Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

Oggi è la #GiornataInternazionaledeiMusei.
Tema di questo 2026: Musei che uniscono un mondo diviso.

Mi ci ritrovo, e parecchio.
Il mio primo museo l'ho avuto in casa, la libreria di papà, libri sparsi su 2 piani, locandine, mostri di cera, una biblioteca che era una piccola Wunderkammer.

Il secondo è stato, nemmeno a dirlo, l'amore della mia vita: gli #Uffizi, un amore cominciato al Salone dei 500 in Palazzo Vecchio, proprio di fronte all'ufficio di mamma.
La strada che porta da Piazza della Signoria al museo è tutta dritta, sfocia sul Lungarno De' Medici, uno dei migliori dopo il Lungarno Serristori; il Piazzale degli Uffizi ospita anche uno storico mimo che interpreta Dante e la sua agonia - ragalategli un obolo e un sorriso, merita!

Se devo misurare il gradimento dei musei sul mio "museometro", posso spostare il cuoricino anche sul Grand Egyptian Museum del Cairo, uno spettacolo di cultura da fare gola a Fantomius!

L'ultimo, in ordine di tempo, è il Piccolo Museo del Purgatorio a Roma (di quello ne ho parlato in uno speciale di RdF).

In mezzo, parecchi altri.
Anche di questi, prima o poi, scriverò.

Small Engine Gets DIY EFI Upgrade


The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

Small internal combustion engines usually keep things simple, relying on carburetors to handle metering the correct amount of fuel and air. Recently, [Carlos Takeshita] decided his small engine could use an upgrade in the form of electronic fuel injection (EFI).

The build began with a Predator 212, a popular gasoline engine from Harbor Freight. [Carlos] set about kitting it out with a missing tooth trigger wheel to measure the crankshaft position with a hall effect sensor. The engine also scored a custom-built aluminium fuel cell, complete with a high-pressure fuel pump and regulator suitable for driving the solitary fuel injector installed in the custom intake manifold. A Teensy 4.0 is charged with monitoring a manifold air pressure (MAP) sensor and the crank position, and choosing when and how long to fire the injector to dose the engine with the correct amount of fuel. Files are on GitHub for those eager to dive deeper.

It can be quite a job to convert an engine to run with electronic fuel injection, but you’re certain to learn a lot during the install and tuning process. We’ve featured similar builds many times over the years.

youtube.com/embed/ApN0I983zUQ?…


hackaday.com/2026/05/18/small-…

Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

Kazuar si evolve: Secret Blizzard (Turla) trasforma il suo backdoor storico in una botnet P2P modulare invisibile
#CyberSecurity
insicurezzadigitale.com/kazuar…


Kazuar si evolve: Secret Blizzard (Turla) trasforma il suo backdoor storico in una botnet P2P modulare invisibile


Si parla di:
Toggle

Il gruppo russo Secret Blizzard, operativo per conto dell’FSB (Federal Security Service) russo e meglio conosciuto come Turla, ha trasformato il proprio storico malware Kazuar in una botnet peer-to-peer modulare, progettata per mantenere accessi persistenti e praticamente invisibili nelle reti governative. La rivelazione arriva da Microsoft Security, che il 14 maggio 2026 ha pubblicato un’analisi approfondita dell’architettura del malware — descrivendo quello che è a tutti gli effetti un salto evolutivo nella sofisticazione operativa di uno dei gruppi APT più longevi al mondo.

Da backdoor tradizionale a ecosistema P2P


Kazuar è attivo almeno dal 2017 ed è stato impiegato in decine di campagne di cyberspionaggio contro governi, ambasciate e organizzazioni della difesa in Europa, Asia Centrale e Ucraina. La versione analizzata da Microsoft nel 2026 rappresenta però un cambio di paradigma: il malware non è più un semplice backdoor controllato centralmente, ma un ecosistema distribuito composto da tre moduli distinti che collaborano per garantire resilienza, persistenza e stealth.

La riorganizzazione è eloquente: non ogni macchina compromessa comunica con il server di comando e controllo (C2). Invece, un unico nodo “leader” — eletto dinamicamente dal modulo Kernel tra i sistemi infetti presenti nella stessa rete o segmento di rete — assume il ruolo di proxy verso l’infrastruttura esterna. Gli altri nodi entrano in modalità “silent”, eliminando quasi completamente il traffico verso l’esterno e riducendo drasticamente la superficie di rilevamento per i team di incident response.

Architettura modulare: Kernel, Bridge e Worker


Microsoft descrive tre componenti fondamentali della nuova architettura Kazuar:

  • Modulo Kernel: È il coordinatore centrale. Gestisce i task, controlla gli altri moduli, elegge il nodo leader e orchestra le comunicazioni e il flusso di dati attraverso la botnet.
  • Modulo Bridge: Agisce come proxy tra il nodo leader Kernel e il server C2 remoto. Filtra e instrada il traffico, permettendo ulteriore separazione tra i sistemi compromessi e l’infrastruttura degli attaccanti.
  • Modulo Worker: È il componente operativo. Registra i tasti premuti (keylogging), aggancia gli eventi Windows, traccia i task, raccoglie informazioni di sistema, listing di file e dettagli MAPI — incluse caselle email di Exchange.

Questa separazione funzionale non è casuale: in caso di rilevamento di un Worker, i nodi Kernel restano inalterati e possono continuare a operare silenziosamente. L’architettura è progettata per sopravvivere a rimozioni parziali.

150 parametri di configurazione: granularità operativa senza precedenti


Uno degli aspetti più rilevanti della nuova versione è il sistema di configurazione esteso: Kazuar supporta ora più di 150 parametri che gli operatori possono personalizzare per ogni campagna o vittima specifica. Questi parametri controllano metodi di esecuzione e persistenza (scheduled task, servizi Windows, chiavi di registro), bypass di AMSI e ETW, timing dell’esfiltrazione e dimensione dei chunk di dati, process injection e tecniche di lateral movement, e protocolli di comunicazione multipli: HTTP, WebSocket ed Exchange Web Services (EWS).

L’uso di EWS per mascherare le comunicazioni C2 nel traffico legittimo di Exchange è particolarmente insidioso: in ambienti enterprise dove Exchange Server è ubiquo, questo canale risulta quasi impossibile da distinguere dal traffico normale senza ispezione profonda dei payload.

Targeting: governi, ambasciate e settore difesa in Europa e Ucraina


Secret Blizzard (alias Turla, Uroburos, Venomous Bear) è noto per campagne di spionaggio ad altissimo valore strategico. Le vittime documentate includono ministeri degli esteri, ambasciate diplomatiche, dipartimenti della difesa e organizzazioni governative in Europa Orientale, Asia Centrale e — con intensità crescente — Ucraina nel contesto del conflitto in corso.

L’evoluzione di Kazuar verso un’architettura P2P suggerisce che il gruppo abbia tratto lezione dalle operazioni di takedown condotte negli ultimi anni contro infrastrutture di malware centralizzate. La distribuzione del controllo rende un’eventuale disruption dell’infrastruttura C2 molto meno efficace: rimuovere il server C2 non smantella la botnet, poiché il leader può essere eletto nuovamente tra i nodi sopravvissuti.

Due righe per i difensori


Microsoft raccomanda di concentrare il rilevamento su indicatori comportamentali piuttosto che su signature statiche. I team di sicurezza dovrebbero monitorare attività IPC insolite tra processi non correlati, rilevare pattern di elezione del leader nella rete interna tramite comunicazioni laterali anomale, identificare esfiltrazione dati staged e frammentata con timing irregolare, e controllare accessi anomali a EWS da processi non di posta elettronica. Dato il targeting storico di Secret Blizzard su entità diplomatiche e governative europee, le organizzazioni in questi settori dovrebbero considerare una revisione urgente dei log di rete e degli endpoint.

Indicatori di Compromissione (IoC)

# Kazuar - Secret Blizzard (Turla) - Maggio 2026
# Fonte: Microsoft Security Blog, 14 maggio 2026

# Tecniche MITRE ATT&CK associate
T1574.001 - DLL Search Order Hijacking
T1055     - Process Injection
T1071.001 - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (HTTP/WebSocket)
T1071.003 - Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols (EWS)
T1030     - Data Transfer Size Limits (staged exfiltration)
T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job (persistence)
T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable/Modify Tools (AMSI/ETW bypass)

# Comportamenti anomali da monitorare
- Comunicazioni IPC anomale tra processi non correlati
- Accessi Exchange Web Services (EWS) da processi non di posta
- Traffico P2P laterale interno su porte non standard
- Esfiltrazione dati in chunk temporizzati verso IP non categorizzati
- Moduli .NET iniettati in processi di sistema legittimi

# Referenza completa IoC
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/14/kazuar-anatomy-of-a-nation-state-botnet/

Fonti: Microsoft Security Blog, BleepingComputer, The Hacker News

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

Kazuar si evolve: Secret Blizzard (Turla) trasforma il suo backdoor storico in una botnet P2P modulare invisibile


@Informatica (Italy e non Italy)
Il gruppo russo Secret Blizzard (Turla/FSB) ha trasformato il malware Kazuar in una botnet peer-to-peer con tre moduli distinti (Kernel, Bridge, Worker) e 150 parametri di configurazione. La


Kazuar si evolve: Secret Blizzard (Turla) trasforma il suo backdoor storico in una botnet P2P modulare invisibile


Si parla di:
Toggle

Il gruppo russo Secret Blizzard, operativo per conto dell’FSB (Federal Security Service) russo e meglio conosciuto come Turla, ha trasformato il proprio storico malware Kazuar in una botnet peer-to-peer modulare, progettata per mantenere accessi persistenti e praticamente invisibili nelle reti governative. La rivelazione arriva da Microsoft Security, che il 14 maggio 2026 ha pubblicato un’analisi approfondita dell’architettura del malware — descrivendo quello che è a tutti gli effetti un salto evolutivo nella sofisticazione operativa di uno dei gruppi APT più longevi al mondo.

Da backdoor tradizionale a ecosistema P2P


Kazuar è attivo almeno dal 2017 ed è stato impiegato in decine di campagne di cyberspionaggio contro governi, ambasciate e organizzazioni della difesa in Europa, Asia Centrale e Ucraina. La versione analizzata da Microsoft nel 2026 rappresenta però un cambio di paradigma: il malware non è più un semplice backdoor controllato centralmente, ma un ecosistema distribuito composto da tre moduli distinti che collaborano per garantire resilienza, persistenza e stealth.

La riorganizzazione è eloquente: non ogni macchina compromessa comunica con il server di comando e controllo (C2). Invece, un unico nodo “leader” — eletto dinamicamente dal modulo Kernel tra i sistemi infetti presenti nella stessa rete o segmento di rete — assume il ruolo di proxy verso l’infrastruttura esterna. Gli altri nodi entrano in modalità “silent”, eliminando quasi completamente il traffico verso l’esterno e riducendo drasticamente la superficie di rilevamento per i team di incident response.

Architettura modulare: Kernel, Bridge e Worker


Microsoft descrive tre componenti fondamentali della nuova architettura Kazuar:

  • Modulo Kernel: È il coordinatore centrale. Gestisce i task, controlla gli altri moduli, elegge il nodo leader e orchestra le comunicazioni e il flusso di dati attraverso la botnet.
  • Modulo Bridge: Agisce come proxy tra il nodo leader Kernel e il server C2 remoto. Filtra e instrada il traffico, permettendo ulteriore separazione tra i sistemi compromessi e l’infrastruttura degli attaccanti.
  • Modulo Worker: È il componente operativo. Registra i tasti premuti (keylogging), aggancia gli eventi Windows, traccia i task, raccoglie informazioni di sistema, listing di file e dettagli MAPI — incluse caselle email di Exchange.

Questa separazione funzionale non è casuale: in caso di rilevamento di un Worker, i nodi Kernel restano inalterati e possono continuare a operare silenziosamente. L’architettura è progettata per sopravvivere a rimozioni parziali.

150 parametri di configurazione: granularità operativa senza precedenti


Uno degli aspetti più rilevanti della nuova versione è il sistema di configurazione esteso: Kazuar supporta ora più di 150 parametri che gli operatori possono personalizzare per ogni campagna o vittima specifica. Questi parametri controllano metodi di esecuzione e persistenza (scheduled task, servizi Windows, chiavi di registro), bypass di AMSI e ETW, timing dell’esfiltrazione e dimensione dei chunk di dati, process injection e tecniche di lateral movement, e protocolli di comunicazione multipli: HTTP, WebSocket ed Exchange Web Services (EWS).

L’uso di EWS per mascherare le comunicazioni C2 nel traffico legittimo di Exchange è particolarmente insidioso: in ambienti enterprise dove Exchange Server è ubiquo, questo canale risulta quasi impossibile da distinguere dal traffico normale senza ispezione profonda dei payload.

Targeting: governi, ambasciate e settore difesa in Europa e Ucraina


Secret Blizzard (alias Turla, Uroburos, Venomous Bear) è noto per campagne di spionaggio ad altissimo valore strategico. Le vittime documentate includono ministeri degli esteri, ambasciate diplomatiche, dipartimenti della difesa e organizzazioni governative in Europa Orientale, Asia Centrale e — con intensità crescente — Ucraina nel contesto del conflitto in corso.

L’evoluzione di Kazuar verso un’architettura P2P suggerisce che il gruppo abbia tratto lezione dalle operazioni di takedown condotte negli ultimi anni contro infrastrutture di malware centralizzate. La distribuzione del controllo rende un’eventuale disruption dell’infrastruttura C2 molto meno efficace: rimuovere il server C2 non smantella la botnet, poiché il leader può essere eletto nuovamente tra i nodi sopravvissuti.

Due righe per i difensori


Microsoft raccomanda di concentrare il rilevamento su indicatori comportamentali piuttosto che su signature statiche. I team di sicurezza dovrebbero monitorare attività IPC insolite tra processi non correlati, rilevare pattern di elezione del leader nella rete interna tramite comunicazioni laterali anomale, identificare esfiltrazione dati staged e frammentata con timing irregolare, e controllare accessi anomali a EWS da processi non di posta elettronica. Dato il targeting storico di Secret Blizzard su entità diplomatiche e governative europee, le organizzazioni in questi settori dovrebbero considerare una revisione urgente dei log di rete e degli endpoint.

Indicatori di Compromissione (IoC)

# Kazuar - Secret Blizzard (Turla) - Maggio 2026
# Fonte: Microsoft Security Blog, 14 maggio 2026

# Tecniche MITRE ATT&CK associate
T1574.001 - DLL Search Order Hijacking
T1055     - Process Injection
T1071.001 - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (HTTP/WebSocket)
T1071.003 - Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols (EWS)
T1030     - Data Transfer Size Limits (staged exfiltration)
T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job (persistence)
T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable/Modify Tools (AMSI/ETW bypass)

# Comportamenti anomali da monitorare
- Comunicazioni IPC anomale tra processi non correlati
- Accessi Exchange Web Services (EWS) da processi non di posta
- Traffico P2P laterale interno su porte non standard
- Esfiltrazione dati in chunk temporizzati verso IP non categorizzati
- Moduli .NET iniettati in processi di sistema legittimi

# Referenza completa IoC
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/14/kazuar-anatomy-of-a-nation-state-botnet/

Fonti: Microsoft Security Blog, BleepingComputer, The Hacker News

Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

Someone sent me these pics from the Epsilon party at @offensivecon in Berlin.

Nice trolling on Trenchant's zero-day thief Peter Williams and on us with the now classic "Sun, Seafood, and Spyware" tagline. Thanks for reading!

This Week in Security: Android Exposes ADB, ShinyHunters Get Paid, Robot Dogs, and More


The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

Google has patched an Android ADB bug in the May security patch set. If you have a Pixel phone you should already have the patches, and most other major manufacturers should be close behind. Unfortunately, the biggest risk from this patch will be to the vendors who are also the least likely to release timely – or any – security updates.

ADB, the Android Debug Bridge, is the main tool for installing apps during development and debugging apps while they’re running. It can also be used to side-load apps from a PC. While most normal users are unlikely to ever enable it, developers typically do and some power users might when jailbreaking a device or setting parameters not exposed in the Android UI. Debugging can be done locally via USB, or optionally over the network. To protect the device, the user must unlock the Android device and authorize each new debug agent.

Covered by Risky.Biz, a bug introduced in 2020, and present in every Android release since, allowed bypassing authorization entirely if network debugging was enabled and at least one connection had been made to the ADB service in the past. This happens because ADB compares the certificate of the incoming debug connection with the list of saved certificates. If the certificate type does not match — for instance supplying an Ed25519 certificate instead of a RSA certificate — ADB has been incorrectly handling the error code, and allowing the connection.

In most programming languages, false is considered zero, and true is considered anything not zero. The certificate API returns a 1 for a valid match, a zero for an invalid match, and a negative-one for a type mismatch. Negative one is not zero, so when treated as a boolean value, it becomes true.

To exploit the bug, ADB must be enabled in wireless mode, and there must be at least one trusted device in the ADB configuration. For the average user this is an unlikely combination, but for developers, the time to update is now.

Mythos Finds a Curl Bug


Daniel Stenberg of Curl posts about recent interactions with the Mythos AI model finding vulnerabilities – or rather a singular vulnerability – in Curl. Curl, and the companion library libcurl, run in an estimated 20 billion instances, so any security issue could be critical.

After some confusion about access to the model, five vulnerabilities found were ultimately condensed to a single new vulnerability. Classified as “not particularly dangerous”, the issue will be assigned a CVE and be fixed in an upcoming patch.

Daniel’s post contains a wealth of additional information and commentary about the experience with Mythos. The lack of findings from Mythos may be more a reflection on the maturity of the Curl codebase than anything else; the Curl code is an excellent example of the impact of continual auditing, by all types of tools.

XBow Finds an Exim Bug


XBow has found a vulnerability in Exim using AI tooling. Exim is an open-source message transport agent (MTA, or email server to most of us) like Postfix and Sendmail. Classified as CVE-2026-45185, it has a 9.8 CVE score (out of 10), allowing arbitrary code execution without authentication.

The bug is one of the “use after free” class of mistakes: after allocating memory, using it for some task, then releasing the memory (freeing it), Exim forgets the memory has been freed and continues to use it. In this case, memory allocated as part of a TLS encrypted connection is freed when the TLS connection is ended, but the handler for incoming email data may still write to the now-destroyed buffer, which in turn allows corruption of the memory management system inside Exim and, ultimately, running arbitrary code.

Arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities are typically just as bad as they sound – the ability to run arbitrary code is essentially the ability to run anything on the system, including running system commands as if logged in. Combined with the recent collection of local privilege escalation vulnerabilities like CopyFail (and more on this later), unauthenticated code execution is a short path to full root control of the system.

The Internet indexer Shodan currently shows 2.5 million installs of Exim globally. If you run Exim anywhere, hopefully you’ve already updated – and update immediately if not!

CopyFail Three-quel


It’s the three-quel nobody wanted; being named “CopyFail 3.0” and “Fragnesia”, another vulnerability that is extremely similar to those used in CopyFail and DirtyFrag has been found and patches have begun on the Linux kernel. Like the previous bugs, this one lies in the Linux kernel handling of IPSec ESP encryption, and allows modifying the in-memory page cache used for accelerating disk IO.

Fortunately, because this uses the same kernel modules as previous vulnerabilities, any system with the mitigations for DirtyFrag in place — essentially disabling IPSec functionality — should not be impacted, however any system patched for DirtyFrag with the IPSec kernel modules available will need to be patched again!

It’s Patch Tuesday!


It’s Microsoft Patch Tuesday again! Brian Krebs has the roundup, calling out three patches in particular that allow privilege escalation to admin or system, and one remote code execution bug in the Microsoft DHCP client.

If you’re a Microsoft user, or run IT in a Microsoft shop, you already know the balancing act – update immediately because of the security implications, or wait and see if this set of patches breaks basic functionality again?

More Windows 0-Days


It seems like it wouldn’t be a Patch Tuesday without additional drama – the author behind previous Windows zero-day exploits the past two months follows up this month with two more, seemingly still upset with the Microsoft security teams responses.

The YellowKey vulnerability consists of nothing more than specifically named files on a USB stick. When booted in recovery mode, the files trigger a Windows 11 recovery image to launch a shell with Bitlocker disk encryption turned off. It’s unclear if this functionality is a deliberate backdoor or some sort of debug functionality accidentally left in the builds, but it is extremely odd.

GreenPlasma is a privilege escalation vulnerability, allowing elevation to system level privileges, which would give access to the system credentials database, among other bad results. Similar issues were patched in this months Patch Tuesday set, but not this one.

Criminals Use Tools for Crime


Google is trying to hype what is claimed to be the first use of AI to write an exploit caught in the wild. This seems extremely unlikely given the past year or more of development on the AI front.

Treating news as boring is never fun, but it seems unsurprising that criminals are going to use the tools available to continue being criminals. This feels like less of a revelation than a continuation of obvious trends: groups who have not been able to develop in-house tooling have always purchased tools, stolen tooling from other groups, or used commoditized exploits, easily as far back as the Anonymous “Low Orbit Ion Canon” tool in 2005 to allow recruitment and participation by less technical users.

Attack and exploit code doesn’t need to worry about the technical debt or repeatability challenges of AI generated code, and it seems obvious that attackers will minimize their own effort whenever possible.

Malware and Residential Proxies


Bitsight Research published a paper on the relationships between malware infections and residential proxy networks.

Proxy networks act similarly to a VPN, taking traffic from one source and tunneling it to appear to come from a different source. Made up of typically unwitting home users, residential proxy networks are often resold as cheap commercial VPN services. (Not all commercial VPN providers are equal, while some are completely legitimate, many are not.) Proxy networks can also be leveraged to allow attackers to operate inside a different country, obfuscating the true attack location or bypassing login restrictions or alerts to detect if a user has an impossible location or travel pattern. Proxy networks are also often involved in advertisement click fraud, appearing as an army of normal home users who are really interested in click on ads, and are also used to pivot into the internal home network, where devices are often completely unprotected.

Bitsight tracked over 53 million IPs acting as residential proxy devices over a two-month period, split between several proxy network brokers reselling access, typically with over eight million nodes available daily, with strong ties between malware infections and remote access proxy tool installation.

FCC Extends Router Deadline


The FCC has announced it is extending the initial timeline for foreign-made routers. Previously the FCC had declared that not only would nearly all new consumer router hardware be banned from FCC certification, it would no longer be allowed to receive software updates as of early 2027.

Possibly noticing the conflict in the stated goal of increased security while prohibiting security patches, the deadline has been extended for consumer routers and drones to receive software updates until 2029.

SMS Spammers Arrested


You might rightly assume that most SMS spam comes from compromised phones or Internet-connected SMS bridges, but TechCrunch reports on the arrest of three men in Toronto for operating a mobile SMS-spamming cell tower.

The spammers ran the spoofed cell tower in the back of a car while driving around the city. Once a phone connected to the false tower, the tower bombarded it with SMS messages with phishing lures for credential and banking theft.

Operating a fake cell tower is extremely illegal in almost all countries, in no small part because it actively interferes with emergency services such as E911. Police estimate that over a million SMS messages were sent by the trio since November, 2025.

Robot Dog Malware


A paper in IEEE Spectrum from November, 2025 covers discoveries of a potentially wormable vulnerability in the Unitree robotics platform used for canine and humanoid robots. Unitree robots are sometimes used as security or even military devices.

This week, Benn Jordan published a YouTube video exploring some of the vulnerabilities in his personal robots, referencing the GitHub of the original researchers.

Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in the robotics platform that allow overriding the safety mechanisms of the robots, as well as running arbitrary code on the robot, scanning for WiFi and Bluetooth devices, and mechanisms the robots use to communicate with various servers, some in foreign countries.

The research suggests that at least one vulnerability – the ability to gain root on the device from an unauthenticated Bluetooth Low-Energy connection – could be turned into a worm, where one infected robot could use the on-board Bluetooth to infect other nearby devices.

Benn Jordan has previously been influential in the public outcry against monitoring platforms like Flock, so highlighting vulnerabilities in a platform used by police, private security, and military seems a reasonable continuation.

TCLBANKER Trojan


A WhatsApp based worm is targeting users of banking, crypto, and fintech services. The TCLBANKER malware hijacks WhatsApp web and Outlook email accounts to spread a zip file which uses a legitimate signed Logitech tool but injects the payload into the install process.

Once infected, the user is presented with a series of falsified UI screens, including fake system updates, which hides the actual activity of the infection and tricks the user into clicking on hidden elements of the true UI to authorize actions.

The TCLBANKER worm attempts to hide from analysis by downloading encrypted payloads keyed to a hash of the environment. If analysis tools like a debugger are installed, the payload will not decrypt.

ShinyHunters Get Paid


Last week, the group known as ShinyHunters made news by compromising the Canvas educational platform and threatening to leak the personal data and messages of millions of students. The attack culminated with ransom notes taking over the portals of hundreds of schools, and the Canvas platform being shut down “for maintenance” during finals week for many schools.

This week, it appears the ransom was paid, with ShinyHunters promising to destroy the stolen data.

Paying ransom is a hot-button issue: nobody wants to see the ransomware model continue as a profitable venture, but it is tough to argue that millions of students with no voice in the choice of educational platforms should have their data released.

Token Stealer Doesn’t Want to Leave


Trojaned packages continue to be a problem for NPM and other ecosystems, as automated supply chain infections continue to infect high-profile projects.

This time, the TanStack application framework used for developing web applications was compromised by a supply chain worm, “Mini Shai Halud”, a variant of the Dune-themed “Shai Halud” worm infecting packages since March.

The worm spreads via NPM and PyPi and infects packages, developer systems, and GitHub actions, targeting service keys for package repos, cloud resources, AI platforms, and GitHub. The worm also installs services on infected developer systems to capture future service tokens when they are added, and further investigation by the TanStack team uncovered additional services which monitor the stolen credentials and attempt to wipe infected systems using rm -rf / if the stolen credentials are revoked.

Prescription Drug Ransomware


A ransomware attack has hit West Pharmaceutical in Pennsylvania, USA, with filings indicating the attack disrupted the company globally.

West Pharmaceuticals manufacturers packaging for drugs and healthcare items, so a global shutdown of manufacturing and shipping could have a much longer impact on drug availability.

[Editor’s note: Sorry this one runs late! Hackaday Europe was on and it slipped through the cracks. The next installment of This Week in Security will be hitting the pages on Friday as usual.]


hackaday.com/2026/05/18/this-w…

Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

#ShinyHunters hack 7-Eleven: franchisee data and Salesforce records exposed
securityaffairs.com/192336/dat…
#securityaffairs #hacking
Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

Public #Amazon bucket leaks sensitive guest data from Japanese hotel platform #Tabiq
securityaffairs.com/192302/dat…
#securityaffairs #hacking

MiniPlasma: la patch del 2020 su Windows che non c’è mai stata o è sparita


@Informatica (Italy e non Italy)
Una vulnerabilità Windows corretta nel 2020 potrebbe non essere mai stata davvero risolta. Con MiniPlasma, il ricercatore Chaotic Eclipse dimostra che il vecchio PoC di Google Project Zero funziona ancora su sistemi Windows 11 aggiornati. Il caso evidenzia i

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics

In the third quarter of 2025, we updated the methodology for calculating statistical indicators based on the Kaspersky Security Network. These changes affected all sections of the report except for the statistics on installation packages, which remained unchanged.

To illustrate the differences between the reporting periods, we have also recalculated data for the previous quarters. Consequently, these figures may significantly differ from the previously published ones. However, subsequent reports will employ this new methodology, enabling precise comparisons with the data presented in this post.

The Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) is a global network for analyzing anonymized threat information, voluntarily shared by users of Kaspersky solutions. The statistics in this report are based on KSN data unless explicitly stated otherwise.

The quarter in numbers


According to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q1 2026:

  • More than 2.67 million attacks utilizing malware, adware, or unwanted mobile software were prevented.
  • The Trojan-Banker category was the prevalent mobile malware threat with a 10.86% share of total detections.
  • More than 306,000 malicious installation packages were discovered, including:
    • 162,275 packages related to mobile banking Trojans;
    • 439 packages related to mobile ransomware Trojans.



Quarterly highlights


The number of malware, adware, or unwanted software attacks on mobile devices decreased to 2,676,328 in Q1, down from 3,239,244 in the previous quarter.

Attacks on users of Kaspersky mobile solutions, Q3 2024 — Q1 2026 (download)

The overall drop in attack volume stems primarily from a reduction in adware and RiskTool detections. Nonetheless, this trend does not equate to a lower risk for mobile users. As shown later in this report, the number of unique users targeted by these threats remained relatively stable.

In Q1, Synthient researchers identified a link between the notorious Kimwolf botnet and the IPIDEA proxy network. This network was later taken down in cooperation with GTIG.

In early 2026, we discovered several apps on Google Play and the App Store that contained a new version of the SparkCat crypto stealer.

The Trojan code, meticulously concealed, was embedded into the infected Android apps. The obfuscated malicious Rust library was decrypted using a Dalvik-like virtual machine custom-built by the attackers. The iOS version of the malware also underwent several changes; specifically, the attackers began leveraging Apple’s proprietary Vision framework for optical character recognition (OCR).

Mobile threat statistics


The number of Android malware samples saw a slight increase compared to Q4 2025, reaching a total of 306,070.

Detected malicious and potentially unwanted installation packages, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

The detected installation packages were distributed by type as follows:

Detected mobile apps by type, Q4 2025* — Q1 2026 (download)

* Data for the previous quarter may differ slightly from previously published figures due to certain verdicts being retrospectively revised.

Threat actors once again ramped up the production of new banking Trojans; as a result, this category overtook all others in volume, accounting for more than half of all installation packages.

Share* of users attacked by the given type of malicious or potentially unwanted app out of all targeted users of Kaspersky mobile products, Q4 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

* The total percentage may exceed 100% if the same users encountered multiple attack types.

Following the surge in banking Trojan installation packages, the number of associated attacks also rose, causing Trojan-Banker apps to climb one spot in terms of their share of targeted users. Mamont variants emerged as the most prevalent banking Trojans, accounting for 73.5% of detections, with the rest of the users encountering Faketoken, Rewardsteal, Creduz, and other families.

Yet banking Trojans were still outpaced by adware and RiskTool-type unwanted apps when measured by the total number of affected users. Despite a decrease in their share of installation packages, these two app types retained their positions as the top two threats by attack volume. The most common adware detections involved HiddenAd (44.9%) and MobiDash (38.1%), while most frequently seen RiskTool apps were Revpn (67%) and SpyLoan (20.5%).

TOP 20 most frequently detected types of mobile malware


Note that the malware rankings below exclude riskware or potentially unwanted software, such as RiskTool or adware.

Verdict%* Q4 2025%* Q1 2026Difference in p.p.Change in ranking
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ag2.627.09+4.48+10
DangerousObject.Multi.Generic.6.755.84-0.92-1
DangerousObject.AndroidOS.GenericML.3.525.51+1.99+6
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo0.005.28+5.28
Trojan.AndroidOS.Fakemoney.v5.403.44-1.96-1
Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.Keenadu.l0.003.35+3.35
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx0.003.09+3.09
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.z4.873.08-1.79-2
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.fe5.012.98-2.02-4
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Keenadu.a2.072.73+0.66+6
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg0.342.37+2.03
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.hf2.152.23+0.07+3
Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh2.352.15-0.200
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ii5.682.07-3.60-11
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ae1.911.76-0.16+3
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ab1.791.72-0.08+3
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.gn2.381.58-0.80-5
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg1.561.50-0.06+2
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ga1.481.50+0.01+4
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ad0.531.40+0.87+44

* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky mobile solutions.

The pre-installed Triada.ag backdoor rose to the top spot; it is similar to the older Triada.z version we documented previously. Because the same variant was pre-installed across a wide range of devices, the total number of affected users is aggregated. Consequently, Triada outpaced even Mamont, as users encountered a variety of Mamont variants, causing the share of that banking Trojan to spread across multiple rows. Other pre-installed Triada variants (Triada.z, Triada.ae, Triada.ab, and Triada.ad) also made the rankings. Furthermore, we observed increasing activity from the Keenadu.a backdoor, while diverse variants of the embedded Triada Trojan remained in the rankings.

Mobile banking Trojans


Q1 2026 saw a characteristic rise in mobile banking Trojan activity, with the number of packages totaling 162,275, a 50% increase compared to the prior quarter.

Number of installation packages for mobile banking Trojans detected by Kaspersky, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

We saw a similar growth in the previous quarter, with banking Trojan volumes rising by 50% during that period as well. Various Mamont variants accounted for the absolute majority of packages and represented nearly every entry in the rankings of most frequent banking Trojans by affected user count.

TOP 10 mobile bankers

Verdict%* Q4 2025%* Q1 2026Difference in p.p.Change in ranking
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo0.0015.75+15.75
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx0.009.22+9.22
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg1.477.08+5.61+24
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg6.794.48-2.32-3
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.ks0.003.98+3.98
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ws6.033.78-2.25-2
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.hl4.303.27-1.03+1
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.iv6.003.08-2.92-3
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jb3.933.07-0.86+1
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jv0.002.79+2.79

* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky mobile security solutions who encountered banking threats.


securelist.com/malware-report-…

IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics


The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics

The statistics in this report are based on detection verdicts returned by Kaspersky products unless otherwise stated. The information was provided by Kaspersky users who consented to sharing statistical data.

Quarterly figures


In Q1 2026:

  • Kaspersky products blocked more than 343 million attacks that originated with various online resources.
  • Web Anti-Virus responded to 50 million unique links.
  • File Anti-Virus blocked nearly 15 million malicious and potentially unwanted objects.
  • 2938 new ransomware variants were detected.
  • More than 77,000 users experienced ransomware attacks.
  • 14% of all ransomware victims whose data was published on threat actors’ data leak sites (DLS) were victims of Clop.
  • More than 260,000 users were targeted by miners.


Ransomware

Quarterly trends and highlights

Law enforcement success


In January 2026, it was reported that the FBI had seized the domains of the RAMP cybercrime forum, a major platform used extensively by ransomware developers to advertise their RaaS programs and to recruit affiliates. There has been no official statement from the FBI, nor is it clear if RAMP servers were seized. In a post on an external website, a RAMP moderator mentioned law enforcement agencies gaining control over the forum. The takedown disrupted a key element of the RaaS ecosystem, creating ripple effects for ransomware operators, affiliates, and initial access brokers.

A man suspected of links to the Phobos group was apprehended in Poland. He was charged with the creation, acquisition, and distribution of software designed for unlawfully obtaining information, including data that facilitates unauthorized access to information stored within a computer system.

In March, a Phobos ransomware administrator pleaded guilty to the creation and distribution of the Trojan, which had been used in international attacks dating back to at least November 2020.

In March, the U.S. Department of Justice charged a man who had acted as a negotiator for ransomware groups. The company he worked for specializes in cyberincident investigations. The prosecution alleges the suspect colluded with the BlackCat threat actor to share privileged insights into the ongoing progress of negotiations. Additionally, the suspect is alleged to have had a prior direct role in BlackCat attacks, serving as an affiliate for the RaaS operation.

In a separate development this March, a U.S. court sentenced an initial access broker associated with the Yanluowang ransomware group to 81 months of imprisonment. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the convict facilitated dozens of ransomware attacks across the United States, resulting in over $9 million in actual loss and more than $24 million in intended loss.

Vulnerabilities and attacks


The Interlock group has been heavily exploiting the CVE-2026-20131 zero-day vulnerability in Cisco Secure FMC firewall management software since at least January 26, 2026. The vulnerability enabled arbitrary Java code execution with root privileges on the affected device. This campaign demonstrates the ongoing reliance on zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access, a focus on network appliances as high-value entry points, and the rapid weaponization of new vulnerabilities within the ransomware ecosystem.

The most prolific groups


This section highlights the most prolific ransomware gangs by number of victims added to each group’s DLS. This quarter, the Clop ransomware (14.42%) returned to the top of the rankings, displacing Qilin (12.34%), which had held the leading position in the previous reporting period. Following closely is a new threat actor, The Gentlemen (9.25%). Emerging no later than July 2025, the group had already surpassed the activity levels of mainstays such as Akira (7.25%) and INC Ransom (6.13%).

Number of each group’s victims according to its DLS as a percentage of all groups’ victims published on all the DLSs under review during the reporting period (download)

Number of new variants


In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected six new ransomware families and 2938 new modifications. Volumes have returned to Q3 2025 levels following a surge in Q4 2025.

Number of new ransomware modifications, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans


Throughout Q1, our solutions protected 77,319 unique users from ransomware. Ransomware activity was highest in March, with 35,056 unique users encountering such attacks during the month.

Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q1 2026 (download)

Attack geography

TOP 10 countries and territories attacked by ransomware Trojans
Country/territory*%**
1Pakistan0.79
2South Korea0.64
3China0.52
4Tajikistan0.40
5Libya0.38
6Turkmenistan0.36
7Iraq0.35
8Bangladesh0.33
9Rwanda0.30
10Cameroon0.28

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 50,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users whose computers were attacked by ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.

TOP 10 most common families of ransomware Trojans

NameVerdict%*
1(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen33.90
2(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren6.38
3WannaCryTrojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna5.87
4(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder4.68
5(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent3.80
6LockBitTrojan-Ransom.Win32.Lockbit2.80
7(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny1.99
8(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Agent1.96
9(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.Python.Agent1.93
10(generic verdict)Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod1.89

* Unique Kaspersky users attacked by the specific ransomware Trojan family as a percentage of all unique users attacked by this type of threat.

Miners

Number of new variants


In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected 3485 new modifications of miners.

Number of new miner modifications, Q1 2026 (download)

Number of users attacked by miners


In Q1, we detected attacks using miner programs on the computers of 260,588 unique Kaspersky users worldwide.

Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q1 2026 (download)

Attack geography

TOP 10 countries and territories attacked by miners
Country/territory*%**
1Senegal3.19
2Turkmenistan3.06
3Mali2.63
4Tanzania1.62
5Bangladesh1.06
6Ethiopia0.95
7Panama0.88
8Afghanistan0.79
9Kazakhstan0.77
10Bolivia0.75

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 50,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users whose computers were attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.

Attacks on macOS


In Q1 2026, Google uncovered a new cryptocurrency theft campaign. The scammers directed victims to a fraudulent video call, prompting them to execute malicious scripts under the guise of technical support fixes for connection problems.

In March, researchers with GTIG and iVerify reported the discovery of an in-the-wild exploit chain targeting both iOS and macOS devices. The exploit kit was apparently marketed on the dark web, providing threat actors with a suite of spyware capabilities alongside specialized cryptocurrency exfiltration modules. The exploit was delivered via drive-by downloads when victims visited various compromised websites. Our analysis confirmed that the toolkit included an updated version of a component previously identified in the Operation Triangulation attack chain.

Devices running macOS were similarly impacted by the high-profile supply chain attack targeting the Axios npm package, a widely used HTTP client for JavaScript. The installation of the infected package led to the deployment of a backdoor on macOS devices.

TOP 20 threats to macOS

Unique users* who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS (download)

* Data for the previous quarter may differ slightly from previously published data due to some verdicts being retrospectively revised.

The share of PasivRobber spyware attacks is beginning to decline, giving way to more traditional adware and Monitor-class software capable of tracking user activity. The popular Amos stealer also maintains its presence within the TOP 20.

Geography of threats to macOS

TOP 10 countries and territories by share of attacked users
Country/territory%* Q4 2025%* Q1 2026
China1.281.97
France1.181.07
Brazil1.130.98
Mexico0.720.52
Germany0.710.45
The Netherlands0.620.75
Hong Kong0.490.53
India0.420.48
Russian Federation0.340.37
Thailand0.240.27

* Unique users who encountered threats to macOS as a percentage of all unique Kaspersky users in the country/territory.

IoT threat statistics


This section presents statistics on attacks targeting Kaspersky IoT honeypots. The geographic data on attack sources is based on the IP addresses of attacking devices.

In Q1 2026, the share of devices attacking Kaspersky honeypots via the SSH protocol saw a significant increase compared to the previous reporting period.

Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of attacking devices (download)

The distribution of attacks between Telnet and SSH maintained the ratio observed in Q4 2025.

Distribution of attackers’ sessions in Kaspersky honeypots (download)

TOP 10 threats delivered to IoT devices

Share of each threat delivered to an infected device as a result of a successful attack, out of the total number of threats delivered (download)

The primary shifts in the IoT threat distribution are linked to the activity of various Mirai botnet variants, although members of this family continue to account for the majority of the list. Furthermore, a new variant, Mirai.kl, surfaced in the rankings. We also observed a significant decline in NyaDrop botnet activity during Q1.

Attacks on IoT honeypots


The United States, the Netherlands, and Germany accounted for the highest proportions of SSH-based attacks during this period.

Country/territoryQ4 2025Q1 2026
United States16.10%23.74%
The Netherlands15.78%17.57%
Germany12.07%10.34%
Panama7.72%6.34%
India5.32%6.05%
Romania4.05%5.82%
Australia1.62%4.61%
Vietnam4.21%3.50%
Russian Federation3.79%2.35%
Sweden2.25%2.09%

China continues to account for the largest proportion of Telnet attacks, though there was a marked increase in activity originating from Pakistan.

Country/territoryQ4 2025Q1 2026
China53.64%39.54%
Pakistan14.27%27.31%
Russian Federation8.20%8.25%
Indonesia8.58%6.71%
India4.85%4.66%
Brazil0.06%3.30%
Argentina0.02%2.51%
Nigeria1.22%1.38%
Thailand0.01%0.55%
Sweden0.54%0.55%

Attacks via web resources


The statistics in this section are based on detection verdicts by Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when suspicious objects are downloaded from malicious or infected web pages. These malicious pages are purposefully created by cybercriminals. Websites that host user-generated content, such as message boards, as well as compromised legitimate sites, can become infected.

TOP 10 countries and territories that served as sources of web-based attacks


The following statistics show the distribution by country/territory of the sources of internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages redirecting to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, and so on). One or more web-based attacks could originate from each unique host.

To determine the geographic source of web attacks, we matched the domain name with the real IP address where the domain is hosted, then identified the geographic location of that IP address (GeoIP).

In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions blocked 343,823,407 attacks launched from internet resources worldwide. Web Anti-Virus was triggered by 49,983,611 unique URLs.

Web-based attacks by country/territory, Q1 2026 (download)

Countries and territories where users faced the greatest risk of online infection


To assess the risk of malware infection via the internet for users’ computers in different countries and territories, we calculated the share of Kaspersky users in each location on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries and territories.

This ranked list includes only attacks by malicious objects classified as Malware. Our calculations leave out Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.

Country/territory*%**
1Venezuela9.33
2Hungary8.16
3Italy7.58
4Tajikistan7.48
5India7.21
6Greece7.13
7Portugal7.10
8France7.05
9Belgium6.83
10Slovakia6.80
11Vietnam6.62
12Bosnia and Herzegovina6.57
13Canada6.56
14Serbia6.50
15Tunisia6.36
16Qatar6.01
17Spain5.95
18Germany5.95
19Sri Lanka5.89
20Brazil5.88

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 10,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users targeted by web-based Malware attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.

On average during the quarter, 4.73% of users’ computers worldwide were subjected to at least one Malware web attack.

Local threats


Statistics on local infections of user computers are an important indicator. They include objects that penetrated the target computer by infecting files or removable media, or initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form. Examples of the latter are programs in complex installers and encrypted files.

Data in this section is based on analyzing statistics produced by anti-virus scans of files on the hard drive at the moment they were created or accessed, and the results of scanning removable storage media. The statistics are based on detection verdicts from the On-Access Scan (OAS) and On-Demand Scan (ODS) modules of File Anti-Virus and include detections of malicious programs located on user computers or removable media connected to the computers, such as flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, or external hard drives.

In Q1 2026, our File Anti-Virus detected 15,831,319 malicious and potentially unwanted objects.

Countries and territories where users faced the highest risk of local infection


For each country and territory, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users whose computers had the File Anti-Virus triggered at least once during the reporting period. This statistic reflects the level of personal computer infection in different countries and territories around the world.

Note that this ranked list includes only attacks by malicious objects classified as Malware. Our calculations leave out File Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.

Country/territory*%**
1Turkmenistan47.96
2Tajikistan31.48
3Cuba31.03
4Yemen29.59
5Afghanistan28.47
6Burundi26.93
7Uzbekistan24.81
8Syria23.08
9Nicaragua21.97
10Cameroon21.60
11China21.09
12Mozambique21.02
13Algeria20.64
14Democratic Republic of the Congo20.63
15Bangladesh20.44
16Mali20.35
17Republic of the Congo20.23
18Madagascar20.00
19Belarus19.78
20Tanzania19.52

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 10,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users on whose computers local Malware threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.

On average worldwide, Malware local threats were detected at least once on 11.55% of users’ computers during Q1.

Russia scored 11.92% in these rankings.


securelist.com/malware-report-…

Warning from the UK: how not to create digital policy


The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

Warning from the UK: how not to create digital policy
IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS. I'm Mark Scott, and you find me filing this dispatch via dodgy wifi on the way to Brussels. If you're in town, I'll be at the CPDP conference most of the week. Let's grab coffee.

— The United Kingdom is again engulfed in political infighting. The country's tech ambitions are equally on life support.

— In the wake of the recent China-United States summit, Middle Power countries are using their unique digital industrial policy skills to navigate the new geopolitical reality.

— The world's leading artificial intelligence firms are massively subsiziding their models to win market share. That is unsustainable.

Let's get started:



digitalpolitics.co/newsletter0…

Running a VPN Gateway on an ESP32


The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

A black screen with green text is shown. The green text logs events from a VPN gateway.

If you need a VPN gateway to access your home network, the fastest and most cost-effective way is probably by using a Raspberry Pi Zero. But in [Samir Makwana]’s view, an ESP32-S3 is just as capable for moderate use, and in some respects even superior.

This was possible thanks to the MicroLink project, which is a full implementation of a Tailscale client for the ESP32 family. In some ways the ESP32 worked better than a Raspberry Pi: it boots in two seconds rather than thirty, draws 0.5 Watts rather than 1.5, and there’s no chance of it failing due to a corrupted SD card. Compared to a Raspberry Pi, however, which can be set up as a Tailscale client in a few minutes, this took several hours to get running. The biggest issue was making sure that there was enough memory available for TLS handshakes, which was solved by enabling the ESP32’s PSRAM.

Once the VPN client is running, the ESP32 can be used as an SSH jump machine to access other devices on the home network, without needing to expose those machines to the open Internet. The ESP32 also hosts an HTTP server which can send a wake-on-LAN magic packet to another device on the local network, letting unused devices sleep without impairing their availability.

The ESP32 doesn’t provide much bandwidth — streaming video would cause issues — but it works well enough for lightweight applications. If you’re wanting to stream video from an ESP32, though, it is technically possible.


hackaday.com/2026/05/18/runnin…

Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

Salute mentale, il caso italiano
@psicologia
psichiatria.it/salute-mentale-…
Salute mentale, il caso italiano Quei pazienti persi dai radar L’82,2 per cento di loro smette di frequentare le strutture senza un accordo con i medici […]
Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

The Queen Is Dead Volume 205 – Absu, Enduser, Lesotho, Putred

Absu, Enduser, Lesotho e Putred: caos rituale e metal

Absu, Enduser, Lesotho e Putred: quattro dischi tra black/death rituale, breakcore inquieta, post metal catartico e death romeno marcio. Nessuna posa.

iyezine.com/absu-enduser-lesot…

Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

Signal apre i test pubblici della verifica automatica delle chiavi


Con la beta 8.11 di Signal per Android arriva in test pubblico la verifica automatica delle chiavi crittografiche basata su key transparency. Ecco come funziona e quali sono i limiti.
The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

Verificare che una conversazione su Signal sia davvero cifrata end-to-end con la persona giusta finora ha richiesto un confronto manuale: incontrarsi di persona, confrontare i 60 numeri del safety number, oppure scansionare il QR code attraverso un canale alternativo fidato. Una procedura corretta in teoria, ma che non sempre è facile o si ha voglia di eseguire sul serio. Con la beta 8.11 di Signal per Android, in distribuzione in queste ore, lo stesso controllo inizia a essere automatico.

La funzione si chiama automatic key verification e si basa sulla key transparency, un meccanismo crittografico in sviluppo presso Signal da diverso tempo. Per provarla basta aprire il profilo di un contatto, toccare “View Safety Number” e premere il pulsante “Verify automatically”: se la verifica va a buon fine compare un segno verde con la dicitura “Encryption verified”.

Come funziona la key transparency


Il post di Signal che annuncia la feature si limita a dire che la verifica automatica è “un sistema di controlli continui effettuati da più parti, l’utente, l’interlocutore e auditor indipendenti di terze parti”. Non spiega in dettaglio cosa succede dietro le quinte. Per capire il funzionamento del sistema bisogna guardare al codice pubblicato da Signal su GitHub e alla bozza IETF di riferimento, scritta tra gli altri da un ingegnere di Signal.

Per cifrare i messaggi end-to-end, Signal deve associare a ciascun utente una chiave pubblica. Storicamente queste associazioni sono custodite sui server di Signal e fornite ai client quando serve. Il limite di questo approccio è noto: un server compromesso, o sotto pressione legale, potrebbe in teoria fornire una chiave diversa da quella reale e rendere possibile un attacco con un terzo interposto. L’app già oggi notifica all’utente i cambi di safety number, ma per capire se un cambio è legittimo, ad esempio una reinstallazione, oppure è un attacco, bisognava confrontare manualmente il numero con la controparte.

La key transparency interviene su questo punto. Dalla documentazione tecnica risulta che Signal continua a custodire le stesse informazioni di prima, ma in una struttura che non permette modifiche silenziose: ogni cambio di chiave viene aggiunto a un elenco in cui si possono solo accodare nuove voci, mai cancellare o riscrivere quelle vecchie. È come un libro contabile in cui ogni pagina è legata matematicamente a quelle precedenti, quindi strappare una pagina o riscriverla lascerebbe una traccia evidente.

A controllare che Signal non bari servono soggetti esterni, chiamati auditor. Signal ha pubblicato su GitHub il codice di un auditor di riferimento e Trail of Bits, società di sicurezza nota nel settore, ha pubblicato una propria implementazione indipendente. L’idea descritta nelle specifiche è che soggetti terzi possano scaricare in continuazione gli aggiornamenti del registro e accorgersi se i server di Signal provassero ad alterarlo o a mostrarne versioni diverse a utenti diversi.

Dal codice pubblico e dalla bozza IETF risulta che il registro non è una rubrica aperta consultabile da chiunque: la sua struttura è progettata in modo che gli auditor possano verificarne la correttezza matematica senza vedere in chiaro quali numeri sono iscritti e con quali chiavi. Chi conosce già un numero specifico può chiedere al server quale chiave gli è associata, come succede oggi quando si aggiunge un contatto a Signal, ma scaricare l’elenco completo degli iscritti non è possibile.

L’app esegue inoltre verifiche per conto proprio: controlla che la chiave del contatto sia effettivamente presente nel registro e che il registro stesso sia rimasto coerente nel tempo. Tutte queste verifiche insieme, secondo Signal, offrono la stessa garanzia di un confronto manuale del safety number, senza richiedere alcuna azione all’utente.

I limiti, e cosa succede quando non funziona


La verifica automatica non è disponibile in tutti i casi. Funziona soltanto se il client conosce il numero di telefono dell’altra parte, condizione che si verifica se la chat è stata iniziata tramite la funzione “Trova per numero”, se il contatto è in rubrica ed è raggiungibile per numero, oppure se l’interlocutore ha scelto di rendere il proprio numero visibile a tutti (l’impostazione predefinita lo nasconde a chiunque).

Anche quando funziona, può smettere di farlo per ragioni del tutto normali, come il cambio di numero della controparte. In quei casi, ricorda Signal, si torna al vecchio safety number da confrontare attraverso un canale alternativo fidato. La verifica automatica si affianca quindi al safety number manuale, non lo sostituisce del tutto.

Quando arriva in versione stabile


Per il momento la novità è confermata nel canale beta di Android. Sviluppo della key transparency è in corso da diverso tempo anche su iOS e Desktop, e la feature dovrebbe arrivare in test pubblico anche su quelle piattaforme nelle prossime settimane, anche se le release notes ufficiali delle rispettive beta in distribuzione non la menzionano esplicitamente. Signal chiede di segnalare nel forum eventuali casi in cui la verifica non risulta disponibile pur ricorrendo una delle tre condizioni descritte. Le beta servono proprio a questo prima del rilascio generale.

SOURCE:// community.signalusers.org
SOURCE:// community.signalusers.org
SOURCE:// github.com

Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

CVE-2025-14177: Malicious JPEG Files Expose PHP Heap Memory — Critical Flaws in getimagesize() and iptcembed() Patched
#CyberSecurity
securebulletin.com/cve-2025-14…
Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

First Public macOS Kernel Exploit on Apple M5 Bypasses Hardware Memory Protection — Developed in Just Five Days With AI Assistance
#CyberSecurity
securebulletin.com/first-publi…
Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

Grafana Labs Security Breach: Hackers Steal GitHub Token, Download Private Codebase, and Demand Ransom
#CyberSecurity
securebulletin.com/grafana-lab…
Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 Day 2: Exchange, Windows 11, and AI Coding Tools Fall to Zero-Days — $908,750 in Total Prizes
#CyberSecurity
securebulletin.com/pwn2own-ber…

Building a Working Replica of the Chernobyl Power Plant’s SKALA Display


The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

In a recent video by the [Chornobyl Family] it’s shown how they made the SKALA status display which was featured at the recent 40-year memorial exhibition of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) #4 reactor accident, along with the RBMK reactor control panel replica and SKALA console which they had made previously.

Detail of the SKALA display. (Credit: Chornobyl Family, YouTube)

We previously covered this SKALA control system of the ChNPP’s RBMK reactors, as well as its 1990s modernization. This SKALA status display is one of the original elements of the control room, providing a status overview of the entire control system at a glance, including its processors and peripheral devices.

The replica uses similar looking components, with a metal casing and LED lighting that invokes the aesthetics of the original electroluminescent mnemonic panels. Overall the goal was to keep the appearance as close to the original as possible — they even had operators of the ChNPP reactors look over the panel and give it their stamp of approval.

Some of the components like the error indicators had to be 3D printed, while the metal case was cut out of sheet metal. There’s also a very big speaker for the alarm, at the top right of the panel. Along with the LEDs for the electroluminescent-style indicators this meant a lot of addressable LEDs and a lot of wiring.

The full build plans are available via the [Chornobyl Family] Patreon, if you feel like building up your own RBMK-style reactor control room.

youtube.com/embed/80UTQHD2gVM?…


hackaday.com/2026/05/18/buildi…

#4
Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

#Chaotic #Eclipse discloses #MiniPlasma zero-day, suggesting a missing or undone 2020 #Windows security fix
securityaffairs.com/192325/hac…
#securityaffairs #hacking
Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

Experts warn of active exploitation of critical #NGINX flaw CVE-2026-42945
securityaffairs.com/192289/unc…
#securityaffairs #hacking
Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

313 – Pagheremo la spesa in modo diverso. Dipende da chi siamo camisanicalzolari.it/313-paghe…

A Status Screen For Bambu Labs Printers


The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

If you’ve got a Bambu Labs printer, it’s usually pretty straightforward to keep an eye on it via the onboard display or the various apps the company has released. However, if you want a dedicated display somewhere remote from your printer, you might like this build from [Keralots].

The project is based on an ESP32-S3 Super Mini, paired with a 1.54″ TFT display with a 240 x 240 resolution. It’s set up to talk to Bambu Labs printers over MQTT with TLS. It harvests status data and uses it to display a real-time dashboard with critical printer parameters display on arc gauges. There’s also plenty of live stats to pore over, as well as buzzer notifications if you want auditory alerts about what is going on. It’s possible to use with just about any Bambu Labs printer with a Bambu Cloud access token; otherwise, you can tinker with LAN Direct connections on certain models, but you might need to enable Developer Mode depending on your rig.

If you want to monitor your printer’s vital statistics at a glance, this project is a great way to do it. It breaks out the fundamental numbers in a clear and obvious fashion that’s a little easier to parse quickly compared to the interface of the official software. We’ve featured similar builds before, too. If you’re also paranoid about prints and using that to motivate you towards creating useful hardware, don’t hesitate to let us know on the tipsline.


hackaday.com/2026/05/17/a-stat…

Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

Texas contro la Cina: dispositivi medici sotto accusa per rischio cyber spionaggio

📌 Link all'articolo : redhotcyber.com/post/texas-con…

A cura di Carolina Vivianti

#redhotcyber #news #sicurezzainformatica #datimedici #partitocomunistacinese #texas #governatore

Turning a Junk Laptop Screen Into a Portable Monitor


The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

Sure, you can buy a portable monitor off your favorite e-tailer, but with perfectly fine displays in devices like laptops being tossed out every single day, why not repurpose those instead? That’s what [ScuffedBits] recently did with the panels pulled from some old laptops.

A good question with any such salvaged panel is just how practical it is to still use them, with disqualifying features being things like passive-matrix TFTs as well as the use of CCFL backlighting as with one of the three panels demonstrated in the video.

Looking up the model number of a panel on a site like panelook.com will tell you the display technology, resolution and other important details before you decide to commit to using it. If it’s using a LED backlight and at least Low-Voltage Differential Signaling (LVDS) but ideally eDP you can likely find a cheap driver board for it that has all the requisite inputs like HDMI and power.

The hardest part is probably the case for the panel, as they’re rather thin and fragile. Here [ScuffedBits] opted to 3D print two different types of cases, with the second variant probably being the best version as it protects most of the panel. Installing these is quite easy: slide the panel into the first half, then add the second half of the case to close it up. Permanently keeping the case in place was left as an exercise to a future [ScuffedBits], while demonstrating why it’s definitely the hardest part of repurposing an old laptop display.

youtube.com/embed/KKTylJXI4VE?…


hackaday.com/2026/05/17/turnin…

Hackaday Links: May 17, 2026


The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

Hackaday Links Column Banner

To start things off, we’d like to extend a special thanks to everyone who joined us for Hackaday Europe this weekend in Lecco, Italy. It was 48 hours of fascinating talks, incredible badge hacks, and some of the greatest company you could hope for. For those who couldn’t make it in person, we didn’t forget you — expect to hear more about what went down once we get a chance to catch our collective breath.

That’s not the only thing to keep an eye out for in the coming days. This is your reminder that Amazon will be officially ending support for older Kindles in a few days. After May 20th, any of the megacorp’s e-readers that were introduced before 2012 will be persona non grata, so you should plan accordingly.

The biggest change is that these older devices won’t be able to buy digital books from Amazon, but you can still use them offline, and the fantastic Calibre makes it a breeze to load up content from other sources. To be perfectly honest, we’d advise any Kindle user to decouple their device from the Amazon mothership by using Calibre or even jailbreaking it and installing KOReader, so the end of official support is fine by us. In fact, if a surge of unsupported Kindles brings more attention and users to those projects, that suits us just fine.

We’ve also heard that Microsoft is removing the “Together” feature from Teams on June 30th. We actually had to look this one up — apparently, it was a mode added during the pandemic that made it look like you and the other people in the call were all sitting together in a virtual conference room of sorts. Sounds an awful lot like a dystopian nightmare to us, but to be fair, things got kinda weird there when we were all sheltering in place, so it’s hard to judge. In any event, we don’t think too many people will miss this particular feature in 2026.

While on the subject of products the world seems to have forgotten about, Electrek reports that Tesla has all but given up on their once promising solar roof tiles. The company won’t say just how many installations they’ve completed since the camouflaged panels hit the market in 2016, but estimates suggest the number may be as low as 3,000. It will probably come as little surprise to find that cost seems to be the biggest factor: a roof full of Tesla’s swanky tiles could run you six-figures, while traditional panels are only getting cheaper every year.

From end-of-life to the latest and greatest, today also marks the release of Linux 7.1-rc4. If you’re in the business of running release candidate kernels, you probably don’t need to be told what’s new, but for everyone else, Phoronix has a rundown on some of the changes. Highlights include improvements to hardware support (including a fix for the Framework Laptop 13 Pro), security fixes, and new guidance about the use of AI-generated code.

Finally, if you want a time-waster, there’s Halupedia. According to the site’s GitHub: An infinite, hallucinated encyclopedia. Every link leads to an entry that does not exist yet — until you click it, at which point an LLM pretends it has always existed and writes it for you, in the deadpan register of a 19th-century scholarly press. For example, you can read about “The Ministry of Slightly Wrong Maps,” or, if you prefer, “The Ministry of Terribly Wrong Maps.”


See something interesting that you think would be a good fit for our weekly Links column? Drop us a line, we’d love to hear about it.


hackaday.com/2026/05/17/hackad…

Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

La popolarità di Trump è ora più del doppio negativa rispetto al primo mandato! (17 maggio)


Non si arresta la caduta dell'approvazione di Trump che precipita ulteriormente nel burrone, scendendo sotto al 40% e toccando il -20 di net rating, senza che si intraveda il benché minimo segnale di una possibile risalita.

Come ogni domenica, facciamo un resoconto sulla approvazione del presidente Trump, con i cambiamenti occorsi negli ultimi sette giorni.

Come ormai da diverso tempo a questa parte, prosegue il periodo horror per Trump, con la popolarità che continua a subire ingenti perdite dall'inizio della guerra in Iran.

La situazione per il tycoon è estremamente drammatica, ed è difficile trovare dei dati così negativi nella storia recente della politica americana.

Il net rating ha ormai raggiunto la cifra record di -20, con il tasso di approvazione che resta abbastanza stabilmente sotto al 40% (con punte molto negative) e la disapprovazione non lontana dal 60%.

Sono numeri terrificanti, che non erano mai stati toccati nemmeno nei momenti peggiori del primo mandato e fino a dieci punti inferiori rispetto a prima della guerra in Iran.

Per il tycoon sarà difficile rialzarsi da questa situazione: soprattutto qualora dovesse riprendere la guerra o dovessero perdurare il caos e la paralisi della situazione, i numeri potrebbero scivolare ulteriormente verso il basso.

Il dato è peggiore di quattro punti rispetto alla media di Joe Biden nel maggio 2022; questo significa che l’approvazione di Trump è la peggiore di qualunque presidente fino al giorno d’oggi dopo sedici mesi di presidenza, e la distanza col suo predecessore si è notevolmente ampliata. Arriva addirittura a oltre undici punti, invece, la distanza con il suo primo mandato.

Il net rating (la differenza tra tasso di approvazione e tasso di disapprovazione) rimane saldamente in territorio negativo sia per la media di RealClearPolitics (RCP), sia per quella del Silver Bulletin, sia per la nostra di Focus America.

Seguici anche su WhatsApp

Tutte le medie registrano una discesa di circa un punto rispetto a sette giorni fa, con Focus America e Silver che toccano il -20, mentre RCP si mantiene qualche punto più alta.

Come già accennato, dopo più di sedici mesi alla Casa Bianca, il gradimento di questo secondo mandato si colloca sotto rispetto ai primi sedici mesi del suo primo mandato e di Biden.

Sondaggi
L’approvazione di Trump e degli altri presidenti
Approvazione netta (approva − disapprova), per giorni dall’insediamento

Presidente
Trump II

Grafici Recap numerico

Facendo un paragone con il passato, grazie ai dati di Focus America, si nota come il dato di apprezzamento di Trump dopo 481 giorni di presidenza (-20 secondo la nostra media) sia il più basso tra tutti i presidenti USA dal secondo dopoguerra in avanti nello stesso periodo, indietro come detto anche rispetto al suo primo mandato, in cui era ben più del doppio, a -8,7.

Anche Joe Biden, comunque, con il suo -16,1 non brillava particolarmente dopo sedici mesi di presidenza.

Sul nostro sito trovate i grafici con il confronto con tutti i primi mandati degli altri presidenti, con una frequenza di aggiornamento pari a 8 volte al giorno.

Il tasso di approvazione di Trump oscilla tra il 38% e il 40%, mentre il tasso di disapprovazione si aggira intorno al 57%-59%.

Nelle prossime settimane monitoreremo l’evoluzione di questa situazione, per cogliere se ci saranno ulteriori ripercussioni sui numeri con gli sviluppi della tregua con l’Iran.

Di seguito pubblichiamo una selezione delle rilevazioni dei migliori istituti rilasciate nel corso dell'ultima settimana. Di fianco alla casa sondaggistica scriviamo due numeri percentuali: il primo è il tasso di approvazione, il secondo quello di disapprovazione.

Ricordiamo che, stante la chiusura del sito FiveThirtyEight, abbiamo deciso di utilizzare i numeri del Silver Bulletin, il nuovo sito di Nate Silver, fondatore di 538.

Sondaggi
Gli ultimi sondaggi sulla popolarità di Trump
6 rilevazioni di 6 istituti — 17 maggio 2026

Sondaggi Metodo

Ordina per:Data fineNet Approval

Legenda campioni

RV

Registered Voters · 1 sondaggio
Elettori registrati al voto

A

Adults · 5 sondaggi
Tutti gli adulti americani — campione più ampio

Affidabilità
RVA

Elaborazione di Focus America su dati dei sondaggi pubblici · Ultimo aggiornamento: 17 maggio 2026

Il sito Silver Bulletin (che fa una propria media aggiustata di tutti i sondaggi, dandone un peso maggiore o minore in base al bias storico e al rating delle firme che li svolgono) segna una media generale di 38,5% (-0,3) - 58,3% (+0,5). In totale un net approval arrotondato di -19,8 (-0,8).

Il sito RealClearPolitics, invece, che fa una selezione solo di alcuni sondaggi in base all'affidabilità di chi li esegue, segnala una media totale migliore: 40,1% (-0,4) - 56,9% (+0,6). In totale un rating di -16,8 (-1).

La media calcolata da noi di Focus America, invece, è di 38,5% (-0,5) - 58,5% (+1,1), con in totale un rating di -20 (-1,6). La metodologia utilizzata è specificata direttamente nella pagina del nostro sito dedicata ai sondaggi sulla popolarità di Trump.

Tracker
L’approvazione di Trump: tre medie a confronto
Andamento giornaliero dall’insediamento

Seleziona fonte
Confronto Silver Bulletin RCP FocusAmerica

Silver Bulletin

RealClearPolitics

FocusAmerica

Clicca qui per vedere i dati aggiornati in tempo reale della popolarità di Trump

NFC Record Player Promotes Intentional Listening


The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

Streaming services have enabled many of us to have easy access to the world’s media library at the touch of a screen, but [Coconauts] thinks we’ve lost something along the way. To bring some intentionality back to the listening experience, they built an NFC record player called Minilos.

Like a normal record player, Minilos requires the user to select an album to play on the machine. These were originally decorative coasters with records printed on them, so they are much smaller than even a 45. Each one features an NFC tag that instructs ESP32 microcontroller hidden in the device to play the requested song. Once placed on the record player, it will then play through that album and come to a stop.

In [Coconauts]’s current setup, the ESP32 is connected to a Home Assistant server which then instructs a Google Speaker to play the requested song via Spotify, although we could easily imagine this being used to play music directly from an SD card or other digital storage device instead.

If you want complete control over your music listening while still keeping that authentic vinyl experience, you could always look into cutting your own records with a laser.


hackaday.com/2026/05/17/nfc-re…

Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

thestateofbrand.com/news/ai-su… mi sa che per parecchi un certo giorno sarà un brutto risveglio

reshared this

Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

L’UE e le “conversion therapy”: tra tutela dei diritti e retorica propagandistica
#PoliticalNotes

ilglobale.it/2026/05/lue-e-le-…
@politica

CGA As You Have Never Seen It Before


The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

An old-style graphics system as found on many 8-bit computers and on early PC graphics cards drew its characters by retrieving their bitmaps from a ROM. With a little sideways thinking, [GloriousCow] has exploited this process to make a CGA card perform graphical tricks it was never designed to do.

The CGA card clocks its character ROM continuously across the whole screen, even at the edges where nothing would normally be displayed. By placing the ROM in tandem with a Raspberry Pi Pico 2 they were able to use this ROM clocking as a synchronization signal, and inject whatever pixel data they chose.

The result is a CGA card that can display 60 Hz high-res graphics in text mode, albeit with a very retro one bit color depth. It can overlay the text and the graphics too, because the ROM is still present. One fun result of this is a bouncing DVD logo screensaver, on a DOS PC.

There’s a PCB and a promise of more, meanwhile we suggest you take a look at an impossible feat using a similar technique: NES Doom.


hackaday.com/2026/05/17/cga-as…

Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

Francesca Romana D’Antuono, copresidente di Volt Europa, lo sa bene: l’umanità è in pericolo. Non per la crisi climatica, le guerre, il costo della vita o i salari bassi. No: siamo invasi dagli alieni di Plutone.

Per questo Volt lancia “Negozio Umano”: l’adesivo per riconoscere negozi, botteghe e attività ancora gestite da esseri umani.

Una parodia? Certo. Ma dietro iniziative come “Negozio Italiano”, promosse nell’area di Roberto Vannacci e arrivate anche in Emilia-Romagna, c’è qualcosa di molto serio: l’idea che una vetrina debba diventare un confine, che il commercio locale si difenda dividendo le persone tra “noi” e “loro”.

Noi pensiamo l’opposto: negozi, artigiani e botteghe si sostengono con affitti sostenibili, accesso al credito, rigenerazione urbana, meno burocrazia e servizi nei quartieri.

Non con bollini identitari.

Il problema non sono gli alieni di Plutone. È chi vede nemici dove ci sono persone.

#NegozioUmano #SatiraPolitica #CommercioLocale #NoAlRazzismo #Vannacci #EuropaFederale #Volt #VoltItalia #VoltEuropa

in reply to Volt Italia

@Volt Italia

Quegli adesivi sono utilissimi invece, spero arrivino anche a Firenze.

Mi aiuterebbero a scegliere in quali negozi entrare e in quali no e ad evitare che i miei soldi finiscano in mano ad un razzista.

Finalmente Vannacci ne ha fatta una giusta 😁

Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

E se domani gli USA spegnessero il cloud? KDE riceve 1,3 milioni dalla Germania

📌 Link all'articolo : redhotcyber.com/post/e-se-doma…

A cura di Marcello Filacchioni

#redhotcyber #news #europa #opensource #kde #sovreigntechfund #sicurezzainformatica

Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please go to the original post.

E noi amiamo la vita se troviamo la via per viverla

Lunedì 25 maggio alle ore 18:00, Centro Studi Sereno Regis, via Garibaldi 13, #Torino.

Mahmud Darwish
Incontro sulla #Palestina tra il dolore e la #Poesia.

Con Martina Marchiò, vicepresidente di #MediciSenzaFrontiere; Tareq Aljabr, poeta e traduttore; Marica Tarantino e Mirca Leccese, di Torino per Gaza.

Proiezione del cortometraggio vincitore del #NazraFilmFestival 2023: Vibration from #Gaza.

serenoregis.org/evento/e-noi-a…

@serenoregis @torino


E noi amiamo la vita se troviamo la via per viverla


E noi amiamo la vita se troviamo la via per viverla
Inizia: Lunedì Maggio 25, 2026 @ 6:00 PM GMT+02:00 (Europe/Rome)
Finisce: Lunedì Gennaio 01, 0001 @ 12:00 AM GMT+00:00 (UTC)

Mahmud Darwish

Incontro sulla Palestina tra il dolore e la Poesia

Proiezione del corto "Vibration from Gaza", di Rehab Nazzal (vincitrice del Nazra festival 2023)

Martina Marchiò, vice presidente di Medici Senza Frontiere - Italia e operatrice umanitaria;
Tareq Aljabr, poeta e traduttore di Mahmud Darwish;
dialogano con Marica Tarantino e Mirca Leccese del Coordinamento Torino per Gaza,
con la partecipazione del comitato Un aiuto per la Palestina


Questa voce è stata modificata (3 settimane fa)
Cybersecurity & cyberwarfare ha ricondiviso questo.

Mozilla alle autorità di regolamentazione del Regno Unito: le VPN sono strumenti essenziali per la privacy e la sicurezza e non dovrebbero essere compromesse

Le VPN rappresentano strumenti essenziali per la privacy e la sicurezza degli utenti di tutte le età. Nascondendo gli indirizzi IP degli utenti’, le VPN aiutano a proteggere la posizione degli utenti’, ridurre il tracciamento ed evitare la profilazione basata su IP. Le persone utilizzano le VPN per molti motivi diversi: per connettersi da remoto alla rete della propria scuola o del proprio datore di lavoro, per evitare la censura o semplicemente per proteggere la propria privacy e sicurezza online. Sebbene poter accedere alle VPN sia particolarmente importante per i gruppi vulnerabili come attivisti, dissidenti o giornalisti, le VPN migliorano la protezione di base di tutti online.

blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/202…

@Privacy Pride

Qualcomm’s New QCC74x Appears to Target the ESP32 MCUs


The media in this post is not displayed to visitors. To view it, please log in.

These days wireless microcontrollers featuring built-in WiFi and Bluetooth are all the rage, with Espressif’s range of ESP32 MCUs being the default option for commercial and hobbyist projects alike. This makes Qualcomm’s recently released QCC74x MCU rather interesting, as specification-wise it would seem to be placed firmly in ESP32 territory.

On the radio side you get 1×1 WiFi 6, Bluetooth 5.4, and IEEE 802.15.4 (e.g. Thread and Zigbee), coupled with a single-core 352 MHz RISC-V CPU with FPU and DSP features and 484 kB of SRAM. The SDK for this MCU is hosted on Codelinaro, featuring the typical FreeRTOS-based stack, though confusingly Bluetooth and Zigbee support are currently marked as ‘not supported’. This might still be in progress.

Where the competition with Espressif feels clear is in the pricing, with the highest-performance evaluation board (QCC748M EVK, pictured above) listed for $13 (before taxes/tariffs). This gets you 8 MB of PSRAM built-in with unspecified link speed, but likely the same QSPI as used for the NOR Flash. USB support is available on this higher-end tier, while absent on the QCC743. Development documentation is also available, and looks fairly complete based on first glance.

Overall the QCC74x looks to be an upgrade to the older and significantly less powerful QCC730 MCU. Depending on software support and final pricing it could make for an interesting competitor to some of Espressif’s modules like its ESP32-C series or ESP32-S2, though the upcoming ESP32-S31 would seem to have it matched or beat on all metrics.


hackaday.com/2026/05/17/qualco…