La fine di #ChatControl non è una falla di sicurezza, ma un nuovo inizio! Basta sorveglianza di massa, servono indagini mirate e app sicure. Il nostro piano in 5 punti per tutelare davvero i minori (incluse voci dei sopravvissuti)

informapirata.it/2026/04/02/la…

informapirata

2026-04-02 21:14:46

La fine di chatcontrol rappresenta un’opportunità: un piano d’azione in 5 punti per una vera protezione dei minori.

La fine di #ChatControl non è una falla di sicurezza, ma un nuovo inizio! Basta sorveglianza di massa, servono indagini mirate e app sicure. Il nostro piano in 5 punti per tutelare davvero i minori (incluse voci dei sopravvissuti)
informapirata.it/2026/04/02/la…

La fine di chatcontrol rappresenta un’opportunità: un piano d’azione in 5 punti per una vera protezione dei minori.

La fine di #ChatControl non è una falla di sicurezza, ma un nuovo inizio! Basta sorveglianza di massa, servono indagini mirate e app…

^{informapirata}

Tomorrow, April 3, EU Regulation 2021/1232 will expire. This controversial regulation allowed US tech companies to scan private messages without suspicion or a judicial warrant (commonly known as “Chat Control”). To mark this occasion, civil rights activist and former Member of the European Parliament, Dr. Patrick Breyer, presents a 5-Point Action Plan for effective child protection by EU governments. Featuring statements from survivors of abuse, the core message is clear: The end of mass surveillance must mark the beginning of genuine protective measures.

Dr. Patrick Breyer, former Member of the European Parliament, explains:
“The end of indiscriminate Chat Control is not a setback, but an opportunity for genuine child protection. Trying to protect children with mass surveillance is like desperately mopping the floor while leaving the faucet running. Untargeted bulk Chat Control is as unacceptable as indiscriminately opening everyone’s postal mail—and accordingly, it would never have stood up in court. For four years, this failed system served as an alibi to delay real measures, instead overwhelming police forces with false alarms and duplicates. These excuses are now obsolete. Our action plan demonstrates that we need more child protection, not less—but we need effective protection, not a false sense of security.”

The Myth of the “Protection Gap”: What actually changes—and what doesn’t

• What ends: US providers are no longer allowed to scan unencrypted private messages without suspicion and without a warrant. This affects direct messages on platforms like Instagram, Discord, Snapchat, Skype, and Microsoft’s Xbox, as well as emails via Google’s Gmail and Apple’s iCloud.
• What remains: Public posts on social media and files in cloud storage can still be scanned. Private messages can still be reported by users or intercepted via lawful, warrant-based telecommunications surveillance.
• What was never scanned anyway: Encrypted chats, such as those on WhatsApp, were already exempt from scanning. Furthermore, European messenger and email providers have never practiced Chat Control.
• What the numbers say: Due to the increasing encryption of direct messages, the number of US suspicion-based reports has already dropped by 50% since 2022. According to these EU Commission figures, the end of Chat Control could reduce this by another 36% (the share of private messages in all reports in 2024). Of the incoming reports, statistics from the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) show that 48% are not criminally relevant from the outset. Furthermore, German crime statistics reveal that 40% of the resulting investigations target children and teenagers themselves (e.g., consensual sexting). An estimated 99% of the material reported by Meta under Chat Control was already known to authorities, making it virtually useless for stopping ongoing, new abuse. The EU Commission has been unable to provide any evidence that indiscriminate scanning of private communications has resulted in more convictions.

There is no “protection gap”: The most effective tools—warrant-based telecommunications surveillance, user reports, and the scanning of public content and cloud storage—remain fully intact. The only thing that ends is the suspicionless searching of private, unencrypted messages of unsuspected citizens by a few US companies.

Just weeks ago, Europol’s “Operation Alice“ successfully shut down over 373,000 pedocriminal dark web sites and identified hundreds of suspects globally. This monumental strike against CSAM networks was achieved entirely without mass scanning private citizen chats. It relied on what actually works: international cooperation, server seizures, and targeted cyber-investigations.

Breyer: “Portraying the end of indiscriminate Chat Control as a disaster for child protection confuses mass surveillance with actual protection. The previous system flooded investigators with hundreds of thousands of largely irrelevant reports, triggered criminal proceedings against children, and left the images of victims circulating untouched on the Darknet. Now is the time to establish child protection measures that are effective and compliant with the rule of law. It is up to EU governments to implement this action plan.”

The Voices of Survivors: “We need privacy to bring abusers to justice”

Survivors of sexual violence explicitly emphasize that untargeted Chat Control did not help victims:

Alexander Hanff, survivor of child sexual abuse and privacy advocate, clarifies:
“As a survivor I relied on confidential communications to tell my story and find justice for 28 schoolboys—myself included—resulting in the conviction of multiple offenders. We survivors need privacy, because without it we lose our voice. Chat Control was not created to protect children. It was about Big Tech companies like Meta or Google wanting access to our data for profiteering, and states attempting to expand mass surveillance. The EU Commission has wasted five years and millions of euros on algorithms that cannot protect children and were never meant to. This money should have been diverted to real policing, causal research, and support for survivors, millions of whom have never received any support at all.”

Marcel Schneider* (name changed), a survivor who has been suing Meta in court over its voluntary Chat Control, adds:
“Anyone mourning the end of Chat Control today has not understood what actually helps survivors of sexual violence. Mass surveillance by corporations like Meta does not prevent abuse. Genuine protection means: deleting material at the source, proactive police work on the Darknet, and apps that are safe by design for children from the very start.”

5-Point Action Plan for Genuine, Lawful Child Protection

1. Delete instead of looking away – Use freed-up police capacity for the systematic deletion of abuse material
For years, police authorities across Europe have refused to systematically report depictions of child sexual abuse in pedocriminal Darknet forums for removal, citing a lack of personnel—even though two journalists recently demonstrated that this is possible with minimal staff and can shut down entire forums. With the end of voluntary Chat Control, the flood of tens of thousands of irrelevant or already-known reports from the US, which previously tied up investigators, will decrease. EU Member States must now deploy these freed-up capacities for what survivors have been demanding for years and what has been proven to work: the proactive, systematic search for known CSAM in Darknet forums and on publicly accessible websites—and its removal at the source to stop the ongoing abuse of victims.

2. Safe from the start – Security by Design for Apps
Tech companies must stop shifting responsibility onto algorithms. Apps must be designed to protect users from unwanted contact by strangers. By default, profiles must not be publicly visible, contact from strangers must be blocked, nude images must be blurred, and users must be warned before sharing personal data. This is necessary to technically prevent grooming and harassment. EU governments need to support these proposals made by the European Parliament in the ongoing CSAR trilogue negotiations.

3. Strengthen law enforcement: Quality over Quantity
Instead of paralyzing police forces with tens of thousands of false or previously known hits from US corporations, investigations must be professionalized:

• Lawful, targeted instruments: Targeted but mandatory suspicion-based searches of private communications, strictly based on a judicial warrant, must be introduced in line with the European Parliament’s position. Just as police may only search a home with a warrant, the scanning of private messages must only be possible upon concrete suspicion and by judicial order. If EU governments in the Council do not give up their resistance to this targeted, lawful approach and continue to cling to the failed instrument of voluntary mass scanning, the ongoing trilogue negotiations for the permanent child protection regulation risk derailing and failing.
• Technology and Personnel: Anyone serious about child protection must invest in investigative capacities. EU Member States should provide: specialized and sufficient personnel, modern technology for data analysis, centralized evaluation units, mandatory training, and centralized monitoring of case progress and capacities. Undercover online investigations against perpetrator networks must be expanded to stop ongoing abuse and the flood of new material at the source.

4. Prevention in schools: Nationwide distribution of “Digital Self-Defense” materials
Children must be empowered to recognize abusers early and protect themselves online. As an immediate measure, a “Prevention Kit” should be distributed to high school students, teaching them in an age-appropriate way how to recognize grooming. Crucial tips for digital self-defense include: never trusting the claimed identity of strangers, never sharing location or phone numbers, never meeting an online contact alone, and reporting abusive messages instead of responding to them. According to a poll, 43% of children suggest that improving media literacy and training minors on risks and appropriate responses is the most effective approach to protect them from harm on the Internet.

5. Anchor protection concepts locally in real life
Abuse happens in the real world. We demand the mandatory introduction of safeguarding concepts in all organizations where children spend time—schools, daycare centers, churches, sports clubs, clinics, and youth camps.

Background: EU Transition Regulation 2021/1232, in effect since 2021, allowed messenger, email, and chat services to voluntarily scan private communications for potential CSAM (Child Sexual Abuse Material) without suspicion and without a judicial warrant. In March 2026, the European Parliament voted against extending it. Negotiations between the Council and Parliament on a permanent successor regulation (CSAR, or “Chat Control 2.0”) are ongoing and expected to conclude by summer.

patrick-breyer.de/en/the-end-o…