A nome dell’Associazione Luca Coscioni, esprimiamo il nostro profondo cordoglio per la morte di un giurista straordinario e di un uomo che ha saputo mettere la sua competenza e il suo rigore al servizio della libertà e dei diritti fondamentali.

La sua voce è stata per noi un riferimento morale e culturale in molte battaglie per l’affermazione dello Stato di diritto e la tutela della dignità della persona. Con sensibilità e coraggio, ha saputo unire il pensiero giuridico più alto a un impegno civile concreto, sempre dalla parte delle persone più vulnerabili.

Per noi Vladimiro è stato anche un amico, generoso e attento, con cui abbiamo condiviso riflessioni profonde e momenti cruciali di confronto, sempre guidati da valori comuni: la laicità delle istituzioni, il rispetto dell’autonomia individuale, la difesa dei diritti civili.

Ci mancherà la sua intelligenza limpida, la sua ironia sottile, la sua determinazione gentile.

Con Marco Cappato e l’Associazione Luca Coscioni tutta, lo ricorderemo con affetto, stima e gratitudine.

Un abbraccio affettuoso alla sua famiglia.

L'articolo È morto Vladimiro Zagrebelsky proviene da Associazione Luca Coscioni.

Dichiarazione di Chiara Lalli, Mirella Parachini e Anna Pompili, responsabili della campagna Aborto senza ricovero

La vicenda siciliana ripropone la questione della garanzia di un servizio medico essenziale, quale l’interruzione volontaria della gravidanza (IVG), anche laddove ci siano alte percentuali di obiezione di coscienza tra i ginecologi.

L’articolo 9 della legge 194, quello che permette al personale sanitario di sollevare obiezione di coscienza, è certamente il più applicato, ma non – guardacaso – nella sua interezza. La seconda parte, infatti, impone agli “enti ospedalieri” e alle “case di cura autorizzate” di assicurare “in ogni caso l’espletamento delle procedure previste dall’articolo 7 e l’effettuazione degli interventi di interruzione della gravidanza richiesti secondo le modalità previste dagli articoli 5, 7 e 8. La regione ne controlla e garantisce l’attuazione”.

La legge stessa, dunque, fornisce gli strumenti per garantire alle donne l’accesso all’IVG. Basterebbe applicarla, il che vale anche per le strutture sanitarie con il 100% di obiettori di coscienza, che sono comunque tenute ad assicurare il percorso per l’IVG.

C’è poi l’aggiornamento delle linee di indirizzo ministeriali sulla IVG farmacologica che permettono la deospedalizzazione della procedura. Sono passati ben 5 anni, e solo in due Regioni è ammessa, con la possibilità di autosomministrazione del misoprostolo a domicilio. È evidente che, anche se non risolutiva, la deospedalizzazione limiterebbe enormemente il peso dell’obiezione di coscienza sull’accesso all’IVG. C’è da chiedersi come mai proprio nelle Regioni – come la Sicilia – dove questi ostacoli sono più pesanti e dove i bilanci della sanità sono più problematici, non si sia pensato a questa semplice soluzione.

Ecco perché abbiamo lanciato la campagna Aborto senza ricovero. Per garantire a tutte le donne di scegliere, per non sprecare risorse preziose e per chiedere ai consigli regionali di approvare procedure chiare e uniformi per l’aborto farmacologico in modalità ambulatoriale e senza ricovero.

L’aborto con il metodo farmacologico è sicuro ed efficace e il ricovero non ne aumenta la sicurezza, ma ne decuplica i costi. È il principio dell’appropriatezza delle procedure: a parità di efficacia e di sicurezza, se la persona che deve esservi sottoposta la richiede, deve essere privilegiata la modalità assistenziale che comporta minore spreco di risorse per la sanità pubblica.

È un dovere non solo per evitare lo spreco di risorse, ma anche – in questo caso – per garantire il diritto di scelta delle donne, un principio irrinunciabile e che dovrebbe essere sempre garantito.

Si può firmare QUI

L'articolo Applicare la legge 194, garantire un servizio essenziale proviene da Associazione Luca Coscioni.

Introduction

In a recent incident response case in Brazil, we spotted intriguing new antivirus (AV) killer software that has been circulating in the wild since at least October 2024. This malicious artifact abuses the ThrottleStop.sys driver, delivered together with the malware, to terminate numerous antivirus processes and lower the system’s defenses as part of a technique known as BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver). AV killers that rely on various vulnerable drivers are a known problem. We have recently seen an uptick in cyberattacks involving this type of malware.

It is important to note that Kaspersky products, such as Kaspersky Endpoint Security (KES), have built-in self-defense mechanisms that prevent the alteration or termination of memory processes, deletion of application files on the hard drive, and changes in system registry entries. These mechanisms effectively counter the AV killer described in the article.

In the case we analyzed, the customer sought our help after finding that their systems had been encrypted by a ransomware sample. The adversary gained access to the initial system, an SMTP server, through a valid RDP credential. They then extracted other users’ credentials with Mimikatz and performed lateral movement using the pass-the-hash technique with Invoke-WMIExec.ps1 and Invoke-SMBExec.ps1 tools. The attacker achieved their objective by disabling the AV in place on various endpoints and servers across the network and executing a variant of the MedusaLocker ransomware.

In this article, we provide details about the attack and an analysis of the AV killer itself. Finally, we outline the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by the attackers.

Kaspersky products detect the threats encountered in this incident as:

• Trojan-Ransom.Win32.PaidMeme.* (MedusaLocker variant)
• Win64.KillAV.* (AV killer)

Incident overview

The attack began using valid credentials obtained by the attacker for an administrative account. The adversary was able to connect to a mail server via RDP from Belgium. Then, using Mimikatz, the attacker extracted the NTLM hash for another user. Next, they used the following PowerShell Invoke-TheHash commands to perform pass-the-hash attacks in an attempt to create users on different machines.
Invoke-WMIExec -Target "<IP>" -Domain "<DOMAIN>" -Username "<USER>" -Hash "<HASH>" -Command "net user User1 Password1! /ad" -verbose
Invoke-SMBExec -Target "<IP>" -Domain "<DOMAIN>" -Username "<USER>" -Hash "<HASH>" -Command "net user User2 Password1! /ad" -verbose
Invoke-SMBExec -Target "<IP>" -Domain "<DOMAIN>" -Username "<USER>" -Hash "<HASH>" -Command "net localgroup Administrators User1 /ad" -verbose
An interesting detail is that the attacker did not want to create the same username on every machine. Instead, they chose to add a sequential number to the end of each username (e.g., User1, User2, User3, etc.). However, the password was the same for all the created users.

Various artifacts, including the AV killer, were uploaded to the C:\Users\Administrator\Music folder on the mail server. These artifacts were later uploaded to other machines alongside the ransomware (haz8.exe), but this time to C:\Users\UserN\Pictures. Initially, Windows Defender was able to contain the ransomware threat on some machines right after it was uploaded, but the attacker soon terminated the security solution.

The figure below provides an overview of the incident. We were able to extract evidence to determine the attacker’s workflow and the involved artifacts. Fortunately, the analyzed systems still contained relevant information, but this is not always the case.

Incident flow

This kind of attack highlights the importance of defense in depth. Although the organization had an AV in place, the attacker was able to use a valid account to upload an undetectable artifact that bypassed the defense. Such attacks can be avoided through simple security practices, such as enforcing the use of strong passwords and disabling RDP access to public IPs.

The AV killer analysis

To disable the system’s defenses, the attackers relied on two artifacts: ThrottleBlood.sys and All.exe. The first is a legitimate driver originally called ThrottleStop.sys, developed by TechPowerUp and used by the ThrottleStop app. The application is designed to monitor and correct CPU throttling issues, and is mostly used by gamers. The driver involved in the incident has a valid certificate signed on 2020-10-06 20:34:00 UTC, as show below:
Status: The file is signed and the signature was verified
Serial number: 0a fc 69 77 2a e1 ea 9a 28 57 31 b6 aa 45 23 c6
Issuer: DigiCert EV Code Signing CA
Subject: TechPowerUp LLC
TS Serial number: 03 01 9a 02 3a ff 58 b1 6b d6 d5 ea e6 17 f0 66
TS Issuer: DigiCert Assured ID CA-1
TS Subject: DigiCert Timestamp Responder
Date Signed: 2020-10-06 20:34:00 UTC

When loaded, the driver creates a device at .\\.\\ThrottleStop, which is a communication channel between user mode and kernel mode.

ThrottleStop device driver communication overview

Communication with the driver is carried out via IOCTL calls, specifically using the Win32 DeviceIoControl function. This function enables the use of IOCTL codes to request various driver operations. The driver exposes two vulnerable IOCTL functions: one that allows reading from memory and another that allows writing to it. Both functions use physical addresses. Importantly, any user with administrative privileges can access these functions, which constitutes the core vulnerability.

The driver leverages the MmMapIoSpace function to perform physical memory access. This kernel-level API maps a specified physical address into the virtual address space, specifically within the MMIO (memory-mapped I/O) region. This mapping enables reads and writes to virtual memory to directly affect the corresponding physical memory. This type of vulnerability is well-known in kernel drivers and has been exploited for years, not only by attackers but also by game cheaters seeking low-level memory access. The vulnerability in ThrottleStop.sys has been assigned CVE-2025-7771. According to our information, the vendor is currently preparing a patch. In the meantime, we recommend that security solutions monitor for the presence of this known vulnerable driver in the operating system to help prevent exploitation by EDR killers like the one described in this article.

The second artifact, All.exe, is the AV killer itself. Our analysis began with a basic inspection of the file.

First, we inspected its properties. While searching for relevant strings, we noticed a pattern: multiple antivirus process names inside the binary. The following image shows an excerpt of our query.

AV names inside the binary

We were able to map all the processes that the malware tries to kill. The table below shows each one of them, along with the corresponding vendor. As we can see, the artifact attempts to kill the main AV products on the market.

When the binary is executed, it first loads the ThrottleBlood.sys driver using Service Control Manager (SCM) API methods, such as OpenSCManagerA() and StartServiceW().

ThrottleStop/ThrottleBlood driver loading process

The AV killer needs the ThrottleStop driver to hijack kernel functions and enable the execution of kernel-mode-only routines from user mode. To invoke these kernel functions using the driver’s vulnerable read/write primitives, the malware first retrieves the base address of the currently loaded kernel and the addresses of the target functions to overwrite. It achieves this by utilizing the undocumented NtQuerySystemInformation function from Win32.

Kernel base address gathering

Passing the SystemModuleInformation flag allows the function to return the list of loaded modules and drivers on the current system. The Windows kernel is referred to as ntoskrnl.exe. The base address is always different because of KASLR (Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization).

To perform read/write operations using MmMapIoSpace, the system must first determine the physical address used by the kernel. This is achieved using a technique called SuperFetch, which is packed in the open-source superfetch project available on GitHub. This project facilitates the translation of virtual addresses to physical addresses through a C++ library composed solely of header files.

Physical address calculation

The superfetch C++ library makes use of the NtQuerySystemInformation function, specifically using the SystemSuperfetchInformation query. This query returns all current memory ranges and their pages. With this information, the superfetch library can successfully translate any kernel virtual address to its respective physical address.

Calling kernel functions

Now that the physical base address has been collected, the malware must choose a kernel function that can be indirectly called by a system call (from user mode). The chosen syscall is NtAddAtom, which is rarely used and easily callable through ntdll.dll.

NtAddAtom address collection

By loading ntoskrnl.exe with the LoadLibrary function, the malware, among other things, can easily discover the offset of the NtAddAtom function and thus determine its kernel address by adding the current base address and the offset. The physical address is obtained in the same way as the kernel base. With the physical addresses and driver loaded, the malware can exploit the vulnerable IOCTL codes to read and write the physical memory of the NtAddAtom function.

Kernel code injection using vulnerable driver

To call any kernel function, the AV killer writes a small shellcode that jumps to a target address within the kernel. This target address can be any desired kernel function. Once the function completes, the malware restores the original kernel code to prevent system crashes.

Kernel code injection diagram

Process killer main routine

Having obtained all the necessary information, the AV killer starts a loop to find target processes using the Process32FirstW() and Process32NextW API calls. As we mentioned earlier, the list of target security software, such as MsMpEng.exe (Windows Defender), is hardcoded in the malware.

MsMpEng.exe match found

The AV killer checks all running processes against the hardcoded list. If any match, it kills them by using the vulnerable driver to call the PsLookupProcessById and PsTerminateProcess kernel functions.

If a process is killed, a message indicating this, along with the name of the process, is displayed in the console, as depicted in the following image. This suggests that the malware was being debugged.

MsMpEng.exe was killed

Like most antivirus software available today, Windows Defender will attempt to restart the service to protect the machine. However, the main loop of the program will continue to identify and kill the associated AV process.

Defender tries to restart, but is killed again

YARA rule

Based on our analysis of the sample, we developed the following YARA rule to detect the threat in real time. The rule considers the file type, relevant strings (most of which are related to AV processes), and library function imports.
import "pe"

rule AVKiller_MmMapIoSpace {
meta:
description = "Rule to detect the AV Killer"
author = "Kaspersky"
copyright = "Kaspersky"
version = "1.0"
last_modified = "2025-05-14"
hash = "a88daa62751c212b7579a57f1f4ae8f8"
strings:
$shellcode_template = {4? BA 00 00 40 75 00 65 48 8B}
$ntoskrnl = "ntoskrnl.exe"
$NtAddAtom = "NtAddAtom"
$ioctl_mem_write = {9C 64 00 80}
$ioctl_mem_read = {98 64 00 80}
condition:
pe.is_pe and
pe.imports("kernel32.dll", "DeviceIoControl")
and all of them
}

Victims

Based on our telemetry and information collected from public threat intelligence feeds, adversaries have been using this artifact since at least October 2024. The majority of affected victims are in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Brazil.

Attribution

This particular AV killer tool was recently used in an attack in Brazil to deploy MedusaLocker ransomware within a company’s infrastructure. However, this type of malware is common among various threat actors, including various ransomware groups and affiliates.

Conclusion and recommendations

This incident offers several valuable lessons. First, that strong hardening practices must be implemented to protect servers against brute‑force attacks and restrict public exposure of remote‑access protocols. Had the victim limited RDP access and enforced robust password policies, the initial breach could have been prevented. Furthermore, this incident underscores the necessity of defense in depth. The AV killer was able to disable the system’s defenses, allowing the attacker to move laterally across machines with ease. To mitigate such threats, system administrators should implement the following mechanisms:

• Application whitelisting and strict enforcement of least‑privilege access.
• Network segmentation and isolation to contain breaches and limit lateral movement.
• Multi‑factor authentication (MFA) for all remote‑access channels.
• Regular patch management and automated vulnerability scanning.
• Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS/IPS) to identify anomalous behavior.
• Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools for real‑time monitoring and remediation.
• Comprehensive logging, monitoring, and alerting to ensure rapid incident detection.
• Periodic security assessments and penetration testing to validate the effectiveness of controls.

Recently, we have seen an increase in attacks involving various types of AV killer software. Threat protection services should implement self-defense mechanisms to prevent these attacks. This includes safeguarding application files from unauthorized modification, monitoring memory processes, and regularly updating detection rules on customers’ devices.

Tactics, techniques and procedures

The TTPs identified from our malware analysis for the AV killer are listed below.

Indicators of compromise

Vulnerable ThrottleBlood.sys driver
82ed942a52cdcf120a8919730e00ba37619661a3
Malware observed in the incident
f02daf614109f39babdcb6f8841dd6981e929d70 (haz8.exe)
c0979ec20b87084317d1bfa50405f7149c3b5c5f (All.exe)
Other AV killer variants
eff7919d5de737d9a64f7528e86e3666051a49aa
0a15be464a603b1eebc61744dc60510ce169e135
d5a050c73346f01fc9ad767d345ed36c221baac2
987834891cea821bcd3ce1f6d3e549282d38b8d3
86a2a93a31e0151888c52dbbc8e33a7a3f4357db
dcaed7526cda644a23da542d01017d48d97c9533

securelist.com/av-killer-explo…

No, of course not. Per Betteridge’s law, that’s the answer to any headline with a question mark. On the other hand, while a thermal printer might not cure ADHD, it can help treat it — according to [Laurie Hérault], to the point of curing his procrastination habit. Even if you don’t have ADHD, you probably do procrastinate sometimes, so this hack is worth a look.

The printer itself is a key hardware portion of the hack, but the hack itself is purely organizational. [Laurie] started with post-its before adding automation. Before the post-it notes came a simple realization: [Laurie] could sit and play games for hours, but not buckle down for serious work for more than a few minutes, if he could even get started. (Who can’t relate?) That sent him down a rabbit hole reading about the psychology of what makes games so addictive — and the idea of “gamification” that was so popular in educational circles not long ago.

Unlike work, games give you a loop of unambiguous, instant, and continuous feedback to pump your dopamine circuits. [Laurie] uses the example of an FPS. You aim, you shoot — and either you miss, or you hit the target. Either way, there’s feedback. When you hit, your brain gives you dopamine. This fast loop of input -> feedback is what [Laurie] felt he was missing from his day.

You’d want to organize the post-its better than this. (Image by Pexels.)
That’s where the post-it notes came in. Post-its went up on a board with all of his tasks for the day; the input was his completing the tasks, and the feedback was taking them down, crumpling them up, and putting them into a clear jar that would serve as a score bar for his productivity. The feedback actually rewarded multiple senses this way: the tactility of crumpling paper, the sound of it, and the visual of the rising level of the jar.

A key insight [Laurie] had in this process is that many productivity apps (including gamifying ones) are focused too much on high-level tasks by default. “Clean the kitchen,” for example. That’s too big! It’s daunting, and it takes too long for that immediate, gamified feedback. Instead [Laurie] breaks down “Cleaning the Kitchen” into “Clean the dishes”, “Wipe the Counter”, “Take out the Trash”, et cetera. The smaller the steps, the more frequent the reward, and the easier it is to start them without exerting much willpower: just like a video game.

Of course writing all of those post-it notes gets tedious, especially for recurring and pre-scheduled tasks, and that tedium increases exponentially when breaking tasks down into the smallest possible chunks. That’s where the thermal printer came in. [Laurie] wrote a simple software utility to allow him to create high-level tasks, and break them down into small action items that are immediately sent to the thermal printer. After that, the system works just as it does with the post-it notes. He promises to share this software, but it does not seem to have yet been released. Hopefully he’s not procrastinating on that, or our faith in the process is ruined.

Thermal printers are great for lifehacks, like this hack for receipt-like mementos, or this one to ease the load on a dungeon master. If you prefer you can skip the ‘life’ part of lifehacks, and just make an instant camera.

hackaday.com/2025/08/06/can-a-…

Reloading filament on a 3D printer is hardly anyone’s favorite task, but it’s even worse when you’re trying to shove stiff filament down a long and winding Bowden tube. Enter the speed loader from [Mr Flippant], which aims to take the pain out of this mechanically-frustrating chore.

The design is simple enough. It’s a small handheld tool that uses a 12 VDC gear motor to drive a set of Bondtech-style drive gears that you might find in an extruder. They’re assembled in a 3D printed housing with a microswitch to activate the motor, and a 9 volt battery to supply the juice.

To use the device, first thread the filament into the beginning of the Bowden tube. The idler gear is on a hinge, such that clamping it into position around the filament with the main gear activates the microswitch and turns the motor on, driving the filament all the way to the extruder. Job done! [Mr Flippant] notes that the filament should be as straight and unkinked as possible for best results, but that’s good advice when 3D printing in general.

Funnily enough, around these parts, when we talk about speed loaders, we’re usually discussing tapes.

youtube.com/embed/EtV3ZXkA_nE?…

youtube.com/embed/qL7nFMtGzdM?…

Thanks to [LookAtDaShinyShiny] for the tip!

hackaday.com/2025/08/06/a-spee…

[Avi Gupta] recently sent in their LoRaSense RGB Pi HAT project. This “HAT” (Hardware Attached to Top) is for any Raspberry Pi with 40-pin header. The core of the build is the custom printed circuit board which houses the components and interconnects. The components include an SHT31 temperature and humidity sensor, an SX1278 LoRa module, and a 10 amp 220 VAC relay. The interconnects include support for UART, I2C, SPI, and WS2812B RGB LED interfaces as well as a stackable header for daisy chaining HATs.

The attached components in combination support a wide range of use cases. Possible uses for this Raspberry Pi HAT include smart home systems, agricultural projects, industrial monitoring, smart greenhouse, remote weather stations, or alerting systems. You can detect weather conditions, send and receive information, switch mains powered loads, and use RGB LEDs for status and alerting.

If you’re interested in LoRa technology be sure to read about the Yagi antenna that sends LoRa signals farther.

hackaday.com/2025/08/05/lorase…

Il 5 agosto 2025, Adobe ha rilasciato un aggiornamento di sicurezza urgente per Adobe Experience Manager (AEM) Forms su Java Enterprise Edition (JEE), risolvendo due gravi vulnerabilità: CVE-2025-54253 e CVE-2025-54254.

La più pericolosa, il CVE-2025-54253, è una zero-day attivamente sfruttata in natura prima della patch, con un punteggio CVSS di 10.0, il massimo possibile. Un attaccante non autenticato può sfruttare questa falla per ottenere il pieno controllo del server vulnerabile, eseguendo comandi da remoto, accedendo a dati sensibili e muovendosi lateralmente nella rete.

La vulnerabilità è causata da una configurazione errata in alcune installazioni di AEM Forms, dove risulta abilitata per impostazione predefinita la modalità di sviluppo di Apache Struts. Questo consente l’esecuzione di espressioni OGNL, tipiche degli attacchi RCE. Inoltre, è stato segnalato un bypass dell’autenticazione che consente l’esecuzione degli exploit anche senza credenziali.

Adobe ha confermato che un proof-of-concept è stato pubblicamente disponibile per un breve periodo prima di essere rimosso. Tuttavia, al momento non sono noti exploit pubblici completamente funzionanti, anche se è altamente probabile che esistano versioni private utilizzate da attori malevoli.

La seconda vulnerabilità, CVE-2025-54254, è anch’essa critica (CVSS 8.6) e riguarda una falla di tipo XXE (XML External Entity) che permette la lettura arbitraria del file system. Anche in questo caso è stata confermata la disponibilità di un PoC pubblico.

Adobe invita gli utenti a installare immediatamente l’aggiornamento che porta AEM Forms su JEE alla versione 6.5.0-0108, classificata come aggiornamento di priorità 1. In assenza della possibilità di aggiornare subito, è fortemente consigliato limitare l’accesso esterno agli endpoint AEM Forms e disattivare la modalità di sviluppo di Struts in tutti gli ambienti.

Inoltre, è fondamentale controllare i log di accesso e di sistema alla ricerca di attività sospette, come richieste contenenti sintassi OGNL, che potrebbero indicare tentativi di exploit.

L'articolo Adobe Experience Manager Forms sotto attacco! Patch urgente per bug RCE zero-day da score 10 proviene da il blog della sicurezza informatica.

Every Thursday of the week, Bastian’s Night is broadcast from 21:30 CEST (new time).

Bastian’s Night is a live talk show in German with lots of music, a weekly round-up of news from around the world, and a glimpse into the host’s crazy week in the pirate movement.

If you want to read more about @BastianBB: –> This way

piratesonair.net/bastians-nigh…

Ho scoperto questo manga di recente e me ne sono innamorato. Affronta tematiche importanti senza banali superficialità, offrendo uno spaccato "chiaramente un po' romanzato" della vita degli studenti delle superiori. Onestamente, non ne ho mai abbastanza!

🌕⭐: Non amo dare voti assoluti, ma questo per me se li merita tutti. Aspetto con impazienza i nuovi capitoli.

🧭 Quando spiritualità, politica e tradizioni si intrecciano, nascono spazi inaspettati, capaci di superare ogni binarismo.
Slavs and Tatars, collettivo di arte e ricerca, ci ricorda che le identità non sono mai chiuse: sono fatte di passaggi, contaminazioni, transiti fra mondi come i simboli e i rituali che attraversano l’Eurasia.

Nel dialogo con Kathleen Reinhardt e Leah Feldman, il loro lavoro appare come un continuo attraversamento: dalle pratiche spirituali e conviviali (come il samovar o la condivisione del tè) a quelle linguistiche e politiche, sempre alla ricerca di ciò che sfugge alle categorie imposte.
La loro idea di postcoloniale non si rifugia nell’identità da difendere, ma apre possibilità: celebra le mescolanze, crea collettività mai precostituite, né dettate dall’alto.
Penso a certe risonanze con il lavoro di Mona Hatoum: anche lei capace di trasformare simboli domestici e geografici in strumenti di disorientamento critico.

Simboli come il Simurgh, il cetriolo sotto sale o la lingua stessa diventano strumenti per costruire mondi condivisi, lontani da logiche etno-nazionali e imperiali, offrendo “ospitalità” a chi spesso, nei musei o nei discorsi ufficiali, non trova spazio per riconoscersi.

Anche qui nel Poliverso e su Friendica possiamo fare delle nostre interazioni un laboratorio di attraversamento, ascolto e ridefinizione reciproca.

Quali confini sentiamo il bisogno di attraversare?
Come si intrecciano, nelle nostre storie, le radici spirituali e politiche che portiamo dentro?

🔗 moussemagazine.it/magazine/sla…

@Arte e Cultura @Cultura, Storia, Libri, Arte, Architettura, Scuola, Design, Fumetti e Bookwyrm @arthistory group
#arte #artecomtemporanea #SlavsAndTatars

Slavs and Tatars: Being One with Many, Being One Through Many. Leah Feldman, Kathleen Reinhardt, and Payam

Spanning languages, regions, and disciplines, the art collective Slavs and Tatars—founded by Payam Sharifi and Kasia Korczak—has, since its inception as a

^{Mousse Magazine}