While CDs were still fighting for market share against cassettes, and gaming consoles were just starting to switch over to CD from cartridge storage, optical media companies were already thinking ahead. Only two years after the introduction of the original PlayStation, the DVD Forum had introduced the DVD-RAM standard: 2.58 GB per side of a disc in a protective caddy. The killer feature? Essentially unlimited re-writeability. In a DVD drive that supports DVD-RAM, they act more like removable hard drive platters. You can even see hard sectors etched into the media at the time of manufacture, giving DVD-RAM its very recognizable pattern.

At the time, floppy drives were still popular, and CD-ROM drives were increasingly available pre-installed in new computers. Having what amounted to a hard drive platter with a total of 5 GB per disc should have been a killer feature for consumers. Magneto-optical drives were still very expensive, and by 1998 were only 1.3 GB in size. DVD-RAM had the same verify-after-write data integrity feature that magneto-optical drives were known for, but with larger capacity, and after the introduction of 4.7 GB size discs, no caddy was required.

So why didn’t DVD-RAM completely take over removable storage? The gigabyte-size MO drives in 2002 sold for about $400 in 2001 (roughly $721 today), whereas the first 4.7 GB DVD-RAM drives sold in 1998 for $500-$800, with blank discs costing $30 for single-sided and $45 for double-sided, which would have been 9.4 GB total per disc. Around the same time, MO discs with 1.3 GB capacity were often around $20-$25, though they varied widely. So we can see the up-front cost for a DVD-RAM drive was higher, with the media cost per megabyte lower.

Another benefit of DVD-RAM over MO drives was the ability to do hard-drive-like fast random seeks and support various filesystems, allowing non-contiguous data. MO drives were typically quite a bit slower, though they had a decent continuous write speed if writing large blocks of data contiguously. Around this same time, devices like the LS-120 and ZIP drive were trying to replace floppy drives, but their relatively small media sizes of 120 MB / 240 MB and 100 MB / 250 MB couldn’t do the same things DVD could do. Despite this, the Iomega ZIP in particular did have some breakthrough success. This was mostly because of the relatively low drive cost, and the price per 100 MB ZIP disk being $10-$15 on average. These were more expensive per MB than DVD-RAM or MO, but with lower overall consumer investment. So it really seems like the up-front drive costs for DVD-RAM kept them from becoming ubiquitous, though reviews at the time showed that those who bought and used the drives loved them and felt they were an economical way to store and transfer data.
A DVD-RAM disc, with its distinct hard sector pattern clearly visible

DVD-RAM, What’s It Good For?

One of the killer apps for DVD-RAM ended up being Personal Video Recorders, or PVRs. The TiVo introduced consumers to the idea of easy, high-quality timeshifting without having to faff about with the timer feature on their VCRs. A DVD-RAM-based PVR could easily record many shows in high quality, play them back instantly, and be used an essentially unlimited number of times. With the purchase of 3-4 DVD-RAM discs, you could easily record and store your favourite TV shows and later transfer them to another medium for long-term storage. Similarly, DVD-RAM drives in handheld camcorders made a lot of sense, but for various reasons, DVD-RW and some tape formats continued to dominate in that field.

For archival and backup purposes, CD-R, DVD-R and even LTO tape drives were still much more popular. Despite write-once optical media being single-use, the much lower media cost and the rapidly falling price of CD and then DVD burners meant they were much more popular. Many consumers didn’t even realize that their newly purchased DVD burner could almost certainly also support DVD-RAM discs. And for audio and video, write-once media made more sense for the vast majority of end users. Though CD-RW and DVD-RW weren’t quite as popular as the write-once media, they remained more popular than DVD-RAM despite lacking the extreme write endurance of DVD-RAM. It’s hard to say definitively why this is the case, though consumer confusion about all the different blank media formats likely played a part. People were already confused enough about the difference between DVD-R and DVD+R!

Of course, we can’t talk about DVD-RAM’s downfall without mentioning USB flash drives. First introduced commercially around 1999 in sizes of 8 MB, by 2002 drives in the 1 GB – 2 GB capacity were available. These were much smaller and lighter than optical media and had very fast read/write speeds (comparatively) — especially with USB 2.0 becoming popular. Their cost and ubiquity were the death knell not only for DVD-RAM as a portable storage format, but also floppies, magneto-optical, ZIP drives, and essentially everything except for CD-R and DVD-R for audio and movie burning, respectively. While USB drives didn’t have the write endurance of DVD-RAM drives, for most users this wasn’t a problem — they were just transferring office documents, pictures, and other files back and forth between computers. If one started to wear out, another could be cheaply purchased.

So in 2024, is there any use for DVD-RAM left? I recently purchased a pack of 6 brand-new, Japanese-made Panasonic DVD-RAM discs to test out with my USB DVD burner. Essentially all DVD drives still support DVD-RAM, though as Technology Connections discovered in his rundown on the format, the drive firmware support for DVD-RAM seems to be slapdash and lacking in many ways. Write speeds are nowhere near what they should be. On my Arch Linux laptop, I couldn’t believe how slow copy speeds were. iostat showed utilization of less than 1% of the available bandwidth, and with the disc constantly speeding up and spinning down, I was seeing speeds way under 50 kB/s most of the time. Considering DVD-RAM discs support up to 3x (4140 kB/s), something was clearly wrong.

I connected the drive to my Windows 10 virtual machine and saw mostly similar speeds, except when writing an ISO to the drive. Because this seems to be a firmware issue, the usefulness of DVD-RAM for doing backups of important files depends entirely on the drive you happen to own. My idea was to back up all my code, schematic, and PCB design files as they are the most valuable files on my laptop. If I can find a decent drive, I might still follow through — but with 128GB USB drives being less than the cost of the 6 DVD-RAM discs I bought, I can’t say it’s economical, more just for the nerd cred.

For over six years now, Kaspersky’s Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) has been sharing quarterly updates on advanced persistent threats (APTs). These summaries draw on our threat intelligence research, offering a representative overview of what we’ve published and discussed in more detail in our private APT reports. They’re designed to highlight the key events and findings that we think people should know about.

In this latest installment, we focus on activities that we observed during Q2 2024.

Readers who would like to learn more about our intelligence reports or request more information about a specific report, are encouraged to contact intelreports@kaspersky.com.

Most notable findings

In March, a backdoor was discovered in XZ, a compression utility integrated into many popular distributions of Linux. The backdoored library
liblzma is used by the OpenSSH server process sshd. OpenSSH is patched to use systemd features on a number of systemd-based distributions, including Ubuntu, Debian and RedHat/Fedora Linux, and therefore depends on this library (Arch Linux and Gentoo are not affected). The code was inserted in February and March 2024, mostly by Jia Cheong Tan – probably a fictitious identity. The likely goal of the attack was to introduce exclusive remote code execution capabilities into the sshd process by targeting the XZ build process, and then to push the backdoored code to major Linux distributions as a part of a large-scale supply-chain attack. The attackers used social engineering to gain prolonged access to the source/development environment, and extended that access by faking human interactions in plain sight to build credibility for introducing the malicious code.
There are two levels at which the backdoor in the
liblzma library was introduced. The source code of the build infrastructure that generated the final packages was tweaked slightly (by adding an extra file, build-to-host.m4) to extract the next stage script that was hidden in a test case file (bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz). The script then extracted a malicious binary component from another test case file (good-large_compressed.lzma) that was linked with the legitimate library during the compilation process to be shipped to Linux repositories. Some of the big vendors ended up shipping the malicious component in beta and experimental builds without realizing it. The compromise of XZ Utils was given the identifier CVE-2024-3094 and a maximum severity score of 10.
The attackers’ initial goal was to successfully hook one of the functions related to RSA key manipulation. In our analysis of the hook process, we focused on the backdoor’s behavior inside OpenSSH, specifically OpenSSH portable version 9.7p1 (the most recent version). Our analysis revealed a number of interesting details about the functionality of the backdoor.

• The attacker set an anti-replay feature to make sure the backdoor communication couldn’t be captured or hijacked.
• The author hid the public key for backdoor decryption in the x86 code using a custom steganography technique.
• The backdoor hooks the logging function to hide its logs of unauthorized connections to the SSH server.
• The backdoor hooks the password authentication function, which allows the attacker to use any username/password to log in to the infected server without any further checks. It also does the same for public key authentication.
• The backdoor has remote code execution capabilities, which means the attacker can run any system command on the infected server.

You can read our analysis here, here and here.

Chinese-speaking activity

In an earlier report on ToddyCat, we described various tools used to collect and exfiltrate files of interest to this APT threat actor. One of these tools was PcExter, which was initially only used to exfiltrate data previously collected with the help of other tools, such as FileScan. However, we recently found a new version, PcExter 2.0, which has been completely redesigned and rewritten in .NET to be able to collect the data itself, as well as use an improved file search mechanism. We found several versions of this tool, together with a set of special loaders.

In 2021, we published a private report describing the technical details of QSC, a framework that was discovered while investigating an attack on the telecoms industry in South Asia. While our research did not reveal how the framework was deployed, or the threat group behind it, we continued to monitor our telemetry for further detections of the QSC framework. In October 2023, we saw multiple detections of QSC framework files in the West Asia region targeting an ISP. Our investigation revealed that the target machines had already been infected with Quarian Backdoor version 3 (aka Turian) since 2022, and the same attackers used this access to deploy the QSC framework starting from October 10, 2023. In addition to the QSC framework, the attackers also deployed a new backdoor written in Golang, which we named “GoClient”: we saw the first deployment of this GoClient backdoor on October 17, 2023. After analyzing all the artifacts from this campaign, we assess with medium confidence that the CloudComputating threat actor is behind the deployment of the QSC framework and the GoClient backdoor.

Early in 2023, the activities of GOFFEE were discovered when this threat actor used a modified version of a monitored malicious IIS module called Owowa. Since then, GOFFEE has stopped using Owowa, as well as a PowerShell RCE implant VisualTaskel; however, it has continued to conduct intrusions leveraging PowerTaskel, the threat actor’s previous HTA-based infection chain, and has added a new loader, disguised as a legitimate document and distributed via email, to its arsenal.

We recently found a new remote access tool (RAT) with a low detection rate called SalmonQT that was uploaded from a computer in China to a public multi-scanner platform. What caught our attention was that the sample used GitHub’s REST API to accept instructions and upload data, thereby acting as a C2 (command and control) server. At first glance, it appeared that the path to the GitHub repository had been deleted, but on closer inspection, the repository was set to private and the REST API could only be accessed using the correct token. The C2 server was active from early January 2024 up to the completion of our report at the end of June this year. We attribute this newly discovered RAT with low confidence to the threat actor CNC. CNC (aka APT-C-48) is highly focused on Chinese entities.

Middle East

Gaza Cybergang has been active since at least 2012, targeting the Middle East and North Africa. When we first started tracking the group, its attacks were relatively basic in nature, often relying on publicly available malware families such as QuasarRAT. Nevertheless, the group exhibited a particular TTP that we can still see today – going after only a few targets per campaign. At the start of this year we detected several cases involving Gaza Cybergang in which the threat actor adjusted its TTPs slightly. Instead of using
tabcal.exe as a vehicle to sideload its initial access downloader IronWind, the group switched to setup_wm.exe, another legitimate Windows Media Utility file. The lures were also changed to a more generic theme, rather than focusing on a specific geopolitical situation.

Southeast Asia and Korean Peninsula

We discovered Mysterious Elephant in 2023 while investigating attacks using a set of malware families previously associated with other known threat actors, such as SideWinder and Confucius. As we analyzed the infrastructure, we realized that the attacks were not in fact delivered by any of the previously known actors, but by a new threat actor that we dubbed Mysterious Elephant. The threat actor has remained active since then and has launched several attacks since our initial report. We have discovered a wealth of new malware families developed and used by Mysterious Elephant in its recent attacks, as well as recently created infrastructure and updated tools – mostly backdoors and loaders to minimize detection in the early stages of attacks. In our report, we describe the latest attacks delivered by this threat actor and analyze the newly discovered malware samples and associated infrastructure.

Hacktivism

With the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in February 2022, hundreds of different hacktivist groups have emerged on both sides. One such group is -=Twelve=-. This group announced itself in the information sphere by claiming to have hacked various government and industrial enterprises of the Russian Federation. Some of the targets were published on the group’s official channel on its own platform, while others remained in the shadows. While there are several reports on the internet about the Twelve group from various CTI (Cyber Threat Intelligence) vendors that attempt to describe the group’s activities, we have not seen any that detail the tools and techniques used in the attacks. Our report on Twelve provides a detailed overview of the TTPs used by the group, as well as the connections to its infrastructure.

In February, the Institute of Geography and Statistics of Albania (INSTAT) was attacked. The attack was the work of Homeland Justice – a self-described hacktivist group, but suspected of being a state sponsored group – that has been relentlessly attacking Albanian targets, particularly in the government sector, for over three years. The attackers were able to obtain more than 100TB of data, as well as disrupt the official websites and email services of organizations and wipe database servers and backups. One of the main reasons for the attacks is the presence of a Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK) refugee camp on Albanian territory: Homeland Justice considers this group to be a terrorist organization and believes that specific sectors of the Albanian government and certain companies provide them with support and funding. The threat actor conducts ongoing cyber operations aimed at conveying its anti-MEK political message. They are attempting to garner support among the Albanian people for the government to abandon the MEK – their actions are framed within what are known as psychological operations (PsyOps) campaigns.

We have analyzed the group’s campaign history, which spans almost three years of cyberattacks aimed at exerting long-term pressure on the Albanian government and populace. In our report, we cover its main campaigns, ranging from sophisticated operations involving collaboration with allied groups with the same aims, to opportunistic attacks. We also describe the main techniques employed by the group, which range from exploiting internet-facing servers for initial access, lateral movement activities, expanding the attack surface, to using custom wiping malware and ransomware in the final disruptive phase of the cyber operations. Additionally, we examine the group’s persuasion mechanisms, such as amplifying messaging through social networks and news media, sharing stolen data to gain notoriety and advocate for change, and the continual threat of future attacks to induce a state of permanent vigilance among its targets.

Other interesting discoveries

We discovered a new modular malware framework, which we dubbed “Aniseed Vodka”, on a system in East Africa: the system was infected in 2018. The framework consists of a main module, a JSON-formatted configuration file, and a set of plug-ins. The framework is highly configurable, allowing its operator both to specify operating parameters for plug-ins and to schedule plug-in tasks (such as screen capture, webcam capture, and data exfiltration) at specific intervals. The framework employs anti-detection and anti-forensics techniques, enabling it to operate covertly. It uses non-traditional communication channels to evade network detection, using Google Chat as a C2 channel, Gmail to send alerts and Google Drive as an exfiltration channel. The framework we presented in our report is, as far as we know, not publicly known. We have not been able to tie this framework to an existing threat actor.

Our previous report on DinodasRAT showed a wealth of overlaps in features between the Linux backdoor version and its Windows counterpart, as well as additional Linux-specific functionalities such as persistence through systemd or SystemV. In recent months, we were able to collect more relevant samples, giving us a deeper insight into the Linux variant. There are indications that it has been used in campaigns dating back to 2021. Previously identified as XDealer, an ongoing APT campaign using the Windows version of this threat was disclosed by ESET and named “Operation Jacana”. DinodasRAT was also used in a recent APT campaign, which included both its Windows and Linux versions, as described by Trend Micro. In our latest report on the Linux variant of DinodasRAT, we focus on the network communication with the C2 and the operations performed by the malware on the infected machine, beyond establishing persistence and awaiting C2 commands.

In May 2024, we discovered a new APT targeting Russian government entities. The CloudSorcerer malware is a sophisticated cyber-espionage tool used for stealth monitoring, data collection and exfiltration via Microsoft, Yandex and Dropbox cloud infrastructures. The malware uses cloud resources for its C2 servers, accessing them through APIs using authentication tokens. Additionally, CloudSorcerer uses GitHub as its initial C2 server. CloudSorcerer’s modus operandi of is reminiscent of the CloudWizard APT, which we reported on in 2023. However, the malware code is completely different. We believe that CloudSorcerer is a new threat actor that has adopted a similar method of interacting with public cloud services.

In April, we discovered a previously unknown campaign targeting organizations in Russia, including the government sector, using the Telemos backdoor. The malware is delivered via spear-phishing emails as a ZIP file containing one of two types of dropper – a PE64 executable with an .SCR extension or a Windows Script File with a .WSF extension. These drop and execute a PowerShell-based script with backdoor functionality. We found several malicious samples associated with these attacks and were able to restore the original source code. The main purpose of this threat is espionage – collecting data from browsers such as login credentials, cookies and browsing history, as well as collecting files of interest from available drives on the affected system. The operation cannot be tied to a known threat actor at this point.

Final thoughts

While some threat actors’ TTPs remain the same, such as a heavy reliance on social engineering to gain entry to a target organization or compromising an individual’s device, others have updated their toolsets and broadened the scope of their activities. Our regular quarterly reports are designed to highlight the most significant developments related to APT groups.

Here are the key trends we saw in Q2 2024:

• The key highlight this quarter was the backdooring of the XZ compression utility integrated into many popular Linux distributions – in particular, the use of social engineering to gain persistent access to the development environment.
• This quarter we saw APT campaigns focused on Europe, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and Africa targeting a range of sectors including government, military, telecoms and judicial systems.
• The purpose of most APT activities is cyber-espionage, although some campaigns are driven by financial gain.
• Hacktivist attacks have also been a feature of the threat landscape this quarter. Not all of these attacks are focused on areas of open conflict, as illustrated by the attacks on entities in Albania by the Homeland Justice group.

As always, we would like to point out that our reports are the product of our insight into the threat landscape. However, it is important to remember that while we strive for continuous improvement, there is always the possibility that there are other sophisticated attacks that may go unnoticed.

Disclaimer: when referring to APT groups as Russian-speaking, Chinese-speaking or other-language-speaking, we refer to various artifacts used by the groups (such as malware debugging strings, comments found in scripts, etc.) containing words in these languages, based on the information that we obtained directly or that is otherwise publicly known and widely reported. The use of certain languages does not necessarily indicate a specific geographic relation, but rather points to the languages that the developers behind these APT artifacts use.

securelist.com/apt-trends-repo…

The Teenage Engineering badging usually appears on some cool gear that almost always costs a great deal of money. One such example is the Rabbit R1, an AI-powered personal assistant that retails for $199. It was also revealed that it’s basically a small device running a simple Android app. That raises the question — could build your own dupe for $20? That’s what [Thomas the Maker] did.

Meet Rappit. It’s basically [Thomas]’s take on an AI friend that doesn’t break the bank. It runs on a Raspberry Pi Zero 2W, which has the benefit of integrated wireless connectivity on board. It’s powered by rechargeable AA batteries or a USB power bank to keep things simple. [Thomas] then wrapped it all up in a cute 3D printed enclosure to give it some charm.

It’s software that makes the Rappit what it is. Rather than including a screen, microphone, or speakers on the device itself, [Thomas] interacts with the Pi-based device via smartphone. It makes it a less convincing dupe of the self-contained Rabbit R1, but the basic concept is the same. [Thomas] can make queries of the Rappit via a simple Android or iOS app he created called “Comfyspace,” and the Rappit responds with the aid of Google’s Gemini AI.

If you’re really trying to duplicate the trend of AI assistants, you really need standalone hardware. To that end, the Rappit design could really benefit from a screen, microphone, speaker, and speech synth. Honestly, though, that would only take you a few hours extra work compared to what [Thomas] has already done here. As it is, [Thomas] could simply throw away the Raspberry Pi and just use the smartphone with Gemini directly, right? But he chose this route of using the smartphone as an interface to keep costs down by minimizing hardware outlay.

If you want a real Rabbit R1, you can order one here. We’ve discussed controversy around the device before, too. Video after the break.

youtube.com/embed/QpYoH_iKno0?…

Alla conferenza DEF CON 2024 è stato lanciato un nuovo ambizioso progetto denominato “Franklin”, che mira ad attrarre specialisti della sicurezza informatica per creare politiche nel campo della protezione delle infrastrutture critiche.

Il progetto Franklin ha due obiettivi principali:

1. pubblicazione dell’annuale “Hacker’s Almanac”, che includerà le più importanti questioni di sicurezza delle infrastrutture critiche individuate durante la conferenza. Tale documento ha lo scopo di offrire agli hacker l’opportunità di influenzare le discussioni sulla sicurezza nazionale e sulla politica estera. I creatori del progetto stanno attivamente cercando e analizzando i dati ottenuti al DEF CON per includerli nel futuro “Almanacco”.

Tuttavia, qui sorgono alcune difficoltà. Gli hacker sono bravissimi a penetrare nei sistemi, ma creare documentazione è un compito molto più difficile. Resta ancora molto lavoro per tradurre i risultati tecnici in un linguaggio comprensibile a un vasto pubblico, nonché per raccogliere le opinioni dei ricercatori e verificare i risultati del lavoro.

2. Portare l’attenzione dei legislatori e degli esperti politici sulle questioni di sicurezza informatica al fine di creare una risorsa che servirà come base per lo sviluppo di nuove leggi per proteggere le infrastrutture critiche.

È interessante notare che il Progetto Franklin rende omaggio anche a Benjamin Franklin, che creò i primi vigili del fuoco volontari negli Stati Uniti. In questo contesto, l’iniziativa mira a mettere insieme un esercito di hacker volontari e specialisti di sicurezza informatica per aiutare a proteggere le infrastrutture critiche.

La registrazione dei volontari è ora iniziata e si è riscontrato un notevole interesse da parte della comunità per il progetto.

L'articolo Presentato il progetto Franklin al DEF CON. Una visione diversa della sicurezza nazionale proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

L’FBI ha bloccato server e siti Web associati al gruppo ransomware RADAR/DISPOSSESSOR. L’operazione è stata condotta congiuntamente con partner del Regno Unito e della Germania.

Red Hot Cyber ha intervistato RADAR/DISPOSSESSOR circa un mese fa dove il gruppo ha fornito una serie di informazioni sul suo funzionamento.

Di conseguenza, le forze dell’ordine hanno confiscato server e domini utilizzati dagli hacker per sferrare gli attacchi. In particolare sono stati sequestrati 3 server negli USA, 3 server nel Regno Unito, 18 server in Germania nonché diversi domini (radar[.]tld, dispossessor[.]com, cybernewsint[.]com e altri). I siti servivano sia a coordinare gli attacchi che a creare notizie false e piattaforme video.

Dall’agosto 2023, il gruppo DISPOSSESSOR, guidato da un criminale informatico di nome Brain, attacca le piccole e medie imprese in vari paesi, tra cui Stati Uniti, Argentina, Australia, Germania e altri. In totale sono state colpite 43 aziende. Gli hacker sono penetrati nelle reti attraverso vulnerabilità, password deboli e mancanza di autenticazione a più fattori, rubando dati e crittografando i dispositivi delle vittime, negando loro l’accesso alle informazioni.

Dopo l’attacco, se l’azienda non si metteva in contatto, i criminali stessi contattavano i dipendenti tramite e-mail o chiamate, minacciando di pubblicare i dati rubati. Gli aggressori hanno anche inviato collegamenti a piattaforme dove venivano pubblicati i file rubati, aumentando la pressione sulle vittime. Invece di screenshot con informazioni rubate, gli hacker hanno allegato alla pagina di fuga piccoli video che mostravano chiaramente cataloghi con dati rubati.

L’FBI ha esortato chiunque sia stato violato da DISPOSSESSOR a contattare l’Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) o la hotline 1-800-CALL dell’FBI.

In precedenza, il gruppo Dispossesor operava come gruppo ransomware, rilasciando dati rubati da altri attacchi ransomware come LockBit. Successivamente gli hacker hanno rivenduto i dati su vari forum clandestini. Nel giugno 2024, i criminali hanno iniziato a utilizzare il ransomware LockBit 3.0 trapelato, che ha aumentato notevolmente la portata dei loro attacchi.

Alcuni ricercatori ritengono che il gruppo sia stato creato da ex membri di LockBit, cosa confermata dagli stessi hacker, ma non è possibile verificare l’autenticità delle loro parole.

L'articolo LockBit e rebrand sotto assedio. L’FBI blocca i server di RADAR e DISPOSSESSOR proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

slowforward.net/2024/08/12/nuo…

slowforward

2024-08-12 16:09:19

su slowforward da oggi si attiva una pagina-archivio dedicata ai soli audio comparsi sul sito, con link ai post usciti fin qui, e ai loro mirror su Archive.org: archive.org/details/@slowforwa…

la pagina è a questo indirizzo e per ora contiene “solo” i 36 podcast di Pod al popolo. si arricchirà di volta in volta con le ulteriori uscite dello stesso podcast e audio inseriti in altre occasioni e con altri titoli.

gli argomenti principali sono ovviamente quelli del sito: scritture di ricerca, cambio di paradigma, prosa, prosa in prosa, postpoesia, letteralismo, poesia, assertività, non assertività, testi, letture, critica letteraria, politica, Palestina, vicende italiane, editoria e distribuzione, trasformazioni antropologiche, disastro italiano, ironia, scrittura asemica (asemic writing), glitch, flarf, sperimentazione in senso ampio, arte, musica sperimentale, musica contemporanea, musica d’improvvisazione, musica concreta, materiali verbovisivi, registrazioni sul campo, interviste, reading, frammenti audio, voci d’archivio, estratti da film e video, riflessioni di poetica, prose brevi, prose brevissime, segnalazioni editoriali, recensioni, scritture e operazioni concettuali, scritture installative, derive testuali e testuali-politiche, politica frontale, anarchia, antirazzismo, antifascismo, fluxus, azioni incongrue, loose writing, neodadaismo, cut-up, googlism, avanguardie storiche, art brut / arte irregolare, fotografia, disegno, disseminazioni, marginalia e poco altro.

enjoy!

slowforward.net/2024/08/12/nuo…

#anarchia #antifascismo #antirazzismo #artBrutArteIrregolare #arte #asemicWriting #assertività #audio #avanguardieStoriche #azioniIncongrue #cambioDiParadigma #criticaLetteraria #cutUp #deriveTestualiETestualiPolitiche #disastroItaliano #disegno #disseminazione #disseminazioni #distribuzione #editoria #estrattiDaFilm #flarf #fluxus #fotografia #frammentiAudio #glitch #googlism #interviste #ironia #letteralismo #letture #marginalia #materialiVerbovisivi #music #musicaConcreta #musicaContemporanea #musicaDImprovvisazione #musicaSperimentale #neodadaismo #nonAssertività #nuovaPagina #operazioniConcettuali #Palestina #podAlPopolo #podcast #poesia #politica #politicaFrontale #postpoesia #prosa #ProsaInProsa #proseBrevi #proseBrevissime #reading #recensioni #registrazioniSulCampo #riflessioniDiPoetica #scritturaAsemica #scritturaConcettuale #scrittureDiRicerca #scrittureInstallative #segnalazioniEditoriali #slowforward #sperimentazione #testi #trasformazioniAntropologiche #vicendeItaliane #vociDArchivio

podcast

POD AL POPOLO, 001-036 pod al popolo, #001 _ “non sa cosa si perde”@ archive: pod al popolo, #002 _ primo moroni, dopo l’orda@archive: pod al popolo, #003 _ cinque minuti sulla postpoesia@ archive:…

^slowforward

Le Olimpiadi di Parigi sono appena terminate, e già l’ufficio delle Nazioni Unite contro la droga ed il crimine (#UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) è proiettato verso le prossime manifestazioni sportive di maggior interesse internazionale, ovvero il FIFA World Cup 2026 (Mondiali di calcio in Canada (2 città), Messico (3 città) e Stati Uniti (11 città)) e le Olimpiadi 2028 di Los Angeles.
Lo fa attraverso una pubblicazione che è un Rapporto sulla Corruzione nello Sport (Safeguarding Sport from Corruption: Focus on the FIFA World Cup 2026 and the 2028 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles), nel quale analizza la rilevante tematica (che con ogni evidenza interessa anche aspetti di cooperazione tra le Forze di polizia degli Stati) e fornisce alcune linee guida.
Secondo UNODC prima di tutto le città ospitanti per il FIFA World Cup 2026 e le Olimpiadi 2028 dovranno rispettare i principi sui diritti umani. Importante che la FIFA abbia migliorato il processo organizzativo con misure di integrità e audit indipendenti.
Sono elevati rischi di corruzione e infiltrazione di gruppi criminali organizzati.
Di conseguenza le raccomandazioni delle #NazioniUnite includono la creazione di punti di coordinamento tra autorità e stakeholder. Ciò implicherà necessariamente valutazioni dei rischi e piani di prevenzione per il movimento di persone.
Quali misure possono quindi essere adottate per prevenire la corruzione durante eventi sportivi di grande rilevanza come la FIFA World Cup 2026 e le Olimpiadi estive del 2028?
Si va dalla Cooperazione Interagenzia per promuovere la collaborazione tra autorità giudiziarie, agenzie anti-corruzione e organizzazioni sportive, sì da facilitare lo scambio di informazioni e coordinare le azioni contro la corruzione, alla mappatura dei Meccanismi di Segnalazione: ovvero condurre un'analisi dei meccanismi esistenti per la segnalazione e la prevenzione della corruzione, migliorando la loro applicazione e comprensione, per infine sviluppare le competenze di investigatori e funzionari per indagare e perseguire casi di corruzione, attraverso attività di sensibilizzazione e formazione su buone pratiche.
Tutto ciò perché sussistono rischi di corruzione associati alla FIFA World Cup 2026 e alle Olimpiadi del 2028, legati a conflitti di interesse e pratiche di corruzione durante la selezione delle città ospitanti, utilizzo di fondi pubblici per lo sviluppo di infrastrutture legate agli eventi, con possibilità di corruzione e appropriazione indebita ed aumento del rischio di manipolazione delle competizioni a causa della liberalizzazione dei mercati delle scommesse in Canada e Stati Uniti.
Con riguardo in particolare ai Mondiali di Calcio, come abbiamo accennato la FIFA ha previsto misure specifiche per prevenire la corruzione nella World Cup 2026, consistenti in audit Indipendenti, introduzione di misure di integrità per monitorare i mercati delle scommesse legali e prevenire la manipolazione delle competizioni e sviluppo di meccanismi di segnalazione per la prevenzione e la rilevazione della corruzione, coinvolgendo autorità competenti e organismi sportivi. I principali Rischi di Corruzione nell'Organizzazione del FIFA World Cup 2026 risiedono nella manipolazione dei processi di offerta e selezione degli host, spesso influenzata da interessi personali o politici, nella Corruzione nei Contratti, legati all'assegnazione di contratti per infrastrutture, beni e servizi e nella Rivendita di Biglietti, potendosi porre in atto Pratiche illecite da parte degli organizzatori che rivendono biglietti per profitto personale, compromettendo l'integrità dell'evento.

La pubblicazione è reperibile qui: unodc.org/documents/Safeguardi…

# CorruzionenelloSport #SafeguardingSportfromCorruption

slowforward.net/2024/08/12/pod…

slowforward

2024-08-12 12:36:39

Un minuto e trenta secondi di Frisbees di Giulia Niccolai. Su Pod al popolo. Il podcast irregolare, ennesimo fail again fail better dell’occidente postremo. Buon ascolto.
annotazione di Milli Graffi, dalla sua introduzione a Poemi & Oggetti, Le Lettere, 2012
slowforward.net/2024/08/12/pod…

#audio #audioArchive #frisbees #GiuliaNiccolai #MilliGraffi #PAP #pap036 #podAlPopolo #poemaOggetto #PoemiOggetti #poesia #poesie_

pod al popolo #036, da giulia niccolai, “frisebees (poesie da lanciare)”, 1982-1985

Un minuto e trenta secondi di Frisbees di Giulia Niccolai. Su Pod al popolo. Il podcast irregolare, ennesimo fail again fail better dell’occidente postremo. Buon ascolto. annotazione di Milli Graff…

^slowforward

slowforward.net/2024/08/12/man…

slowforward

2024-08-12 00:11:00

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#art #arte #KaisaKukkonen #Manifesto #manifestoOnNothing

manifesto on nothing / kaisa kukkonen. 2023

^slowforward

slowforward.net/2024/08/11/jim…

slowforward

2024-08-11 21:46:38

______________seven halves of a dog cific partia

specific pecific
cific

partial
artial
partia

It was easy enough to find us. The morning spun its web of darkness shining to the sea. The words and daze were there for all to seep. To seek. For sleek to see. To sleep perchance to reason. Named, paraded, numbered, works of the arts must be, to be a knot, mutual aid or not at all.

Left of lecithin, thinly pacific, fiction runs in the arteries, the familiar tiles and trials, a family of artists, part artillery and part tandem. Familiar trellis, a lattice for the letters. By or even as a mystical pressure in the gut, the tongue gets carried away by the weft and waft of chewing, the chosen chewed, the raw bird has flown, the cooked fowl comes home to rust. Their expectations are in the way of my expectorations. Lung if the less thin leaf. Lift, then bias the lungs with torrid errata. Mythic array away in the arena of pesto pectin the apnea of a stolen gusto. Cleft ruins antenna arribada plectrum pectoral leaf leaf moral wreckage strumming an electric drum. Crumb trick on the wing. Wing thick & humming vectorial prunes. Runes roan rinds moaning hands. Plans groan behind the dunes. Do the dunce hat dance. Flattened fifths in flattered trance. Entrance, perused by a bear. This is our next chance. To beat an ear and bear an egg. To bed to bid to bode too bud for the egg. Are two birds in the egg worth one tree in the hand? Hand me down my walking shoes it’s dawning on me now.

Can you think two thoughts at once? Yes, you can.Two thoughts in the same place at the same time.
Poems do not obey the laws of physics.
That’s why I am a poet and not a politician.
Politicians are not paid to know the same things that I am not paid to know.

Rain fills on the wind seal. The sign on the fence says Beware of Dog wolf wolf but I know, they don’t have a dog, he died last year, woof hoof in mouth, foot on the mouse, disease. Wind full on the wind sock holy sock dirty sock puppet sick of it all day long, working like a dog, the long and short of it: I quit. It sure is quiet out there. Long and out, with a mouthful of dirty wind. Seasoned with a dream.

Rain on wolf a mouth
Wind dirty long and out

Fills the fence with wolf dye.

Finds enough of us ever since.
Fins are just a hint.

23 feet of famine
Drowning in a drought.

Babies born with gills
Sucking circles in the sand.

Moist as a catfish in cultural ether. Either you are fork the fish, or you are again, a loss and a gain, the fish. At first, hoist the cat out of the bag, if at first you don’t succeed, either you are or you are not. It is raining wind.

It is raiding wine and fishforks. I am thirst, barely herein, counting down the whys. Why was there ash, the ash of the few, on the glue? Anew and adieu. Rain amounts to a fistful, a fish full, of air, sail away on the ship of foods, on the breaded snake of fools. First there was a mountain then there was no fountain then thin there, wash their, hair, the hairy mountain, blue skies behind their eyes in the rain. Crying a river of ears. Thunderstorm Pasquotank flash flooding remnants of hurricane Debby. Rebel with snout and claws, doubt and laws of psychics, canopy blurry plants remember, buried in a mime. The hewn bone, the honed burn, trouble nibbles on the dime. I’d rather sleep in a hollow log.

They don’t even half a dog. Seven halves of a dog.

August 2024
North Carolina

slowforward.net/2024/08/11/jim…

jim leftwich — seven halves of a dog

______________seven halves of a dog cific partia specific pecific cific partial artial partia It was easy enough to find us. The morning spun its web of darkness shining to the sea. The words and d…

^slowforward