Attacks that leverage malicious open-source packages are becoming a major and growing threat. This type of attacks currently seems commonplace, with reports of infected packages in repositories like PyPI or npm appearing almost daily. It would seem that increased scrutiny from researchers on these repositories should have long ago minimized the profits for cybercriminals trying to make a fortune from malicious packages. However, our investigation into a recent cyberincident once again confirmed that open-source packages remain an attractive way for attackers to make easy money.

Infected out of nowhere

In June 2025, a blockchain developer from Russia reached out to us after falling victim to a cyberattack. He’d had around $500,000 in crypto assets stolen from him. Surprisingly, the victim’s operating system had been installed only a few days prior. Nothing but essential and popular apps had been downloaded to the machine. The developer was well aware of the cybersecurity risks associated with crypto transactions, so he was vigilant and carefully reviewed his every step while working online. Additionally, he used free online services for malware detection to protect his system, but no commercial antivirus software.

The circumstances of the infection piqued our interest, and we decided to investigate the origins of the incident. After obtaining a disk image of the infected system, we began our analysis.

Syntax highlighting with a catch

As we examined the files on the disk, a file named extension.js caught our attention. We found it at %userprofile%\.cursor\extensions\solidityai.solidity-1.0.9-universal\src\extension.js. Below is a snippet of its content:

A request sent by the extension to the server

This screenshot clearly shows the code requesting and executing a PowerShell script from the web server angelic[.]su: a sure sign of malware.

It turned out that extension.js was a component of the Solidity Language extension for the Cursor AI IDE, which is based on Visual Studio Code and designed for AI-assisted development. The extension is available in the Open VSX registry, used by Cursor AI, and was published about two months ago. At the time this research, the extension had been downloaded 54,000 times. The figure was likely inflated. According to the description, the extension offers numerous features to optimize work with Solidity smart contract code, specifically syntax highlighting:

The extension’s description in the Open VSX registry

We analyzed the code of every version of this extension and confirmed that it was a fake: neither syntax highlighting nor any of the other claimed features were implemented in any version. The extension has nothing to do with smart contracts. All it does is download and execute malicious code from the aforementioned web server. Furthermore, we discovered that the description of the malicious plugin was copied by the attackers from the page of a legitimate extension, which had 61,000 downloads.

How the extension got on the computer

So, we found that the malicious extension had 54,000 downloads, while the legitimate one had 61,000. But how did the attackers manage to lull the developer’s vigilance? Why would he download a malicious extension with fewer downloads than the original?

We found out that while trying to install a Solidity code syntax highlighter, the developer searched the extension registry for solidity. This query returned the following:

Search results for “solidity”: the malicious (red) and legitimate (green) extensions

In the search results, the malicious extension appeared fourth, while the legitimate one was only in eighth place. Thus, while reviewing the search results, the developer clicked the first extension in the list with a significant number of downloads – which unfortunately proved to be the malicious one.

The ranking algorithm trap

How did the malicious extension appear higher in search results than the legitimate one, especially considering it had fewer downloads? It turns out the Open VSX registry ranks search results by relevance, which considers multiple factors, such as the extension rating, how recently it was published or updated, the total number of downloads, and whether the extension is verified. Consequently, the ranking is determined by a combination of factors: for example, an extension with a low number of downloads can still appear near the top of search results if that metric is offset by its recency. This is exactly what happened with the malicious plugin: the fake extension’s last update date was June 15, 2025, while the legitimate one was last updated on May 30, 2025. Thus, due to the overall mix of factors, the malicious extension’s relevance surpassed that of the original, which allowed the attackers to promote the fake extension in the search results.

The developer, who fell into the ranking algorithm trap, didn’t get the functionality he wanted: the extension didn’t do any syntax highlighting in Solidity. The victim mistook this for a bug, which he decided to investigate later, and continued his work. Meanwhile, the extension quietly installed malware on his computer.

From PowerShell scripts to remote control

As mentioned above, when the malicious plugin was activated, it downloaded a PowerShell script from https://angelic[.]su/files/1.txt.

The PowerShell script contents

The script checks if the ScreenConnect remote management software is installed on the computer. If not, it downloads a second malicious PowerShell script from: https://angelic[.]su/files/2.txt. This new script then downloads the ScreenConnect installer to the infected computer from https://lmfao[.]su/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?e=Access&y=Guest and runs it. From that point on, the attackers can control the infected computer via the newly installed software, which is configured to communicate with the C2 server relay.lmfao[.]su.

Data theft

Further analysis revealed that the attackers used ScreenConnect to upload three VBScripts to the compromised machine:

• a.vbs
• b.vbs
• m.vbs

Each of these downloaded a PowerShell script from the text-sharing service paste.ee. The download URL was obfuscated, as shown in the image below:

The obfuscated URL for downloading the PowerShell script

The downloaded PowerShell script then retrieved an image from archive[.]org. A loader known as VMDetector was then extracted from this image. VMDetector attacks were previously observed in phishing campaigns that targeted entities in Latin America. The loader downloaded and ran the final payload from paste.ee.

Our analysis of the VBScripts determined that the following payloads were downloaded to the infected computer:

• Quasar open-source backdoor (via a.vbs and b.vbs),
• Stealer that collected data from browsers, email clients, and crypto wallets (via m.vbs). Kaspersky products detect this malware as HEUR:Trojan-PSW.MSIL.PureLogs.gen.

Both implants communicated with the C2 server 144.172.112[.]84, which resolved to relay.lmfao[.]su at the time of our analysis. With these tools, the attackers successfully obtained passphrases for the developer’s wallets and then syphoned off cryptocurrency.

New malicious package

The malicious plugin didn’t last long in the extension store and was taken down on July 2, 2025. By that time, it had already been detected not only by us as we investigated the incident but also by other researchers. However, the attackers continued their campaign: just one day after the removal, they published another malicious package named “solidity”, this time exactly replicating the name of the original legitimate extension. The functionality of the fake remained unchanged: the plugin downloaded a malicious PowerShell script onto the victim’s device. However, the attackers sought to inflate the number of downloads dramatically. The new extension was supposedly downloaded around two million times. The following results appeared up until recently when users searched for solidity within the Cursor AI development environment (the plugin is currently removed thanks to our efforts).

Updated search results for “solidity”

The updated search results showed the legitimate and malicious extensions appearing side-by-side in the search rankings, occupying the seventh and eighth positions respectively. The developer names look identical at first glance, but the legitimate package was uploaded by juanblanco, while the malicious one was uploaded by juanbIanco. The font used by Cursor AI makes the lowercase letter l and uppercase I appear identical.

Therefore, the search results displayed two seemingly identical extensions: the legitimate one with 61,000 downloads and the malicious one with two million downloads. Which one would the user choose to install? Making the right choice becomes a real challenge.

Similar cyberattacks

It’s worth noting that the Solidity extensions we uncovered are not the only malicious packages published by the attackers behind this operation. We used our open-source package monitoring tool to find a malicious npm package called “solsafe”. It uses the URL https://staketree[.]net/1.txt to download ScreenConnect. In this campaign, it’s also configured to use relay.lmfao[.]su for communication with the attackers.

We also discovered that April and May 2025 saw three malicious Visual Studio Code extensions published: solaibot, among-eth, and blankebesxstnion. The infection method used in these threats is strikingly similar to the one we described above. In fact, we found almost identical functionality in their malicious scripts.

Scripts downloaded by the VS Code extension (left) vs. Solidity Language (right)

In addition, all of the listed extensions perform the same malicious actions during execution, namely:

• Download PowerShell scripts named 1.txt and 2.txt.
• Use a VBScript with an obfuscated URL to download a payload from paste.ee.
• Download an image with a payload from archive.org.

This leads us to conclude that these infection schemes are currently being widely used to attack blockchain developers. We believe the attackers won’t stop with the Solidity extensions or the solsafe package that we found.

Takeaways

Malicious packages continue to pose a significant threat to the crypto industry. Many projects today rely on open-source tools downloaded from package repositories. Unfortunately, packages from these repositories are often a source of malware infections. Therefore, we recommend extreme caution when downloading any tools. Always verify that the package you’re downloading isn’t a fake. If a package doesn’t work as advertised after you install it, be suspicious and check the downloaded source code.

In many cases, malware installed via fake open-source packages is well-known, and modern cybersecurity solutions can effectively block it. Even experienced developers must not neglect security solutions, as these can help prevent an attack in case a malicious package is installed.

Indicators of compromise

Hashes of malicious JS files
2c471e265409763024cdc33579c84d88d5aaf9aea1911266b875d3b7604a0eeb
404dd413f10ccfeea23bfb00b0e403532fa8651bfb456d84b6a16953355a800a
70309bf3d2aed946bba51fc3eedb2daa3e8044b60151f0b5c1550831fbc6df17
84d4a4c6d7e55e201b20327ca2068992180d9ec08a6827faa4ff3534b96c3d6f
eb5b35057dedb235940b2c41da9e3ae0553969f1c89a16e3f66ba6f6005c6fa8
f4721f32b8d6eb856364327c21ea3c703f1787cfb4c043f87435a8876d903b2c

Network indicators
https://angelic[.]su/files/1.txt
https://angelic[.]su/files/2.txt
https://staketree[.]net/1.txt
https://staketree[.]net/2.txt
https://relay.lmfao[.]su
https://lmfao[.]su/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?e=Access&y=Guest
144.172.112[.]84

securelist.com/open-source-pac…

If you’re into Macs, you’ll always remember your first. Maybe it was the revolutionary classic of 1984 fame, perhaps it was the adorable G3 iMac in 1998, or even a shiny OS X machine in the 21st century. Whichever it is, you’ll find it emulated in [Marcin Wichary]’s essay “Frame of preference: A history of Mac settings, 1984–2004” — an exploration of the control panel and its history.
That’s not a photograph, it’s an emulator. (At least on the page. Here, it’s a screenshot.)
[Marcin] is a UI designer as well as an engineer and tech historian, and his UI chops come out in full force, commenting and critiquing Curputino’s coercions. The writing is excellent, as you’d expect from the man who wrote the book on keyboards, and it provides a fascinating look at the world of retrocomputing through the eyes of a designer. That design-focused outlook is very apropos for Apple in particular. (And NeXT, of course, because you can’t tell the story of Apple without it.)

There are ten emulators on the page, provided by [Mihai Parparita] of Infinite Mac. It’s like a virtual museum with a particularly knowledgeable tour guide — and it’s a blast, getting to feel hands-on, the design changes being discussed. There’s a certain amount of gamification, with each system having suggested tasks and a completion score when you finish reading. There are even Easter eggs.

This is everything we wish the modern web was like: the passionate deep-dives of personal sites on the Old Web, but enhanced and enabled by modern technology. If you’re missing those vintage Mac days and don’t want to explore them in browser, you can 3D print your own full-size replica, or a doll-sized picoMac.

hackaday.com/2025/07/10/an-emu…

Una vulnerabilità estremamente grave è stata recentemente scoperta in Veeam Backup & Replication, una delle soluzioni di backup più utilizzate in ambienti enterprise e non.. Se sfruttata, consente a un utente autenticato su Active Directory di eseguire codice arbitrario da remoto con privilegi SYSTEM, mettendo potenzialmente a rischio l’intera infrastruttura IT.

La vulnerabilità è tracciata come CVE-2025-23121, ha ricevuto un punteggio CVSS 9.9 (quasi massimo) ed è stata emessa diverso tempo fa, la quale colpisce tutte le versioni precedenti alla 12.3.1. Tale vulnerabilità è stata risolta con la versione 12.3.2, rilasciata da Veeam ma ancora molti apparati risultano privi di patch esponendoli a potenziali compromissioni.

Dettagli tecnici della vulnerabilità (CVE-2025-23121)

• Componente vulnerabile: backend RPC/API interne di Veeam
• Condizione necessaria: autenticazione su Active Directory con un account standard di dominio
• Vettore di attacco: invio di richieste appositamente costruite ai servizi interni di Veeam, sfruttando autorizzazioni mal configurate (es. tramite pipe nominate, API locali, gRPC)
• Impatto potenziale: Esecuzione di comandi arbitrari con privilegi SYSTEM, manipolazione dei job di backup, accesso non autorizzato a repository e snapshot, movimentazione laterale in ambienti AD

Scoperta e contesto

La vulnerabilità è stata identificata dai ricercatori di CodeWhite e watchTowr, già noti per le loro analisi avanzate sui prodotti enterprise. Secondo il report, il bug è strettamente collegato — o addirittura derivato — da una falla precedente, la CVE-2025-23120, chiusa a marzo 2025 ma aggirabile da un attaccante esperto.

Sebbene al momento non esistano PoC pubblici, la probabilità di un exploit in-the-wild è concreta. Le vulnerabilità Veeam sono storicamente molto ambite, come dimostrato dalla CVE-2023-27532, poi inclusa in tool offensivi privati usati da gruppi ransomware.

Altre vulnerabilità risolte nella versione 12.3.2

CVE-2025-23120 — Privilege Escalation da Backup Operator (CVSS 6.1)
Consente a un utente con ruolo “Backup Operator” di modificare job esistenti, impostare script post-job o destinazioni alterate, inducendo il server a eseguire codice arbitrario con privilegi elevati.

Scenario d’attacco:
1. L’attaccante crea o modifica un job inserendo un payload.
2. Il job viene eseguito da un servizio Veeam che gira come SYSTEM.
3. Il codice viene eseguito con privilegi amministrativi → escalation locale.

CVE-2025-2428 — Scrittura arbitraria su directory Veeam
A causa di permessi NTFS errati, un utente locale non admin può scrivere su directory monitorate da processi elevati, abilitando tecniche come DLL hijacking.

Tecnica sfruttabile:
– Un attaccante piazza una DLL malevola in una directory Veeam.
– Il processo SYSTEM carica la DLL all’avvio.
– L’attaccante ottiene esecuzione privilegiata e persistenza.

Implicazioni per la sicurezza aziendale

I server Veeam rappresentano obiettivi ad alto valore per gli attaccanti, poiché:
– Operano con privilegi SYSTEM
– Accedono a volumi di rete, NAS, repository cloud e host VM
– Gestiscono credenziali critiche per workload e backup
– Sono fondamentali nei piani di continuità operativa

Una compromissione di Veeam può:
– Rendere invisibile l’attacco usando snapshot o backup alterati
– Distruggere copie di backup o disattivarne l’esecuzione
– Abilitare ransomware su larga scala
– Consentire persistence anche dopo la rimozione del malware

Raccomandazioni operative

Aggiornamento urgente
– Installare Veeam Backup & Replication 12.3.2 su tutti i server e agent
– Testare l’update in ambiente di staging prima della distribuzione in produzione

Controllo degli accessi
– Rivedere i ruoli assegnati (in particolare “Backup Operator”)
– Limitare l’accesso al server Veeam a utenti e amministratori autorizzati
– Rimuovere o disabilitare account inutilizzati o obsoleti

Audit e hardening
– Analizzare i permessi NTFS delle directory Veeam
– Isolare il server backup in una VLAN dedicata
– Monitorare le richieste RPC e i processi Veeam con strumenti EDR

Protezione dei backup
– Verificare che esistano copie replicate offsite o in cloud
– Usare repository con WORM (Write Once Read Many)
– Validare che le credenziali nei job siano aggiornate e cifrate

Conclusioni

La CVE-2025-23121 rappresenta una minaccia critica per qualsiasi organizzazione che utilizzi Veeam in produzione. La sua combinazione di RCE, escalation e accesso privilegiato ai dati la rende un vettore ideale per attacchi mirati, ransomware e compromissioni su larga scala. L’aggiornamento a Veeam 12.3.2 è pertanto urgente e deve essere affiancato da una revisione completa della postura di sicurezza legata al backup.

L'articolo Vulnerabilità critiche in Veeam Backup! Un rischio di compromissione totale dei sistemi proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

Un tag mancante su di un campo input di una api key può rappresentare un rischio?

Avrai sicuramente notato che il browser suggerisce i dati dopo aver compilato un form. L’autocompletamento è proprio la funzione di ricordare le cose che inseriamo.

Per impostazione predefinita, i browser ricordano le informazioni inserite dall’utente nei campi dei siti web. Questo consente loro di eseguire questi automatismi.

Come può rappresentare un pericolo?

Esaminiamo il Plugin di CloudFlare per WordPress:

In questo esempio prendiamo in analisi un plugin di CloudFlare, che permette di collegare un sito WordPress con un’istanza cloudflare.

Questo permette di eseguire varie attività come la pulizia della cache, molte volte utile dopo un aggiornamento del sito.

github.com/cloudflare/Cloudfla…

Una volta installato, nella configurazione è richiesto di inserire una mail e un api key.

L’api key è una stringa che viene generata. Ad essa possono essere assegnati una serie di permessi.

La webapp poi con quel codice potrà interfacciarsi con CloudFlare per eseguire diverse azioni, come detto prima per esempio lo svuotamento della cache.

Vediamo cosa succedere se in passato avevamo già inserito un apikey.

Il modulo ricorda la nostra apikey, ecco semplicemente spiegato la funzione di autocompletamento.

Cosa succede in realtà quando il browser salva queste informazioni?

Ogni browser dispone di un file locale, dove salva queste informazioni di autocompletamento.

In chrome, per esempio, questi dati sono salvati in un file a questo percorso:

C:\Users[user]\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Web Data

Aprendo infatti il file è possibile riconoscere la chiave appena inserita nel form.

Perchè questo allora potrebbe rappresentare un rischio?

Questa chiave API può essere rubata se il sistema dell’utente è compromesso ed il file sottratto.

Questo è solo un esempio, in questi campi come detto prima potrebbe contenere anche per esempio dati di carte di credito e altro ancora.

Possiamo vedere che in questi rapporti di analisi di vari infostealer, proprio l’autocompletamento è uno degli obiettivi.

Leggendo alcuni report di SonicWall e Avira vediamo che molti di questi infostealer hanno come obiettivo questi file.

sonicwall.com/blog/infostealer…

Molto spesso gli infostealer vanno alla ricerca di questi file da infiltrare dal sistema attaccato.

[strong]Altre evidenze in questo rapporto di Avira:[/strong]

avira.com/en/blog/fake-office-…

In entrambi i report si vede chiaramente che questi file sono interessanti per gli infostealer.

Infine più a fondo e addirittura addentrarci su IntelX, per una ulteriore verifica a un vero leak..

Come mitigare questo rischio?

Gli input,come le password,non vengono salvate dai browser (più precisamente viene utilizzato invece il portachiavi del browser)

Nel caso invece delle apikey si utlizzi un input semplice, è possibile inserire un tag autocomplete-off, per informare il browser che questo dato non deve essere inserito nel file autocomplete.

es.

Username:

Password:

Login

Oppure

L’impostazione autocomplete=”off”sui campi ha due effetti:

Indica al browser di non salvare i dati immessi dall’utente per il completamento automatico successivo in moduli simili (alcuni browser fanno eccezioni per casi speciali, ad esempio chiedendo agli utenti di salvare le password).

Impedisce al browser di memorizzare nella cache i dati del modulo nella cronologia della sessione. Quando i dati del modulo vengono memorizzati nella cache della cronologia della sessione, le informazioni inserite dall’utente vengono visualizzate nel caso in cui l’utente abbia inviato il modulo e abbia cliccato sul pulsante Indietro per tornare alla pagina originale del modulo.

Analizzando infatti il codice html, non è presente questo tag per la api key.

Conclusioni

La maggior parte dei browser dispone di una funzionalità per ricordare i dati immessi nei moduli HTML.

Queste funzionalità sono solitamente abilitate di default, ma possono rappresentare un problema per gli utenti, quindi i browser possono anche disattivare.

Tuttavia, alcuni dati inviati nei moduli non sono utili al di là dell’interazione corrente (ad esempio, un PIN monouso) o contengono informazioni sensibili (ad esempio, un identificativo governativo univoco o un codice di sicurezza della carta di credito) oppure un token di un api.

I dati di autocompletamento archiviati dai vari browser possono essere catturati da un utente malintenzionato.

Inoltre, un attaccante che rilevi una vulnerabilità distinta dell’applicazione, come il cross-site scripting, potrebbe essere in grado di sfruttarla per recuperare le credenziali archiviate dal browser. JavaScript non può accedere direttamente ai dati dell’autofill del browser per motivi di sicurezza e privacy tuttavia Autofill può riempire i campi HTML automaticamente, e JavaScript può leggere i valori di quei campi solo dopo che sono stati riempiti.
const email = document.querySelector('#email').value;
console.log(email); // Se il browser ha già riempito il campo, questo valore sarà accessibile
Nonostante ciò esiste la possibilità che la mancata disabilitazione del completamento automatico possa causare problemi nell’ottenimento della conformità PCI (PortSwigger).

L'articolo CloudFlare, WordPress e l’API key in pericolo per colpa di un innocente autocomplete proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

What has the EDRis network been up to over the past two weeks? Find out the latest digital rights news in our bi-weekly newsletter. In this edition: European Commission must champion the AI Act, EDRi pushes back against risky GDPR deregulation, & more!

The post EDRi-gram, 10 July 2025 appeared first on European Digital Rights (EDRi).

New research by Bits of Freedom investigated social media platforms Facebook, Snapchat and TikTok, and e-commerce platforms Shein, Zalando and Booking.com for their use of manipulative design. The worrying findings indicate that these platforms continue to nfluence the choices of users to their detriment despite being prohibited by laws.

The post New research shows online platforms use manipulative design to influence users towards harmful choices appeared first on European Digital Rights (EDRi).

After years of debate, the GDPR Procedural Regulation has been finalised. Despite some improvements, the final text may entrench old problems and create new ones, undermining people’s rights and potentially opening the door to weakening the GDPR itself.

The post A missed opportunity for enforcement: what the final GDPR Procedural Regulation could cost us appeared first on European Digital Rights (EDRi).

Every Thursday of the week, Bastian’s Night is broadcast from 21:30 CEST (new time).

Bastian’s Night is a live talk show in German with lots of music, a weekly round-up of news from around the world, and a glimpse into the host’s crazy week in the pirate movement aka Cabinet of Curiosities.

If you want to read more about @BastianBB: –> This way

piratesonair.net/bastians-nigh…

Il primo e più bel concerto della mia vita.

Siamo arrivati a S. Siro alle 15:00, io e un mio amico, a bordo della mia Guzzi V 35 II.

Quando hanno aperto i cancelli siamo corsi sotto al palco poi man mano che il tempo passava ci siamo spostati sempre più indietro in cerca di ombra e abbiamo visto il concerto dalle gradinate di S. Siro.

Casino Royale, poi i Ladri di biciclette e poi lui, Vasco.

Finale indimenticabile, Albachiara, gli accendini accesi, S. Siro è diventato un braciere.

Poi l'organizzazione ha fatto arrivare alle prime file dei dischi di stoffa tipo frisbee, centinaia, la gente ha cominciato a tirarli e lo stadio si è riempito di dischi volanti.

#vasco #SanSiro

I #Carabinieri del #ROS (Raggruppamento Operativo speciale) – col supporto in fase esecutiva dei Comandi provinciali dell’Arma territorialmente competenti e dello Squadrone Eliportato Cacciatori "Calabria” – hanno eseguito nelle aree di Roma, Reggio Calabria, Catanzaro, Cosenza, L’Aquila, Latina e Pistoia una misura cautelare in carcere emessa dal G.I.P. del Tribunale capitolino, su richiesta della Procura Distrettuale.

Interessati 28 indagati italiani e albanesi, gravemente indiziati di aver preso parte ad un’associazione criminale di matrice ‘ndranghetista, con base a Roma ed operante nell’intero territorio nazionale.

Il provvedimento si basa sugli elementi acquisiti dal ROS, nell’ambito di indagini dirette dalla Procura della Repubblica – DDA – presso il Tribunale di Roma, su un 57 enne calabrese, già precedentemente condannato in via definitiva per la violazione dell’art. 416 bis Codice Penale, quando fu ritenuto elemento apicale della "locale dii 'ndrangheta" di Volpiano (Torino), promanazione di quella di Platì (Reggio Calabria).

L’uomo, trasferitosi a Roma agli inizi degli anni 2000, aveva assunto il controllo del quartiere capitolino di San Basilio, promuovendo la nascita di un’associazione composta, tra gli altri, anche dai tre figli, con legami stabili con una paritetica struttura criminale albanese, utilizzata per gli aspetti logistici (estrazione dei carichi dai porti spagnoli e olandesi nonché per il successivo trasporto) e per lo smercio del narcotico in altre zone della Capitale.

La cocaina veniva acquisita in Sud America e fatta giungere, tramite container in alcuni porti della Spagna, a Rotterdam (Olanda) e a quello di Gioia Tauro (Reggio Calabria), anche sfruttando l’interazione con altri broker calabresi, per poi giungere sul mercato romano dove veniva smerciata al dettaglio.

Nel complesso sono stati contestati agli indagati 80 capi di imputazione per operazioni di traffico per oltre 1 tonnellata di cocaina e per 1.497 chili di hashish, nonché un episodio di tortura aggravata dal metodo mafioso, contestato a 4 indagati italiani, gravemente indiziati di avere privato della libertà personale uno spacciatore, cagionandogli sofferenze fisiche e un trauma psichico. Le torture inferte, secondo l’accusa, sono state riprese con un telefonino, per diffonderne successivamente il video al fine di generare nella vittima e nei soggetti dediti alle attività di smercio di sostanze stupefacente in zona San Basilio, sentimenti di paura, omertà e assoggettamento al volere del gruppo criminale.

Il complesso scenario emergente dall’attività investigativa ha consentito di accertare l’impiego sistematico da parte degli indagati di sofisticati sistemi criptofonici utilizzati per le comunicazioni operative e per eludere le attività di controllo. Tali dispositivi venivano approvvigionati attraverso una vera e propria centrale di smistamento, individuata a Roma e facente capo ad un 46enne albanese colpito anch’egli dalla misura cautelare per aver concorso nell’associazione.

L’attività investigativa – grazie alla estesa cooperazione internazionale avviata – ha consentito di localizzare in Spagna 5 latitanti per reati materia di stupefacenti il cui arresto, su indicazione del ROS, è stato eseguito dalle autorità di polizia locali.

Complessivamente, l’attività investigativa, conclusa con l’emissione di 28 provvedimenti cautelari detentivi, 6 interrogatori preventivi, l’arresto in flagranza di reato di 11 soggetti, nonché, all’estero, di 5 latitanti ed il sequestro di ingenti quantitativi di stupefacente (per lo più cocaina ed hashish), ha confermato:

- L’infiltrazione del territorio romano di organizzazioni, dedite al narcotraffico, di matrice ‘ndranghetista
- L’alleanza, ormai strutturale, nello specifico settore, tra la ‘ndrangheta e paritetiche organizzazioni criminali albanesi che, forti della loro ramificazione in molti paesi europei e non solo, garantiscono canali alternativi di approvvigionamento e, soprattutto, la possibilità di utilizzare porti stranieri, ove esercitano il loro controllo, per diversificare le narco-rotte
- La centralità del Porto di Gioia Tauro per le importazioni di cocaina
- L’esistenza di accordi/regole che consentono a organizzazioni di diversa matrice di spartirsi le più redditizie aree di smercio del narcotico nella Capitale
- L’utilizzo sistemico di strumenti tecnologici evoluti e non direttamente intercettabili, per le comunicazioni operative.

Le attività investigative, dirette dalla Procura della Repubblica – Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia di Roma, sono state condotte in cooperazione internazionale con diverse Polizie estere e sono state supportate dalla Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Antidroga (#DCSA), dal Servizio di Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia (#SCIP), da #Interpol- Progetto I-CAN (#ICAN), dalla rete @net (#onnet) della #DIA, nonché dalle Agenzie #Europol e #Eurojust.

@Notizie dall'Italia e dal mondo

Tom Hayden never intended to become a journalist. But in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Hayden decided to look into how his local school district in Evanston, Illinois, was making decisions about when to send kids back to school.

It was a contentious issue in town and deserved journalistic inquiry. But Hayden realized the decline of local media left a void that someone needed to fill. So he decided to step up and launch his Substack newsletter FOIA Gras, which as the name implies, focused on public records-based, Freedom of Information Act-related reporting.

“Ten years ago, a board meeting would have had reporters from suburban beats that are all gone now,” Hayden said. “Now, you just see the high school beat reporter.”

Hayden’s side gig as a journalist was a big success, and his focus expanded beyond pandemic issues. “Our local board initially hated me, but now they consider me like their inspector general,” Hayden said in March. “I’m able to get records that they don’t even know about. I break stories to them about lawsuits that they don’t even know about.”

But soon after we spoke, and after he completed his coverage of Evanston’s school board elections, Hayden announced that he was ending his experiment with citizen journalism. “It’s rendered a considerable toll on my mental well-being, my professional day-to-day career, my finances, and my relationships. I always told myself if the fun is gone, I can walk away, and the fun is gone,” he wrote.

‘Throwing darts’ at public records

Hayden was familiar with FOIA requests before venturing into journalism, from seeking records as part of his day job in the corrosion industry. So, when families started moving out of Evanston to nearby towns where schools had reopened, Hayden put on his citizen-journalist hat and started pulling records.

“I started kind of just throwing darts, looking mainly at lists of public records from the board meetings, which are public, and they immediately hit,” Hayden said.

Under Illinois’ public records laws, requesters are not charged fees for most records requests (aside from copying costs for large document sets). It’s a powerful law, Hayden said, as long as you are diligent and know what you are looking for.

“Our local board initially hated me, but now they consider me like their inspector general. I’m able to get records that they don’t even know about.”

Tom Hayden

Hayden said the records he requested showed that then-superintendent Devon Horton had been misappropriating funds and steering contracts to business partners, misleading Evanstonians about financing for a school in Evanston’s Fifth Ward, and more.

With longstanding disparities in achievement gaps and funding, Hayden felt that Horton had used promises of championing diversity to divide the public rather than address the issues. “Equity is about lifting oppressed communities, not using them as a shoulder to lift yourself to a better job,” he wrote.

Hayden said he intended to use the truth to “try to find a way to bridge the people in this town that have political street fights over this.” Instead of bickering, he thought, “Let’s go get the actual records.”

To do so, Hayden launched FOIA Gras. Quickly, Hayden became a go-to source for Evanstonians to find out what was happening in the board meetings and within the district, for parents and board members alike.

A fork in the road

As a citizen journalist and his own boss, Hayden was able to set his own parameters. Despite the success of the newsletter, however, Hayden announced he was closing down FOIA Gras in April, when the work outweighed the fun and backlash against his editorial choices started affecting his personal life.

“Ultimately, for me, I sort of reached the point where this project reached a fork in the road,” Hayden said, “where I have to decide, ‘Am I a professional journalist, or am I a citizen-journalist-slash-parent-slash-community-member?’”

In one particular case, in 2022, a middle schooler was caught making nooses out of jump ropes outside of a school while a protest was going on inside over some teachers being transferred. The incident blew up in Evanston, but Hayden decided not to cover it at the time to protect the children’s identities.

“The reality is that nobody knows why the student did it,” Hayden said, but the incident became part of a narrative around a school anti-racism initiative.

Hayden FOIA’d a copy of the associated police report, which he said police provided, but improperly, because it contained information on a minor.

“The incentives are broken. This is a massive national issue — there is very little money in the pursuit of truth.”

Tom Hayden

After obtaining the report, Hayden reached out to the parents involved for comment and began writing a story about the district’s response to the nooses incident. Through his reporting, Hayden became uncomfortable continuing to report on a story based on speculation and decided to stop. Unfortunately, that made some of his readers angry.

One parent “reached out to me as a source and provided me some information about his child, who was only tangentially involved, but not the kid who made the nooses,” Hayden said. But the parent then provided the story to a national outlet, The Free Press, because, said Hayden, it fit its agenda of having “anti-woke stories.” That outlet ultimately ran the story.

“Very little money in the pursuit of truth”

The Free Press reported that, according to its sources, the child who made the noose was dealing with mental health issues and didn’t know about the racial connotations of hanging nooses. It accused Superintendent Horton of turning a child’s cry for help into a self-promotion opportunity during the peak of the Black Lives Matter movement. It framed Evanston — known for the country’s first municipal reparations program, among other racial justice initiatives — as an example of wokeness going too far (not long after the article, the Trump administration launched an investigation of the school district).

The drama surrounding the noose incident and Free Press article was the straw that broke the camel’s back for Hayden. People began ascribing nefarious motives to his decision not to cover the story, when in reality he just didn’t want to contribute to putting middle schoolers in the middle of a public spectacle. Hayden decided he’d close down FOIA Gras after the school board election in April. He continues to both work full-time and teach data governance at Northwestern University.

“There’s a set of ethical rules that a professional journalist has to follow, especially when it comes to editorial decisions and injecting my own opinion into stories,” Hayden said. “I just reached that fork in the road.” His preference was always to report on verifiable data — that’s why he felt so at home with FOIA. But fact-based reporting wasn’t enough for his readers, and the aforementioned “political street fights” continued despite his efforts.

Ultimately, despite the important news he broke, the experience left Hayden cynical about the future of the profession he dabbled in. “I don’t feel good about the future of journalism,” he wrote in his departing announcement. “The incentives are broken,” Hayden said. “This is a massive national issue — there is very little money in the pursuit of truth.”

This is fourth in a series of profiles of independent journalists who use public records to hold local governments accountable. The third, about Michelle Pitcher’s reporting on the Texas criminal justice system, is here. The second, about Hannah Bassett of the Arizona Center for Investigative Reporting, is here. The first, about Lisa Pickoff-White of the California Reporting Project, is here.

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