pacification in Algeria', was published in 1963, paid for by ARPA. Four decades before Petraeus made “counterinsurgency” a household phrase, Godel created a worldwide research program dedicated to insurgent warfare that dwarfed anything done in the years after 9/11.
The nascent counterinsurgency program Godel started inadvertently played a critical role in shaping the future agency whose name would become synonymous with innovation. The Vietnam counterinsurgency work eventually became the backbone of ARPA’s "Tactical Technology Office", the seminal division that would produce stealth aircraft, precision weaponry, and drones—the fundamentals of the modern battlefield. The space age might have given birth to ARPA, but Vietnam thrust the agency into the center of Cold War strategic debates, and it was Godel, more than any other ARPA official, who shaped the agency’s future.
Yet it was not all counterinsurgency. In the early 1960s, the esoteric agency Godel helped build was planting the seeds for work that would bear fruit many years later. In the first two years, Godel helped create the agency’s space program, providing cover to the world’s first reconnaissance satellite, a top secret project. He also persuaded the president to launch the world’s first communications satellite and helped build a worldwide network for nuclear test monitoring. By the end of the decade, a descendant of one of ARPA’s first projects, the "Saturn rocket", would launch Neil Armstrong and the other Apollo 11 astronauts on their journey to the moon. And just a month before Godel traveled to Vietnam, ARPA was handed a new assignment in "command and control", which would in less than a decade grow into the ARPANET, the predecessor to the modern Internet. The following year, Godel personally signed off on the first computer-networking study, giving it money from his Vietnam budget.
Godel’s seminal role was largely expunged from the record in later years, and his name rarely mentioned in official materials, forgotten except by a few loyal friends and dedicated enemies. The AR-15, the weapon that Godel personally carried over to Vietnam, eventually became the M16, the standard-issue infantry weapon for the entire U.S. military. The rest of Godel’s Vietnam-era work would be dismissed as a onetime diversion for an agency now more closely associated with high technology than strategic thinking. His story did not fit an agency touted as a model for innovation. Yet the real key to the ARPA legacy lies in understanding how all these varied projects—satellites, drones, and computers— could come to exist in a single agency.
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The Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) sits on a compound in Langley, Virginia, made famous by countless movies and television shows. The NSA’s massive headquarters is ringed by barbed wire and located on a military base in Maryland. Yet the agency responsible for some of the most important military and civil technologies of the past hundred years resides in relative obscurity behind a generic glass facade at 675 North Randolph Street in Arlington, Virginia. The unremarkable office tower stands across from a dying four-level brown-brick shopping mall that houses a mix of fast-food restaurants and discount stores.
Behind the nondescript exterior of the office building, just beyond the guards, is a panoramic wall display that covers more than fifty years of the agency’s history. It begins in the fall of 1957, when the Soviet Union launched the first man-made satellite into orbit. "Sputnik", as the satellite was called in the West, did little more than emit a simple beep. But that beach-ball-size sphere orbiting harmlessly around the earth touched off a storm of news reports that shook the American people’s feeling of invulnerability by demonstrating that the Soviet Union might soon be able to launch a nuclear-armed missile that could reach the continental United States.
?As the story goes, Sputnik sparked a national hysteria, and the American public demanded that the government take action. In response, President Dwight Eisenhower in early 1958 authorized the establishment of a central research agency independent from the military services, whose bickering had contributed to the Soviet Union’s lead in space. This new agency, called the Advanced Research Projects Agency, was the nation’s first space agency—established eight months before the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or NASA. The organization today known as DARPA—the D for “Defense” was added in 1972 (and then dropped, and added again in later years)—has grown into an approximately $3-billion-a-year research agency, with projects that have ranged from space planes to cyborg insects. The display in the lobby is a monument to more than fifty years of this unusual government agency, which has produced marvelous and sometimes terrifying technological achievements: precision weapons, drones, robots, and networked computing, to name a few. By thinking about fundamental problems of national security, DARPA created solutions that did far more than give the military a few novel weapons. In some cases, the agency changed the nature of warfare; in others, it helped prevent the nation from going to war.
By thinking about how to deal with Soviet conventional military superiority without resorting to nuclear weapons, it introduced the era of precision weaponry. By looking for ways to detect underground nuclear explosions, it revolutionized the field of seismology and enabled the negotiation of critical arms control treaties. And by exploring ways to improve nuclear command and control, it created the ARPANET, the precursor to the modern Internet.
Not all solutions are so tidy, however. In trying to tackle the problem of communist insurgency, DARPA embarked on a decade-long worldwide experiment that ended in failure. It is tempting to carve out unsuccessful work, like the counterinsurgency programs, by claiming this was an aberration in the agency’s history. Here we argue, however, that DARPA’s Vietnam War work and the ARPANET were not two distinct threads but rather pieces of a larger tapestry that held the agency together. What made DARPA successful was its ability to tackle some of the most critical national security problems facing the United States, unencumbered by the typical bureaucratic oversight and uninhibited by the restraints of scientific peer review. DARPA’s history of innovation is more closely tied to this turbulent period in the 1960s and early 1970s, when it delved into questions of nuclear warfare and counterinsurgency, than to its brief life as a “space agency.” Those two crucial decades represent a time when senior Pentagon officials believed the agency should play a critical role in shaping world events, rather than just develop technological novelties.
The Internet and the agency’s Vietnam War work were proposed solutions to critical problems: one was a world-changing success, and the other a catastrophic failure. That muddied history of Vietnam and counterinsurgency might not fit well with DARPA’s creation story, but it is the key to understanding its legacy. It is also the history that is often the most challenging to get many former agency officials to address. DARPA may brag about its willingness to fail, but that does not mean that it is eager to have those failures examined.
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DARPA is now more than sixty years old, and much of its history has never been recorded in any systematic way. One effort was made, in 1973, when DARPA approached its fifteenth anniversary. Stephen Lukasik, then the director, commissioned an independent history of the agency to better understand its origins and purpose. The final document was regarded as so sensitive that the authors were only authorized to make six copies, all of which had to be handed over to the government. Although it was supposed to be an unclassified history, the new director was aghast at what he felt was an overly personal account; he stamped the final product as classified and locked it away. It took more than a decade for it to be released.
Agencies, like people, make sense of themselves through stories. And like people, they are selective about the facts that go into their stories, and as time passes, the stories are increasingly suspect and often apocryphal. No other research organization has a history as rich, complex, important, and at times strange as DARPA. Whether it was a mechanical elephant to trudge through the jungles of Vietnam or a jet pack for Special Forces, DARPA’s projects have been ambitious, sometimes to the point of absurdity. Some of these fanciful ideas, like the concept of an invisible aircraft named after a fictional, eight-foot-tall rabbit, actually succeeded, but many more failed. At some point, the successes, and the failures, began to get smaller, because the problems assigned to the agency grew narrower. The key to DARPA’s success in the past was not just its flexibility but also its focus on solving high-level national security problems. DARPA today runs the risk of irrelevancy, creating marvelous innovations that have, unlike previous years, little impact on either the way the military fights or the way we live our lives. The price of success is failure, and the price of an important success is a significant failure, and the consequences of both should be weighed in assessing any institution’s legacy. Conversely, if the stakes are not high, then neither the successes nor the failures matter, and that is where the agency is in danger of heading today, investing in technological novelties that are unlikely to have a significant impact on national security.
Current DARPA officials may disagree with this pessimistic assessment of the agency’s current role or argue about which failures, and successes, should be highlighted. Yet the research for our work is based on thousands of pages of documents, many recently declassified, held in archives around the country, and hundreds of hours of interviews with former DARPA officials. Most past directors share a very similar sentiment: DARPA continues to produce good solutions to problems, but the problems it is assigned, or assigns itself, are no longer critical to national security. To understand why this narrowing of scope happened, it is important to examine the real history of DARPA. The agency’s origins may begin with the space race, but DARPA’s legacy lies elsewhere.
Godel and his trip to Vietnam were seminal to the agency’s history—both its high and its low points. That trip helped create the modern agency and its greatest and worst legacies. Yet Godel’s story is one that DARPA officials today do not talk about, or even know about. It is a story buried in long-forgotten court records and has been nearly written out of the agency’s history, because it no longer fits the narrative of DARPA as an agency dedicated to technological surprise. Yet it is a story that illustrates the true tensions within DARPA, an agency

#ARPA #DARPA #USA #Vietnam #ColdWar #history

Pare che la canzone di Cristicchi a #Sanremo abbia commosso un sacco di gente. Ho persino letto un articolo che, parlando di lui, menzionava il "grande cantautorato".
Ma davvero? A mio modesto parere, la canzone è di una banalità disarmante.

Forse perché mia mamma ci ha cresciuti a pane e De André (& co.), ma per me il grande cantautorato ha un livello un po’ più alto.
Sullo stesso tema, per esempio, si potrebbe citare "Dimentica una cosa al giorno" di Vecchioni, che secondo me ha tutt’altra profondità.

E Fedez? (va beh.. non è certo un cantante che seguo). Ma se proprio voglio ascoltare qualcosa che parli di salute mentale, preferisco canzoni dall’album di Alanis Morissette "Such Pretty Forks in the Road", che mi ha accompagnata e, per certi versi, aiutata durante il burnout.