You can buy all kinds of keyboards these days, from basic big-brand stuff to obscure mechanical delicacies from small-time builders. Or, you can go the maker route, and build your own. That’s precisely what [Lambert Sartory] did with their Clavier build.

This build goes a bit of a different route to many other DIY keyboards out there, in that [Lambert] was keen to build it around an FPGA instead of an off-the-shelf microcontroller. To that end, the entire USB HID stack was implemented in VHDL on a Lattice ECP5 chip. It was a heavy-duty way to go, but it makes the keyboard quite unique compared to those that just rely on existing HID libraries to do the job. This onboard hardware also allowed [Lambert] to include JTAG, SPI, I2C, and UART interfaces right on the keyboard, as well as a USB hub for good measure.

As for the mechanical design, it’s a full-size 105-key ISO keyboard with one bonus key for good measure. That’s the coffee key, which either locks the attached computer when you’re going for a break, or resets the FPGA with a long press just in case it’s necessary. It’s built with Cherry MX compatible switches, has N-key rollover capability, and a mighty 1000 Hz polling rate. If you can exceed that by hand, you’re some sort of superhuman.

The great thing about building your own keyboard is you can put in whatever features you desire. If you’re whipping up your own neat interface devices, don’t hesitate to let us know!

hackaday.com/2025/10/01/an-fpg…

Introduction

When it comes to digital forensics, AmCache plays a vital role in identifying malicious activities in Windows systems. This artifact allows the identification of the execution of both benign and malicious software on a machine. It is managed by the operating system, and at the time of writing this article, there is no known way to modify or remove AmCache data. Thus, in an incident response scenario, it could be the key to identifying lost artifacts (e.g., ransomware that auto-deletes itself), allowing analysts to search for patterns left by the attacker, such as file names and paths. Furthermore, AmCache stores the SHA-1 hashes of executed files, which allows DFIR professionals to search public threat intelligence feeds — such as OpenTIP and VirusTotal — and generate rules for blocking this same file on other systems across the network.

This article presents a comprehensive analysis of the AmCache artifact, allowing readers to better understand its inner workings. In addition, we present a new tool named “AmCache-EvilHunter“, which can be used by any professional to easily parse the Amcache.hve file and extract IOCs. The tool is also able to query the aforementioned intelligence feeds to check for malicious file detections, this level of built-in automation reduces manual effort and speeds up threat detection, which is of significant value for analysts and responders.

The importance of evidence of execution

Evidence of execution is fundamentally important in digital forensics and incident response, since it helps investigators reconstruct how the system was used during an intrusion. Artifacts such as Prefetch, ShimCache, and UserAssist offer clues about what was executed. AmCache is also a robust artifact for evidencing execution, preserving metadata that indicates a file’s presence and execution, even if the file has been deleted or modified. An advantage of AmCache over other Windows artifacts is that unlike them, it stores the file hash, which is immensely useful for analysts, as it can be used to hunt malicious files across the network, increasing the likelihood of fully identifying, containing, and eradicating the threat.

Introduction to AmCache

Application Activity Cache (AmCache) was first introduced in Windows 7 and fully leveraged in Windows 8 and beyond. Its purpose is to replace the older RecentFileCache.bcf in newer systems. Unlike its predecessor, AmCache includes valuable forensic information about program execution, executed binaries and loaded drivers.

This artifact is stored as a registry hive file named Amcache.hve in the directory C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs. The metadata stored in this file includes file paths, publisher data, compilation timestamps, file sizes, and SHA-1 hashes.

It is important to highlight that the AmCache format does not depend on the operating system version, but rather on the version of the libraries (DLLs) responsible for filling the cache. In this way, even Windows systems with different patch levels could have small differences in the structure of the AmCache files. The known libraries used for filling this cache are stored under %WinDir%\System32 with the following names:

• aecache.dll
• aeevts.dll
• aeinv.dll
• aelupsvc.dll
• aepdu.dll
• aepic.dll

It is worth noting that this artifact has its peculiarities and limitations. The AmCache computes the SHA-1 hash over only the first 31,457,280 bytes (≈31 MB) of each executable, so comparing its stored hash online can fail for files exceeding this size. Furthermore, Amcache.hve is not a true execution log: it records files in directories scanned by the Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser, executables and drivers copied during program execution, and GUI applications that required compatibility shimming. Only the last category reliably indicates actual execution. Items in the first two groups simply confirm file presence on the system, with no data on whether or when they ran.

In the same directory, we can find additional LOG files used to ensure Amcache.hve consistency and recovery operations:

• C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.*LOG1
• C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.*LOG2

The Amcache.hve file can be collected from a system for forensic analysis using tools like Aralez, Velociraptor, or Kape.

Amcache.hve structure

The Amcache.hve file is a Windows Registry hive in REGF format; it contains multiple subkeys that store distinct classes of data. A simple Python parser can be implemented to iterate through Amcache.hve and present its keys:
#!/usr/bin/env python3

import sys
from Registry.Registry import Registry

hive = Registry(str(sys.argv[1]))
root = hive.open("Root")

for rec in root.subkeys():
print(rec.name())
The result of this parser when executed is:

AmCache keys

From a DFIR perspective, the keys that are of the most interest to us are InventoryApplicationFile, InventoryApplication, InventoryDriverBinary, and InventoryApplicationShortcut, which are described in detail in the following subsections.

InventoryApplicationFile

The InventoryApplicationFile key is essential for tracking every executable discovered on the system. Under this key, each executable is represented by its own uniquely named subkey, which stores the following main metadata:

• ProgramId: a unique hash generated from the binary name, version, publisher, and language, with some zeroes appended to the beginning of the hash
• FileID: the SHA-1 hash of the file, with four zeroes appended to the beginning of the hash
• LowerCaseLongPath: the full lowercase path to the executable
• Name: the file base name without the path information
• OriginalFileName: the original filename as specified in the PE header’s version resource, indicating the name assigned by the developer at build time
• Publisher: often used to verify if the source of the binary is legitimate. For malware, this subkey is usually empty
• Version: the specific build or release version of the executable
• BinaryType: indicates whether the executable is a 32-bit or 64-bit binary
• ProductName: the ProductName field from the version resource, describing the broader software product or suite to which the executable belongs
• LinkDate: the compilation timestamp extracted from the PE header
• Size: the file size in bytes
• IsOsComponent: a boolean flag that specifies whether the executable is a built-in OS component or a third-party application/library

With some tweaks to our original Python parser, we can read the information stored within this key:
#!/usr/bin/env python3

import sys
from Registry.Registry import Registry

hive = Registry(sys.argv[1])
root = hive.open("Root")

subs = {k.name(): k for k in root.subkeys()}
parent = subs.get("InventoryApplicationFile")

for rec in parent.subkeys():
vals = {v.name(): v.value() for v in rec.values()}
print("{}\n{}\n\n-----------\n".format(rec, vals))

InventoryApplicationFile subkeys

We can also use tools like Registry Explorer to see the same data in a graphical way:

InventoryApplicationFile inspected through Registry Explorer

As mentioned before, AmCache computes the SHA-1 hash over only the first 31,457,280 bytes (≈31 MB). To prove this, we did a small experiment, during which we got a binary smaller than 31 MB (Aralez) and one larger than this value (a custom version of Velociraptor). For the first case, the SHA-1 hash of the entire binary was stored in AmCache.

First AmCache SHA-1 storage scenario

For the second scenario, we used the dd utility to extract the first 31 MB of the Velociraptor binary:

Stripped binary

When checking the Velociraptor entry on AmCache, we found that it indeed stored the SHA-1 hash calculated only for the first 31,457,280 bytes of the binary. Interestingly enough, the Size value represented the actual size of the original file. Thus, relying only on the file hash stored on AmCache for querying threat intelligence portals may be not enough when dealing with large files. So, we need to check if the file size in the record is bigger than 31,457,280 bytes before searching threat intelligence portals.

Second AmCache SHA-1 storage scenario

Additionally, attackers may take advantage of this characteristic to purposely generate large malicious binaries. In this way, even if investigators find that a malware was executed/present on a Windows system, the actual SHA-1 hash of the binary will still be unknown, making it difficult to track it across the network and gathering it from public databases like VirusTotal.

InventoryApplicationFile – use case example: finding a deleted tool that was used

Let’s suppose you are searching for a possible insider threat. The user denies having run any suspicious programs, and any suspicious software was securely erased from disk. But in the InventoryApplicationFile, you find a record of winscp.exe being present in the user’s Downloads folder. Even though the file is gone, this tells you the tool was on the machine and it was likely used to transfer files before being deleted. In our incident response practice, we have seen similar cases, where this key proved useful.

InventoryApplication

The InventoryApplication key records details about applications that were previously installed on the system. Unlike InventoryApplicationFile, which logs every executable encountered, InventoryApplication focuses on those with installation records. Each entry is named by its unique ProgramId, allowing straightforward linkage back to the corresponding InventoryApplicationFile key. Additionally, InventoryApplication has the following subkeys of interest:

• InstallDate: a date‑time string indicating when the OS first recorded or recognized the application
• MsiInstallDate: present only if installed via Windows Installer (MSI); shows the exact time the MSI package was applied, sourced directly from the MSI metadata
• UninstallString: the exact command line used to remove the application
• Language: numeric locale identifier set by the developer (LCID)
• Publisher: the name of the software publisher or vendor
• ManifestPath: the file path to the installation manifest used by UWP or AppX/MSIX apps

With a simple change to our parser, we can check the data contained in this key:
<...>
parent = subs.get("InventoryApplication")
<...>

InventoryApplication subkeys

When a ProgramId appears both here and under InventoryApplicationFile, it confirms that the executable is not merely present or executed, but was formally installed. This distinction helps us separate ad-hoc copies or transient executions from installed software. The following figure shows the ProgramId of the WinRAR software under InventoryApplicationFile.

When searching for the ProgramId, we find an exact match under InventoryApplication. This confirms that WinRAR was indeed installed on the system.

Another interesting detail about InventoryApplication is that it contains a subkey named LastScanTime, which is stored separately from ProgramIds and holds a value representing the last time the Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser ran. This is a scheduled task that launches the compattelrunner.exe binary, and the information in this key should only be updated when that task executes. As a result, software installed since the last run of the Appraiser may not appear here. The LastScanTime value is stored in Windows FileTime format.

InventoryApplication LastScanTime information

InventoryApplication – use case example: spotting remote access software

Suppose that during an incident response engagement, you find an entry for AnyDesk in the InventoryApplication key (although the application is not installed anymore). This means that the attacker likely used it for remote access and then removed it to cover their tracks. Even if wiped from disk, this key proves it was present. We have seen this scenario in real-world cases more than once.

InventoryDriverBinary

The InventoryDriverBinary key records every kernel-mode driver that the system has loaded, providing the essential metadata needed to spot suspicious or malicious drivers. Under this key, each driver is captured in its own uniquely named subkey and includes:

• FileID: the SHA-1 hash of the driver binary, with four zeroes appended to the beginning of the hash
• LowerCaseLongPath: the full lowercase file path to the driver on disk
• DigitalSignature: the code-signing certificate details. A valid, trusted signature helps confirm the driver’s authenticity
• LastModified: the file’s last modification timestamp from the filesystem metadata, revealing when the driver binary was most recently altered on disk

Because Windows drivers run at the highest privilege level, they are frequently exploited by malware. For example, a previous study conducted by Kaspersky shows that attackers are exploiting vulnerable drivers for killing EDR processes. When dealing with a cybersecurity incident, investigators correlate each driver’s cryptographic hash, file path, signature status, and modification timestamp. That can help in verifying if the binary matches a known, signed version, detecting any tampering by spotting unexpected modification dates, and flagging unsigned or anomalously named drivers for deeper analysis. Projects like LOLDrivers help identify vulnerable drivers in use by attackers in the wild.

InventoryDriverBinary inspection

In addition to the InventoryDriverBinary, AmCache also provides the InventoryApplicationDriver key, which keeps track of all drivers that have been installed by specific applications. It includes two entries:

• DriverServiceName, which identifies the name of the service linked to the installed driver; and
• ProgramIds, which lists the program identifiers (corresponding to the key names under InventoryApplication) that were responsible for installing the driver.

As shown in the figure below, the ProgramIds key can be used to track the associated program that uses this driver:

Checking program information by ProgramIds

InventoryDriverBinary – use case example: catching a bad driver

If the system was compromised through the abuse of a known vulnerable or malicious driver, you can use the InventoryDriverBinary registry key to confirm its presence. Even if the driver has been removed or hidden, remnants in this key can reveal that it was once loaded, which helps identify kernel-level compromises and supporting timeline reconstruction during the investigation. This is exactly how the AV Killer malware was discovered.

InventoryApplicationShortcut

This key contains entries for .lnk (shortcut) files that were present in folders like each user’s Start Menu or Desktop. Within each shortcut key, the ShortcutPath provides the absolute path to the LNK file at the moment of discovery. The ShortcutTargetPath shows where the shortcut pointed. We can also search for the ProgramId entry within the InventoryApplication key using the ShortcutProgramId (similar to what we did for drivers).

InventoryApplicationShortcut key

InventoryApplicationShortcut – use case example: confirming use of a removed app

You find that a suspicious program was deleted from the computer, but the user claims they never ran it. The InventoryApplicationShortcut key shows a shortcut to that program was on their desktop and was accessed recently. With supplementary evidence, such as that from Prefetch analysis, you can confirm the execution of the software.

AmCache key comparison

The table below summarizes the information presented in the previous subsections, highlighting the main information about each AmCache key.

AmCache-EvilHunter

Undoubtedly Amcache.hve is a very important forensic artifact. However, we could not find any tool that effectively parses its contents while providing threat intelligence for the analyst. With this in mind, we developed AmCache-EvilHunter a command-line tool to parse and analyze Windows Amcache.hve registry hives, identify evidence of execution, suspicious executables, and integrate Kaspersky OpenTIP and VirusTotal lookups for enhanced threat intelligence.

AmCache-EvilHunter is capable of processing the Amcache.hve file and filter records by date range (with the options --start and --end). It is also possible to search records using keywords (--search), which is useful for searching for known naming conventions adopted by attackers. The results can be saved in CSV (--csv) or JSON (--json) formats.

The image below shows an example of execution of AmCache-EvilHunter with these basic options, by using the following command:
amcache-evilhunter -i Amcache.hve --start 2025-06-19 --end 2025-06-19 --csv output.csv
The output contains all applications that were present on the machine on June 19, 2025. The last column contains information whether the file is an operating system component, or not.

Basic usage of AmCache-EvilHunter

CSV result

Analysts are often faced with a large volume of executables and artifacts. To narrow down the scope and reduce noise, the tool is able to search for known suspicious binaries with the --find-suspicious option. The patterns used by the tool include common malware names, Windows processes containing small typos (e.g., scvhost.exe), legitimate executables usually found in use during incidents, one-letter/one-digit file names (such as 1.exe, a.exe), or random hex strings. The figure below shows the results obtained by using this option; as highlighted, one svchost.exe file is part of the operating system and the other is not, making it a good candidate for collection and analysis if not deleted.

Suspicious files identification

Malicious files usually do not include any publisher information and are definitely not part of the default operating system. For this reason, AmCache-EvilHunter also ships with the --missing-publisher and --exclude-os options. These parameters allow for easy filtering of suspicious binaries and also allow fast threat intelligence gathering, which is crucial during an incident.

Another important feature that distinguishes our tool from other proposed approaches is that AmCache-EvilHunter can query Kaspersky OpenTIP (--opentip ) and VirusTotal (--vt) for hashes it identifies. In this way, analysts can rapidly gain insights into samples to decide whether they are going to proceed with a full analysis of the artifact or not.

Threat intel lookup

Binaries of the tool are available on our GitHub page for both Linux and Windows systems.

Conclusion

Amcache.hve is a cornerstone of Windows forensics, capturing rich metadata, such as full paths, SHA-1 hashes, compilation timestamps, publisher and version details, for every executable that appears on a system. While it does not serve as a definitive execution log, its strength lies in documenting file presence and paths, making it invaluable for spotting anomalous binaries, verifying trustworthiness via hash lookups against threat‐intelligence feeds, and correlating LinkDate values with known attack campaigns.

To extract its full investigative potential, analysts should merge AmCache data with other artifacts (e.g., Prefetch, ShimCache, and Windows event logs) to confirm actual execution and build accurate timelines. Comparing InventoryApplicationFile entries against InventoryApplication reveals whether a file was merely dropped or formally installed, and identifying unexpected driver records can expose stealthy rootkits and persistence mechanisms. Leveraging parsers like AmCache-EvilHunter and cross-referencing against VirusTotal or proprietary threat databases allows IOC generation and robust incident response, making AmCache analysis a fundamental DFIR skill.

securelist.com/amcache-forensi…

There’s an old saying (paraphrasing a quote attributed to Hoare): “I don’t know what language scientists will use in the future, but I know it will be called Fortran.” The truth is, there is a ton of very sophisticated code in Fortran, and if you want to do something more modern, it is often easier to borrow it than to reinvent the wheel. When [Valgriz] picked up a textbook on aircraft simulation, he noted that it had an F-16 simulation in it. In Fortran. The challenge? Port it to Unity3D.

If you have a gamepad, you can try the result. However, the real payoff is the blog posts describing what he did. They go back to 2021, although the most recent was a few months ago, and they cover the entire process in great detail. You can also find the code on GitHub. If you are interested in flight simulation, flying, Fortran, or Unity3D, you’ll want to settle in and read all four posts. That will take some time.

One limitation. The book’s simulator was all about modeling the aerodynamics using data from wind tunnel tests. However, the F-16 is notorious for being a negative stability aircraft — meaning it’s virtually impossible to fly by hand. It is very maneuverable, but only if you let the computer drive using the flight control system. When you direct the aircraft, the control system makes your desire happen, while accounting for all the strange extra motions the plane will create as it flies.

The problem: the book doesn’t include code for the flight controller. [Valgriz], of course, wrote his own. He uses some PID controllers along with limiters for G-force and angle of attack. Interestingly, to do this, the simulator actually runs its own stripped-down simulator to determine the effects of different control inputs.

This is one of those projects we aren’t sure we would attempt, but we’re glad someone did, and we can watch. Just be careful. An interest in flight simulation can lead to reduced space in your garage. We know of at least one F-16, by the way, that has an Arduino in it. However, it is probably the only one.

youtube.com/embed/2HZQnnxdISM?…

youtube.com/embed/7vAHo2B1zLc?…

hackaday.com/2025/10/01/portin…

It’s not every day a student newspaper takes on the federal government. But that’s exactly what The Stanford Daily is doing.

Backed by the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, the Daily sued Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem in August over the Trump administration’s push to deport foreign students for exercising free speech, like writing op-eds and attending protests. The suit argues the administration’s actions violate the First Amendment by retaliating against foreign students for protected speech and chill press freedom by discouraging them from speaking to and writing for the Daily.

We spoke at the start of Stanford University’s fall term with Greta Reich, editor-in-chief of the Daily and president of Stanford Daily Publishing Corp., which operates the paper, about why the Daily is fighting back, even as many corporate media outlets stay silent or capitulate.

Why did The Stanford Daily decide to take this issue to court?

We decided to take this issue to court because we believe legal action would be best for the Daily. Our mission as an independent student paper is to represent the voices of the Stanford community. We cannot fulfill this mission to the fullest extent when a significant portion of students on our campus and in our newsroom are afraid to speak up. The decision ultimately came down to whether or not we felt we could handle the potential negative ramifications of a public suit against the government in order to stay true to our mission. We decided that we could, and we’re hoping for the best outcome.

What happens to your reporting when international students are afraid to talk to your reporters, or when staff quit or avoid covering certain stories because they’re worried about government retaliation?

As we said in our letter from the editors on the lawsuit, fear of government retaliation directly impacts the quality of the Daily’s work.

With every resignation, declined assignment, and refusal to speak on the record, we actively miss out on covering an entire group of students’ voices — as well as the many events and stories on campus that benefit from an international student’s perspective. We are simply not able to conduct our business when speech is chilled like this.

Journalism, and especially student journalism, depends on members of a community not only being able to speak on the record but actively wanting to, at least at times. When an entire subsection of the student population doesn’t feel comfortable speaking with or writing for the Daily, we can’t know what stories are being lost.

When an entire subsection of the student population doesn’t feel comfortable speaking with or writing for the Daily, we can’t know what stories are being lost.

Greta Reich, editor-in-chief of The Stanford Daily

How have people on campus responded to the lawsuit so far?

We only returned to campus this week, so I don’t think I’ve seen every reaction yet, but so far the biggest response has been curiosity. Many of my peers, both in and outside of the Daily, have questions about how the lawsuit is going.

In speaking more in depth with some students throughout the summer and hearing feedback on various social platforms, I know there is a somewhat mixed reaction, though I think it skews positive. Some students, understandably, are concerned about the attention the suit will draw to Stanford as a university. Others have expressed excitement about action being taken to protect First Amendment rights.

I hope that as the suit progresses, students, alumni, faculty, and community members will feel comfortable sharing any opinion with us — we want to hear what people have to say!

How does it feel to stand up for the First Amendment as student journalists when some in corporate media are utterly failing to do so?

It feels great! As student journalists, we definitely face a different set of obstacles and constraints than those in corporate media do. I think that, in a way, these different constraints give us the freedom to take actions like these (though it would be exciting to see more publications taking action too). I am incredibly grateful for all of the support I’ve received from professional journalists and mentors in corporate media, who have reached out with kind words for the Daily. It is not taken for granted one bit.

What outcome are you hoping for, both in terms of the law, but also inspiring student journalists or impacting the national conversation about press freedom?

In terms of the law, we are obviously hoping for the lawsuit to create a real change in how noncitizens are treated with respect to the First Amendment. Whether working for or speaking to our newspaper, no one should fear deportation for what they have to say. In any scenario, I hope those who hear about this lawsuit consider what it means to have a free press and why fear tactics like those the government is currently using have such an impact on it. A central tenet of my education at Stanford has been to form and express my thoughts and opinions with agility. The ability to state these thoughts and opinions publicly is not only being threatened but actively taken away.

And to other student journalists: I am constantly inspired by you and your work, and I hope you are getting through this year with support and engagement from your staff and readers.

freedom.press/issues/student-j…

Appuntamento sabato 4 ottobre alle 9.30 al Palazzo del Capitano del Popolo, in piazza del Popolo 1 ad Orvieto. Il Congresso si svolgerà anche nella giornata di domenica 5 ottobre

Il titolo si ispira a una frase di Laura Santi: “Non rassegnatevi mai”

Oltre 170mila persone hanno sostenuto le nostre richieste alla politica per rimuovere le discriminazioni su fine vita, PMA, aborto e psichedelici. Sono 39 le azioni legali intraprese, 241 le richieste di accesso agli atti. Il Congresso sarà anche l’occasione per fare il punto sui nuovi obiettivi e le azioni politiche del 2026. Filomena Gallo e Marco Cappato commentano: “Non stiamo ad aspettare che vengano tempi migliori per i diritti civili, altrimenti si rischia di tornare indietro come negli USA“.

Nonostante l’ostilità o l’inerzia dei vertici della politica ufficiale e dei partiti, il 2025 è stato un anno di conquiste e azioni concrete per la libertà di scelta, l’autodeterminazione e il diritto alla salute. Dall’approvazione di due leggi regionali per tempi certi di erogazione delle prestazioni sul “suicidio assistito” in Toscana e Sardegna, con proposte analoghe depositate in tutte le Regioni fino alla proposta di legge nazionale in Parlamento per legalizzare l’eutanasia.

E poi, quattro sentenze della Corte costituzionale ottenute tramite procedimenti giudiziari accanto alle persone: due sul fine vita (sentenze 66/2025 e 132/2025) che interpretano come deve essere considerato il requisito del trattamento di sostegno vitale, una sull’accesso alla procreazione medicalmente assistita per donne singole che evidenzia che la cancellazione del divieto non incontra ostacoli costituzionali; una sentenza che ammette con sentenza di incostituzionalità, la firma certificata per le persone che non possono firmare manualmente le liste elettorali, attuando piena partecipazione politica alla vita del paese senza discriminazioni.

La richiesta di garantire l’aborto farmacologico senza obbligo di ricovero e la possibilità alle persone con disabilità di viaggiare in aereo con la propria carrozzina; la pressione sulle ASL per il diritto alla salute in carcere; liste di attesa azioni per garanzie nell’ accesso alle prestazioni. L’Associazione Luca Coscioni ha trasformato nell’ultimo anno le battaglie civili in conquiste di libertà.

Il XXII Congresso, in programma il 4 e 5 ottobre 2025 a Orvieto porrà le basi per le azioni future nella nella Regione dove sono nati Luca Coscioni, pioniere della libertà di ricerca scientifica, e Laura Santi, leader e volto della campagna sul fine vita, che dopo un calvario giudiziario di tre anni ha ottenuto il diritto ad accedere al “suicidio assistito” nel suo Paese, sostenuta dall’Associazione. “Non rassegnatevi mai”, le sue ultime parole, insieme alla memoria di Luca, saranno il filo conduttore del Congresso e delle strategie future dell’Associazione.

Filomena Gallo e Marco Cappato, rispettivamente Segretaria nazionale dell’Associazione e Tesoriere dell’Associazione, hanno dichiarato: “La nostra missione è quella di dare voce e volto alle persone rese invisibili dalla ottusità e dalla violenza delle istituzioni ancora di più che dalla malattia o dalla disabilità e di consentire loro di battersi in prima persona. Non aspettiamo che ‘vengano tempi migliori’ per le libertà civili, perché rischierebbero di non arrivare mai. Infatti, in assenza di lotte sociali nonviolente, in grado di imporsi nell’agenda della politica ufficiale, si rischia anche nel nostro Paese, come sta avvenendo negli USA e in altri Paesi formalmente democratici, un arretramento sul piano dei diritti civili“.

Oltre 170mila firme raccolte

Nell’ultimo anno l’Associazione Luca Coscioni ha raccolto le firme di oltre 170 mila persone in tutta Italia sui temi principali delle sue ventennali battaglie: eutanasia e fine vita, procreazione medicalmente assistita, gravidanza per altri, Aborto senza ricovero, per garantire la possibilità di deospedalizzare l’aborto farmacologico, disabilità, terapie assistite da psichedelici, cannabis legale e firma digitale.

A queste si aggiungono le firme 65.000, raccolte in questi anni su Liberi Subito, la proposta di legge regionale che garantisce il percorso di richiesta di suicidio medicalmente assistito e i controlli necessari in tempi certi e adeguati.

Sono state intraprese 39 azioni legali

Fine vita: 24 procedimenti di cui 18 civili e 6 penali, riguardo l’accesso al “suicidio assistito” in Italia e le disobbedienze civili per l’accompagnamento in Svizzera. Di questi 10 sono attualmente in tribunale e gli altri in fase stragiudiziale. Mentre per i procedimenti penali: un procedimento con tre persone sulle quali pende una imputazione coatta (Felicetta Maltese, Chiara Lalli e Marco Cappato) e altre nove indagate nei cinque procedimenti in cui sono in corso le indagini.

PMA: 15 casi sul tema della fecondazione assistita nei tribunali, di cui oltre 10 sul tema della gravidanza per altri (GPA). Di questi 10, almeno 7 anche sul fronte penale. Sono oltre 50 i casi su cui sono stati forniti pareri in fase stragiudiziale. Sul tema della PMA, è stata ottenuta una sentenza della Corte costituzionale in merito all’accesso alla PMA per donne singole a partire del caso di Evita, 40enne torinese, cui è stata negato l’accesso in Italia alla PMA.

Sono stati condotti 241 accessi agli atti

Salute in carcere: a seguito delle diffide per verificare le condizioni igienico-sanitarie negli istituti penitenziari, sono state effettuate 102 richieste di accesso agli atti a tutte le ASL italiane per ottenere le relazioni delle visite in carcere in modo da monitorare le condizioni degli istituti.

Fine vita (“suicidio assistito”): sono state effettuate 93 richieste di accesso agli atti tra Regioni e ASL per conoscere il numero di richieste di accesso al “suicidio assistito” effettuate in Italia dalla sentenza della Corte costituzionale 242 del 2019 sul caso Cappato-Dj Fabo che ha di fatto legalizzato l’accesso alla morte volontaria assisita in Italia a determinate condizioni.

Sempre in tema di fine vita, oltre 16.000 cittadini hanno ricevuto informazioni tramite il Numero Bianco su diritti legati a fine vita. Le iniziative popolari hanno portato all’approvazione di 2 leggi regionali sul suicidio assistito, al deposito in tutte le Regioni (discussa in 6), mentre sono state ottenute 2 udienze in Corte costituzionale sul fine vita. A livello nazionale, è stata depositata una proposta di legge di iniziativa popolare per legalizzare l’eutanasia. Sono 16.000, inoltre, i testamenti biologici scaricati dal sito dell’Associazione.

Barriere architettoniche: L’Associazione sta conducendo anche una attività di ricognizione dei Piani di Eliminazione delle barriere architettoniche nei comuni capoluoghi italiani. A fronte delle informazioni reperite sui siti di 60 capoluoghi, sono state promosse 46 richieste di accessi agli atti nelle restanti città. All’accesso, per il momento, hanno risposto 17 capoluoghi.

Partecipazione e mobilitazione

Oltre 585 eventi pubblici in tutta Italia hanno portato nelle piazze e nelle città temi sociali e scientifici spesso ignorati dalla politica, coinvolgendo 45.000 persone in campagne, petizioni e azioni politiche. Sono state inoltre depositate 2 proposte di legge in Parlamento, una sul fine vita e una sulla legalizzazione della gravidanza per altri.

L'articolo Al via dal 4 ottobre il XXII Congresso dell’Associazione Luca Coscioni proviene da Associazione Luca Coscioni.

Nuove recensioni su :: acufeni ::
Questa settimana ci siamo persi (e ritrovati) tra post punk, elettronica, black metal e patchwork sonori fuori da ogni schema.

- Coded Marking – debutto impeccabile, forse fin troppo. Un album che avrebbe potuto gridare, ma sceglie di sussurrare.
- Giant Claw – libertà totale e ironia sonora: un patchwork che funziona come poche volte capita.
- Sea Mosquito – spiritualità oscura e critica alla modernità: psichedelia e black metal intrecciati in un lavoro imponente, anche se non perfetto.
- Siavash Amini – Caligo: la polvere dei bombardamenti a Teheran trasformata in un suono che fa male.
- Xeeland – Master Builder: drone e krautrock per costruire cattedrali di cemento sonoro, fredde e opprimenti.

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@Musica Agorà

Coded Marking, Giant Claw, Sea Mosquito, Siavash Amini, Xeeland Recensioni

Questa puntata abbiamo presentato: Coded Marking, Giant Claw, Sea Mosquito, Siavash Amini, Xeeland.

^{Marco Valenti (In Your Eyes ezine)}